National Security Bill

Debate between Viscount Stansgate and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope that I can intervene briefly to ask two questions. I support Amendment 44, but the questions I want to ask relate to government Amendments 38 and 42. If I understand the Minister correctly, subsection 2(c) of Amendment 38 inserts the word “reckless” in order to fill a gap. If so, why does the word “reckless” not appear in his other two amendments, 41 and 42? My second question relates to spiritual injury. What would be the effect if you left out the bit in brackets in subsection 2(e) of Amendment 42? In other words, why is the bit in brackets so crucial?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will begin by raising a question with the Minister regarding his amendments, and will then support my noble friend, as a member of a fairly virtuous party, and my noble “also-friend”, who is equally virtuous but not in the party.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, rightly raised the question of causing spiritual injury. I would be grateful for a lot more clarification as to what the Government’s background justification and intent is in this regard. I would be happy if the Minister wrote to us before Report, because my reading of the new amendment is that causing spiritual injury to any person is now prohibited conduct, in light of the wording in brackets. As I have indicated previously, I have the great privilege of being able to travel extensively and, as the party’s spokesman on foreign affairs, to engage in many discussions on freedom of religion and no belief, on which the greatly respected noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, leads in this House. That means that we are engaged in many discussions on the sensitive nature of religion and politics.

My reading of the amendment is that it could make it an offence for someone to engage with me and seek to persuade me of the view on the abolition of apostasy legislation in the Gulf, for example. The death penalty applies in Malaysia, a Commonwealth country, and in Qatar and the UAE, for example, for apostasy. Lobby groups who are campaigning for the abolition of the death penalty or the decriminalisation of apostasy, which has taken place in other Muslim nations, could well be defined by others as causing spiritual injury. Unless the Government have a definition of this—we do not necessarily need to rely on the Australian case, which I too saw on the same search as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—then those people will be able to say that you are doing them spiritual injury if you wish to undermine their belief in Hudud law, which supports apostasy.

These are extremely sensitive areas which those in our intelligence community have to grapple with, because they are at the heart of the motivation of many people to take forward their political views. The situation is similar with those who seek to reform blasphemy legislation. Blasphemy is a very complex area that interacts with different faiths and laws. My concern is that subsection 2(e) of this amendment could cause considerable difficulties with blasphemy legislation, which has been a fairly delicate legislative area in the past, and with our interactions. I therefore hope that the Minister can provide much greater clarity on this. I would like to know what input the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has had into the amendment regarding the convention on freedom of religion and belief. As a consequence of the amendment, some of our activities could be in contravention of the convention, which refers to freedom of religion and no belief. Therefore, the convention provides for the freedom to challenge what some may hold to be an authentic political view of a religion, but which others may believe to constitute spiritual injury. If the Government intend to prohibit debating political faith—political Islam, political Christianity—then we are on a very dangerous path. I hope that the Minister can reassure me on that.

Turning to donations and Amendments 44 and 43, I support the argument of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. The Electoral Commission has been very clear in public statements that we have to make progress on tackling the lack of faith in politics. Lack of transparency in the funding of politics is key to that, which is why the Bill needs to be strengthened. There is now an overwhelming case for greatly enhanced due diligence on the part of political parties in working through the source of donations. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, there is a balance to be struck. There are those who seek to operate a healthy political system and engage in the political processes with those wishing to fund the parties; equally, we need transparency in those areas where undetermined income is the source of the donation. Importantly, this links to our previous discussions on “grey areas”.

At the moment, a political party could receive a donation from an individual through a bitcoin company which is operated by a national from another country—for example, it is based in the Cayman Islands but the donation comes through a UK national. That is perfectly legal, but there is no way of knowing where that income originated. That could be a live example: a Member of this House is on the global advisory board of a bitcoin company based in the Cayman Islands, so this is not theoretical. Looking at the interaction with the source of the income is important.

There is also a case to be made for enhanced diligence: asking whether companies have made enough money in the UK to fund that loan. I had a quick look at the Electoral Commission database for donations. Of the top 20 donations by companies to all political parties, a number have been through holding companies and there is simply a reference to a donation to the party. There is no mechanism to go beyond that: to state whether that company is solvent or making operating profits. Indeed, two of the companies in question made no operating profits for three years in a row but donated substantial sums to a political party. In other situations, having to investigate unexplained income would be important. We have other areas where due diligence applies—supply chain reforms, modern slavery statements and so on—and I do not see why there cannot be an equivalent regime when companies are interacting in the political realm.

Finally, one area where a very significant loophole needs to be addressed is for those countries which the Government themselves have said are at high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. I took part in the debates on the money laundering, terrorist financing and transfer of funds regulations, which we have transposed into domestic legislation from the EU. In those regulations, we currently have a list of 25 countries for which it is the law that there is enhanced due diligence of any transactions because a company operates, through any business activities, within them. I remind the Committee that that list includes the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar and the United Arab Emirates.

Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 11) Regulations 2022

Debate between Viscount Stansgate and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Wednesday 12th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope the Minister will allow me briefly to mention the No. 11 regulations. I understand from what he said that they derive in part from discussions at the G7, and I presume that all G7 countries are in the process of putting similar ranges of sanctions in place in their own countries. Part 4 inserted by these very extensive regulations deals with chemicals and equipment—it is a very comprehensive list. Is this list the same as that being applied by other European countries? When I looked at it, I thought it might be derived from the former EU regulation on REACH, which is I think the biggest piece of legislation ever passed by the European Parliament. Are we co-operating on important measures such as this to have the effect that the Minister intends?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister knows that these measures are supported by the Liberal Democrat Benches. As when we have debated previous sanctions, I am grateful for the Minister maintaining contact and keeping us informed. He knows of our strong support for measures which aim to ratchet up the pressure on Vladimir Putin and, as is included in these elements, the wider circle of his support.

We would support moving beyond the regulations to include the United Russia party and wider elements of the Russian regime in this part of the sanctions regime. We support the Government in the extension on state entities but, as the Minister knows well enough, there has been considerable state capture of the Russian economy by the Putin regime over recent years. This means that we should include in our sanctions regime not just the political actors but, increasingly, those in the wider economy. Therefore, the banning of certain exports and the wider inclusion of some state entities is to be welcomed.

I also welcome the work of officials on the impact assessments. They are useful tools to look at what the impact could be on the wider Russian economy. This leads to my first question. We have debated many sanctions but are yet to receive what I have asked for previously: an overall assessment of the net impact of the UK sanctions on the Russian economy and regime. I understand entirely that that document will be sensitive, but we must understand what the impact has been; otherwise, we cannot judge what could well be a situation where, in the long run, we want to move away from the sanctions regime. However, that is premature, as we want to increase the pressure.

That leads to my second question, on implementation. I noted that we have seen the first prosecution in the UK of what is effectively sanctions-busting. Can the Minister indicate whether that is an isolated case or if he is aware of more areas where there are active prosecutions of UK citizens and residents who have been acting against the sanctions regime in the UK? We need to know that these sanctions are being actively policed and implemented. They are pointless unless they are implemented in full.

This leads on to my third question: no doubt the Minister will have noted, as I have when I have been travelling, that the number of Russian nationals who have been using other transport routes through the Gulf—and Istanbul in particular—to access the UK and the European Union seems to have markedly increased since the sanctions regime was put in place. Is the UK monitoring passenger levels of individuals who are coming to the UK? I know that there is live debate on visa access for Russian nationals, both to the UK and to the European Union, but I would like the Minister to reassure me that this is being actively monitored.

Turning to the particular measures, I hope the Minister will forgive me for reflecting on one of the elements in the Explanatory Notes on the No. 11 regulations, but it is connected with yesterday’s debate which he and I participated in. On Regulation 7, the Government say:

“Failure to join the international community would undermine the UK’s reputation as an upholder of international law, human rights, freedom of expression and democracy.”


The debate that we had yesterday is relevant to what we are arguing for here in relation to upholding international law, and I wanted to stress that point.

With regard to the No. 12 regulations, the Minister said that our regime is now going beyond that of the European Union. I wonder if he could say a little more, with regards to energy, on where we have departed from the European Union and have now got a stronger regime. I am not opposing this, of course, but it would be helpful to have a little more information.

With regard to the No. 13 regulations, it is helpful that there is now clarification on shipping; this was raised in previous debates, and I welcome it.

Finally, I have a broader point on which I would like the Minister’s reflections. As he will know, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and I have asked how we are working with our allies to ensure that our sanctions regime is not circumvented by friends and colleagues around the world, especially with regard to Russia accessing the very technologies and goods that we are now banning. The Minister knows well enough that Russia is very active in the wider Gulf, in Africa and in India in sourcing some of the materials that we are now banning. I previously raised the issue of concern with regard to the Indian rupee/rouble swap for purchase of energy. When I raised that question, the Minister said it was premature, but that arrangement is now in place. We are apparently only a fortnight away from signing a free trade agreement with India. At the very same time that we are banning the selling of certain goods to Russia, India seems to be increasing the selling of those goods to Russia. Could the Minister say what work we are doing with our allies to ensure that, whilst we are seeking to limit the sourcing of some of these materials to Russia, our allies are not increasing them? If the Minister could respond to these points, I would be very grateful.