Energy Bill
Debate between Alan Whitehead and Barry Sheerman
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that clarification. I am encouraged by the thinking that clearly is beginning to be done on what these things might look like. I wish the Minister luck when the Treasury realises that the pilots taking place on capacity payments may have more substance to them than the Treasury might think. I should not have said that, in case someone there reads the Hansard transcript of this debate! I am encouraged by the Minister’s response.
The other matter that I want to raise relates to amendment 47, which calls for the establishment of a green power auction market arrangement in wholesale and retail sales of energy. I want to spend a moment establishing why something like GPAM is so important. My amendment attempts to resolve, or at least to go some way to resolving, a very serious issue: the drying-up of opportunities for independent generators to establish reliable markets for their low-carbon generation once the renewables obligation comes to an end in the spring of 2017.
Hitherto, those independent generators have been able to secure power purchase agreements on the back of renewables obligation certificates, and to use those agreements effectively to bank their investments, so that they have the sort of market certainty that enables those investments to be funded because it is known that there is a stream of sale coming forward that will ensure that the investment is made and works well, as far as both the independent generator and the bank are concerned. With the arrival of contracts for difference, that simply will not be the case. Indeed, power purchase agreements for those people still undertaking RO arrangements before the end of the renewables obligation have already dwindled to virtually zero. In fact, only one company, as far as I know, is presently providing power purchase agreements.
Most independent generators, whether we are talking about onshore, offshore, or other forms of low-carbon generation, are already thinking, when it comes to their investment decisions, about CFDs rather than ROs, simply because of the time period over which those investments have to be considered. They cannot go back to the bank and say, “Can we have that investment on the basis of what we can demonstrate to you, in the absence of other financial credit lines, is a known supply line for our energy product?”
The outcome could be quite perverse, with regard to what the Bill’s intentions have always been. It was always the intention, with the contracts for difference, to try to bring a lot of new, different investment into the energy market, as well as independent generators of different sizes. It was also the intention to ensure that the vertical integration seen in recent years did not become the enemy of investment, or of small, independent operators and others trying to get into the market, but rather became its friend, as other entrants came into the market alongside larger generators.
If the outcome is that as a result of the Bill we further consolidate the vertical integration of the market rather than the opposite, that will be a perverse outcome relative to everything that the Bill was supposed to bring about. If we can get a mechanism similar to the green power auction market—if it quacks a bit like GPAM and walks a bit like GPAM—I would be happy with that. We need some mechanism that can ensure that independent generators are not captured by the very large companies and that they do not have to enter into such disadvantageous contracts that they will fail to make a living from the energy that they are trying to put into the market in the future.
Mr Sheerman
As I understand it, small generators in some parts of the world, particularly America, are increasingly looking at crowd funding in order to get started. That is a new opportunity for finance, which some people are calling a new form of democratic capitalism that empowers local communities.
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend is right. Indeed, there are companies in the UK, such as Ecotricity, which have not exactly involved themselves in crowd funding, but have engaged in bond arrangements for the development of their low-carbon power. Even if such a source of funding is available, if the deal for the subsequent sale of the energy is so disadvantaged by a contract for purchase that shaves off the reference price or makes arrangements that are extremely disadvantageous to the ability of that company to sell its energy into the market—while at the same time those potential purchasing companies take advantage of their vertical integration by providing routes to market for their own generation at different costs and under different arrangements—the future market will be very distorted indeed.
I welcome the Minister’s saying that the issue is being actively considered, that he understands the problem at the heart of the GPAM proposals, and that he is actively in dialogue with industry on possible routes to solutions. I look forward to proposals in another place to address the issues. It is essential that they are addressed before the Bill completes its passage, so that the market that we produce as a result of CFDs is fair for those participating in it and produces the varied and pluralistic market that we want for electricity generation, particularly low-carbon energy generation, in the future.