Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Viscount Brookeborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

I suppose that would enable CCTV monitoring in areas adjacent to the premises, for which there is no obvious legal justification. Of course, in discussions with such people as the facial recognition commissioner and the Data Protection Commissioner, the people who occupy these premises need some legal basis on which to have that discussion. I took it that this enables them to have that discussion, because the law has given them a duty. At the moment, it could be argued that they have no duty. So, I take both things to be facilitating things and not intrusive things. Yes, there might be a limit to how far that immediate vicinity is, but a bomb can damage things for an awful long way. It is a very serious matter, and I think that to define it by metres would probably be unwise.

[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

My Lords, I may be accused of intruding, because I have not been here for the whole thing. It just interests me that, on one side, we are talking about what is in Clause 5, what we do when a terrorist incident takes place, and on the other hand, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was mentioning how we prevent it. From a Northern Ireland perspective, we had places and events every day of the week that were open to terrorist attack. Yes, having the facilities in place to enable us to take action if it takes place, but then there is also what we do to try to stop it taking place, making it more difficult for the terrorists to do it. We therefore channelled them, unfortunately, into working around what we have put in place.

When we are talking about buildings—I am sorry that I am not technical enough—what about the places outside where people are waiting? I do not understand why we need a building, alone, for the Bill, because people are under threat when they come together in large numbers. That is crucial. We had many events that did not involve buildings at all. Listening to this, I just think that we are not quite linking the two things together to make a good argument, a good reason and a good result for, first, trying to prevent it and then making sure that our protection is far enough away that it does not endanger people.

I shall give a simple example and then I will stop. We had vehicle checkpoints on the border, and they were easy to bomb and blow up to begin with, because people drove into them. It was not suicide, so it is not that far different, but proxy, where people drove into the middle and blew it up. Then we started using electronics—I know these cannot be used for every event—where we moved the protection further away, so that people had to come through that first. But then you create a queue on the other side. All I am saying is that to me, the lay person, I am not sure that we are not slightly confused about where this terrorist attack is going to take place. I cannot think that they consider only buildings.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to be involved in this, but I have a history of ministry in this country, including over the summer months, and after Easter, there are many gatherings that all meet in large tents. Big tops can house up to 10,000 people. If the clause is limited to buildings, so many vulnerable places and open spaces will be left out.

In this country in the summer, there are incredible gatherings—particularly of young people—that do not take place in what you would call a building. They will be in the big top. Subsection (5) tries to define “premises”, which is a much more flexible word than concentrating on “buildings”. Of course, some meetings will be taking place in buildings. The heart of all of this, however, is large gatherings of people—particularly of young people in the summer. Noble Lords would be absolutely surprised by how farmers lend their land for these kinds of concerts, which can go on for a while.

The people who organise these events, such as spring harvest, hold the responsibility for the protection of people, as laid down in the Bill—not because it takes place in a building but because of the event itself. So I would want to look for a tighter definition than what a building is, because I think we know what a building is. I want the events, where they take place and those responsible to have the same due regard as those who have big theatres. So, will the Government continue their flexibility in their definition as they did in subsection (5)? They may borrow some of the phrases from these amendments, but just remember that we get gatherings that are just so vast, you would not actually be providing protection against terrorism for that many people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

If the noble Baroness had waited until the end of my next sentence, I would have answered her question. I recognise that we have to set some number. It was suggested that there was no reason for a figure of 200. Can I just remind your Lordships—because it has not been mentioned yet in this debate—of part 8, volume 1, of the Saunders report? Sir John said, at paragraph 8.43, which I am sure all noble Lords will have read with care:

“An important question for the government will be whether setting the level for the Protect Duty in the first category at venues with a capacity of 100 or more is workable. Very different issues will arise for venues capable of accommodating an audience of only 100 people and one capable of accommodating many thousands such as the Arena”.


That is the Manchester Arena.

The stated aim of the consultation on which those comments were based, said Sir John,

“is for ‘light touch’ regulation. While that may be justified when dealing with smaller venues, it seems to me that different considerations should apply to larger commercial premises. Not only are the potential consequences so much more serious but, for that reason, these premises are more likely to attract the attention of terrorists. They are also likely to have greater resources to put protective measures in place”.

In the final part of what I regard as a very important quotation from Saunders, he says, at paragraph 8.45:

“I recommend that when considering the shape of the legislation, the government considers whether it will be necessary to have further categories above the 100 capacity. While categorising by capacity may be the most straightforward way of deciding on the nature of the Protect Duty to be imposed, there may be other factors that need to be considered. For example, it may be appropriate to use different capacities depending on whether the venue is indoors or outdoors. This will need to be considered”.


I also know, as many other Members of this Committee will know, that Figen Murray and those such as Brendan Cox, who have been the backbone of her campaign, have researched these matters with care, and they were asking, on the basis of the evidence they obtained, for a lower figure of 100. I accept that we have to have some figure, but it must not be one which is part of the encouragement or playbook of terrorists.

The Government have accepted that that figure of 100, which Sir John Saunders had in mind and which was adopted by Mrs Murray, should be raised to 200 and have nuanced the legislation in various parts of this Bill, exactly as Sir John Saunders anticipated and recommended should be done. I therefore believe that this is a reasonable balance and that we should now recognise that this is a proportionate and nuanced provision and stop playing about with these numbers.

[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

My Lords, I too recognise that inevitably we have got to fix a figure, and that is for this House and/or another place to do. I would just like to say one thing about Amendment 8, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, where he says,

“if smaller, the Secretary of State determines”.

One has to see the reality of that, which is that this would probably happen anyway—although I support his amendment—to the extent that how or why would the Secretary of State intervene? He would intervene only because of intelligence.

We have to remember that it is not just what we all think in here. Our intelligence services have kept us safe—touch wood—we are told from many planned incidents over the last few years. Therefore, regardless of the number being six or 800, we rely on them to come through and tell us where the threat is. We have been talking about whether it is a small premises that is attractive to terrorists or a large one, or whether it is a significant name of an event or whether it is the people attending. They will go first to find a target that will gain them the maximum amount of attention. They then say, according to what happened with us and I am sorry to go back to it, “Which one is easy for us to go for?”.

We cannot decide that in here. But we must put the numbers down. I agree with Amendment 8 from the point of view that it recognises that the Secretary of State must have the power to intervene on any event, and not just necessarily the Secretary of State but the police and the intelligence that leads to some form of action on it. So I do support the amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased that we are having this debate. I am not going to decry the three previous groups, but this actually comes to the nub of what I suspect what this Committee stage will be about.

I listened very carefully to what the noble Viscount just said. I have to say that it is quite possible that, under any set of circumstances, the police or the security service will have identified a high risk. Under those circumstances, I hope they would intervene and I hope the organisers would take it extremely seriously and respond—and actually, I suspect that in every single case they would. But the fundamental issue, which is raised by this set of amendments, is not what is the burden of this but what is the risk appetite that the people who are organising this event, and that we as a nation have, about the event concerned?

Every organisation, when it considers its risk register, will consider its risk appetite: what are we prepared or not prepared to tolerate? This figure is, of course, arbitrary. It could be 100; my personal belief is that it should have remained as 100, but the Government consulted very widely, listened to the views that were expressed and came up with this number. So we are presented with 200. A terrorist attacking a premises of 199 is potentially going to kill a very significant number—as many as were killed at the Manchester Arena. They may not be able to injure quite as many as at the Manchester Arena, but they could cause immense damage.