National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025

Viscount Stansgate Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for long. I am in favour of the foreign influence registration scheme and I well remember when the Act went through the House in 2023. I support the transparency that my noble friend the Minister talked about, and I hope that this works. I echo what my noble friend said towards the end of his remarks, which is that registration in itself does not mean that someone is doing something wrong, but it will be part and parcel of what we hope will be a successful series of measures in support of the Act.

I will raise a few items in the order in which they are laid before us, which is not quite the order in which my noble friend took us through them. The first relates to the exemptions for certain foreign power investment funds and so on. I understand—my noble friend made this point—that the exemptions are designed to ensure proportionality by reducing the amount of routine activity required. I am all in favour of increasing the transparency of foreign-power influence over UK democracy.

I refer to Regulation 3 which exempts financial arrangements to provide financial support to students in FE and HE. It says and uses the phrase

“where foreign powers give directions to the student or to the education provider”.

I hope my noble friend will not mind if I ask exactly what that phrase means.

The National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 are very important. I do not know how big a website we will end up with. Regulation 3 provides a whole series of exemptions. They seem to add up to quite a lot and made me wonder whether we might end up with so much of the information being exempt that it might not yield very much. What is the procedure for the Secretary of State to exercise one or more of these exemptions under Regulation 3 of that SI?

On the regulations on Iran, I entirely understand—and this goes with the regulations on Russia—why Parts 1 and 2 cover the areas of official and government organisations and so on. In relation to the impact on businesses, charities and smaller micro-businesses, which the Explanatory Memorandum acknowledges will be the case, there are figures given about how long it will take to register—it is only £9.67 and so on. The draft impact assessment states that:

“Registrations are likely to be completed by an employee in a Human Resources or legal compliance department”.


Forgive me, but it seems that many micro-businesses do not have human resources or legal service operatives, so can my noble friend tell us whether that might prove to be a problem?

On the last regulations, those in relation to Russia, the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“Without this instrument, it would only be necessary for people acting at the direction of Russia to conduct political influence activity in the UK to register with FIRS”.


That would not be enough. What in these regulations might be helpful in relation to the daily cyberattacks conducted on the UK? We have reason to believe that they emanate from hostile actors that might be based in Russia or acting on behalf of a hostile state.

Finally, this is not in any of the regulations in this group, but I noticed the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has asked—and I ask now—why, at the moment, has China not been the subject of this SI process? Can the Minister give some idea of the Government’s thinking at the moment about whether China might in future, and, if so, when, come within the purview of the operation of the Act that we are discussing and the regulations that seek to give it effect?

[Lord Cryer (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for bringing these SIs to the Grand Committee. Like my noble friend, I shall speak briefly about one or two points, in my case, specifically about Iran and the provisions that apply to Iran and, more specifically, about the effectiveness of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has developed a notorious reputation over the past 30 or 40 years. It came along with the revolution in 1979 and has established itself as an arm of the Iranian state since then.

I particularly want to talk about Iran for one reason: Iran is probably the only significant world power that is effectively run by clerical fascists. I cannot think of a parallel country. It is a state that uses proxies all over the world. We all know about Hamas and Hezbollah, but there are other proxies, and this has been covered extensively in the mainstream press. The IRGC uses criminal gangs to further its aims in this country and other countries across Europe and the world.

I have two questions for the Minister. Can he confirm that anybody who does not register a relationship with the Iranian state, who fails to register an interest or a connection, will be committing a criminal act and be subject to criminal prosecution? Does that also apply to anybody who has a clear relationship with an IRGC or Iranian state proxy, for instance Hezbollah or Hamas?

Would that also apply to others? For instance, there have been parliamentarians in the past—I hope that there are none now, but there probably are—who have accepted money from PressTV. They will have to register that in the normal way, but do they also have to register it under the provisions of the statutory instruments that we are talking about today?

--- Later in debate ---

We are not trying to put on unnecessary burdens that are difficult and damaging. All exemptions have been carefully crafted by the Government to ensure that we do not provide a loophole for state actors to evade the scheme—that is not our intention. If we have made an assessment that Russia and Iran are threats to the United Kingdom’s national security—which is why we are putting in place these regulations based on the primary legislation—then we are not going to be putting in place loopholes so they can get around those. We are putting in place a scheme that is proportionate and effective.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

On the subject of exceptions, in Regulation 6 of the statutory instrument on publication, for example, how is Parliament going to know the extent of the exemptions that have been granted? On the face of it, we will not know.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If my noble friend allows me a moment’s reflection on that detail, I will respond to him with a fuller, meaningful reply. I believe that we are going to be transparent in all of this. The whole purpose of these regulations is to provide transparency and ensure that we tackle national security and give proportionate responses. Colleagues and I will reflect on the point he has made and I will respond to him in detail if I can.

Foreign Influence Registration Scheme

Viscount Stansgate Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The FIRS we announced yesterday includes the leadership of Russia, political parties that support the leadership of Russia and a number of other state apparatuses, including the security services in Russia. We have and we will, in due course, present to this House and the House of Commons a statutory instrument that sets out in detail the applicability of the FIRS. I hope that my noble friend can wait for that to see the detail of the specific organisations and individuals named under it.

In informing him of that, I also pay tribute to him and his work with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is done behind the scenes and appears only when reports such as the Russia report are published. I know, from spending four and a half years on that committee, that there is a tremendous amount of work going on under the surface all the time to both challenge the security services, Government Ministers and agencies on their performance on security and to make the sorts of recommendations that appeared in the Russia report to date.

I am pleased that my noble friend supports the Government’s position not to seek the publication of the unredacted report. For the reasons he has mentioned, this is about national security, and it is also about themes: The themes of the Russia report were that the Russian state was seeking to undermine UK democracy and be a malevolent actor and, as we have seen in Salisbury and in Ukraine since the Russia report, it is not a player on the international stage that abides by the rules. In producing that report, we have to withhold some aspects. It is welcome that my noble friend supports the Government’s approach to that issue.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the Statement. I broadly welcome it, and I think there is a broad, cross-party consensus on the national security requirements.

When I hear my noble friend talk about threats from Iran and Russia, as a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy I can tell him that we looked in great detail at the nature of some of these threats—for example, in regard to ransomware—and produced a report on it.

The question I wanted to ask my noble friend relates to the political tier. I quote from the Statement:

“For the first time, Members of this House will now be able to check whether anyone who seeks to influence them is doing so at the direction of a foreign power”.


I wanted to raise the issue of all-party parliamentary groups, because one of the concerns that has been expressed over the years is that they could be a vehicle for unwanted influences—certainly financially—buying their way in and influencing the way all-party groups operate.

I am the president of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, which is the Parliament’s oldest all-parliamentary party group. I hope the Minister can reassure the House that this scheme will enable it to be absolutely clear that no all-party parliamentary group that operates in this House—or in Parliament generally—is in any way open to the type of foreign influence that this Statement is designed to prevent and that as a result Parliament can have confidence that all-party parliamentary groups will be protected under this scheme to some extent by the work being undertaken, and that when FIRS goes live, we will have this confidence open to view.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Stansgate for his work in this field and for his question. Where the scheme will be of best benefit is that it will allow greater transparency around individuals who may be influenced, in this case by Russia or, as in the previous announcement, by Iran. That gives confidence to parliamentarians particularly. Any individual who is engaged with or supporting an all-party group, in whatever shape and form they do that, will have had to make a declaration about foreign influence before they participate in any activity as a whole. After 1 July, that will be a public matter of record. If they do not declare it and are subsequently found to have such influence, they will be subject to severe penalty, tested by the police, the CPS and the court, and ultimately subject to penalties of potential long terms of imprisonment of up to five years. I hope that will bring a transparency and confidence to all-party groups in the event of individuals believing that such groups are somehow influenced or fronted by organisations which are seeking to do malevolent damage to the UK. It gives transparency and flushes that out. If anybody tries to do that in a secretive way and is found to be doing so, they will face a severe penalty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I apologise if I slightly overlooked part of the noble Lord’s question. The Government have not made a judgment on any ISC comment or recommendations. However, we are continually keeping under review every nation in relation to a potential FIRS. We have announced Iran. Yesterday, we announced Russia. All other potential designations are kept under constant review. On China, as I have said in the House before, we co-operate where we can, we challenge where we need to and we ensure that we maintain our national security interests. We will keep that under review, but I cannot give the noble Lord a running commentary on potential FIRS designations. They are not a matter for today, which is about Russia and recommitting to the FIRS declaration on Iran.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, if the House will forgive me for a quick follow-up question, the Minister referred to sector guidance. Will he issue sector guidance relating to Parliament itself?

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Viscount Stansgate Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 25th November 2024 Grand Committee

Relevant documents: 2nd, 4th and 6th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee. Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Legislative Consent sought.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)]

My Lords, in the unlikely event of a Division, the Committee will be adjourned for 10 minutes. Much more likely is that some Members may have been adversely affected by Storm Bert and may not be able to join us for this session.

Clause 1: Product regulations

Amendment 11

Moved by