(9 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, briefly, Amendment 31 seems to introduce a new dimension to the responsibilities of the commissioner, quite apart from the matter of fines, which I would not be in favour of. In the small business sector, lots of businesses are being formed, but lots, I regret to say, are going out of business. That also applies to their customers—the larger businesses. Plenty of them get into trouble from time to time. Repeated failure to pay an invoice may be simply a signal that the invoices are never going to be paid. If one is not careful, the idea that the commissioner should become responsible for credit checks and for a whole host of commercial interventions completely changes the situation.
As I understand it, the commissioner is there to look in particular at the question of late payment as a cultural issue, and to change the culture in a business which appears to have worsened in recent years. I can understand that, but the minute that we start to get into the detailed financial circumstances of individual businesses, the commissioner is in real trouble.
I thank noble Lords for their comments. I emphasise that the Government consider that a punitive approach involving compulsion or financial penalties in the round is not the right one to take if the commissioner is to contribute to culture change in payment practices. We want the commissioner to develop trust and have credibility with small and large businesses alike. The commissioner therefore couples an approach of building the confidence and capability of small businesses to assert themselves with proportionate powers to disincentivise unfavourable practices. Notably, this will be through the power to publish individual reports which can name respondents and draw attention to themes and issues in the annual report.
Turning to Amendment 20, the commissioner has the power in our clauses as drafted to ask the commissioner or respondent to provide voluntary information or documents relevant to a complaint. The amendment seeks to force a respondent to comply with such a request where it concerns contract terms and gives the commissioner a power of investigation. Diligent businesses will want to engage constructively with the commissioner and will not need to be forced. They will be keen to make sure that their small suppliers are being treated in a fair and reasonable way. That makes good business sense. They are being investigated by the Small Businesses Commissioner. Secondly, they will want to protect their reputation and avoid being named and shamed. Anything more heavy-handed would introduce an adversarial and legalistic element to the process. I was interested to hear from my noble friend Viscount Eccles that he felt that that was the right way to go.
Turning to Amendment 21, the handling of a complaint is primarily a matter for the complainant, the respondent and the commissioner. However, if third parties including Government have material relevant to a complaint, there is nothing in the legislation that prevents them approaching the commissioner with such information.
Turning to Amendment 22, which the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, referred to as his favourite, the commissioner has broad scope to recommend steps which he or she considers could remedy, resolve or mitigate issues in complaints. We intend that the commissioner will support small businesses’ use of alternative dispute resolution. The commissioner could, for example, recommend mediation, which, as the noble Lord said, is generally much more expensive, and hopefully quicker, than a long drawn-out legal case. But it is not considered appropriate for the commissioner to require parties to engage in mediation, directly or indirectly. This includes giving the commissioner power to influence costs in litigation where mediation has been refused. Rather, the Government consider that it is the role of the court to determine costs in legal cases. Legal cases are already expected to be conducted at a proportionate cost, and there are of course mechanisms to keep costs reasonable in the courts.
My Lords, we do not believe it right to make the commissioner’s recommendations legally binding—an issue addressed in Amendments 23 and 31. Requiring a party to provide an outline of costs for litigation would require the party to engage with the process and strategy of litigating—for example, looking into instructing lawyers—whereas our aim, as I have said, is to encourage alternative approaches to litigation. Of course, courts may consider a party’s refusal to mediate to be unreasonable, and can address this when considering court costs.
We also agree that it is important to encourage the two sides to come together. We believe, however, as I said at the start, that a punitive approach to costs is not the right way. Stakeholders told us in our consultation that the gaps in knowledge about alternative dispute resolution was the key issue, and we have obviously respected that feedback. The primary intention is that the commissioner will make recommendations that enable the parties to resolve the dispute, rather than being an arbitrator. In certain cases, the commissioner may be considering lawful, if unfair, acts. To accept these amendments would effectively allow the commissioner to create rules on what is and is not good payment practice—quasi-legislating—and this is not the role of the office as we see it. Rather, the Government believe that it is vital that the commissioner build up a position of trust and influence with all parts of the business community.
As is obvious, I do not really agree with the move to broaden the role of the Small Business Commissioner. As I said on Monday, I believe that focus is what we should go for, but I will of course read carefully our various discussions. However, I am not persuaded that, despite the eloquence of the noble Lords who have spoken—including the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who made some points about incentives—we would be right to change these provisions.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, given the concern that has been raised and given that, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, says, our intentions are certainly to cut red tape rather than the reverse, I shall be happy to discuss this before Report if that would be helpful.
My Lords, I have found myself in support of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on other occasions. It is quite a new and strange experience to find him in some support of me. My conclusion is that if Clauses 21 to 27 were quietly to disappear, the world would be a better place.
My Lords, I put my name to the amendment and I will make a brief addition to what my noble friend said. This is a very significant change to the law. It is quite complicated, moving from the present arrangements of opt in to the double arrangement of opt in and opt out, going beyond, interestingly, what the European Union advises, and perhaps not concentrating enough on alternative dispute resolution techniques. Having said all the way through that the one thing we do not want is a US-style lawyers’ charter—we are all agreed on that—unfortunately the Bill is drawn so widely that we run a real risk that that is what we will get.
We need to remember that we are in the Anglo-Saxon camp and have a tendency to do things in a similar way to the way they are done in the United States—in the creative arts or wherever, and including, I fear, the law. We also need to remember that where such arrangements have been made in other jurisdictions, they have not been free of problems. Australia, which is often cited, has had considerable trouble about the authorisation of those who are to conduct the class actions or collective proceedings. It has been described as skirmishing. The way the Bill is drawn, we will have very similar problems with the question of who is to be authorised and who is not—because the person who is not may not be very happy.
New subsection (8)(b) states that a representative can be appointed,
“only if the Tribunal considers that it is just and reasonable for that person to act as a representative in those proceedings”.
I will return to that on the next group, but it is very widely drawn. In support of my worry about the very wide drafting, there was a long and relatively confused debate in the other place in the Bill Committee. The answer, both there and here, seems to be, “Well, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will sort it all out”. I think that that puts too much of a burden on the tribunal and is unlikely to work well.
My Lords, I am delighted to see my noble friend Lord Hodgson back with us. We missed him on the day when the amendments were finally reached, but my noble friend Lady Noakes introduced his amendments with great clarity and verve. We had a good debate and we now have several different amendments, some of which we will be discussing in a minute. I am grateful for the efforts that my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Eccles have made to explain their thinking to me in person. We have tried hard to meet their concerns. Having talked to my colleagues in the Government, I am now able to respond positively.
Although this amendment would require a review of the schedule, I believe that its driving force is to examine the effect of opt-out collective actions. I should say that the Government are happy with our proposals and believe that the existing opt-in regime is prohibitive, with only one collective case in 10 years involving 130 claimants. Therefore, the changes in the Bill are important. I do not share the pessimistic view about US-style claims, mainly because of the safeguards that we have written into the Bill, which we will no doubt come on to on the next amendment. However, I wanted to say that we have had a very good discussion, we have listened and we are happy to agree to a review after five years which covers the ground set out in the amendment. Following a further discussion that I had with my noble friend this morning, we will also commit to a ministerial Statement on the review here in Parliament. I am afraid that we cannot put the review in the Bill, as that would have ramifications for other possible reviews elsewhere in the Bill, but I can commit to a review, and I know that the Confederation of British Industry, which I met on Thursday because of its concerns about this part of the Bill, is content with that.
Of course, Schedule 8 does not just introduce an opt-out collective actions regime. It reforms the entire private actions regime for the benefit of both businesses and consumers. I think we are all agreed that consumers come first here. Therefore, the Government believe that it would be appropriate for the review of the impact of Schedule 8 to examine the whole range of reforms. The review would take into account both opt-in and opt-out collective actions, the fast track regime, the number of cases under the CMA redress power, collective settlement cases and, of course, the provisions outlined by my noble friend in his amendment. In those circumstances, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am delighted to welcome my noble friend Lady Noakes to the Committee and commend the clarity with which she took us through the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. I am sorry that he is not here because he sat patiently through many hours of our proceedings last week. I especially enjoyed my noble friend’s refreshing emphasis on growth and wealth creation. It was also good to hear from the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, who rightly emphasised the importance of this part of the Bill, and from my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, who urged caution and warned us, honestly and graphically, about the role of the lawyers in some climes in this sort of area, which we are seeking to avoid.
An effective competition regime is built on public enforcement and the ability for consumers and businesses to take private actions and claim redress. The current collective actions regime is opt-in, which requires consumers to opt in to a court action. A key feature of the revised regime is the introduction of an opt-out regime, where consumers are automatically part of a court action unless they opt out. This change is being made as there has been only one collective action case in more than 10 years, so we feel that the current law is not working.
My noble friend’s amendments would remove opt-out collective actions. Of course, a collective action is not a new concept; a regime has existed since 2002. Under this regime, consumers have to sign up to an action before it commences in the Competition Appeal Tribunal. As I said, since the regime was created in 2002, there has been only one collective action case, and that had only 130 claimants—less than 0.1% of those eligible. Furthermore, SMEs are not permitted to use the existing regime to bring claims; for example, if a dominant manufacturer were to withhold supplies to drive up prices.
The Government have always been clear that an opt-out collective actions regime would require stringent safeguards to prevent vexatious claims and the US-style class actions that have been described this afternoon. I would also highlight the different legal culture and practice in the US, where significant financial incentives to bring claims, such as treble damages and damages-based agreements, are the order of the day and have led to a large number of claims. We have learnt from that experience and introduced three key safeguards, as the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, explained.
I will summarise the safeguards very briefly. The first is a requirement for the CAT to certify that the representative is suitable to bring the claim. Secondly, the Bill prohibits businesses paying too much redress by prohibiting exemplary damages. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, explained, they would have to pay back only the overcharge to the consumer, not multiple damages. Thirdly, law firms are prohibited from taking a percentage of the damages as a success fee—so-called damages-based agreements. Further requirements that have to be met before a representative can be approved will be set out in the CAT rules. These will include a representative’s ability to pay costs, whether there is a conflict of interest with the underlying claimants, and whether a representative would adequately act in the interests of the underlying claimants.
To assist in understanding, the Government published draft CAT rules on collective actions in March, and they are available in the House Library. I have a copy if anyone would like one. In the draft rules, the CAT would have to scrutinise the nature and function of the representative body. This would include whether or not the body is suitable to be a representative body, including whether the body had a pecuniary interest; for example, whether an underlying claimant wishing to act as a representative had a conflict of interest because they had a financial interest in the outcome of the case.
I have read the draft rules; I brought them with me. I do not think it is all that easy, if you have a pecuniary interest, to define whether or not it is a conflict. If it has been entered into freely as an agreement that in certain circumstances the people being represented will pay fees of a certain size and they have signed up to that, that is not a conflict of interest.
I emphasise that I do not think that the draft rules anywhere near meet the undertakings given by the Government in their response to the consultation and in respect of the advice received from the House of Commons Select Committee.
Perhaps I may just say that I made no reference to the United States in what I said; none at all. I think that the situation is completely non-comparable, so I agree entirely with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about that. However, I do not think that the safeguard regime is anything like adequate in the Bill as it is drafted.
I thank my noble friend for his clarification. He is right to say that the draft rules were constructed by a specialist working group. They will be subject to full public consultation in order to ensure that they strike the right balance, and that will obviously be undertaken well before these provisions come into effect on 1 October next year. Perhaps I may also say at this point that I have talked to the CBI and corresponded with the Law Society, with which I am extremely happy to have a meeting, as I think my noble friend suggested, so that we can go through some of the points that I am making in more detail.
A key safeguard in the Bill is that the CAT must certify that a representative is suitable to bring a collective action. This means, as has been said, a law firm, a claims management firm or a special purpose vehicle. These will not automatically be able to bring a claim, and the draft CAT rules provide for even more scrutiny of a proposed representative. It is appropriate for these requirements to be in the CAT rules so that they can be modified more easily or be made even more stringent if that is necessary. This will ensure an effective regime which promotes the interests of consumers. The Government also believe that the CAT, a specialist competition court which I know from my own experience, has a strong track record in dealing with consumer detriment in competition law, and is well placed to scrutinise each and every body that seeks to act as a representative. I do not share my noble friend’s concern, given my knowledge of the court and its specialist nature.