Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Stephen Doughty and James Brokenshire

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 5th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (James Brokenshire)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

This legislation is being introduced to keep our country safe and to ensure that our operational agencies and public authorities have access to the tools and intelligence that they need to keep us safe—safe from terrorists, safe from serious organised crime groups, and safe from others who wish to cause harm to our country and our citizens. Specifically, the Bill deals with participation in criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources—so-called CHIS. These are agents, or undercover officers, who help to secure prosecutions and disruptions by infiltrating criminal and terrorist groups.

Throughout history, those entrusted to uphold the law or safeguard national security have used covert human intelligence to support and progress their activity. From Sir Francis Walsingham’s use of informers to defend the reign of Elizabeth I from internal and external threats, to the deployments by the newly formed detective units of the Metropolitan police in the latter half of the 19th century, to the double-cross system in the second world war, covert human intelligence has always been a vital part of our national security and law enforcement framework.

More recently, though, CHIS have been critical in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots, drugs and firearms offences, child sexual exploitation and abuse, and other serious organised crime. Since March 2017, MI5 and counter-terrorism police have together thwarted some 27 terror attacks. As the director general of MI5 said when the Bill was introduced:

“Without the contribution of human agents, be in no doubt…these attacks would not have been prevented.”

I have been advised that between November 2018 and 2019 CHIS operations within the Metropolitan police area alone led to 3,500 arrests, the recovery of more than 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, the seizure of more than 400 kg of class A drugs, and the recovery of more than £2.5 million in cash. Similarly, CHIS operations in 2019 alone enabled the National Crime Agency to safeguard several hundred victims of crime, including from child sexual exploitation and abuse. This is an important and unique tactic; by working their way into the heart of criminal groups, CHIS are able to access intelligence that other investigatory powers may simply never detect.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Minister knows how seriously I take these matters and the equipping of our security services to do the job that they need to do, often in horrendous circumstances that affect the integrity of our country and its individuals, but he will also appreciate that safeguards have to be in place. What does he have to say to those who have raised serious concerns that the Bill, as it stands, does not have the safeguards in place to prevent assault, murder and torture, about which there is an absolute prohibition? He knows that we are a signatory to the convention on human rights, so what does he have to say on those matters?

[James Brokenshire]

I hope I will be able to respond to the hon. Gentleman during my speech, underlining some of the safeguards—the importance of oversight, which we attach equally to this Bill, and the operation of a criminal conduct authorisation, as contemplated by the Bill. I hope he will also have noted the specific reference to the Human Rights Act in the Bill, in order to underline some of the important points he makes about convention rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

I have drawn out the separate regime that operates in relation to the authorisation of, for example, undercover officers, as well as the tight remit, the ambit and some of the additional oversight that is provided in respect of that regime. Again, that is all subject to the supervisory nature of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and can, therefore, as with the provisions proposed through the Bill, be drawn out through that route. However, I will hopefully make some more progress and be able to get into how the Bill works and some of the further assurances. I may not be quite as generous with interventions, so that I can hopefully make progress and let other right hon. and hon. Members in.

The Bill amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by inserting a new section to provide a power for public authorities to grant a criminal conduct authorisation. Equivalent amendments are also proposed to the equivalent legislation in Scotland, subject to ongoing constructive engagement with the Scottish Government.

A CCA may be granted only where it is necessary for one of three statutory purposes: national security, the prevention or detection of crime, or in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK. It must also be proportionate to what it is seeking to achieve, and consideration must be given to whether the objective could be achieved by conduct that is not criminal. These authorisations will be tightly bound and granted by a highly trained and experienced authorising officer. They must also be compliant with our obligations under the Human Rights Act, including the right to life and the prohibition of torture or subjecting someone to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Again, I will expand a little further shortly.

A CCA can also apply only where the deployment or engagement of the CHIS has already been authorised under the existing section 29 of RIPA, and is subject to the limits that that section provides. As such, there is a two-stage process: first, the authorisation of the use of a CHIS and, secondly, the separate authorisation of that source to carry out criminal conduct in the tightly prescribed circumstances proposed by the Bill.

It is worth highlighting that, alongside the Bill, we have published draft provisions of the CHIS code of practice, which provides further detail as to how the authorisation process will work and the factors an authorising officer must consider before granting an authorisation. To be clear, all authorisations are precise and explicit. A CHIS will never be given unlimited authority to commit any or all crimes. The effect of an authorisation is to render the authorised conduct lawful. This model is consistent with the approach we have taken for other investigatory powers. Of course, where a CHIS commits any criminality outside the tight parameters of the authorisation, the prosecuting authorities can consider this in the normal way.

Members will understand that, because of the clandestine nature of their work, there are limits to what I can say publicly about the role that CHIS play in saving lives and property, without exposing sensitive information about their methods and techniques. I know that there are concerns about the Bill somehow providing a licence to kill or to commit torture. Let me be clear that there are upper limits to the activity that can be authorised under the Bill, and those are contained in the Human Rights Act. That includes the right to life and the prohibition of torture or subjecting someone to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is unlawful for any public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with the European convention on human rights, and the legislation makes clear that nothing in the Bill detracts from a public authority’s obligations under the Human Rights Act. Therefore, an act that would be incompatible with the ECHR could not lawfully be granted under this Bill.

We do not believe, however, that it is appropriate to draw up a list of specific crimes that may be authorised or prohibited. To do so would place in the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of identifying our agents and sources, creating a potential checklist for suspected CHIS to be tested against. That would threaten the future of the CHIS capability and result in an increased threat to the public. Protecting CHIS from prosecution will have achieved little if we cannot also protect them from being identified by the terrorist and criminal groups they inform against, placing them at personal risk.

[Stephen Doughty]

I am listening very carefully to what the Minister is saying, but will he be clear? This is all predicated on our continued membership of the European convention on human rights and on the Human Rights Act staying as it is, and at the moment we have an Attorney General who has made very clear her intentions towards both those instruments. Can he make it clear that we will stay in the ECHR and that the Human Rights Act will stay as the bedrock of the guarantees on this, but also that other international conventions we are signatories to, including the convention against torture, would also apply in restricting actions that could be authorised under this Bill?

[James Brokenshire]

I have been pretty clear about the way this Bill operates and the manner in which agencies and the different bodies that can be authorised are able to act. Clearly, I cannot bind this House for the future, but I am very clear that we stand by our ECHR commitments, which is why this has been expressed in the way that it has in the Bill. I hope that is helpful to him.