Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Purpose—

“The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).”

This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

New clause 3—EURATOM: maintenance of nuclear safeguarding arrangements—

“No power to make regulations under this Act shall be exercised until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report on his or her efforts to—

(a) seek associate membership of EURATOM, or

(b) otherwise maintain the implementation of nuclear safeguarding arrangements in the UK through EURATOM

after the UK has left the European Union.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on his or her efforts to maintain the implementation of nuclear safeguarding arrangements through EURATOM after the UK has left the EU.

Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 2, line 14, at end insert—

“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that, in his or her opinion, it is no longer possible to retain membership of EURATOM or establish an association with EURATOM that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity through its administrative arrangements.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to certify, before making any regulations to provide for nuclear safeguarding regulations, that it was not possible to remain a member of EURATOM or have an association with it.

Amendment 2, page 3, line 3, at end insert—

“(11) Regulations may not be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing his strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or setting out his reasons for choosing to make nuclear safeguards regulations under this Act rather than seeking associate membership of EURATOM.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from using the powers under Clause 1 to set out a nuclear safeguards regime through regulations until a report has been laid before each House setting out a strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or explaining why the UK cannot seek associate membership of EURATOM.

Amendment 7, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end insert—

“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until—

(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements which will lapse as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of and participation in EURATOM, and

(b) the strategy has been considered by both Houses of Parliament.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament on the protection and trading arrangements that arise from membership of EURATOM, and his strategy for maintaining them prior to making regulations concerning nuclear safeguarding.

[Dr Whitehead]

The proposed new clauses and amendments appear in my name and those of my hon. Friends the Members for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey), who is the shadow Secretary of State, and for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) and others.

First and foremost, I want to set down a marker on new clause 2, because it represents the dividing line between us and the Government on membership, associate or otherwise, of Euratom. This purpose clause makes explicit that this is a contingency Bill. In other words, it is being enacted to deal with circumstances that may never arise—namely, that we as a country have no future association or membership with Euratom that would enable us to continue to reap the benefits of association or membership in a way that I think is almost universally agreed.

I think that it is agreed—the Minister has stated as much during the passage of this Bill—that Euratom has served well our purposes as a nuclear nation over the past 40 years, and nuclear safeguarding has worked very well in inspecting and representing our obligations to international agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Authority.

It is clear that our interests as a country would be best served by continuing our membership of Euratom, which was founded by a different treaty from that which brought about the EU. Indeed, during evidence to the Public Bill Committee, we heard strong arguments along those lines from eminent lawyers who had been called as witnesses. However, we appear to be in the position of assuming that our future membership of Euratom is not possible, because essentially the Prime Minister, as a matter of choice, included exit from Euratom in her letter to the Commission informing it that we were invoking article 50.

[Stephen Kerr (Stirling) (Con)]

The treaty on Euratom membership is part of the set of treaties described in the treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, as we leave the European Union, we will, de facto, leave our membership of Euratom. It is as simple as that.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am afraid that it is not as simple as that. A considerable body of legal opinion states that, because Euratom was founded by a treaty other than the treaty of Rome—it was, in fact, founded before the EU came together—it can and should be dealt with separately. Although arrangements relating to association with and membership of various EU bodies have changed over time as a result of changes in EU regulations, that has not been the case with Euratom. The articles relating to associate membership and arrangements are identical to those that were in place when Euratom was founded. There is no case to answer as far as separate arrangements for Euratom are concerned.

[Albert Owen (Ynys Môn) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making a strong case for associate membership. He will recall a Westminster Hall debate that I held only last year, during which there was broad consensus on the issue, including among Conservative Members. I think that the Minister was the only Member who did not agree. The only reasons the Government have given relate to the legal position and the European Court of Justice. If Conservative Members were not whipped, they would understand the logic of the very sensible new clause.

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that strong point. I recall that even the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) suggested during that debate that associate membership of Euratom could be effective in continuing those arrangements, which have served us so well over many years.

[Rebecca Pow (Taunton Deane) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman has referred to the International Atomic Energy Authority. The Government have made it clear that we will be seeking new arrangements with it and that they will follow exactly the same principles as the current arrangements—that is, the right to inspect civil nuclear facilities and to continue to receive all the safeguards and reports. We should be confident that this Government are going about the issue in a serious, sensible and meticulous way.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Lady makes the case for our new clause. If the Government are going about their business in a sensible and coherent way—I note the Secretary of State’s statement on 11 January on how the Government intend to go about conducting relationships with Euratom—it would be a good idea to place that procedure into the Bill, so that we can be clear about what we are about, what we want to achieve and how we will do so.

After all, it has been stated that this is a contingency Bill. We want to know what it is a contingency against and therefore how it should be framed in terms of what we should be doing in contemplating whether to bring it into operation. If we had either membership of Euratom or an associate form of membership, which might be fairly similar to that enjoyed currently by Ukraine but with a number of additional factors, this Bill would not be needed. The arrangements with Euratom would continue to be in place, rendering the Bill superfluous. We need to be clear about what we are debating.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

The shadow Minister knows that he and I often agree on stuff, but I wonder whether today he might concede this point. At worst, his new clauses would merely render the Bill superfluous if we manage to achieve associate membership of Euratom, but at best we are providing the contingency plan that gives industry the certainty that it says that it so much wants. The Bill is therefore relevant and necessary in that sense, even if it may ultimately prove to be superfluous because we achieve Euratom membership.

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed. I suspect that the hon. Gentleman and I are going to agree substantially on this. We regard the Bill as necessary in the context of the possibility that, after Brexit, no arrangements can be brought about with Euratom, either associate membership or full membership. The Bill will then ensure that the nuclear industry is clear about its future and that the arrangements for our international obligations can be properly carried out in the absence of those arrangements. We have indeed been constructive and helpful during the Bill’s whole passage through Parliament. However, that does not detract from our thinking that a number of its procedural elements should be strengthened in relation to what we do while it is gestating and coming to potential fruition after the point at which the things that we are doing may not have had any success.

The hon. Gentleman will see that in some of our amendments we are also trying to make sure that Parliament is fully informed of what processes are under way while we get to the position that the Bill could, or could not, come into operation. That is important for Parliament’s sake. After all, we are in new territory with regard to this Bill, and we therefore have to do a number of new things in legislation that fit the bill for our future arrangements. That is essentially the beginning and end of what we are trying to do through this group of amendments.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

I am puzzled why new clause 1 is necessary. All its ingredients are issues that form part of the transition negotiations that our country is going through with the European Commission. It therefore seems bizarre to try to legislate that

“conditions under which the UK is a member of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply”

during the transition. On that basis, we would be legislating for all sorts of things that form part of the negotiations to continue during the transition. What would the hon. Gentleman say to that?

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman has slightly got ahead of me, because I started by talking about new clause 2, and I am about to start talking about new clause 1. He thinks that new clause 1 may be superfluous. I would suggest that because this Bill is about procedure as much as fact, the new clause sets out a procedure that we need to undertake in the event of certain things not happening, and it is important that a number of those possible events are covered in the Bill. Should it not prove possible to remain a member of Euratom, for various reasons, it is important to consider the idea of a transition period after which we would then be in a position to fully carry out our obligations to the IAEA and other agencies separate from Euratom. That, indeed, is what the Bill is essentially trying to bring about. The Bill is predicated on the notion that membership or association with Euratom will not be possible, and it is therefore necessary to recreate the arrangements for nuclear safeguarding that have served us so well in a solely domestic form and thereby enabled us to negotiate separate voluntary arrangements with the IAEA and, indeed, separate bilateral agreements with a number of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Japan, and Canada.

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[Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)]

I accept that there was a vast amount of legal argument on our membership, or not, of Euratom. Indeed, it is not a simple point. However, we have now triggered our leaving Euratom. The treaties are uniquely joined, so it is a fact that we have left Euratom and will no longer be members. As we go forward with negotiations, putting the word “contingent” into the Bill would create uncertainty for our partners in the EU, given that the negotiations are two-sided. Those negotiations have yet to progress, so we need this Bill to be a clear signal or statement to our EU partners to achieve what we want. I fear that having the word “contingent” in the Bill will muddy the waters in our negotiations with our partners. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?

[Dr Whitehead]

I would have thought that the Bill, in whatever form it eventually emerges, demonstrates the opposite. Yes, there are a number of negotiations to be undertaken. We do not yet know the results of those negotiations. We have not left Euratom, which, it is generally agreed, has served our purposes very well. The new clause would enable us to signal, in the event of all those negotiations not working, that we are nevertheless still able to fulfil our obligations to the IAEA and to show it that we have a regime in place that does the business with regard to nuclear safeguarding from the point of view of the IAEA’s concerns. Putting forward this Bill as a contingency measure, as the Secretary of State said was the case, is important in the uncertain position we are in at the moment. Nevertheless, we will need certainty, over a relatively short period, with the bodies that are responsible for policing and organising the nuclear non-proliferation treaties and the whole arrangements relating to nuclear safeguarding. I think, if I may say so, that that is the right way to do it as far as putting a Bill before the House is concerned. The Opposition do not dispute that: we think it is right to have the Bill as a contingency. Our concern, however, is whether there are sufficient elements to the process part of the Bill to ensure that it works as well as it could. That is really the point of difference on the Bill at the moment.

[Richard Graham]

The hon. Gentleman knows that this is incredibly important to him and several of his colleagues, and it is incredibly important to me, with EDF Energy’s operational headquarters for nuclear in my constituency and Horizon just down the road, so we are all coming from the same point. His specific proposal—I am talking about new clause 1 again—is very specific. It even mentions a period of two years, although the transition period that is being negotiated may well come to an end at the end of 2020. In effect, he is asking the Government to legislate on something over which they do not have control. Surely the better approach is to plan for the contingency, as he has already agreed, and recognise that the other elements—Euratom and other agencies—are all subject to a negotiation that this House cannot, by its nature, control.

[Dr Whitehead]

That is a little strange in that the Prime Minister referred to transition periods for the overall EU negotiations in her Florence speech, and the Secretary of State did so strongly in his written statement on 11 January. If the hon. Gentleman wants to be assured, as far as the nuclear industry is concerned, that there will be a seamless transition at the point at which we are no longer a member of Euratom, I would have thought he ought to be strongly in favour of aspiring to a transition period. As he knows and we know, the process of recreating in the UK all the things that have been done by Euratom for 40 years—we will discuss that later—will be extremely difficult, lengthy and problematic. It will certainly, in the opinion of many people, be extremely difficult to achieve in the period ahead if we corral those negotiations and are to complete them by March 2019. If he thought about it for a moment, he would recognise that the last thing we could conceivably want is a period of, in effect, nuclear shutdown, or of defaulting on our international obligations because we are not ready to carry them out on Brexit. That is why a transition period may be so important.

[Richard Graham]

Yes, of course we all want a transition period, which is precisely a part of the negotiations. What I struggle to understand is that the scenario the hon. Gentleman describes is in effect not within our control. The transition we are seeking is being negotiated—in fact, the Minister and other Front Benchers have made it absolutely clear several times that we want to continue the relationship with Euratom as deeply as possible—but I cannot see the need, in a legislative context, for his proposed new clause 1. In fact, I do not believe it would be possible for any Government conceivably to agree to it.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I repeat my suggestion that, because the Bill is about process as much as content, it is important that it is guided by the sort of considerations we want to take place in order to achieve, as we are all agreed, the best outcome—[Interruption.] Indeed, yes, the best outcome. We must make sure that the negotiations not only proceed with the best outcome in mind, but cover the fact that it may be the case—again, this is out of our control—that if we stick to a position, with the provisions of the Bill, in which everything essentially stops in March 2019, that would be just catastrophic for our nuclear industry and our international nuclear safeguarding obligations. We must get this right, and we must have continuity of arrangements inside or outside Euratom. It is in those circumstances that a transition period is suggested.

The arrangements for the founding of Euratom and its articles suggest that a period of transition for negotiating our way out of Euratom may not be identical to the period for the arrangements for negotiating our way out of the EU as a whole. It is quite possible to conceive the circumstances in which we do not have a transition period beyond March 2019 for negotiating our general withdrawal from the EU, but we do have a transition period for negotiating our way out of Euratom. It is at the least strongly arguable that that may be the case in the future, and it is another reason why such a provision should be in the Bill.

[Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)]

I feel I must pull up the hon. Gentleman because he has twice referred to Euratom having been around for 40 years, but it began in 1957. It was born out of the civil nuclear industry that began in my constituency of Copeland when Calder Hall was first constructed. I thought that I should make it clear that this was from Britain and by Britain back in 1957. We have actually had it for 70 years, although there was the merger in 1967.

[Dr Whitehead]

I was referring to the length of time that we have been a member of Euratom, not the length of time that Euratom has been around. Indeed, the hon. Lady will know that when Euratom was founded, the UK was not a member of it. I am sure she will also know that the founders of Euratom, particularly one of them—Mr Spaak—wrote a substantial report at the time of the founding of Euratom that strongly envisaged, setting out in chapter and verse, how an associate relationship of Euratom with the UK could come about. The arrangements that Mr Spaak considered in the report for associate membership are identical to those that exist today. I thank the hon. Lady for reminding us that Euratom has been around a lot longer than the period during which the UK’s relationship with Euratom has existed, but I am sure she will agree that even at the outset of Euratom, an association with the UK was envisaged before the UK joined to facilitate nuclear exchange, nuclear development and—although the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was not around at the time—joint endeavours in civil and defence nuclear work.

I fear, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I have tested the patience of the House, particularly, given the number of interventions I have taken, because of the necessity of ensuring that I responded to them fully. I will end by telling the House that we need to remember that this Bill covers just one aspect of our relationship with Euratom over the period during which we have been a member of it. Our relationship with Euratom also includes participation in nuclear research, the transportation of nuclear materials, the development of nuclear arrangements, the trading of nuclear materials and a number of other arrangements, all of which will lapse on our exit from participation in Euratom and all of which will need to be secured for the future. They are not the subject of the Bill, but they will have to be dealt with at some stage if we are not to have a close association with Euratom after Brexit. Amendment 7 would provide for at least an understanding that we will move forward to secure working arrangements for a future outside Euratom, not just making provision for our treaty obligations concerning nuclear safeguarding.

The Opposition think that the suite of connected amendments to the Bill will strengthen it enormously so that it is a fully fit-for-purpose contingency arrangement. I therefore commend these new clauses and amendments to the House.

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[Richard Harrington]

With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, this quite amuses me, because last week I was berated for being a mouthpiece for the nuclear industry—something with which I was pleased to agree, by the way. The important point is that the language of whether we can have associate membership or not is not important; the important thing is what we come up with. People inside and outside the House can call it what they want, but effectively we all want the same thing. It is just not correct to call it associate membership, however, because there is no such thing. I have made that clear absolutely beyond doubt, as has the Secretary of State.

[Dr Whitehead]

In the light of what the Minister has just said, will he confirm that in his view an associated status in relation to nuclear safeguards would be distinctly possible?

[Richard Harrington]

I hope and believe that a very close association to do with nuclear safeguards absolutely will be possible, but I do not think it helps just to bandy language between one side and the other. We all know what we want, and I am delighted that everybody—it seems to me—on the Opposition and Government Benches wants exactly the same thing. We have all made our points about the language, but I think we all want the same thing. That is very unusual in this House and it really is a credit to everybody.

It is essential that projects and investments are not adversely affected by our withdrawal from the EU and can continue to operate in the certainty that nuclear safeguards arrangements will be in place. That is why we are putting in place arrangements for a new domestic nuclear safeguards regime, regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, as well as negotiating new bilateral agreements with the IAEA and nuclear co-operation agreements with priority third countries. Those arrangements are not dependent on the EU negotiations and the UK Government’s work is well advanced.

The Bill and the regulations that will be made under its powers are crucial. They will enable us to establish a domestic nuclear safeguards regime to meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply in the UK. As Members have noted, it will take time to develop and implement the new regime, so it is absolutely imperative that we maintain the momentum of the work needed to deliver it in the timescale required. However well meaning the new clauses and amendments are—I accept in good faith the reasons why they were tabled—the reality is that they could delay our domestic preparations and lead to uncertainty in our discussions with international partners. There can be no question of our waiting until we know the outcome of negotiations before we put in place our own arrangements. The implications of not having the right systems operating from when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply are too serious for the industry and for our position in the international safeguards regime.

On the implementation period, we intend to ensure continuity for the nuclear industry and to avoid the possibility of a cliff edge for the industry on the date of exit. Members will be aware—if they were not listening at the time, this has been mentioned several times already today, so they will be aware now—that the Prime Minister set out in her Florence speech her desire for an implementation period after the UK ceases to be a member of the EU. If the European Commission agrees to an implementation period of around two years, the UK will not be a member state of the European Union during that period. None the less, the acquis will continue to apply, which means that, for the duration of that implementation period, the UK will expect to continue to pay into the EU, to be bound by its rules and to benefit from access to its market. The European Commission’s draft guidelines are explicit that, in its view, this acquis would include Euratom matters. The implication of that—I accept that it is an implication because it has to be tested in negotiations—is that the current Euratom regime could continue to apply during any transition period.

I have to reiterate that a transition period prior to our withdrawal, as proposed by new clause 1, is not a situation envisaged in the proposals for the implementation period. Both parties to the discussions agree that it would helpful to have the matter agreed as speedily as possible—again, there is no disagreement over that—so as to provide the certainty that we need. Whatever the outcome of the talks about an implementation period, let me emphasise that the UK’s overarching objective remains to maintain as close and effective an association with Euratom for the long term as possible.

New clause 1, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, proposes not an implementation period after exit, but a transitional period before exit. That would delay the UK’s exit from Euratom, but that situation is not envisaged in the proposals for the implementation period, or in the article 50 notification that has already been passed by Parliament.

Let me briefly raise quarterly reporting, which I mentioned in reply to the question asked by the hon. Member for Leeds West. It is very important to give Parliament clarity about the progress that the Government are making. That was why my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made a commitment in the written statement to provide quarterly updates on progress, which will include updates on the negotiations and progress made by the ONR on establishing the UK’s domestic safeguard regime.

I hope that those arguments will persuade Opposition Members not to press the amendments and new clauses to a Division.

[Dr Whitehead]

We will not be pressing any measure to a vote, except for new clause 1, which has been debated in a very unsatisfactory way this afternoon. We are not convinced by the responses that we have received, so we will be pressing it to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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Nuclear safeguards

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 22, at end insert—

“(c) ensuring that inspections of nuclear facilities and materials for the purpose of nuclear safeguards continue at the level previously established by UK membership of EURATOM.”

This amendment would aim to ensure that nuclear safeguarding inspections continue at the same level subsequent to leaving EURATOM as they were when the UK was a member of EURATOM.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 4, page 2, line 41, leave out from “must” to the end of line 44 and insert—

“(a) consult—

(i) the ONR,

(ii) the National Audit Office, and

(iii) such other persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult, and

(b) lay before Parliament a statement declaring that he or she is satisfied that the staffing and financial resource available to the ONR is sufficient for the purpose of assuming responsibility for nuclear safeguarding in the United Kingdom.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to declare that the ONR has the resources necessary to take on extra responsibilities for nuclear safeguarding in the UK.

Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may only exercise powers under this section at the point at which amendment of any of the legislation in subsection (1) becomes necessary in order to complete the process of transposition of responsibility for nuclear safeguarding from EURATOM to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and for no other purpose.

(1B) Upon exercising the power set out in subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the operation of the power.”

This amendment would limit circumstances under which the Secretary of State may exercise certain powers in this section and requires a report to be laid before Parliament.

Amendment 6, in clause 4, page 4, line 41, at end insert

“, but not before the Secretary of State has published draft regulations relating to each of the other provisions of this Act under which the Secretary of State may make regulations.”

This amendment would ensure that draft regulations specified in the Bill are published before the provisions of the Act come into force.

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[Dr Whitehead]

In speaking to these amendments, I want to draw attention to further events that have taken place between the end of the Committee stage and today’s Report stage. I say “further events” because they are separate from the very welcome statement that the Secretary of State has made on what we may do about negotiating an association with Euratom, which I think has helped our proceedings considerably. Another matter that might have helped proceedings considerably had it taken place a little earlier was our having the impact assessment on the Bill that we have now received.

As I am sure hon. Members know, impact assessments should, under Cabinet Office rules, ideally be produced before Bills are discussed. To be honest, it is pretty bad that it has taken so long for the impact assessment to arrive, particularly as it arrived after our deliberations in Committee had concluded. I would say that it is particularly bad following an examination of what the impact assessment actually says—it might have helped our proceedings in Committee had we been able to look at it at that time.

Predominantly, the assessment works on the basis of costing various options relating to what a future inspection regime would look like. Indeed, there are or could be choices, as we have heard, about that inspection regime, which is, after all, at the heart of the Bill. How are we going to replicate in the closest possible detail the inspection arrangements that franked our probity as a nuclear nation in international agreements on non-proliferation and nuclear safeguarding? We have been signed up to those arrangements all these years, but we have hitherto engaged with them through the agency of Euratom, rather than independently. As we know, duties in relation to safeguarding ultimately end in agreements made between nuclear states and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The inspection regime we envisage for the future could vary, because the level of inspection—such as the number of inspections and the depth of inspection needed to satisfy the minimum criteria of the IAEA—could be at a lower level than we have been used to under the Euratom regime. We might envisage a bronze standard inspection regime whereby we scrape by in our future relationship with the IAEA, or we could ensure that the inspection regime, overseen by the ONR, will be as good and as thorough as that carried out by Euratom inspectors in the past. As the impact assessment says, that would be marginally more expensive.

I am pleased that the latter option is strongly advocated in the impact assessment, because it seems to me that we should not seek in future to get by on the lowest level we can get away with. Instead, we should assure ourselves of our own integrity on the matter, and assure others likewise—both the IAEA and the countries with which we will be making bilateral agreements—that we are doing it absolutely properly. That will entail seeking to continue with inspections at the high level laid down in Euratom’s arrangements. That is what amendment 1 is about. It is designed to place in the Bill exactly what the impact assessment states we should do—to ensure that we will go forward at that level.

The Minister may well say—I hope he does—that we are committed to maintaining that level of inspection regardless of whether it is written in the Bill. But there is a problem with that: when we go independent, will we have the resources to carry out inspections to that level, or will we need an extended period in which we are allowed to scrape by with the minimum, because that is all we will be able to do?

At the beginning of the Bill Committee we heard from an excellent witness, Dr Golshan, the deputy chief inspector at the ONR. She gave us a fairly stark statement of reality, which members of the Committee have shared this afternoon. Those hon. Members will all recall Dr Golshan indicating clearly that when we leave Euratom,

“we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q9.]

In amendment 1, we set out an aim for the Bill: that we cleave to the Euratom standards as soon as possible and assure ourselves that we have the resources to do so.

There is a wider context. What resources will the ONR have to enable it to carry out the substantial new tasks that we set it in this legislation? The ONR is mainly funded through charges to the nuclear industry. That is how it generally recovers the money for its operations, but it also receives some grant funding. Essentially, that funding pays for the nuclear safeguarding work, while the charges on the nuclear industry pay for the ONR’s other functions, which are not the subject of this Bill.

That distinction is important, because the Government intend to halve the grant to the ONR in the period to 2020. At the outset of the negotiations, we face the prospect of the ONR being able to do less work than it does at the moment. If it is to continue to do as much as it does now, it will probably have to levy substantially higher charges on the industry to make up for the loss of the grant up to 2020. At the same time, if the Bill progresses, we are plainly saying that the ONR will have to undertake a whole lot of new work that it has not budgeted for, that has not been in its terms of reference for a long time and that will clearly require a lot more resource. As we heard in oral evidence to the Committee, that is no mean amount of additional work for the ONR to undertake.

To enable it to carry out all its functions, Euratom employs about 160 staff, 25%—or 40—of whom focus on UK installations. One can reasonably assume that the ONR would have to add a similar number of people to its complement of staff if it were to take on the work done by Euratom on nuclear safeguarding. The safeguards unit in the ONR comprises eight professional staff. Between now and March 2019, therefore, the ONR will have to find roughly 32 staff—qualified, highly skilled and trained nuclear inspectors—from somewhere to take over that responsibility. That is in addition to all the other things that the ONR will have to put in place, such as IT systems and administration resources, to allow it to take on that role.

Another excellent witness who contributed to our proceedings in Committee was Sue Ferns, from the union Prospect. She stated that training safeguards inspectors could take up to five years. We are faced with the prospect of needing 32 such people within 18 months. She said, of the role of an inspector:

“This is a warranted role; this is not just working in the industry. It is not just about knowledge, but experience and commanding the confidence of the companies and the organisations that you deal with, so there are very specific aspects to that role.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 35, Q69.]

She also alluded to the relatively small pool in which we are fishing. Not only do we have to fish in the pool, but we have to do so accurately, and we have to attract a good proportion of those people if we are to fill the gap. Consequently, she put a considerable question mark against whether it is possible for the ONR to be ready, as we would like it to be, for the tasks that we are going to give it.

I accept that a number of people in the nuclear industry have many of the qualities that could make them nuclear inspectors—indeed, as the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) said in Committee, there are many such people in the industry—so it may not be necessary to fully train everybody for five years. Nevertheless, it will be a very steep cliff to climb to get those 32 inspectors, at least, in place for whenever we take over inspections from Euratom. I sincerely hope, as I am sure all Members do, that those matters can be resolved. It may be a question of making sure that the ONR is funded to the extent that it can properly undertake that activity of fishing in a small pool—perhaps, as I mentioned in Committee, with pound notes attached to the end of its fishing line.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Harrington]

No. I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s version of what I have said. We want a Rolls-Royce standard, the best possible standard we can have.

The negotiations on implementation are due to begin in the spring and, as hon. Members know, we will be reporting to the House regularly on progress.

Let me turn to the Henry VIII power. The hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) has mentioned his dislike for Henry VIII powers. This is a tiny Henry VIII power—a Henry VIII who has been on a diet for a long time—that is limited to amending references in the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004 in order to accommodate safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Those amended references will enable the IAEA to carry out its activities in the UK, including by providing legal cover for the UK activities of its inspectors. We have to be able to update that legislation so that it contains the correct references for new safeguards arrangements with the IAEA, which have not yet been made but will be in the near future. Without amendment, the existing provisions will become ineffective when the current agreements no longer apply, which would leave us in breach of any new international safeguards regime.

The detailed amendments will not be known until the agreements are in place, so the power that we are asking for is essential if we are to ensure that the UK has a safeguards regime that complies with its future international obligations when Euratom’s safeguards arrangements no longer apply. It is a very narrow power and I do not think that it is relevant to the general discussions that the House has had on Henry VIII powers. I hope that Members on both sides of the House are satisfied and that they will not seek to press their amendments.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have listened carefully to the Minister this afternoon and would like to thank him for the constructive way he took the Bill through Committee. My personal view is that that is how we should legislate in practice. He has played a substantial part in making the process as good as it could be. However, just as I do not blame him personally for the fact that his football team recently scored a completely illegal goal—it was hand-balled—against my team and deprived it of two points, I do not blame him for the way the Bill has been constructed. He has attempted to justify parts of it that he is unable to amend, but nevertheless their construction, in my view, remains deeply unsatisfactory.

I am happy to withdraw amendment 1 and not to press the amendments that relate to the staffing and funding of the ONS—the Secretary of State has committed himself to reporting quarterly on progress with Euratom, which was the subject of one of our amendments in Committee, for which I am grateful—but I will press amendment 5 to a vote, because it relates to the Henry VIII clauses, which are a fundamental defect in the structure of the Bill. We wish to put it on the record that we would not wish such arrangements to be proceeded with under other circumstances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 1.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2

Power to amend legislation relating to nuclear safeguards

Amendment proposed: 5,  page 4, line 13, at end insert—

‘(1A) The Secretary of State may only exercise powers under this section at the point at which amendment of any of the legislation in subsection (1) becomes necessary in order to complete the process of transposition of responsibility for nuclear safeguarding from EURATOM to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and for no other purpose.

(1B) Upon exercising the power set out in subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the operation of the power.”—(Dr Whitehead.)

This amendment would limit circumstances under which the Secretary of State may exercise certain powers in this section and requires a report to be laid before Parliament.

Question put, That the amendment be made.