Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Viscount Camrose and Lord Tyrie

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Does the Minister not agree that since, with a merits appeal, a fine could be reduced to nugatory amounts, that what would be considered equivalent to a full merits review of the substantive decision?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

That would be in respect only of the fine itself. Any other element of the decision, such as the imposition of new conduct requirements or other actions taken to correct anti-competitive effects in the market, would stand and would have been standing throughout the appeal in any event.

I turn to Motion B, which addresses Amendments 12 and 13, on the countervailing benefits exemption, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch. The amendment looks to revert the clause back to its original wording of

“the conduct is indispensable ... to … those benefits”.

The Government’s revised wording, which replaces “indispensable”, does not change the effect of the clause. It still requires the same high threshold to be met and has the same safeguards. To qualify for the exemption, SMS firms must establish that all the criteria are met. There must be no other reasonable, practicable way to achieve the same benefits to consumers with a less anti-competitive effect. I hope that noble Lords feel reassured that the Government’s drafting maintains the same robust threshold and keeps consumers at the heart of the pro-competition regime.

Your Lordships will remember Amendment 38, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, which sought to place in the Bill a 40-day timeframe for the Secretary of State’s approval of CMA guidance. The Government listened carefully to concerns led by my noble friend relating to a risk of delay in the digital markets regime. We are absolutely committed to getting this regime up and running to start fixing competition problems and deliver greater consumer benefit.

To reinforce this commitment, the Government have tabled Amendment 38A in lieu. This takes the spirit of my noble friend’s amendment and merely adjusts the time limit to working days to align with other timelines in the Bill. It also asks for reasons if guidance is not approved within the time limit. I hope that this provides reassurances to noble Lords about our commitment to the digital markets regime. I thank my noble friend for championing this matter in earlier debates and for his support for the amendment in lieu.

Once again, I thank noble Lords for their contributions during the Bill’s passage and I look forward to others during this debate. Across this House, we are all committed to making the DMCC Bill the best and most effective legislation it can be. I therefore invite noble Lords to agree the government Motions before them. I beg to move.

Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Viscount Camrose and Lord Tyrie

Report stage
Monday 11th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, I believe that is the case and I accept that. But, as I said, I will commit to carrying out a review in the future to understand how best to implement a collective action basis.

Under the digital markets regime, the CMA will be—

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Can the Minister tell us when he intends that review to take place?

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Viscount Camrose and Lord Tyrie

Committee stage
Wednesday 31st January 2024 Grand Committee

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed. While the noble Lord was speaking, I was trying to look for a counter- example but I have yet to find one. I will look for examples of regimes where this does not apply and communicate that to the noble Lord.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

I am sorry to intervene a second time. When the Minister is looking for counter- examples, I would be grateful if he kept to the major sector regulators, which are the direct comparator. There are more than 500 significant quangos, and I am sure I would be able to find a few quite quickly.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

Before the Minister stands up, may I ask him whether, if he cannot find a counterexample, this amendment may find some favour with the Government?

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Viscount Camrose and Lord Tyrie

Committee stage
Monday 29th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As the noble Lord says, the intent is to keep those two separate. During and on the merits appeal for the penalty, the penalised firm could argue that the value of the penalty exceeded the crime, or that the breach took place inadvertently or by accident. It could not argue, however, that no breach took place; the fact that a breach took place is the premise against which the rest of the penalty appeal takes place. If the firm then wants to appeal that no breach took place, that would be done under JR, not on the merits.

The boundaries of the merits appeal process are explained in the Explanatory Notes for Clause 89. If those can be made any clearer, I am happy to engage on that. We will continue to listen to any concerns that noble Lords have on this important point.

I turn now to Amendments 72A and 72B from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. I thank him for his amendments, which raise an important question about the appeal standard across the wider digital markets regime. These amendments would align the appeal standard of all regulatory decisions in the regime with appeals carried out against Ofcom’s decisions taken under the Communications Act 2003. I am sure that many noble Lords are aware that the appeal standard in the Communications Act regime is often referred to as judicial review-plus. Although Parliament amended the Act in 2017 so that these appeals are to be decided on judicial review principles, the CAT has ruled that, due to retained EU law, it must also

“ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account”.

To turn back to this Bill, the Government heard the strong views expressed by your Lordships on the Select Committee, among others, on the importance of retaining judicial review. The changes made by the Government in the other place sought to uphold the use of the well-known judicial review principles for appeals in the new regime, except for those about penalties, as I have already discussed. Judicial review principles balance robust scrutiny of the CMA’s decisions with the need for the CMA to use its expertise to act quickly and iteratively to resolve issues.

As we discussed on the second day in Committee, the Government have made an explicit requirement for the CMA to consider proportionality when imposing conduct requirements and PCIs. As I set out during that discussion, it is right that interventions should be proportionate, but we are clear that any appeals of these matters should be heard under standard judicial review principles.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

In which case, it is clearly not the Ofcom standard, is it? The Ofcom standard imports a measure of appeal on the merits. Why are the Government continuing to assert that this is the Ofcom standard? It is nothing of the sort.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I suggest that I set out a comparison in writing and perform the analysis as to the differences, should there be any, between the two.

Noble Lords expressed a concern on the second day in Committee that there should not be ambiguity in how appeals will be conducted. Introducing a requirement in a new domestic regime that requires an analysis of unrelated retained EU law to be able to understand how an appeal should be decided risks creating that kind of ambiguity. Complicating the appeals standard with EU case law would slow down appeals while the boundaries of what is captured by JR-plus are agreed.

Regarding decision-making, the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, mentioned the CMA independent panel. Our approach to internal decision-making balances accountability and independence. Launching major market-shaping investigations under the regime will be reserved for the board. A board committee will oversee the regime’s regulatory interventions. At least half the members of the committee will be non-executive directors and members of the CMA’s independent panel. This make-up will ensure an independent perspective and the ability to develop deep expertise over time.

I hope that the reasoning I have put forward provides the necessary reassurances to noble Lords and that they will feel able not to press their amendments.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Viscount Camrose and Lord Tyrie

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am happy to provide that information in the form of a letter, and I will leave it at that for now.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Perhaps I could answer the question: the CMA never has scope to act disproportionately in law.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

In respect of my noble friend Lord Vaizey’s concern that proportionality will affect how the CAT conducts an appeal, the retention of judicial review in Clause 103 will still apply to the CAT, which will still have to conduct an appeal when a firm raises non-ECHR proportionality arguments in a JR style. It will not become a full merits appeal.

Amendments 33 and 52, from my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, also remove the statutory requirement for proportionality but, in doing so, create greater impacts on the regime. Amendment 33 would remove the obligation on the CMA to set out, in its conduct requirement notice, the objective in relation to which it must consider proportionality. However, this is a key feature for setting a conduct requirement and it is important to include it in the notice for both the SMS firm and third parties.

Amendment 52, by removing Clause 46(1)(b), would reduce the Bill’s clarity that the primary objective of PCIs is to address competition problems. It is important that the Bill is clear on the objective that PCIs must pursue. Additionally, proportionality provisions will ensure that the CMA addresses its objectives without placing unnecessary burdens on firms and harming consumers.

I turn to my noble friend Lady Stowell’s Amendments 17 and 54. As she set out in her explanatory statement, these amendments seek to clarify that the use of “proportionate” does not create a novel legal standard. The amendment would state that it is defined in accordance with prevailing public law standards. Of course, I agree with her that it is important to be clear about what we expect from the CMA and concur with the spirit of her amendments. However, I hope my explanation of this provision as currently drafted will satisfy my noble friend’s concerns.

These amendments assume that there is a single public law definition of proportionality, when there is not. However, proportionality is also not a novel concept for either the CMA or the domestic courts to apply. There is domestic case law about how proportionality requirements have been interpreted. We expect that the CMA, the CAT and courts would follow the broad approach set out in the Bank Mellat 2 case, which considered proportionality in relation to the application of ECHR rights, as well as fundamental rights at common law. This is relevant when considering whether an infringement of a qualified ECHR right and/or a fundamental common-law right is justified. Noble Lords with an interest in this area will be familiar with the four-limb test set out by Lords Sumption and Reed. Previously, our domestic courts applied a separate, but broadly similar, test when considering proportionality under EU law.

In the event of an appeal against CMA interventions, it is the role of the courts to provide a definitive interpretation of the legislation, but they will likely give a certain amount of deference to the CMA as the expert regulator. When an intervention has engaged A1P1, there would be a clear link with the approach of the domestic courts to the ECHR proportionality requirements that I have already discussed. In the rare situation when an intervention did not engage A1P1, it seems logical that the courts would take an approach consistent with how they approach digital markets cases which do engage A1P1, although this could involve some modifications on a case-by-case basis.

The basic requirements of proportionality—that it balances private interests adversely affected against the public interests that the measure seeks to achieve—is well understood. As such, I hope my noble friend can appreciate that although I agree with the spirit of her amendments, in practice I do not believe they would provide the clarity they seek.

Amendments 220 and 222 from my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance on how the appeals standard for financial penalties, proportionality and countervailing benefits exemption would operate. The amendments set out that the CMA could not impose conduct requirements, pro-competition interventions or financial penalties before this guidance was published.

I thank my noble friend for these amendments. He should be pleased to hear that the CMA will, as part of its approach to implementing the regime, produce guidance outlining its approach to delivering the regime before it is implemented. We expect this guidance to include the CMA’s approach to proportionality and the countervailing benefits exemption. The Secretary of State will have oversight of the CMA’s approach through the approval of that guidance. The Government feel that this approach strikes the right balance between maintaining the independence of the CMA and the CAT, and providing appropriate government oversight and clarity about how the regime will work. Suitable guidance will already be in place before the regime commences; as such, these amendments are not required.

I hope this has helped to address the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friends Lady Stowell of Beeston and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and that, as a consequence, they feel able to withdraw, or not to press, their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As I said, I am very happy to carry on with this; there is a sense of rounding up the usual suspects otherwise.

Amendment 60 from my noble friend Lord Lansley is intended to give the CMA jurisdiction to intervene in a merger when an SMS firm seeks to remove or absorb a smaller firm that could reasonably be expected to compete with it in future. I agree that it is important to ensure that the CMA can act against harmful mergers, including so-called killer acquisitions. I reassure my noble friend that the CMA can and does do so under the current legislative framework.

When reviewing a merger, the CMA can already consider whether it removes a potential future competitor. This can be seen in the Meta/Giphy case where, in its forward-looking assessment, the CMA found that the merger removed Giphy as a potential challenger and consequently ordered Meta to sell Giphy. The decision was upheld by the CAT, which I hope and think shows that the CMA has the necessary legislative cover.

It has been suggested that the CMA and other regulators have not scrutinised mergers by large digital firms enough in the past. However, since the Furman review, the CMA has undertaken a comprehensive review of its merger assessment guidelines and updated them in 2021 to ensure that they more clearly reflect the CMA’s current thinking and practice on digital markets, drawing on conclusions from expert reports, analysis and cases.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Before the Minister leaves that point, and further to the discussion we have had about the importance of the CMA taking advantage of its powers, is he able to signal that he is sympathetic to the approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, will take later on with her proposal to give Parliament much greater powers of scrutiny of the CMA, to give us a better prospect that the CMA will continue with its more activist approach to dealing with these mergers? The risk for all of us is that there is a boost in activity for a period, with this legislation and the focus and attention that we all are giving this issue, but that, over time, the CMA slips back to the very comfort zone-oriented place it seemed to be in when it implemented a number of its statutory obligations in the past.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for raising that point. He has alluded a number of times during our conversations to ensuring that the working culture within the CMA is suitably postured to deal with a fast-moving regime. I can indicate that I certainly have sympathy with the intent of enhancing the accountability both to Parliament and government of the CMA—with this and other ends in mind, but to ensure that it remains assiduous in its identification of opportunities to intervene.

The Bill will enhance the CMA’s ability to act to prevent harmful mergers by SMS firms. The reporting requirement will improve the transparency of merger activity in digital markets. Additionally, Clause 127 in Part 2 and Schedule 4 will introduce a new acquirer-focused jurisdiction threshold, which provides an additional basis for the CMA to review mergers involving large firms, including SMS firms.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Lansley will be reassured for the time being and not press their amendments.