(1 week, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, contrary to Amendment 129, I think that the Bill gets it right in requiring, at Clause 4(3), that the voluntary assisted dying commissioner must hold or have held office as a judge of the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. This is quite clearly not a medical role. Its principal functions are to ensure that the statutory processes and safeguards that Parliament would have established are being adhered to.
However, we have to accept that a postholder having been a judge does not automatically mean that they will not come with personal views about the scope of the law that Parliament has passed. Therefore, the debate that the Committee has just had on how to make sure that there is transparency about the views that such an individual might hold before their appointment is ratified has merit.
For example, I was very struck by an important interview that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, the former President of the Supreme Court, gave in Prospect magazine in December 2024. She recorded that, in the case, for example, of Tony Nicklinson back in 2014, who wanted it to be declared that it was lawful for people to assist him to take his own life because he had a disabling illness but was not terminally ill, two Justices of the Supreme Court
“would have been prepared to make a declaration that the current law on assisting suicide was incompatible with the Human Rights Convention”.
She went on to say:
“There were nine of us on the court. Of that, five of us took the view that when the time was right, the court might make such a declaration of incompatibility. But three of those five thought the time was not yet right”.
I infer from that that—at that particular point in time, anyway—five Justices of the Supreme Court would have taken the view that the Bill before us, if passed by Parliament, would fall foul of their reading of the European convention.
It is helpful to think about the mechanisms by which Parliament could know the views of such judges, were they to be put forward for appointment as the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. The thrust of Amendment 127 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, therefore has merit. It would require, for example, pre-appointment hearings by one or more Select Committees in the House of Commons, which would give us an opportunity to probe these questions and make sure that a nominee was going to stick to the faithful implementation of the legislation that Parliament, after such careful deliberation, would have produced, rather than, for example, interpreting the role of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner as in some way akin to that of the Children’s Commissioner, which is clearly an advocacy role for the rights of children.
My Lords, this is a really important clause and a really important schedule. This is the one time when a judge, whether they are current or retired, will be involved in any of this process after the Commons chose to strip judges away from the original proposal. I have tabled stand part notices opposing Clause 1 and Schedule 4 because I would prefer a judge-led process; I have a lot of sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, articulated several weeks ago.
Let me say at the start that I disagree completely with the idea from the noble Baroness, Lady Cass, that this role should start to become like that of the Children’s Commissioner, the Victims’ Commissioner or similar. That is simply not the case, and not only because the legal powers in the Bill—in Clause 18, in particular— are where they must make judgments on whether there have been errors of law in the panellists’ determination. I am very keen, which is why I have tabled Amendment 913ZD, for us to get this back in focus, particularly in terms of the commissioner’s role, and to think about this person being a judge, not the Secretary of State.
I agree that it should be the Lord Chancellor so, to some extent, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that Select Committees of Parliament should be able to go through this process as well; it should be the Ministry of Justice and the relevant committee in the Commons. There is precedent here. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, who managed to get a determination role for the Treasury Committee so that it had, in law, a power of veto on the appointment of the chair of a body; I think it was the CMA, but I cannot quite recall it right now. So there is a precedent in this regard.
I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, just said. The Bill is right, in that it should be a retired judge. There are a lot of views and a variety of opinions on this. So far, only one retired judge, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has come out publicly against the Bill. Those who have expressed views are, as has just been articulated, very much in favour of the Bill; in fact, they think it should go a lot further. So some sensitivity will be required by whoever gets to make the decision on who the commissioner should be.
My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier would like this role to be done by His Majesty. There is a certain irony there. It is good to see so many Lords Spiritual here. I did try to see whether I could table an amendment to strip out, at the very beginning of the Bill,
“with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal”,
but the Lords Spiritual have already been very clear that they do not, and will not, consent to the Bill. Why, then, should we put the onus to make this appointment on the Supreme Governor of the Church of England? I appreciate that there have been some difficulties with the current Prime Minister and his appointments recently, but I would be surprised if anything quite so careless happened again with future appointments concerning this or other approaches. More broadly, I support their proposals to get this into the public appointments process.
On Amendment 134, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan completely in trying to prevent mission creep. That is a risk, which is why I have tabled Amendments 913ZA to 913ZD and 914A to 914C as probing amendments. Schedule 1 to the Bill says that, basically, the Secretary of State will hand over as much money as they see fit. They will decide on pay and pension arrangements and will give people offices—all the things one might expect of a sole corporation. As far as I can tell, none of the employees will be civil servants, unless they are seconded civil servants.