(11 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, an important finding of the commission was that the existing approved persons regime was flawed. After a debacle wiping billions of pounds off the value of shareholdings, requiring the state to inject billions of pounds into the industry and take huge financial exposures, and after several serious lapses of conduct, according to my researches one person has been fined and another person has negotiated an agreement not to practise.
Our conclusion was that the APR operates mostly as an initial gateway to taking up a post, rather than serving as a system through which regulators can ensure the continuing exercise of responsibility at the most senior levels within banks. A major cause of this flaw was that responsibilities were ill defined and were not joined up, so that those at the top could claim they “didn’t know” or, “It wasn’t me”.
We proposed a two-tier system: a senior persons regime, now called a senior managers regime, covering a meaningful chain of accountabilities, which we wanted to apply to all banks and holding companies operating in the UK; and, below that, a licensing regime, where no prior approval from the regulator would be required to employ anyone but banks would have to take responsibility for ensuring that those they did employ were properly qualified and trained and that they observed a code of conduct. This would apply to those who could seriously damage the bank or the bank’s reputation or harm a customer’s reputation.
The commission welcomes many of the Government’s proposals: defining the functions of senior management; requiring senior managers to have a statement of responsibilities; extending the limitation period for regulators to take enforcement action from three years to six; recording information on a person’s regulatory history so that a new employer can find out important details about whom they are recruiting; and the reversal of the burden of proof on whether a person is fit and proper.
However, serious issues are left unresolved. Amendment 55 provides a definition of a bank to which the regime applies. I found it impossible to discover what the definition means. Does it meet the commission’s objective of covering all banks and holding companies operating in the UK? Would the Minister clarify what he means by “bank”? Could it be a ring-fenced bank, a non-ring-fenced entity conducting investment activities within a group, a whole group or a freestanding investment bank? In our view, the new senior managers regime should apply to all such entities. It would make a mockery of the scheme if, as I suspect may be the case, it applied only to banks taking deposits from the general public—that is, ring-fenced banks. It would be completely unacceptable if the regime did not apply, for example, to the senior managers overseeing the LIBOR traders, to those overseeing rogue traders such as the “London Whale”, to those overseeing the marketing of highly dubious packages of sliced and diced mortgages or to those engaged in the mis-selling of interest rate swaps. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give us an answer today or address this between now and Report.
There is no mention of the licensing regime, which the commission recommended. The Government said that they would ensure that regulators had the ability to take regulatory action against persons who were not senior persons—senior managers—or who were not subject to prior regulatory approval. There is no mention of the licensing regime in the government amendment. They have come up with something rather different in Amendment 53 on the rules of conduct. It states:
“If it appears … necessary or expedient for … advancing one or more of its operational objectives, the FCA may make rules about the conduct of the following persons”,
and those persons could be any employee of the bank.
I question whether that is the right answer. It is “may” rather than “must”, but I should have thought it essential that the FCA made rules. Is it right that it should apply to all employees from purely backroom or administrative staff? In some ways, the government scheme goes wider but it is possibly too permissive.
The final omission to highlight is that we propose that as well as an initial statement of responsibilities for each manager, there should be a handover note when people change jobs. We think that that is crucial because without it the chain of accountability breaks down, and when someone changes jobs we are back to, “I didn’t know”, or, “It wasn’t me”.
I intervene to ask the Minister to comment on some concerns that I have about this new “approved persons” or senior managers’ regime. First, I am worried that it will place British banks at a considerable disadvantage when they try to recruit the most talented managers available, not just from the United Kingdom but from around the world. Everybody agrees that bank management failed, so it is clear that the supervision of senior mangers needs to be enhanced and improved. For example, someone may be offered a job to work in Hong Kong, where he would probably pay less tax anyway, and he is unlikely to run the risk of being individually liable or culpable in that jurisdiction. I am not sure which other jurisdictions intend to introduce some kind of senior managers’ regime such as this.
My second concern is that it seems to me that it is up to the manager to prove that he was not negligent in the exercise of his responsibilities. It is wrong that a senior manager should be deemed to be guilty unless he can prove his innocence. My third concern is that to increase the individual responsibilities of senior managers will have the unintended consequence of diminishing the responsibility of the board of directors as a whole, or the executive committee, risk committee, or whichever committee it may be. I have sat on an executive committee of a bank and often the business being discussed was not my responsibility, but I felt that I should understand what was going on and what the discussion was about because I was collectively responsible as a member of that committee. What worries me is that if it is very clear that the individual manager is going to be responsible, that effectively diminishes the responsibilities of the other members of the committee. It also diminishes the ability of the chief executive to change the responsibilities of his senior team based on his judgment, because it would be too complicated as each department or division would effectively be under the supervision of people outside the chief executive’s control. Can the Minister comment on these points as well?
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I had considerable sympathy with the amendment of the right reverend Prelate, which I found rather clearer and easier to understand than I did the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Barnett. I am not convinced that appointing an additional two deputy governors is necessary because I believe these three sub-divisions of the Bank could be rationalised. However, appointing deputy governors will tend to make the governance of the Bank of England more rather than less level in that if you have a governor and one deputy, only one person comes close to challenging the governor’s authority. As proposed in the Bill, there will be three deputy governors, which will mean that the perception of the balance of power will be more level than before.
It is completely unnecessary for the governor to chair the Financial Stability Committee, because the governor chairs the court and the Financial Stability Committee is a sub-committee of the court. It is not right that the chairman of the court—that is, the governor—should also chair one of its own committees. That is highly illogical.
I do not think that the governor chairs the court any longer.
I apologise to the noble Lord and I stand corrected. Perhaps the governor should chair the court. However, where possible, the deputy governors rather than the governor should chair the sub-committees.
My Lords, I am not in favour of the amendments. First, there is the post of the deputy governor for prudential regulation. This is the old head of the FSA, in so far as it deals with macroprudential regulation, who is given the status of deputy governor in order to bring him into the councils of the bank. No extra posts or salaries are being created here. One might have been created by the creation of the FSA, but that is not here.
Secondly, as to the checks and balances on the governor, I do not think that a committee as important as either the NPC or the FPC being chaired by his deputy is a good way of exerting supervision of the governor. You cannot work for someone and supervise them at the same time.
At the moment, the governor chairs these committees and brings their thinking together; and, as we discussed earlier, there are other mechanisms around the court or the oversight committee—whatever it is called—that check the over-mighty power of the governor. Using one of his deputies to do this does not make sense.