Yemen

Alan Duncan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2015 Westminster Hall

[Sir Alan Duncan (Rutland and Melton) (Con)]

Thank you for chairing the debate this morning, Mr Caton. I thank the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) both for securing the debate and for every single word that he said. I agree with all of it. That illustrates that this is very much a cross-party issue, and by joining together across this House to focus on Yemen, we are doing the world a very important service. As he rightly says, it cannot be parked into a corner and isolated as a poor part of the Arabian peninsula that does not matter and has no effect on everything else, because it most certainly does. Perhaps the most important sentence of his comments this morning was that, if it goes wrong, a lot else goes wrong with it. That is what needs to govern our thinking and shape our conclusions.

The right hon. Gentleman can claim 50 years of experience in Yemen. I can claim only 30, after initially going as an oil trader but then taking a political and ministerial interest in the country. When I first went, as when he was there, one could travel in Sana’a and from Sana’a to Aden. At the moment, no such journey is possible in safety, and that illustrates the country’s deterioration, on which we now need to focus.

While I was a Department for International Development Minister, I tried to raise the profile of Yemen in government for the very reasons that the right hon. Gentleman articulated: it is more dangerous and more significant than people think, and has also had a long-term humanitarian need, where many children—a high percentage under the age of five—were stunted, and where a large percentage did not know where their next meal was coming from. That was before the deterioration over the past few months. The United Kingdom has been committing a direct budget of about £70 million a year to Yemen’s needs. When we apportion what we give to the United Nations and multilateral organisations, the figure is perhaps, in effect, double that, so we are giving Yemen well over £100 million. In my view, that is necessary money. It is being well spent, or has been so far. Perhaps the money I am most proud of is the £1 million that I committed as a Minister to launch Jamal Benomar as the United Nations special representative. Over the last few years, he has been crucial to the negotiations that have held the country together until today.

To understand the country, we need to step back, perhaps a few centuries, but at the very least a few years and look at what has happened in what we call the Arab spring, because it was not the same in Yemen as it was in Libya, Tunisia or even Egypt. Across Arabia, or Arab-speaking countries, some have changed regime by violent conflict. Others within the Gulf Co-operation Council have sustained current regimes, because they have greater resources with which to reach an accommodation with their own people. However, Yemen was very much unique, in that through the GCC initiative, it was able to effect, with a minimum of conflict, a presidential transition and move from one president to another without the violence we saw elsewhere. That transition got Yemen off to a very good start in the context of the disruption that we saw elsewhere in Arabia. The GCC initiative, supported by Jamal Benomar, and by the UK and the US, has allowed Yemen—let us put it honestly—to muddle along for the last three or so years without collapsing into a complete mess. In that sense, Yemen has not been like any other country.

It started unlike any other country, because it has a weak Government at the centre and very powerful satellite interests commanded by what one might loosely call warlords within the country. That has always created a very difficult problem of balancing power and influence and of attracting enough power into the centre to give it an effective and purposeful Government who can be said to be legitimate and doing what is necessary for the people.

[Rehman Chishti]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend’s expertise in the area and his work. He is talking about the different factions in Yemen. Looking at the national dialogue—where it has been and where we are now—how do we ensure that everyone who has a stake in Yemen comes round the table and effectively moves the country forward?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

That is exactly the right question, because what emerged from the GCC initiative was a plan for exactly that kind of unifying national dialogue within the country. It was a plan to bring together all parts, all sections and all interests in the country to agree a path towards a constitutional settlement that could lead to proper, legitimate and respected elections. That remains the objective of what we need to see yet return from the difficulties that the country faces. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that that strand of discussion and unifying constitutional debate in the country is the glue—they are components that stand to bring the country together.

With the GCC initiative came donor pledges— $6 billion or $7 billion dollars at a pledging conference arranged by the Friends of Yemen, co-chaired by the UK and the Saudis—and an International Monetary Fund package that was on the brink of being implemented before things deteriorated. The dialogue that my hon. Friend mentioned did come to a conclusion, but it has not yet been fully implemented with the subsequent actions that are necessary to make it effect the planned changes.

The tragedy is that the GCC initiative and the stability that we hoped for in the country have disintegrated over the last six months. The Houthis— or soft Shi’a Zaydis—focused mostly in the north, who comprise a maximum of perhaps 30% of the country, have taken arms and advanced on the capital city. Yemen is not a habitual sectarian country. It is far more tribal than it is sectarian, but that does begin to introduce a possible and dangerous sectarian element in the complex power play in Yemen itself. My hon. Friend’s reference to Iran has validity, although I do not think that the absolutist terms in which he describes it reflect what is actually happening in the country. It could be said that Iran backs rather than directs the Houthis, but what matters is what is happening inside Yemen.

[Rehman Chishti]

My right hon. Friend says that Iran backs rather than directs, but even if that is the case, it has leverage over the Houthis by backing them, and it should use that leverage if it wants to be part of the international community, in relation to the nuclear deal that is coming up.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I refer to what I said a moment ago. No life is quite so simple as that, but I understand my hon. Friend’s view.

Let us just look at what has happened. The Houthis, perhaps against people’s expectations and largely because they had overtaken a battalion in Amran and taken its heavy weapons, were able to advance on Sana’a and pretty well march into the capital city uncontested, but what they were supposed to have done, just before they did that, was to have adhered to a firm agreement that was reached on 21 September last year—the peace and national partnership agreement—which should have said, “You’ve gone this far. Now hold it, muck in and work with everyone else to find a solution.” They have not adhered to the terms of the PNPA. By advancing into Sana’a, the Houthis have displaced the Government, but they have not replaced them with any form of government that can be called such, so in effect we have a vacuum.

An element that is utterly unacceptable is the placing of legitimate, continuing Ministers under house arrest. Fortunately, President Hadi escaped at the weekend, but Khaled Bahah, the Prime Minister of Yemen, remains under house arrest. He and others who have been put under house arrest must be released by the Houthis and allowed to go free. I have spoken to Khaled Bahah regularly. It is not right that he is detained under house arrest in the way he is.

We have seen a very strong United Nations Security Council statement. That is an essential part of the pressure that needs to be applied in relation to what is happening in Yemen at the moment. The next few weeks are crucial. Yemen is more on the brink today than people have said it has been for many years. Jamal Benomar is doing his best and deserves our full support. He is slaving away in Sana’a, trying to hold the country together and reach some kind of accommodation between all the competing parties, and he deserves our full support, as do all the efforts in the UN to apply pressure in relation to what is happening in the country.

This is an essential point. My hon. Friend the Minister will no doubt say more on all this, but I would like to echo what the right hon. Member for Leicester East said about the danger we are looking at. The list, when it all comes together, if it all goes wrong together, is potentially cataclysmic. We are looking at a country in the southern Arabian peninsula, close to Somalia, where there is people trafficking and things like that, where guns can run through the country and all kinds of risk can be nurtured, and at a country that might have no Government and hence be an ungoverned, anarchic space. We are looking at a country that could collapse into tribal anarchy and the absence of any kind of order and government whatever.

We are looking at the risk of tribal conflict. This country is more tribal than sectarian. That tribal conflict could become very vicious. As the right hon. Gentleman said, there are more weapons than people, and when they start firing at one another, there is no end to what could go wrong. The tribal conflict could collapse into civil war. There have been civil wars in Yemen before. The latest was in 1994. That could easily happen, even within the next few weeks, if things go terribly wrong.

We could again see, as part of the civil war, the division of the country between north and south. There are fewer people and more resources in the south and many more people and fewer resources in the north, so even if one liked the idea of a nicely contained southern Yemen, it is inconceivable that the north would accept that as an option when it would feel deprived and starved of resources.

We are looking at the danger of al-Qaeda being free to train and run riot, perhaps not just in southern Yemen but more widely across the country. We are perhaps looking at a proxy cold war, which could become a hot one, between the Iranians and the Saudi Arabians, fought out in Yemen because of their competing interests. Amid all those ingredients, we are looking at the awful danger of economic collapse and deep humanitarian disaster—not just lack of food, but disease, people trafficking and everything else that goes with it.

As I am sure the Minister will say, it is important to work with the whole of the GCC, but especially Saudi Arabia and Oman, which are the immediate neighbours, and with the United States and, lest anyone belittle it, the United Nations, which has proved so crucial both in the political negotiations and in the meeting of health and other needs in the country.

President Hadi remains the legitimate Head of State, but he has become separated from the functions of an effective Government. Somehow, legitimacy and effectiveness need to be remarried in a settlement that puts Yemen back on the path to some kind of stable government that people accept, and that can avoid the conflict and disaster that at the moment are looming if there is no such quick and effective solution.