Criminal Justice Bill (Tenth sitting)

Alex Cunningham Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

I have just said that I would not contribute because I want to get off, but obviously I have not stuck to that. How many people will this clause bring in line with the law? We have some evidence from Refuge, which I cannot put my finger on right now—I am sure I will be able to manage that in a moment. I know and remember from the evidence sessions that a tiny, tiny fraction of people receive a sentence of more than 12 months in cases of coercive control. Would the Minister provide us with some understanding of exactly what this groundbreaking realignment of the law will actually bring about?

We still fail to recognise, though we must recognise it, that no one is convicted in the vast majority of cases of coercive control, domestic abuse-related crime or sexual violence. The monitoring that is needed must come before the instance. Schemes are currently being run by the Metropolitan police around the 100 highest priority at-risk offenders. In reality, however, although I am delighted that the Minister heralded some previous amendments of mine in a Bill Committee not dissimilar to this one—she is welcome—that is not what we are talking about in this clause. If it is more than 200 people, I would be surprised to hear that. I will find the data while she responds.

The Government are proposing legislation that allows us to monitor people as we do for terrorism, but in cases of terrorism no convictions are needed to undertake the type of monitoring that we hope our security services are doing day in, day out to prevent terrorism. To suggest that monitoring will happen only on conviction is absolutely not in line with terrorism. We still have a two-tier system, where the actual domestic terrorism that occurs in people’s homes is still very much allowed to happen.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

The clause makes a straightforward amendment that would provide for the automatic, rather than discretionary, MAPPA management of offenders convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship who are sentenced to 12 months or more. As a result, such offenders will be treated as category 2 rather than category 3 offenders for MAPPA purposes.

It should come as no surprise to the Government that we enthusiastically support the clause. Labour has committed to halving incidents of violence against women and girls within a decade. For far too long, those dangerous criminals have been let off and victims have been let down. Indeed, the multi-agency public protection arrangements were introduced by the last Labour Government in 2001 under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, being strengthened again in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those arrangements see the police, probation and prison services working together to ensure the proper management and monitoring of sexual or violent offenders. In a joint thematic inspection of MAPPA, I have seen them called

“one of the success stories of the criminal justice system”.

The inter-agency approach of MAPPA improves public protection by bringing together criminal justice organisations, as well as others, in a structured way to address and actively manage the behaviour of offenders who can sometimes be difficult to accommodate and who may pose serious levels of risk. Labour is in complete agreement with the Government that perpetrators of coercive and controlling behaviour should be brought more directly under the remit of MAPPA. As Women’s Aid said, this signals that the crime of coercive and controlling behaviour, which is central to so much domestic abuse, is being taken more seriously by the justice system. As it also points out, bringing CCB offenders automatically under the remit of MAPPA is particularly important given the links between coercive control and homicide.

For cases where there is high risk of domestic abuse, the active management and inter-agency engagement that MAPPA provides can be an effective response. However, a report by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in 2021 identified a lack of multi-agency management of individuals who posed the most significant risk of harm to women and girls through domestic abuse. As part of the inspection, HMICFRS asked forces to identify the five individuals whom they considered posed the highest threat to women and girls within the local force area. Of the 40 individuals identified, only three were being managed under MAPPA.

Additional guidance for category 3 offenders who are perpetrators of domestic abuse has been welcome, but HMICFRS noted in its 2022 MAPPA review that there

“is still not a clear enough pathway for those who pose a risk of harm through domestic abuse, particularly for those who commit lower-level offences over a sustained period of time but pose a real risk of harm to their victims through long-term abuse.”

The impact that the clause might have, while welcome, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, is relatively limited, given the number of individuals who have been convicted of coercive and controlling behaviour since the introduction of the offence in 2015. Fewer than 2,000 people have been convicted of that offence, and yet—I think this is probably one of the most important points that I will make during this Committee—the data from the crime survey in England and Wales estimates that 2.1 million people experienced domestic abuse in the year ending 2023. Not every case of domestic abuse will include instances of coercive and controlling behaviour, but given the centrality of such offending behaviours in many cases of domestic abuse the number of CCB convictions still appears very low. Since the provision will apply to that relatively small cohort of offenders, it is difficult to discern what huge impact it will have.

I am interested to hear from the Minister about any additional provisions that her Department has been looking at in preparation for the Bill in relation to MAPPA and perpetrators of domestic abuse, particularly if it has looked at other measures that would make individuals who have committed domestic abuse MAPPA-eligible, because repeat perpetrators of this appalling violence against women and girls too often get away with their patterns of criminality and go on to commit more violence and cause more harm.

As I said, we fully support the clause and will vote with the Government, but we fear the level of impact that it will have. The criminal justice system is in crisis, and the Government are completely failing to address the shocking levels of violence against women. As with much of the Bill, we do not oppose the measures, but we are left wondering if these tweaks are all that the Government have to offer a system in crisis.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and for supporting the clause. In answer to his final criticism that we have abandoned women and girls, the Serious Crime Act that created the offence of coercive, controlling behaviour received Royal Assent in February 2015. With respect to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, it predates her arrival in Parliament, but we created that criminal offence and we have been evolving its implementation since.

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

I don’t—[Interruption.] Yes, it has.

The clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It extends eligibility to those who are serving multiple sentences where the index sex offence will already have expired. To give a rather grim illustration of what that might look like, if somebody is sentenced for convictions of rape and murder, by the time of their release the sentence for the sex offence will have expired, and they would therefore not automatically qualify for polygraph testing without the extension that the clause provides.

The clause also extends polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who have received non-terrorism sentences. At this point, I want to pick up on what Jonathan Hall told the Committee in evidence just before Christmas. This measure could apply, for example, in the case of someone who was convicted of conspiracy to murder but whose offences were an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or were committed for the purposes of terrorism, if they committed their offences before the relevant legislation came into force.

The way in which we make that assessment will depend on the judge’s sentencing remarks. If, in sentencing, the judge made an express reference to the offending being in the course of terrorism, the extension provided by the clause would make polygraph testing applicable. We define this cohort as historical terrorism-connected offenders, and the polygraph testing licence condition is currently unavailable as a tool to manage the risk that they pose, although it would be available for an individual who commits the same offence today.

The intention of the clause is to fill the gap and provide more effective risk management in the community. I reassure the Committee that that does not mean that the person can be recommitted to prison. It is an assessment of their licence conditions. It affects their risk management. If it should later transpire that they have breached licence conditions, they could be recalled, but not by the polygraph test alone. As a whole, the clause will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who pose a risk of sexual offending and those who committed historical terrorism-related offences.

[Alex Cunningham]

In his evidence to the Committee, Jonathan Hall said:

“In fact, if you look at the wording of the Bill, the Secretary of State will be allowed to be ‘satisfied’—not beyond reasonable doubt, just satisfied—on exactly the same test that currently applies to judges”

in determining whether the test should be taken. He went on to say:

“There is obviously a fundamental issue there, which I can expand on, but there is also a really practical issue, because what is a terrorism offence is not always very obvious.”—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66, Q170.]

He was clear that the clause might not have all the bolts and washers that it needs to be totally effective.

Nevertheless, I thank the Minister for introducing the clause. As she said, it will allow the polygraph condition to be imposed where the Secretary of State considers that an offender convicted of murder

“poses a risk of committing a relevant sexual offence on release”,

and where an offender is

“serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of an offence who…at an earlier time during that sentence was concurrently serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of a relevant sexual offence”.

It will also extend the use of polygraph conditions for terrorist offenders by enabling the Secretary of State to extend polygraph conditions to offenders where the Secretary of State is satisfied—just satisfied: this was the issue that Jonathan Hall was concerned about—that the offence

“was, or took place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or…was committed for the purposes of terrorism.”

Labour supports the clause. Where polygraph conditions have proved to be effective with certain offender cohorts, we should certainly be enabling the courts to impose such conditions to improve public protection. The extensions included in the clause are sensible additions to the scope of polygraph conditions.

We are also happy to support the Government amendments to the clause. They clarify some matters in relation to service offences and offences with alleged terrorism connections in Scotland. I would be interested if the Minister could share any additional recent evidence that she may have of the effectiveness of polygraph conditions on public protection, particularly if there are any ongoing assessments by her Department of the current use of polygraph conditions in England and Wales. Conducting polygraphs can be an expensive and time-consuming process, so I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to ensure that there is a robust evidence base to show that expanding the conditions will contribute further to public protection.

Although we support the clause, I am left to ask the Minister: is this all there is? Offender management has been in disarray for years, especially following the failed structural reforms through which the Government have dragged it. The Public Accounts Committee said that the probation service was

“underfunded, fragile, and lacking the confidence of the courts.”

That was even before the additional serious challenges that it has faced throughout and following the pandemic.

The chief inspector of probation noted that the high-profile independent reviews into the supervision of the likes of Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney found

“broader systemic issues in both cases which we are seeing time and time again, both in our local probation inspections and thematic reviews. These included: overloaded practitioners and line managers with well above their target workloads; significant delays in handing over cases from prison to community probation staff, resulting in last minute and inadequate release planning; and incomplete or inaccurate risk assessments. This is the case at both the court stage and start of supervision, with very inexperienced staff being handed inappropriately complex cases with minimal management oversight.”

That is the reality of our probation service today. It is another criminal justice agency in deep crisis.

A properly functioning probation service—I will say more about this on a later clause—is essential to keep the public safe by managing the risk of offenders in the community. The Government have brought yet another justice Bill before us and have given themselves another chance to improve the probation service and provisions around offender management. The Minister will probably talk about the new investment in the probation service, but we have to set that in the context of the huge cuts that the service has suffered since the current Government came to power in 2010. They have missed a lot of opportunities with this Bill. As I said on the previous clause, the offender provisions in the Bill are so slight that their impact will be negligible.

We are seeing a Government who have simply run out of ideas and are not doing enough to keep our communities safe. Although we fully support the clause, I again put on record our disappointment at the lack of ambition that the provisions show when our justice system is in chronic and intractable crisis.

[Laura Farris]

On Jonathan Hall’s comments, there are two points to make. First, given his expertise, it is relevant to consider what he said about polygraphs in general, which is that

“polygraph measures for released terrorist offenders are a good thing.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 64.]

You asked for an updated example of where polygraph testing had been instrumental, and he gave an example—in fact, I do not think it had been used—when he said:

“I was in favour of polygraph measures after Fishmongers’ Hall. It was partly on the back of one of my recommendations that polygraph measures were brought in. They always, or at least for a long time, existed for sex offenders. You will recall Usman Khan, who was clearly a very deceptive man. My view was that polygraph measures could be useful.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66.]

It is difficult to prove a negative, but they were brought in shortly after that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. I gently remind members of the Committee, from Ministers down, that when you use the word “you”, you are referring to me. You must refer to the hon. Gentleman either by his constituency or by his title, otherwise I might get a bit worried about what I have been up to.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister will know that we are very supportive in this entire area, but we have the right to highlight the issues that others have raised with the Committee. Jonathan Hall talked about the powers to carry out tests for people who may have served a sentence for a terrorism offence abroad and who return to this country. He went into some detail about that in his evidence. The Minister said that it is important that we have as strong a law as possible in the UK. On the overseas powers, Jonathan Hall’s final sentence was:

“Slightly ironically, the power that Parliament is being asked to create here would make the protections available to a domestic offender less than those that apply to a foreign offender.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 65, Q170.]

That is why the Minister needs to look again at the aspects that she has outlined. Clearly Jonathan Hall thinks that they could be strengthened.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call the Minister—sorry, the shadow Minister, Alex Norris.

[Alex Cunningham]

It will not be long until he is.

[Chris Philp]

That is a bit of wishful thinking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

I would like to remain popular with colleagues, so I will not do that.

The Government amendments relate to clauses 34 to 37, which seek to strengthen the operation of serious crime prevention orders. SCPOs are a powerful tool for preventing and disrupting the activities of the highest-harm criminals involved in serious crime. However, they are not currently being used to maximum effect and their use is significantly lower than was when they were introduced in the Serious Crime Act 2007.

As drafted, clauses 34 to 37 apply to England and Wales only. Having consulted the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, we tabled the amendments to extend the application of the clauses to Northern Ireland, which will ensure parity between England and Wales and Northern Ireland when it comes to SCPOs. Scotland will keep the existing regime, as set out in the 2007 Act, whereas Northern Ireland will benefit from the various provisions of clauses 34 to 37. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the express power for courts to impose electronic monitoring; the opportunity for a wider range of frontline agencies to apply directly to the High Court for an SCPO; the introduction of a prescribed set of notification requirements for these orders; and the enabling of the Crown court in Northern Ireland to make an SCPO on acquittal where the two-limb test is met.

Ideally, we would apply these measures on a UK-wide basis. However, at the request of the Scottish Government, they will not be extended to Scotland at this time. I think it would be better if they were, but on this occasion we will respect the request made by the Scottish Government. However, we have considered how we can manage the differences in regime between Scotland and the rest of the UK once the measures come into force.

Scotland will, of course, continue to benefit from the existing SCPO regime under the 2007 Act, and in instances where an SCPO made in England, Wales or Northern Ireland is breached, the offender will not be able simply to flee to Scotland. The offence of breaching an order, as set out in the 2007 Act, remains a UK-wide offence, so enforcement against breach continues on a UK-wide basis. The exception to that will be in breaches of the prescribed notification requirements in clause 36, as the offence of not providing that information will apply to England, Wales and Northern Ireland but not to Scotland.

That is the substance of the amendments. As for the substance of clause 34 itself—I think that we will talk about clauses 35, 36 and 37 separately—it provides an express power for the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of an SCPO. Tagging the subject will be used to monitor their compliance with various relevant terms, such as an exclusion zone or a curfew, and that will make the orders more effective. They are strengthened in other ways too, but those ways are set out in clauses 35 to 37, which we will talk about later. Clause 34 provides for those electronic monitoring or tagging obligations to be imposed as part of the SCPO.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am sure that the Government Whip, in particular, will be pleased to know that I am going to make one speech to cover clauses 34 to 37, and it is relatively brief.

Clauses 34 to 37 make several amendments to the Serious Crime Act 2007, in relation to serious crime prevention orders, that will apply to England and Wales only.

[The Chair]

Order. We are debating clause 34. I know that the clauses are connected, but there will be separate debates on clauses 35, 36 and 37. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could concentrate on clause 34 and all the amendments to it. I will call him again at the appropriate time if he wants to make points specific to clauses 35, 36 or 37.

[Alex Cunningham]

I will be guided by what you say, Dame Angela.

We support the changes proposed in relation to clause 34 on electronic monitoring requirements. We recognise, as the Minister did, that SCPOs can be a powerful tool for disrupting the activities of the highest-harm serious and organised criminals. The orders are not currently being used to maximum effect and clause 34 amends the 2007 Act to strengthen and improve their functioning. Applications to the High Court have been significantly lower than anticipated since the 2007 Act was passed. The idea is to streamline the process for the police and other law enforcement agencies, place restrictions on offenders or suspected offenders, and stop them from participating in further crime.

As I have said before—it is particularly pertinent to clause 34—the Government have recognised the Bill’s many weaknesses, evidenced by the many amendments they have tabled. In fact, I do not recall, having scrutinised half a dozen justice Bills, seeing seen so many amendments to one clause. Even with the amendments, the Bill will not bring about the changes necessary in the light of the crisis in our probation system, which will have a major role to play in the work created by this clause. I recognise what is, in fact, the replacement of funding to the probation service outlined by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Newbury. I acknowledge that we also now have additional staff—4,000 people. That is very good news, but the probation service is still playing catch-up, and the people recruited are of course very inexperienced in comparison with those who have left the service.

It was not so many years ago that the then Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), implemented a disastrous privatisation of the service, and it has been under a huge strain ever since. Even with the partial reversal of those reforms in 2021 with the partial renationalisation of probation, the service is still facing huge challenges and pressures due to a host of issues. That impacts very much on the work introduced by the clause.

I will quote directly from a report from the chief inspectorate that contains important context. It states:

“We’ve found chronic staff shortages in almost every area we’ve visited and poor levels of management supervision – as well as large gaps in whether the needs of people on probation that might have driven their past offending are being met.

It swiftly became clear that the service was thousands of officers short of what was necessary”—

I acknowledge that more have been more recruited—

“to deliver manageable workloads under the new target operating model for the re-unified service…68 per cent of probation officers and 62 per cent of PSOs rated their caseloads as being… ‘unmanageable’”.

Against that backdrop, does the Minister expect these changes to fulfil their statedobjectives?

Furthermore, the outgoing chief inspector of probation, Justin Russell, reported in September that

“chronic staffing shortages at every grade…have led to what staff report perceive to be unmanageable workloads”.

The Government frequently boast about the funding put into the recruitment of staff and having beaten their target of recruiting 1,000 trainee probation officers. However, that should not distract from the huge problems around retention and burnout in the service. The probation system’s own case load management tool shows that probation officers are working at a case load of between 140% and 180% of their capacity. It should be 90% 95%, so half the current load, for staff to do their job effectively.

In the year to March 2023, 2,098 staff left the probation service, which is an increase of 10% on the year before. Two thirds of those had five or more years’ experience; 28% of probation officers who left in 2023 had been in service for less than four years, so something clearly needs to be done to recruit and retain staff; and 19% of trainee probation officers recruited in 2021 have left the service.

The staffing shortages and retention issues put a strain on those doing more work than they can manage. In 2022, 47,490 working days were lost due to stress among probation staff; the average working-day loss per staff member due to stress was two days. We know that that has an impact on public safety. The recent report by Justin Russell warned about the impact that cuts to probation were having and said that there was “consistently weak” public protection. That followed a similar report in 2020.

In the cases of Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney, we saw the impact of the poor conditions facing probation. In both cases, incorrect risk assessments meant that junior probation officers were dealing with offenders who should have been classed as a high risk. The Government’s impact assessment states:

“There is insufficient data with which to monetise the benefits of this measure”.

Can the Minister address whether data collection in this department could do with improvement?

The impact assessment for the Sentencing Bill, which is being scrutinised in parallel to this Bill, shows that the case load for probation will increase by between 1,700 and 6,800. That will cost around £3 million for probation, with a running cost of between £3 million and £4 million a year—a good measure, with real costs and issues behind it. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Chris Philp]

Many of the questions concerning the probation service are for the Ministry of Justice, not the Home Office, but I know that the Ministry of Justice is investing more resources. Now that the probation service has been effectively renationalised, there is a lot more direct control over its activities and some of the quality problems that arose a few years ago. It is worth saying that it is not the probation service that manages SCPOs, but the National Crime Agency, but I wanted to offer the hon. Gentleman reassurance about the probation service.

The National Crime Agency supports these measures. In last two years, between 2021-22 and the current financial year, 2023-24, there has been a 21% increase in its budget from £711 million to £860 million, giving it quite a lot of bandwidth to monitor these orders. The issue, really, is getting more orders made, but the monitoring of them is also important, as the shadow Minister says.

Amendment 84 agreed to.

Amendments made: 85, in clause 34, page 27, line 18, after “Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 84.

Amendment 86, in clause 34, page 27, line 28, at end insert “—

(a) where the order is made in England and Wales,”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 87.

Amendment 87, in clause 34, page 27, line 30, at end insert—

“(b) where the order is made in Northern Ireland, must be of a description specified in an order made by the Department of Justice under Article 40(3) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (N.I. 1).”

This amendment provides that the person responsible for conducting electronic monitoring must be a person specified by the Department of Justice under Article 40(3) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (N.I. 1).

Amendment 88, in clause 34, page 28, line 23, leave out “The court” and insert

“A court in England and Wales”.

This amendment sets out the requirements to be satisfied for a court in England and Wales to impose an electronic monitoring requirement. It is limited to England and Wales because electronic monitoring is available throughout Northern Ireland.

Amendment 89, in clause 34, page 28, line 29, leave out “In” and insert “For the purposes of”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment clarifies that the definitions in new section 5C(5) are relevant to subsection (4)(a) (but the defined terms are not all set out in subsection (4)(a)).

Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Applicants for an order: England and Wales

Amendments made: 90, in clause 35, page 30, line 16, leave out “the appropriate court” and insert “a court or sheriff”.

This amendment restates the position under sections 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 in relation to applications for serious crime prevention orders to the High Court of Justiciary or the sheriff in Scotland under section 22A of that Act.

Amendment 91, in clause 35, page 30, leave out lines 32 and 33 and insert—

“(ii) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office,

(iii) the Director General of the National Crime Agency,

(iv) the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs,

(v) the chief officer of police, or

(vi) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, and”.

This amendment provides that the persons listed in the amendment may apply to the High Court in Northern Ireland for a serious crime prevention order.

Amendment 92, in clause 35, page 30, line 34, leave out from “by” to end of line 39 and insert

“a person listed in paragraph (a)(iii) to (vi), only if the person has consulted the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.”

This amendment omits the requirement that a chief officer of police in Northern Ireland may only apply for a serious crime prevention order if it is terrorism-related. It also provides that each of the applicants listed in paragraph (a)(iii) to (vi) must consult the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland before making an application.

Amendment 93, in clause 35, page 30, line 39, at end insert—

“(1D) A serious crime prevention order may be made by the Crown Court in Northern Ireland—

(a) only on an application by—

(i) the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland,

(ii) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, or

(iii) a chief officer of police, and

(b) in the case of an application by a chief officer of police, only if—

(i) it is an application for an order under section 19 or19A that is terrorism-related (see section 8A), and

(ii) the chief officer has consulted the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.”

This amendment makes provision for the Director of the Serious Fraud Office to apply to the Crown Court in Northern Ireland for a serious crime prevention order.

Amendment 94, in clause 35, page 30, leave out lines 41 to 44 and insert—

“(a) in paragraph (a)—

(i) omit sub-paragraphs (i) and (iii);

(ii) after sub-paragraph (iv) insert—

“(v) in any other case, the person who applied for the order;”;

(b) for paragraph (b) substitute—

“(b) in relation to a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland, the person who applied for the order.””

This amendment makes provision for the meaning of “relevant applicant authority” for serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and is consequential on amendment 91.

Amendment 95, in clause 35, page 31, line 17, at end insert—

“(4A) In section 28 (power to wind up companies: Northern Ireland)—

(a) in subsection (1)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a), after “Northern Ireland” insert “or the Director of the Serious Fraud Office”;

(ii) in paragraph (b), for “of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland” substitute “concerned”;

(b) for subsection (1A) substitute—

“(1A) A person mentioned in section 8(1C)(a)(iii) to (vi) may present a petition to the court for the winding up of a company, partnership or relevant body if—

(a) the company, partnership or relevant body has been convicted of an offence under section 25 in relation to a serious crime prevention order made on an application by the person, and

(b) the person considers that it would be in the public interest for the company, partnership or (as the case may be) relevant body to be wound up.”;

(c) in subsection (3), for the words from “the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland” to the end substitute “a person who is authorised to present a petition in accordance with subsection (1) or (1A).”

This amendment makes provision for each of the new applicants for a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland to be able to present a petition to the court for the winding up of a body which has been convicted of an offence in relation to an order made on the application of the applicant. It is consequential on amendment 91.

Amendment 96, in clause 35, page 31, line 18, at end insert—

“(za) in paragraph 12—

(i) in paragraphs (a) and (b), after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”;

(ii) in paragraph (c), after “section 27” insert “or 28”;”.

This amendment extends the functions of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and is consequential on amendment 91.

Amendment 97, in clause 35, page 31, line 24, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.

This amendment and amendments 98 and 99 extend the functions of the Director General of the National Crime Agency in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and are consequential on amendment 91.

Amendment 98, in clause 35, page 31, line 29, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 97.

Amendment 99, in clause 35, page 31, line 33, after “section 27” insert “or 28”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 97.

Amendment 100, in clause 35, page 31, line 43, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.

This amendment and amendments 101 and 102 extend the functions of the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and are consequential on amendment 91.

Amendment 101, in clause 35, page 32, line 4, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 100.

Amendment 102, in clause 35, page 32, line 8, after “section 27” insert “or 28”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 100.

Amendment 103, in clause 35, page 33, line 7, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.

This amendment and amendments 104 to 105 extend the functions of the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and are consequential on amendment 91.

Amendment 104, in clause 35, page 33, line 12, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 103.

Amendment 105, in clause 35, page 33, line 15, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 103.

Amendment 106, in clause 35, page 33, line 20, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.—(Chris Philp.)

See the explanatory statement to amendment 103.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

The clause amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to provide that all those subject to an SCPO are required to provide the police with specified personal data as standard. It includes a set of appropriate requirements for bodies corporate. All those requirements can currently be attached to an SCPO at the discretion of the court, on a case-by-case basis, but the clause will place the same set of notification requirements on all individuals without the need for case-by-case applications.

Most respondents to the public consultation agreed with this proposal. Many highlighted that standardising notification requirements will create consistency and save the court some time. The notifiable information includes information such as the person’s address, employment details, telephone numbers, email address and some financial information.

Government amendments 117 and 119 will add to the list of notification requirements. The clause already includes things such as usernames and display names for social media, because monitoring these individuals’ activity online is very important. Amendment 117 adds to that list a requirement so that, in addition to usernames for social media, the relevant individuals must notify the police of any names used to access, or that identify them on, an online video-gaming service with messaging functionality. Law enforcement agencies report that such gaming websites are frequently used by individuals to communicate with other people, including in an attempt to circumvent restrictions on communications detailed in their order, so that they may re-establish their criminal enterprises.

Tightening the legislation will remove that loophole.

Amendments 109 and 116 provide that the time within which an individual made subject to an SCPO must provide the relevant information to the police is three days from the day the order comes into force—not three days from the day the order is made, as drafted. Although some orders come into force on the day they are made, others do not until, for example, the individual has served their prison sentence. The amendments allow for those different circumstances and will ensure that individuals do not inadvertently fall foul of the offence of failing to provide the required information when that would not be the Government’s intention or be reasonable. The amendments have the same effect as amendment 69, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North—I apologise that the Government have adopted the measure, if that is the right word.

[Alex Cunningham]

It is nice to win occasionally.

[Chris Philp]

There we are. We have enthusiastically embraced the hon. Gentleman’s idea. I give him and his colleagues full credit for conceiving it. I acknowledge that the Government amendment does the same thing as his amendment 69 would do, for which I thank and congratulate him.

Finally, Government amendment 114 is a drafting amendment—it might even be a technical drafting amendment—to ensure that the definition of a “relevant body” in proposed new section 15A of the Serious Crime Act 2007 carries through to the proposed new section 15C. I am sure that even the shadow Minister will agree that that is fairly technical in nature.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

This has been a long time coming. The Minister and I have looked across at each other many times in this room over the past few years, and I think this is the first time he has accepted that we have actually got it right. I am obliged to him for that. This set of measures improves the efficiency of our court system, and anything that we can do to enable that is critical. Adding the information to the system automatically will make it much easier in future to ensure that those people are properly monitored and can be contacted wherever they are. We are happy to support the clause.

Amendment 109 agreed to.

Amendments made: 110, in clause 36, page 34, leave out lines 4 to 6 and insert—

“(3) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order.

(3A) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order.”

This amendment clarifies the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with a notification requirement under section 15A.

Amendment 111, in clause 36, page 34, line 7, leave out “on summary conviction to a fine” and insert “—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;

(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”

This amendment makes provision for the penalties to apply in Northern Ireland for a failure to comply with the notification requirements set out in section 15A.

Amendment 112, in clause 36, page 34, leave out lines 22 to 24 and insert—

“(3) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (2) as it applies by virtue of the order.

(4) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (2) as it applies by virtue of the order.”

This amendment clarifies the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with a notification requirement imposed by section 15B.

Amendment 113, in clause 36, page 34, line 25, leave out “on summary conviction to a fine” and insert “—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;

(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”

This amendment makes provision for the penalties to apply in Northern Ireland for a failure to comply with the notification requirements set out in section 15B.

Amendment 114, in clause 36, page 34, line 36, at end insert—

“(3) In this section “relevant body” has the same meaning as in section 15A.”

This amendment inserts a definition of “relevant body” into section 15C.

Amendment 115, in clause 36, page 35, line 1, after “Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.

This amendment and amendments 118 and 120 to 123 make provision for notification requirements by individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland.

Amendment 116, in clause 36, page 35, line 2, leave out from “with” to end and insert “the first day on which any of its provisions comes into force,”.

This amendment adjusts the time period during which a notification under section 15D(1) must be made.

Amendment 117, in clause 36, page 35, line 13, at end insert—

“(da) any name—

(i) which the person uses to access a video game that is a user-to-user service or that is available as part of a user-to-user service, or

(ii) the function of which is to identify the person as the user of such a game;”.

This amendment requires the subject of a serious crime prevention order to notify the police of any name used to access a video game which is a user-to-user service or which identify the person as the user of such a game.

Amendment 118, in clause 36, page 35, leave out lines 24 to 36.

This amendment and amendment 120 clarify the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with a notification requirement under section 15D and make provision for the penalties to apply on conviction in Northern Ireland.

Amendment 119, in clause 36, page 36, line 12, at end insert—

“(e) ‘user-to-user service’ has the meaning given by section 3 of the Online Safety Act 2023.”

This amendment defines “user-to-user service” for the purpose of amendment 117.

Amendment 120, in clause 36, page 36, line 12, at end insert—

“(6) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if the person—

(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order;

(b) notifies the police, in purported compliance with such a requirement, of any information which the person knows to be false.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (6) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine, or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.

(8) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if the person—

(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order;

(b) notifies the police, in purported compliance with such a requirement, of any information which the person knows to be false.

(9) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (8) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.”

See the explanatory statement to amendment 118.

Amendment 121, in clause 36, page 36, line 18, after “person” insert—

“who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales”.

This amendment and amendments 122 and 123 clarify the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with section 15E(1).

Amendment 122, in clause 36, page 36, line 21, at end insert—

“as it applies by virtue of the order”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 121.

Amendment 123, in clause 36, page 36, line 30, at end insert—

“(3A) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if the person—

(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order;

(b) notifies the police, in purported compliance with such a requirement, of any information which the person knows to be false.

(3B) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (3A) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.”

See the explanatory statement to amendment 121.

Amendment 124, in clause 36, page 37, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert—

“(3) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if the person fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with subsection (1) in relation to the notification.”

This amendment and amendment 125 make provision for a person to commit an offence under section 15G(1) under the law of Northern Ireland.

Amendment 125, in clause 36, page 37, line 17, at end insert—

“(5) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if the person fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with subsection (1) in relation to the notification.

(6) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (5) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.”

See the explanatory statement to amendment 124.

Amendment 126, in clause 36, page 37, line 20, after “Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment provides for a court in Northern Ireland to make provision in a serious crime prevention order about how notifications under section 15A to 15E are to be made.

Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal

Amendments made: 127, in clause 37, page 38, leave out lines 19 to 21 and insert—

“(2) A court that makes an order by virtue of subsection (1) in the case of a person who is already the subject of a serious crime prevention order in England and Wales must discharge the existing order.

(2A) The Crown Court in Northern Ireland may make an order under this section in relation to a person who is acquitted of an offence by or before the court, or where the court allows a person’s appeal against a conviction for an offence, if—

(a) the court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime (whether in Northern Ireland or elsewhere), and

(b) the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by the person in serious crime in Northern Ireland.

(2B) A court that makes an order by virtue of subsection (2A) in the case of a person who is already the subject of a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland must discharge the existing order.”

This amendment and amendment 128 make provision for the Crown Court in Northern Ireland to make serious crime prevention orders on acquittal or when allowing an appeal.

Amendment 128, in clause 37, page 38, line 27, at end insert

“or (as the case may be) Northern Ireland”.

See the explanatory statement to amendment 127.

Amendment 129, in clause 37, page 38, line 38, at end insert—

‘(5A) In section 3(4), for “section 1(2)(a)” substitute “sections 1(2)(a) and 19A(2A)(a)”.’

This amendment is consequential on amendments 127 and 128.

Amendment 130, in clause 37, page 39, line 4, after “19A(1)” insert “and (2A)”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment is consequential on amendments 127 and 128.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Clause 37 also amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to provide the Crown court the power to impose an SCPO on a person who has been acquitted or when allowing an appeal. The High Court already has the power to impose an SCPO in lieu of conviction, provided that it meets the two-limb test set out in the 2007 Act: the court must be satisfied that a person has been involved in a serious crime, presumably on the balance of probability, and it must have reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by the person in serious crime. The serious offences are defined in schedule 1 to the 2007 Act, and they include slavery, drug trafficking, firearms offences, terrorism, armed robbery, people trafficking and economic crime, including fraud, money laundering, sanctions evasion and offences in relation to the public revenue.

Clause 37 sets out that the Crown court can impose an SCPO on acquittal or when allowing appeal if the same test is met. The Government believe that the Crown court, on application from the Crown Prosecution Service or the Serious Fraud Office, is best placed to decide whether to make an order against a person whom it has just acquitted, given that the court will have heard all the evidence relating to the person’s conduct and can ensure that the two-limb test has been met.

There are reasons why a person may be acquitted of a particular offence where the standard of proof is high—beyond reasonable doubt—but where an SCPO may still be appropriate: for example, when the evidence may not satisfy the court beyond reasonable doubt that a serious offence has been committed, but there may be sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the person has been involved in serious crime. The court could then decide that imposing an SCPO would protect the public.

There is precedent for this approach: domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 also allow for court orders to be made against individuals on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. This clause will streamline the process and help ensure that SCPOs can be used more frequently where appropriate.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister rightly said that, when somebody is acquitted but the court is considering the imposition of an SCPO, the grounds on which the order is made must be very robust and they must pass the necessary tests. How do we ensure that that happens? Given that these people have been acquitted of an offence, will there be any report to Ministers or to Parliament on how the clause is working? It is significant if a person is declared innocent but is still subject to a control order. I would welcome clarity on whether we would have feedback on that.

[Chris Philp]

The shadow Minister asks how he can be sure that these orders will be used reasonably. The answer to that lies in the two-limb test, which was set out in the 2007 Act. I guess it must have been either the Blair Government or the Brown Government who set out the test. It is that the court—now it will obviously be the Crown court as well as, previously, the High Court—is satisfied that a person has been involved in serious crime and that it has reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public. The protection really is that the court must be satisfied of those two things. All we are really doing is extending to the Crown court the ability that the High Court has had already in applying those tests, which have been around for the past 17 years.