Clean Energy Investment

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Ian Lavery

Wednesday 25th November 2015 Westminster Hall

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. That comes under the category of the signals that the Government are giving out, which are almost wholly negative as far as renewable and low carbon investment are concerned.

[Ian Lavery]

My hon. Friend mentioned the fact that the Government’s energy policies are in complete turmoil and are a shambles. Speculation has it that over the next three years, the number of staff in DECC may be reduced by up to 90%. How will that help the situation?

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend puts his finger on a very real fear among many people. Future Government cuts will mean that the Department will no longer be able to function as a Department that can marshal investments together. If that is a consequence of the spending review being undertaken at the moment, it is a serious state of affairs not only for the future of energy management, but for the future of our investment in renewables overall.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) pointed out how much investment has gone into offshore wind, with the emergence of the Siemens arrangement in Hull, the Vestas investment on the Isle of Wight and the appearance of Gwynt y Môr, which he was recently able to attend the opening of, unlike some other people.

The hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) pointed out the possible economic value for the future of renewables. Perhaps it is worth reminding the House that, according to a recent report by Cambridge Econometrics, the economic value of offshore wind over the next 20 years could increase UK GDP by £20 billion a year by 2030. It could create 70,000 more jobs and reduce gas imports by £8 billion, and emissions in the power sector could be three times lower than at present. That is the prize ahead of us as far as investment in renewables is concerned. That is the prize being dashed by what has happened recently and by the longer-term uncertainty that the Government have introduced in terms of support for renewable investment.

The Minister will say—has said, I am sure—that this is okay because our targets for the deployment of renewable energy to generate electricity look as though they might be reached. I remind the House—indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley underlined this point—that we are failing miserably to reach our overall EU energy targets in electricity, heat and transport. The recent letter from the Secretary of State, which came to public attention, indicated how badly we were likely to miss the targets over the next period. The EU is quite happy for us to overachieve in certain areas, even if we underachieve in other areas. The idea that because you have achieved in one area, you can then drop the baton in all the other areas and not worry about it seems a further misunderstanding of the task ahead of us.

IPCC Fifth Assessment Report

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Ian Lavery

Thursday 20th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend sets out a process that seems remarkably similar to every single bit of policy work that ever takes place anywhere in the world on pretty much anything. There is a scientific process and if scientists wish to inform policy makers who are involved in that process, those policy makers will be involved in a process that is less than perfect in relation to what the science says. It is a combination of what is possible, what the policy is that is informed by the scientific process and, most importantly, whether the policy makers should wait for the science to be absolutely perfect before they do anything. My hon. Friend is coming close to saying that unless the science is perfect and scientists can have a sign-off on absolutely everything that goes on to the desk of the last policy maker, we should do nothing.

[Ian Lavery]

I am probably the only person here who is not a scientist. Politicians who, like me, are not scientists rely on evidence from scientists on both sides of the argument, because we, as politicians, make decisions based on what the scientists tell us. Where does that leave me?

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend is in exactly the position that I have just described. He is a policy maker who has to be advised by the best science. Given the full and informed contributions that he has always made to our Select Committee considerations, he is the complete embodiment of that process. Policy makers have to combine how they see the landscape with what the science is advising about the landscape and make judgments about what should be done in relation to those two facts in their role as policy makers. That is not and should not be a surprise to anybody. There is a real link between what the science is telling us and what we as policy makers have to do about it.

Mesothelioma Bill [Lords]

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Ian Lavery

Tuesday 7th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Ian Lavery]

Every hon. Member who has spoken today understands that the insurance companies had to be dragged to the table, because contribution after contribution has cited examples where the first thing an insurance company does after an individual has been diagnosed with mesothelioma is run away and deny it for as long as possible in the hope that the problem goes away. In Committee, I applauded the work done by successive Governments in getting the Bill to this stage. We are just a little too far away from this Bill being absolutely fantastic for mesothelioma sufferers. Three or four points mean that it is nowhere as good as it could be, and some great arguments have been made today on how to bridge the gap.

I return to the point that the insurance companies are not companies that are just surviving. They have made profits over generations—10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 years. They took the premiums and invested the money. Never mind contingency funds, the funds should be there—unless, of course, the money has been paid out in dividends or in other ways. That means that the money that should have been there for mesothelioma sufferers is not there any more because it has been given to shareholders. That is simply a point. The insurers paid out nothing on the untraced policies that they lost or destroyed. Again, that is not the fault of the people who are suffering—it is not their difficulty. Remember, the only thing wrong that they have done is to attend the workplace. For goodness’ sake, we cannot forget that that is the main point.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend accept that in terms of events in the workplace we are talking about identical events with a different period of maturity into full-blown mesothelioma? Some people with identical circumstances will not qualify, while others will. Will he speculate on the issues that that may cause? Someone may have been through the same process as the person sitting next to them in the workplace—in the case of Southampton, handling blue asbestos in the docks, bailing it up and throwing it on to the dockside—with the disease appearing many years later over different periods for different people—

Energy Bill

Debate between Alan Whitehead and Ian Lavery

Wednesday 4th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I am a little bemused by some of the talk that we are hearing this afternoon about the capacity crunch and the extent to which the amendment might exacerbate it over the next period, bearing in mind, first, that it would not take effect until after 2023 in any event and, secondly—this has perhaps gone rather unremarked—that the power plants that are not producing and that are offline and either light mothballed or deep mothballed are not coal-fired but gas-fired plants. About six of them are mothballed—even though those operators could operate perfectly efficient gas plants for their own operations—not because they cannot produce on a reasonable basis, but because of the spark spread for gas and electricity prices. Therefore, it is not a capacity crunch because there is no capacity; it is a capacity crunch, potentially, because of the way that plants operate relative to each other.

Nothing in the long-term prognosis has changed, in terms of what we have to do in the longer term or how we have to deploy capacity. Getting the right amount of capacity and the right amount of reserve capacity in the market is a combination of ensuring that capacity is properly utilised and that new capacity comes on stream in the right proportion to support the changing nature of our energy production market. As regards that progress over the next period, up to 2030, one of the remarkable things written in most DECC documents to come out on the matter concerns where we need to go in decarbonising our energy supplies.

DECC’s central target is an overall level of emissions of 100g per kWh by about 2030. Everyone knows what that means. Unless we hear this afternoon that the target has changed, there will no longer be room for large amounts of unabated coal to continue to operate in the system, whether in new, existing or refurbished plant, without carbon capture and storage in the period leading up to 2030.

There is currently a disjunction between what DECC says about its target and what the policy appears to suggest when it comes to whether those coal plants will become able to play a part in our future energy mix with carbon capture and storage, or will no longer play a role as base-load generators but either convert to other forms of supply—as Drax is doing in moving to biomass—or run at much lower levels, as peak and back-up plant, over a period, to keep within the overall targets. The amendment connects what we think that we are doing with what we ought really to be doing over the coming period and starts to dissolve the disjunction between what we think is in policy and what appears to be in policy.

One of the effects of uncertain signals about the direction in which we are going in respect of, for instance, decarbonisation targets is that people do not invest in one thing rather than another; they do not invest in anything. They do not do what they might otherwise have been doing, because they are not sure what the signals are telling them. I believe that the amendment gives a certain rather than an uncertain signal in regard to the long-term future of coal, thus enabling those who are thinking of investing in coal over the coming period to be clear about what to do, rather than unclear, as they are at present.

Ministers seem to be saying today that there will be much more operation of coal, and perhaps some new investment in coal, but they know that it cannot really be unabated, and they know that it cannot really operate for all those hours over the period. How certain can an investor be that what he invests in will not to be stranded in the intervening years? It depends whether we believe what Ministers are saying, or believe what is in the documents that they claim to support in their daily work at the Department.

[Ian Lavery]

Does my hon. Friend believe that if the amendment is passed, investment in carbon capture and storage will be more rapid?

[Dr Whitehead]

That is an important question. I think that if the amendment were passed and if it sent that “certain” signal in regard to future investment, it would bring about something that my hon. Friend and I observed recently in a Canadian province. Given the certainty of an EPS that would apply to all plants in the province in the future, the operators of a 150 MW power plant decided that if the plant was to continue to provide coal-fired power, it would need carbon capture and storage. As a result, next year there will be a very impressive plant, which will sequester all its carbon and continue to supply the Saskatchewan power system with coal-fired power. I understand that the operators made their decision in the certain knowledge that they would not be able to continue to supply unabated coal-fired power to the Canadian system for ever.