Football Governance Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Stephanie Peacock and Stuart Andrew

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart Andrew]

My hon. Friend is right. I genuinely think that this is an excellent Bill: it is considered, and it will achieve the objectives that we want. As I have said on so many occasions, when a football club goes into administration, it is not just the club that feels it, but the whole community, all the businesses supported by the club and its sense of identity.

I hope that whoever wins the election on 4 July will see this as a good Bill to crack on with, because it is important for the future of football and, crucially, for the future of football fans. They are the ones we have been thinking about through the whole process. They are the heart and centre of the Bill. I hope it will be taken up. I thank everybody for all their help and support.

[Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

I understand why we are adjourning, and I echo the Minister’s comments that that is with disappointment and a heavy heart, because the Football Governance Bill is so important to communities up and down the country. I know that from my own in Barnsley.

I have a few thank yous. I thank you, Ms Nokes, and the other Members who have chaired our sittings. I thank all the officials and stakeholders who have worked so hard on the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford for all her work on the fan-led review; I pay her huge tribute and wish her very well as she stands down from Parliament. I would like to say a big thank you and pay tribute to the Minister. It has been a real pleasure to shadow him: he has been courteous, polite and kind throughout. He has done a really good job and will be missed.

I would like to say a big thank you to everyone in my office, and particularly to Anna Clingan. We have done three Bill Committees together. It is not the easiest thing to do in opposition. We are watching wash-up very closely. A big thanks to all the staff who have worked incredibly hard on this. The Bill is incredibly important. I end by wishing everyone the very best.

Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Stephanie Peacock and Stuart Andrew

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stuart Andrew)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Ms Nokes.

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East thinks I can work that quickly, just in the time we had during the break, but I have committed to write to him. Work is going on among colleagues in the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, for example, but I will write to him with further details.

On the specific question of the hon. Member for Barnsley East about local information, she made an important point. Fans and other sources are able to provide information to the regulator about the suitability of their owners or officers should they wish to do so. It will of course be up to the regulator to determine the relevance and significance of any information provided to it, but the mechanism exists.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 to 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Determinations under sections 28 and 29: time limits

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 32, page 24, line 2, at end insert—

“(2A) A determination period as specified in subsection (2) should have an end date which is as soon as is reasonably practicable.”

This amendment would ask the Secretary of State to propose a timely end date to a determination period.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I welcome the principle of the clause. I will discuss that first, before moving to the amendment.

That decisions on ownership should be taken within a reasonable timeframe is right. Allowing the Secretary of State to set maximum time limits, alongside allowing for extensions where a case is particularly complex, seems a sensible way to go about ensuring that decisions are made in good time. Indeed, although I hope that I have set out my belief that the owners and directors test should be comprehensive, the purchase of any club is likely to be time sensitive. Circumstances are subject to changing quickly on both ends of a deal, and in many cases the right takeover deal can be the difference between a club surviving and not.

Oldham Athletic was in trouble after a period of severe turbulence that saw assets sold, staff unpaid and its main stand unable to be used for certain games due to a lease dispute. After a successful takeover, its new owner, local man Rothwell, cleared Oldham’s debts. Birmingham City and Wigan Athletic also appear to have reversed their fortunes thanks to new ownership. Birmingham City is now one step closer to a new stadium as St Andrew’s falls into disrepair, a long-term project that owners have promised will not be affected by relegation this season. In Wigan’s case, local businessman Mike Danson has appeared to stabilise the club after a period of losses on and off the pitch. Those examples show just how crucial the timing of ownership change can be for clubs in financial distress.

I welcome what the clause is trying to achieve, but I wonder whether it could go one step further. It is of note that the time limits in the clause are not accompanied by a general duty on the regulator to make determinations as soon as is reasonably practicable. That is why I tabled amendment 12. As the English Football League has argued, it is crucial that owners are able to sell their clubs when needed, particularly in instances of financial distress. Protracted takeovers can impact a club’s finances further, and they are hardly an advert for potential investors in clubs.

Given the fear some have expressed about the unintended consequences of the Bill on investment, it is important that the clause is watertight in ensuring that the time limits are truly seen as a maximum, rather than as a target. That is of particular concern given that the clause says that if the regulator does not make a determination within the time limit, it is automatically to be treated as having determined that the prospective owner or officer has failed the test. Again, I understand why that measure is in place—it is dangerous to allow a takeover where a person cannot be approved by the criteria set by the regulator—but we must ensure that the provision is protected against misuse. A regulator working in good faith would surely not time-out a test just to ensure an owner or officer is prevented from being granted a positive determination.

Protections should be built in to the legislation to ensure that it cannot be exploited. Not only is it built into the principles of the regulator to work efficiently, but it is within its general duties to avoid any adverse effects on financial investment in English football. I hope that the Minister will carefully consider amendment 12, which would ensure that determinations are made as expeditiously as possible, and recognise it as in keeping with the underpinnings of the regulator.

[Stuart Andrew]

The Government recognise the intent behind amendment 12, which is to ensure that the determination period is set at the right level so that the regulator makes a timely decision. Clause 32, which I will turn to shortly, provides that the determination period will be set in secondary legislation by the Secretary of State, who will have to consult such persons as she thinks appropriate when setting the period.

The purpose of the determination period is to provide more certainty to the industry about how long the determination of a new owner or officer will take, to incentivise new owners and officers to promptly provide the information the regulator needs to assess whether they are suitable, and to keep the process efficient. It is important to get the length of the determination period right. If it is too long, it could result in a slow and bureaucratic process, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East said, which could have a negative impact on investment. However, if decisions had to be taken too quickly, there would be a risk of them being less rigorous, and investors might worry about being failed because the clock runs out before the regulator can gather all the relevant information to make a decision.

The Government do not believe that amendment 12 is necessary because the Secretary of State will already consider those trade-offs, as well as other matters, including existing deadlines for comparable tests in other industries and the views of appropriate stakeholders. For example, we expect that the regulator will likely be consulted when the determination period is being set in regulations. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to support the hon. Lady’s amendment, and I hope she will withdraw it.

With regard to clause 32, football is a fast-paced industry, where clubs operate within constraints such as league seasons and transfer windows. Timely decision making about the suitability of new owners and officers is important for clubs’ financial sustainability. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, with a decision unable to be reached.

The regulator will need to conduct thorough scrutiny of new owners and directors, but it will also need to make decisions in an appropriate timeframe to ensure that clubs are not unnecessarily impacted in this fast-paced industry. That is why it will be subject to a statutory deadline when it tests the suitability of prospective owners and officers. The determination period will start when a person provides a complete application to be a new owner or officer of a regulated club. By the end of the period, the regulator must find the applicant suitable or unsuitable.

As well as providing certainty to the industry, the deadline will incentivise new owners and officers to provide the information the regulator needs to assess suitability. If the regulator cannot decide before the initial deadline is met, it can extend the determination period. That will provide it with the necessary flexibility to gather more information to make a well-informed, but still timely, decision.

As I set out, the determination period, including the maximum amount of extra time, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. That will ensure that the regulator is bound by it but that there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in future. If the regulator cannot make a decision about a prospective new owner or officer before the period expires, the person will automatically be determined to be unsuitable. That means that only owners and officers that the regulator is confident are suitable will be allowed to get involved with clubs.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The amendment was simply intended to ensure that decisions on owners and directors are made with time sensitivity in mind. I appreciate the Minister’s comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Duties to notify IFR of change in circumstances relating to incumbent owner or officer

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart Andrew]

It is important for clubs’ sustainability that their incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable. That is why the Bill gives the regulator the power to test incumbents if it has grounds for concern about their suitability, to mitigate the risk of harm from individuals already in the system. To do so it needs to be aware of any material change in the circumstances of incumbent owners and officers that is relevant to their suitability.

The clause therefore places a duty on incumbent owners and officers, as well as regulated clubs, to notify the regulator when they consider there has been, or may have been, a material change in circumstances that is relevant to whether the individual is suitable to be an owner or officer of the club. For example, if an officer became subject to criminal or relevant civil proceedings that the regulator was not previously aware of, that would constitute a material change in circumstances.

The notification must include certain matters listed in subsection (3), including an explanation of the material change in circumstances and why it is relevant to whether the owner or officer in question is suitable. If that information gives the regulator grounds for concern about the incumbent’s suitability, it can test them using the powers in clauses 34 and 35. If they are determined to be unsuitable, the regulator has a strong suite of powers to remove them. By ensuring that the regulator is aware of relevant material changes, we will better enable it to ensure that incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause mirrors the notification requirements for prospective owners and officers, requiring incumbent owners and officers to go through the same process of notifying the regulator in the event of a material change that might affect their suitability. This is an important provision that will ensure that owners and directors cannot circumvent the standards set out in the tests after their appointment. I certainly think it is the intention that the tests should act as the beginning of an ongoing compliance with the standards by owners and clubs, rather than the end.

If an owner or officer becomes subject to criminal proceedings, or new information comes to light about a criminal source of their wealth, it is only right that their suitability should be reviewed by the regulator. For example, the owner and chairman of Fleetwood Town FC was recently found guilty of defrauding creditors, false representation and being concerned with the retention of criminal property. The multimillion-pound fraud operation, which duped firms into expensive energy contracts, earned him jail time amounting to 13 years. Of course, in that case, Mr Pilley resigned following his conviction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners who are already in place at clubs. It limits the regulator to testing where there is concern about an owner’s suitability. That will allow the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable owners already in the industry, while recognising that there are suitable owners already in the system who do not need to be tested. If the regulator has information that gives it concern about the fitness of incumbent owners, those owners can be assessed to ensure that they have the requisite honesty and integrity and are financially sound to own a club.

If the regulator has information that gives it grounds for suspicion, incumbent owners can also be tested on their source of wealth to establish whether it is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking and fraud. The regulator will not remove incumbent owners because of mere suspicion about their source of wealth; rather, an incumbent owner must be treated as unsuitable if the regulator is more sure than not that the source of wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test incumbent owners where a risk of harm arises. Clauses 39 to 44 provide the regulator with the powers needed to remove unsuitable owners, allowing the regulator to address such risks. That will help ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term, benefiting football now and into the future.

Clause 35 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent officers who are already in place at clubs. It limits the regulator to testing where there is concern about their suitability. That will allow the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable officers already in the industry, while recognising that there are suitable officers already in the system who do not need to be tested. Again, if the regulator has information that gives concern about their fitness, incumbent officers can be tested to ensure that they have the requisite honesty, integrity and competence and are financially sound enough to continue in their role. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test those incumbent officers, and clauses 39 to 42 provide the regulator with the powers needed to remove them if necessary. That will help ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term.

Finally, on clause 36, the regulator’s ability to test or re-test incumbent owners and officers will prevent unsuitable custodians from harming clubs over the long term, not just at the point of entry. The Government are aware that a finding that an incumbent owner or officer is unsuitable brings about significant consequences for that person and may cause concern for the club or fans. That is why, when the regulator is minded to fail an incumbent owner or officer, clause 36 requires it to give them and the relevant club an opportunity to make representations before making its final decision. That will allow an owner or officer an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable, ensuring that the regulator has all relevant information available to it and allowing it to make better decisions and ensure that the regime is more effective.

I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I have no major issues with the clauses, so in the interests of not repeating what the Minister outlined, I will simply welcome them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Matters relevant to determinations

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is incredibly important that if the regulator is going to take on responsibility for conducting the owners and directors tests, it is also given the teeth to enforce the outcome of those tests. I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss those powers.

I will speak to each clause in the group in turn, starting with clause 38, on disqualification orders. In some circumstances, a test may reveal that not only is the person in question unsuitable to be an owner or officer of a particular club, but their record is such that they should not be considered for such a role again. I agree with the principle of the clause, which is to ensure that tests are not unnecessarily duplicated and to protect multiple clubs from the same issue.

On clause 39, if the regulator has determined an owner of a club is not suitable, it is right that it is bound to give a direction requiring that person to take reasonable steps to cease being an owner. That binds the regulator to the outcome of its test, rather than giving it discretion over whether a negative determination results in the departure of an incumbent owner. I have a few questions about what that would mean in practice. I am curious to hear the Minister’s take on what taking “all reasonable steps” to cease ownership might involve. It surely implies that a person needs to sell their shares, but what if they are unable to find a buyer? Would they be required to give the club away if there was no willing purchaser? Furthermore, if there is a buyer but they offer a price below market value, or a value that would result in big losses for an owner, would the person still be forced to sell?

The answers to those questions, and a clear direction on the application of the clause, is important for two distinct reasons. First, it matters because this process may have a knock-on effect on people’s willingness to invest in football clubs. Secondly, it matters for the sustainability of the club and its fans. It is important that the club is in the right hands for the right price, or this entire part of the Bill on owners will be undermined. I hope the Minister can today, or in due course, provide some further information on how clause 39 will work in practice.

Clause 40 largely mirrors the removal directions for owners, but applies them to officers. How the clause will work in practice is less complex, as the removal of officers is less likely to hinge on the finances of an outside party. I am also satisfied that the alternative officer arrangements in clause 42, to appoint an interim officer, might mitigate any problems with an officer’s removal.

Clause 41 provides an important protection against unsuitable officers or owners carrying out activities that might negatively impact the club in the long term. When it comes to actions that have an impact on a club’s future, it is right that anyone who has been identified as a potential harm to a club can be limited in those areas if needed.

Finally, I welcome clause 43, which gives the regulator the ultimate power to ensure that a person ceases to be an owner when they have failed to comply with orders given under powers in this part. That power is complimented by the safeguards and notice provisions in clause 44.

[Stuart Andrew]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments.

As I said, if the regulator deems that a current owner is unsuitable, it would first direct them to leave the club in the specified timeframe. During that period, the regulator will have available several powers to safeguard the club from further harm. However, as the hon. Lady rightly said, there is a risk that an unsuitable owner does not comply with the directions. For instance, they may refuse to leave the club or may continue to use their position as owner to damage the club. In those situations, the regulator will have the powers to directly remove the unsuitable owner from the club.

The hon. Lady makes a point about cases in which there is a failed incumbent owner but no new prospective buyer for the club. By conducting strong statutory tests on prospective owners, the regulator will ensure that clubs are run by suitable custodians and that unsuitable owners can be stopped at the point of entry. That will help to reduce the risk of unsuitable owners entering the industry.

The wider regulatory system of financial regulation and improved governance will further put clubs on a more sustainable footing, which should ensure that clubs are attractive as investments for prospective buyers. If an owner wishes to sell, or is required to sell by the regulator, the club should therefore be a much more attractive asset.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, that is true, and it is true for all of us and anyone who takes a wage, but I think it is a rather unfair expectation to put upon players. I am not sure that I accept the hon. Member’s argument, but obviously, if he has strong views on this issue, he can make a speech when I have concluded.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East set out, there are two main components in football, and they are the players and the fans. I think it is incredibly curious that this Bill does not mention players at any point. That is why I am making the case for these amendments.

I will draw my remarks to a close in a moment. I would just like to share a few other examples with the Committee. To give a troubling example, we will all remember that, following the penalty shoot-out at the Euro 2020 final, a wave of racist social media abuse was aimed at certain players. Ensuring a duty of care to protect players from abuse deserves its own conversation, but I think it is relevant to raise. It is not right that players are not given any say in relation to prohibited competitions, but could be told that they must compete in one—only to face the wrath of fans afterwards. Football is for the fans, of course, but it cannot exist without the players. I therefore encourage the Minister and members of the Committee to consider the benefit of player input on the regulator’s decision making in that area. Given that fans and the FA will already be consulted for their views, it would only require a simple change to the legislation. I hope that we can all get behind amendment 13 to strengthen the clause as much as possible.

Amendment 22, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, would strengthen the duty of the regulator to understand the view of fans, so that the full impacts of any particular competition are considered. As the European Super League attempt showed, the consequences of a closed competition, where qualification is not based on merit, are plenty. It is therefore important that the full range of impacts is considered. Is the Minister satisfied that the current wording will ensure that, or is amendment 22 needed to require the regulator to take everything into account when gathering the views of relevant stakeholders?

[Stuart Andrew]

Amendments 21 and 13 would require the regulator to determine and have regard to the views of club staff and players, placing them on equal footing with the club’s fans for the purposes of clause 45. I do not believe that the inclusion of players and club staff is necessary here. The Bill is designed to protect and promote the sustainability of clubs so that they continue to serve the interests of their fans in local communities, who have been around far longer than any owners and will be around long after those owners have moved on. That is why clause 45 requires the regulator to determine and consider the views of fans.

A decision to prohibit a competition may also impact a wide range of other stakeholders, which is why the clause already requires the regulator to

“consult such other persons as”

it

“considers appropriate.”

That allows for consultation with a broad range of potential stakeholders. If the regulator considers players and staff of regulated clubs to be an appropriate group, it must consult them. It is right that the regulator has the discretion to make the judgment.

Amendment 22 seeks to draw out that when the regulator is determining the views of fans about a competition being prohibited, it must include their views on the full impact of the competition being prohibited. Specifying that in the Bill is unnecessary as it is already implicit that fans would consider the potential impacts as part of reaching a view on a competition’s prohibition. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the amendment will be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, the purpose of the Bill has been tightly focused to feature those particular issues. We have a fine balance to ensure that we do not upset or get into challenges with UEFA and FIFA, and it is for football to make some of the decisions that it has made, but I would expect that, as the provisions in the mandatory conditions say, clubs will consult their fans on decisions on match days.

The extension to clubs regulated in the past 10 years will stop them circumventing the rules by withdrawing from existing competitions in order to join a new breakaway competition. The regulator is expected to prohibit competitions on the basis of the predetermined, proportionate and transparent framework based on the prescribed factors set out in legislation. That will provide up-front clarity to the industry and means that new competitions will not just be prohibited outright. That is important to ensure that the regulator does not unduly stand in the way of innovation in the market—for example, like when the old First Division became the Premier League in 1992.

The clause requires the regulator, when deciding whether to prohibit a competition, to consider several factors, including whether the competition is merit based, operates on the basis of fair and open competition, jeopardises the sustainability of English football’s existing competitions or the clubs in those competitions or harms the heritage of English football. Of course, football belongs to its fans, so the regulator will also determine and consider the views of fans in England and Wales before prohibiting a competition. As the national governing body for football, the FA will be consulted before the regulator prohibits any competition, and the regulator will also consult anyone else it considers appropriate. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Apart from my amendments, which I had hoped would strengthen clause 45, I am pleased to offer my support more generally for the clause. I will not repeat my remarks from previous debate, but given the fallout from the so-called Super League attempt, the Bill is absolutely right to make provisions around prohibited competitions.

However, I have three remaining questions on wording that I hope the Minister can clarify. The clause provides that a club will not be able to join a prohibited competition so long as it has been regulated in the last 10 years. However, that does not apply retrospectively, so if a club has never been regulated—as is the case now, before the Bill passes—the rules cannot be enforced. That has sparked concern that clubs might form a breakaway league before the Bill passes and the regulator will be left unable to enforce its own rules. Will the Minister confirm whether the regulator will have any power to act in such a situation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

The regulatory framework is not a zero-failure regime. Therefore, it is possible that football clubs may enter administration despite the best efforts of the regulator. We would of course, hope that this is rare. There already exists a legal framework for companies—and that includes football clubs—to enter into administration, which is detailed in the Insolvency Act 1986, and in many cases this existing framework has enabled clubs to go into administration and re-emerge as solvent clubs. It should be noted that those clubs often re-emerge in a lower league as a result of the sporting sanctions placed on them by the competition organisers.

Given that the existing administration regime seems to work well in relation to appointments initiated by creditors, it is not necessary for the regulator to cut across that process. However, there are occasions where the administration of a club is not initiated by creditors but by the club itself. A club can appoint administrators directly, and so does not require a court to sanction the appointment in advance. In those circumstances, there have been occasions in which some stakeholders have had cause to question the relationship between the insolvency practitioner appointed as administrator and the football club.

That is why, in those specific circumstances, the appointment of an administrator requires the regulator’s approval to ensure that the process is transparent and to avoid conflicts of interest. Such approval should give all stakeholders, particularly fans, more confidence in the system and more confidence that the outcome is the best available, in the circumstances, for the individual club.

The requirement to seek approval from the regulator for the appointment of an administrator applies to clubs that have a licence, and those that should have a licence but for whatever reason do not, as well as clubs that were formerly regulated within the previous five years. That is included to ensure that clubs are not deliberately run so that they are no longer in the leagues that the regulator has oversight of, to then take advantage of being an unregulated entity to appoint an administrator without approval of the regulator.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause sets out that regulated clubs and clubs that have been regulated at any point in the last 10 years must seek approval from the regulator before appointing an administrator. I understand that this measure is needed to offer protection against rushed insolvencies that end up having adverse effects. It is also needed so that club owners are not able to appoint firms or people they have connections to as administrators in an attempt to manipulate the administration. Although we hope that, with the regulator’s guidance, fewer clubs will face administration, it is important that, if the worst happens, proper administrators, without conflicting interests, are appointed to oversee the process. I therefore support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

That is a very good question, and I feel my officials thinking, “Not another letter!” If the hon. Gentleman does not mind, we will write to him. I apologise to my officials, who have enough on their plate, but I want to make sure I am not saying something that is not correct.

The existing FA rule has been used to prevent name changes that have been proposed in the past against the wishes of fans, as happened at Hull City, for example. Codifying that as a legal duty will mean that there are additional powers to ensure that clubs do not make changes without proper approvals and to respond to instances of non-compliance. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Heritage assets are incredibly important to a football club and its fans. They carry the history of where the club is based, what its identity is and the journey fans have been on through the years, in victory and loss. It is therefore pleasing that, in the light of the fan-led review, the FA has updated its rules on changes to club heritage assets. Those rules, supported by the clause, will hopefully ensure that a majority of fans are in favour of a change.

It is not just fans who will benefit from owners not being able to make unilateral changes to heritage items. There have been cases of clubs changing badges and crests without consultation, only to find that fans dislike them and will not buy replica kits or merchandise. Avoiding such situations is beneficial for people on all sides.

I know that some fan groups and Fair Game are disappointed that fans will not have a direct say over changes to a club’s name, because that is done via the FA. However, the FA told us in evidence that it consults fans as part of the name change process, so it would be good if the Minister can confirm whether he thinks that that is adequate.

The clause offers the bare minimum of fan engagement. Clubs can and must build on it through the consultation requirements in other clauses, forging ongoing listening exercises with their supporters on relevant matters. In many ways, therefore, this measure should be seen as a backstop, ensuring that a club cannot be stripped of its identity against the wishes of fans. In that context, I am pleased to welcome it.

[Stuart Andrew]

I absolutely have confidence that the FA rules will apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Duty to notify of changes in circumstances relevant to the IFR’s functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart Andrew]

In order to regulate clubs effectively, the regulator will need the complete picture of each club. Complete transparency and timely updates will allow the regulator to stay abreast of any relevant changes. That is why clause 50 imposes a duty on all regulated clubs to notify the regulator of any material changes in circumstances relevant to the regulator’s functions as soon as reasonably practicable. For example, the club’s finances might have materially changed, or the club might no longer comply with the licence condition. The self-reporting will facilitate the regulator’s ongoing real-time monitoring of clubs.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 50 ensures that a club notifies the regulator if there is a relevant material change in circumstances affecting the club and, again, we must be clear what “material change” means. However, it is absolutely right that if a shift in a club’s nature, behaviour or external context might impact compliance with its duties under the regulator, the regulator should know about that as soon as possible. I have no issues to raise with clause 50.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Duty to publish a personnel statement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart Andrew]

The owners and officers who control and run football clubs are vital for clubs’ sustainability. The regulator therefore needs to know who is running a club behind the scenes, so that it can implement the regime. The Bill requires licensed clubs to prepare a personnel statement and submit it to the regulator for approval. A personnel statement must outline each of the club’s owners and the club’s ultimate owner; officers and the job description of each officer; and senior management and their roles at the club.

Once the statement has been submitted, the regulator will review it and decide whether to approve or modify it. Any modification must be made in consultation with the club to ensure that the statement is accurate. Once the statement is approved by the regulator, clubs must publish it online, increasing transparency and accountability in football. Subsequent statements must be submitted to the regulator if an old statement becomes out of date, such as after the departure or hiring of an officer.

[Stephanie Peacock]

During our discussion of clause 16, I spoke about the importance of clubs publishing personnel statements. By identifying exactly who holds key positions, including owners and officers, the regulator will be absolutely clear who must be held accountable for the proper fulfilment of licence conditions at each football club. With that in mind, I am pleased to support clause 51.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Duty to pay a levy

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

When the fan-led review first proposed the creation of an independent regulator for football, it suggested that the most logical way to pay for it would be through a levy on those who would benefit from it: the clubs. I agree with that conclusion, and I am pleased that the Bill confirms that the regulator will be able to require licensed clubs to pay an annual levy.

However, even though clause 52 is relatively detailed, there is surprisingly little on how the levy will be split between the clubs themselves. That is something that amendment 30, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, has sought to rectify. If the regulator is given wide discretion to determine the extent of the levy, clubs further down the pyramid might be concerned that their payments will not be proportionate to their wealth and size. Of course, clause 52 states that the regulator should have regard to the financial resources of each club and the competition it operates in. That is promising, but it is worth clarifying today what that is expected to mean in practice. Will decisions be based on broadcast incomes, as per the fan-led review, or just on average total revenue, as per the White Paper?

There is broad agreement that the richest clubs should subsidise regulation for others. The majority of costs should, in this case, fall on Premier League clubs. The Government identified that these clubs could pay about 80% of the cost, with the six richest clubs taking on 50% of the total cost. The regulator will ultimately dictate the shape of the levy, but it should be under a clear direction to ensure that the levy is progressive and proportionate. It hardly makes sense for a regulator focused on financial sustainability to shackle struggling clubs to paying large fees. It is important that clubs do not fear the introduction of the new regime and view it as an opportunity, rather than being scared into thinking it will be a hindrance.

Clause 53 requires the regulator to consult before making the levy rules. That will include taking input on a draft version of the rules from the Secretary of State, the Treasury, regulated clubs and other appropriate persons. That welcome measure will hopefully shape the levy rules in a progressive way. It is also right that the regulator must publish information about the costs involved in calculating the levy charge before it starts charging in any given year. That transparency will be important, particularly for the clubs, which will want to understand exactly what they are paying for and why.

Overall, I welcome the levy and the method of payment, and I look forward to clarification on how the Minister expects the levy will be set.

[Stuart Andrew]

The Government understand that the intent behind the amendment is to create certainty about how the regulator’s levy charges will be distributed between clubs. The clause gives the regulator the necessary discretion to determine how the levy is calculated and the individual charges to be paid by clubs. The Government do not have the information or datasets required to determine the appropriate way to calculate levy payments, but those will be available to the regulator. Therefore, the regulator, rather than Government, will be best placed to determine how to distribute levy charges across clubs. Importantly, that reinforces the regulator’s operational independence.

I strongly support the objective that levy charges should be affordable to clubs, which is why there is already provision that should ensure that. However, requiring the regulator to be guided by a percentage of a club’s annual revenue in its levy calculations could undermine its ability to ensure that the charges are proportionate and affordable. In addition to revenue, the regulator should have the discretion to take into account clubs’ other financial resources when determining levy payments, which may be a more appropriate indicator of what a club’s charges should be. That could include resources such as owners’ funds, but also the offset of club expenditure.

Clause 52 already provides assurance that the regulator must take into account clubs’ differing financial circumstances. That includes clubs’ financial resources and the leagues that club teams play in, as that ultimately has a direct link to revenue. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the amendment from the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, so I hope he will withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

Amendment 23 will correct a cross-reference in the Bill, to ensure that clause 54(1)(b) correctly refers to section 24.

Clause 54 outlines the circumstances in which a relevant league must notify the regulator whether, for example, it believes or suspects that a club has breached one of the league’s own rules that is relevant to the regulator’s regime. The clause also requires that a relevant league consult the regulator when it is considering changing its own competition rules where a rule is relevant to the regulator’s regime. Just as the regulator is required to consult the industry in certain circumstances, these duties on relevant leagues will ensure appropriate notification and consultation in the other direction, too. If a relevant league has certain pertinent information, given its knowledge and understanding of the football industry, it must tell the regulator. Equally, if the relevant league is intending to take certain action that might impact on the regulator’s regime, it must engage with the regulator. That will allow for co-operative regulation whereby information is pooled and action can be co-ordinated. That should help both the regulator and the relevant leagues to deliver their respective regulations more effectively, and ultimately minimise the overall burden on clubs.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 54, with the correction made by amendment 23, is one of the only measures in the Bill that directly places duties on competition organisers. As I have made clear throughout these Committee proceedings, I believe it is extremely important that the regulator has a constructive relationship with existing football governance structures where possible, and that they work together to ensure a coherent regulatory regime. This clause will ensure that by placing a clear duty on competition organisers to keep the regulator updated on the enforcement of its own rules, as well as on areas where they might have information that overlaps with the regulator’s remit.

It is good to see, for example, that competition organisers will report to the regulator on any risk to financial resilience, as well as on any breach of specified competition rules and any subsequent sanctions they are placing on clubs. Competitions will also have to consult the regulator before adding to their own rules; this, again, is a positive step which will hopefully prevent any such rules from undermining the regulator.

However, I do think there needs to be further consideration for how the respective regimes will work when rules and regulation overlap. Ultimately, although the regulator will be consulted on new rules, competition organisers have the final say. The Government’s White Paper says:

“Where rules of industry bodies stray into the Regulator’s remit, the Regulator would have oversight to ensure that regulations are coherent and effective.”

I would like to ask the Minister, therefore, whether he thinks that the regulator has all the powers it needs to make sure that the landscape is coherent and effective when there is crossover. This is important for all of those who enforce rules in football, as well as for clubs.

[Stuart Andrew]

I can confirm that I am confident.

Question put and agreed to.

Amendment 23 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55

PART 6: OVERVIEW AND INTERPRETATION

Football Governance Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Stephanie Peacock and Stuart Andrew

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stuart Andrew)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. Starting with clause 15, one of the regulator’s main responsibilities will be to operate a licensing system for football clubs through which the majority of its regulation will be delivered. The licensing regime will cover all football clubs that have a team playing in any competition specified by the Secretary of State in regulations. It is proposed that it will cover the top five leagues of the English football pyramid, but that is subject to the Secretary of State’s discretion and parliamentary approval. I will use “specified competitions” as shorthand to denote those competitions covered by the regime. That means that football clubs will require a licensed, lawfully operated team in any of the specified competitions. A licensing system to enact regulation is not a new idea, with sectors such as communications, finance and healthcare all operating such a system.

The clause sets out the requirement for clubs to have a provisional or full operating licence, and the regulator’s power to grant those licences, subject to clubs passing the relevant tests, which are established in the following clauses. The licence will enable the regulator to regulate clubs through licence conditions set out later in the Bill. This will enable proportionate regulation tailored to clubs rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. An operating licence will specify which club the licence relates to, the team that the club is operating and any conditions attached to the licence.

I will move on to clause 16. The introduction of a football regulator into a previously unregulated sector will be a substantial change to the industry, but a necessary one to safeguard the future of English football. In order to provide for a graduate transition to being a fully licensed club, a club will initially apply to the regulator for a provisional operating licence. We see that as the natural first step to attaining a full operating licence. That will give clubs time to adapt to the regulatory system and make the necessary changes without being unfairly penalised for not being able to raise standards overnight.

The application for a provisional licence requires basic information on the club’s owner or owners, officers and senior management as well as a strategic business plan detailing things such as the estimated costs of the club and how they are expected to be funded. The regulator should look to make that process as simple and straightforward as possible, assisting clubs with their applications where necessary. It will be aware of the possible constraints on smaller clubs lower down the football pyramid. We envisage that the majority of clubs will meet the test for a provisional operating licence through the submission of basic information and documentation, and showing a readiness and willingness to work with the regulator to meet the mandatory licence conditions and free-standing duties.

Clause 17 outlines the granting of a provisional operating licence that will allow the club to operate for a time-limited period. That may be up to three years initially, although it could be shorter or extended depending on the circumstances. The provisional period will allow the regulator time to assess the current standing of the club and determine what steps it will need to take to obtain a full operating licence as well as giving the club time to take the necessary steps. The provisional licence will ensure that all clubs under the remit of the regulator meet basic fundamental requirements, in the mandatory conditions, that will help to safeguard the club’s sustainability and heritage.

There are three aspects of the test to grant a provisional operating licence. First, the club must operate a relevant team in a specified competition, which effectively means that the club must be in scope of the regulator. Secondly, the club will comply with the mandatory licensing conditions attached to the licence by the regulator. Full details of the mandatory licence conditions are in schedule 5 to the Bill, but they encompass a financial plan condition, a corporate governance statement, a fan consultation condition and an annual declaration condition. Thirdly, the club will comply with the duties on clubs as set out in part 5 of the Bill. If the regulator is not satisfied that the club passes all elements of the test, the clause gives a club the opportunity to engage with the regulator to rectify the issues identified. That collaborative approach will aim to ensure that clubs are given every opportunity to meet the requirements and gain a provisional operating licence.

Clause 18 states that in order to pass the test for a full licence, the regulator must be satisfied that a club is meeting the threshold requirements as set out in schedule 4 and that the club is complying and will continue to comply with the mandatory licensing conditions and free-standing duties on clubs set out in part 5. The regulator must also not have determined that any person who is an owner or officer of a club is unsuitable for the position they hold.

Clause 18 also details the power of the regulator to extend the provisional operating licence for a club. That will be done only if the regulator believes that the club does not meet the bar for a full licence at present, but will if given more time. As set out later in the Bill, the regulator will be able to sanction a club if it has to extend its provisional licence. Once a club has a full licence, it will not have to be periodically reviewed. Instead, the regulator would continue to monitor and supervise the club, and there will be an annual touchpoint in the form of the annual declaration, where the club will notify the regulator of any changes within the club over the past year that are relevant to the regulator. That is intended to minimise burdens while still ensuring that the club continues to adhere to the necessary requirements, including requirements that ensure that fans’ best interests are at the heart of the club’s decision-making process.

Clause 19 details the revocation of a club’s provisional operating licence for failing to progress to a full licence, as well as when the licence ceases to have an effect. For a provisional operating licence to be revoked, the regulator must satisfy itself of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if given more time. The regulator should be engaging with the club throughout that period, and we expect that through constructive dialogue, a solution that avoids that drastic step can be found in all but the most serious cases. The regulator must notify the club of its decision and provide its reasoning. To reduce as much as possible the regulator’s impact on ongoing sporting competitions, a revocation must not be before the end of the current season.

A licence will cease to have effect only if the club ceases to operate a relevant team. The most likely cause of cessation of an operating licence is that a club has been relegated from a specified competition and is therefore no longer in the scope of the regulator.

I understand the intention behind new clause 8, which would require the regulator to provide clubs with “reasonable and proportionate assistance” as they engage and comply with the licensing system. However, I can reassure the hon. Member for Sheffield South East that the Bill already achieves that in principle. It is already implicit that any good regulator should provide support and assistance to the regulated population as necessary, to aid their understanding and support compliance. But for the avoidance of any doubt, we have also explicitly codified that participative approach into the Bill through the regulatory principles. The regulatory principle in clause 8(b) encourages the regulator to

“so far as reasonably practicable, co-operate, and proactively and constructively engage, with…clubs”.

The regulatory principle in clause 8(c) encourages the regulator to be proportionate. Those two principles would encourage the regulator to provide clubs with assistance in engaging with the licensing system.

It is in everyone’s interest to maximise clubs’ compliance with the system and minimise burdens on them as much as possible. Indeed, ensuring a smooth transition and minimising burdens on clubs has been at the heart of our design of the licensing system. That is precisely why there is a two-step structure of provisional licences followed by full licences, with clubs given time and support to progress from one to the next.

[Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Sharma. I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss the content of the operating licences that will make up the regulator’s regime. As the Minister has said, clauses 15 to 19 set out the process for applying and granting both provisional and full operating licences. I would like to welcome a few things about these clauses.

First, I welcome the ability for clubs to gain a provisional licence first, with the conditions in this licence providing the building blocks for the full-time licence. This process recognises the importance of the transition period, allowing clubs to take the necessary time to understand the new requirements and get themselves in order to meet them if needed.

I also welcome that clause 16 clarifies that any club can apply for a provisional licence, allowing those expecting promotion to the National League to be proactive. Further, I am pleased that the process will require a personnel statement to be provided. That will be crucial in ensuring that the regulator is able to hold the right people accountable for the proper fulfilment of the licence at any given club.

The clauses allow for an advocacy first approach, where the regulator will provide an encouraging and flexible pathway for clubs to gain their licences. Coupled with the enforcement power in clause 19 to ensure that the regulator has the teeth it needs in the event of non-compliance, the process in this part of the Bill seems to offer a fair and supportive approach to getting clubs up to speed with the full requirements.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right to highlight in new clause 8 that clubs should be supported in their transition to becoming fully regulated. That is especially important for those clubs in the National League and the lower tiers of the English Football League. In his evidence to this Committee, Steve Thompson, the managing director of Dagenham & Redbridge told us he was

“really worried that the extra reporting…will be more than a lot of them can manage without taking on extra staff.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 14 May 2024; c. 39, Q61.]

He also highlighted that most clubs at National League level operate on one or two full-time staff, with some working on volunteers alone.

I think the Bill has done a good job of ensuring regulation will be proportionate. Further, I believe reporting requirements have been minimised wherever possible and should in any case be balanced out by the benefits of good financial planning and governance. However, given the concerns of clubs, I understand why some may feel it is better to make it explicit that the regulator will support clubs that are or will be licensed.

I hope the Minister can use this as an opportunity to highlight some of the ways in which the Bill as it stands will adopt an advocacy first approach and offer clubs the assistance they need to keep up with the regime. I do not believe it is anyone’s intention for the regulator to have to use its enforcement powers on well-intentioned clubs that are genuinely struggling to comply.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for that comment, which I will talk about later. I am sure that the Minister also heard it and will respond if he feels able to. For now, I ask the Minister to set out his thinking on why fans are not consulted on the heritage implications of moving a home ground. Overall, I welcome schedule 4 but would welcome a strengthening of the fan engagement provisions.

[Stuart Andrew]

Schedule 4 introduces the threshold requirements that clubs will have to meet to be granted a full operating licence. These are the three main areas of the regulator’s club licensing regime, which build on the freestanding duties and the mandatory conditions. Meeting the threshold requirements will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently and will be able to continue to operate sustainably in its financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas.

Although the threshold requirements are principles set in legislation, what each club must do to meet those requirements will not be the same. For example, what constitutes appropriate financial resources for a Premier League club will be very different from a League One club. A club might already meet the threshold requirements—for example, through naturally good operations or by complying with competition rules—in which case, the regulator will not need to intervene directly. If a club does not, the regulator can apply discretionary licence conditions to bring it up to the required threshold. That structure will allow for a proportionate system with requirements tailored to individual clubs, rather than the approach taken by the industry to date of blanket rules catering to the lowest denominator but applying to all.

The threshold requirement for financial resources means that clubs need an appropriate level of financial resources to support their long-term financial sustainability, accounting for their circumstances and risks. For example, that might include which competition the club competes in, its financial relationship with its owners, and the wider economic context in which it operates.

In particular, the regulator should take into account the club’s financial plan and its contingency plans for dealing with financial shocks. For non-financial resources, a similar requirement and process applies. “Non-financial resources” refers to things such as internal controls, systems and policies, as well as the information and people that the club has at its disposal. Although not financial in nature, those are important resources for any well-run club, so they need to be adequate. When assessing whether the resources are appropriate, the regulator might consider the skills and experience of the senior management and its corporate governance arrangements.

The threshold requirement for fan engagement requires that clubs adequately consult and consider the views of fans when making decisions relating to certain specified matters. As we heard from the FSA on Tuesday, this is the first time that there has ever been a requirement for fan engagement to this extent. The relevant matters are listed in the Bill and cover key off-pitch decisions, which the fan-led review highlighted as important to fans across the specified leagues. The threshold requirement is designed to work in tandem with the fan consultation mandatory licence condition. Through that condition, all clubs must regularly consult a representative group of supporters to discuss the relevant matters listed in the Bill, and that must be in place by the time a club receives a provisional licence.

Appropriate fan engagement will look different at every club and will partly be based on the size and complexity of the club’s fanbase. The threshold requirement has been designed to allow the regulator to recognise the inherent variation between clubs while ensuring that standards are raised where necessary.

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[Stuart Andrew]

The hon. Gentleman makes a really important point, which is why one of the mandatory conditions is good corporate governance. Some clubs do that extremely well, and he gives an example of one that may not be doing so well. For it to get a licence, the regulator would expect a minimum level of corporate governance.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 20 and schedule 5 provide us with the building blocks of a licensing regime. The Minister set out the mandatory licence conditions that all clubs must comply with in order to obtain a provisional or full licence. That will ensure that base-level requirements are fulfilled on key areas such as finances, corporate governance and fan engagement. I will speak briefly to each area in turn, and then address the amendments.

The first condition relates to financial plans. I will not spend too much time on it as we have already discussed financial resources. However, I believe that the requirement to submit a financial plan would be fundamental for clubs wanting to exercise best practice.

The second requirement is on corporate governance. As we just discussed, good corporate governance can help to deliver better business outcomes, improve the efficiency of decision making and demonstrate to stakeholders that a club is well managed, to the benefit of both fans and investors. Furthermore, as the Government’s White Paper says, poor governance can exacerbate financial issues, allowing reckless decisions to be made without challenge or scrutiny. Many clubs already engage in good corporate governance, and for those that are not, the introduction of requirements should genuinely help to move them towards best practice.

However, I have some questions about the content of the corporate governance code of practice, which will be published by the regulator and reported against by clubs. In particular, Fair Game and Kick It Out have questioned whether issues such as equality, diversity and inclusion will be included in the code. Indeed, the Government chose not to pick up the recommendation of the fan-led review to mandate EDI action plans through the licence regime, pointing instead towards enhanced industry assessments in that area.

I understand the need to ensure that existing structures that are working well are not disrupted, and to give the regulator a well-defined scope. Given the explicit focus that the regulator will have on good governance, however, it seems slightly odd to divorce the concept from the issue of EDI. The fan-led review said:

“Aside from a clear moral case, improving diversity is also a key aspect of driving better business decisions by football clubs. Diverse companies perform better”.

A football that welcomes everyone, then, is a football in which clubs have the best possible chance of success. But change is needed at almost every level for that to happen.

Kick It Out’s reporting statistics from last season show that it received a record 1,007 reports of discriminatory behaviour across the professional game, including a 400% increase in reports of sexism and misogyny. Meanwhile, in 2019, the law firm Farrer & Co found that across all professional football clubs only 7% of board directors were female. Just one club met the 30% target set for other industries, and only 7% have a woman in a leadership position on the board. Work must be done to address the problem across the board. I am keen to hear from the Minister about how whether issues such as EDI will form part of the governance code will ultimately be decided, and whether he has a view on whether they should.

I have spoken about fan consultation in detail during our discussions on schedule 4, so I will save repeating how important it is. However, I would like to raise some further concerns. Namely, I am disappointed that the Bill makes no provisions regarding supporters’ trusts, as noted by my amendment 19 and amendment 7 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby.

At the time of the fan-led review, 73 clubs had a community benefit society in the form of a supporters’ trust. Community benefit societies are incorporated co-operatives that conduct business for the benefit of their community. They must follow certain rules, including operating on a democratic basis and ensuring that any profits gained by a trust can only be reinvested into the club or returned to the community. Those minimum standards mean that CBSs in the form of supporters’ trusts operate with a broad level of consistency and reliability. Many of them have a long legacy of connecting with the local area, liaising with their club and organising on behalf of fans. Many trusts should therefore be viewed as an asset to the community that clubs can learn from and engage with positively. We saw that at first hand in our evidence sessions, with the insight that Action for Albion, Supporters’ Trust At Reading and Arsenal Supporters’ Trust brought us in respect of their clubs and the view of their communities.

I understand why the Bill has sought to ensure that fan engagement measures are not a one-size-fits-all. However, where trusts are established, I believe that clubs should consider them when forming their consultation processes. Amendment 19 would ensure that where a club’s fans have established a legally registered supporters’ trust, that body is considered for representation in the club’s fan consultation process. Clubs would not be bound by any hard-and-fast rules, but would be encouraged to consider the benefits of engaging relevant existing trusts.

That brings me to the broader issue of how fans will be selected for consultation. Amendment 7 suggests that fans are given a democratic mandate if they are to be consulted by the club regularly. That way they would have the backing of fellow fans, helping to avoid scenarios in which the fans are seen as a mouthpiece for the club directed at fans, rather than the other way round. I am keen to hear how the Minister thinks we can ensure that fans are both selected and treated fairly. Will there be standards or guidance on that specific issue?

Finally, I am pleased to touch on the annual declaration condition. Given that there is no requirement for licences to be renewed, it is right that there is a touchpoint for clubs with the regulator to ensure that everything is in order, but I have one brief question. The schedule outlines that the annual declaration must contain a summary of any “material change” at the club over the year. That phrase is used 11 times throughout the Bill, but its definition is not clearly set out. Will the Minister provide a working definition today, or write to me with one?

Overall, I am broadly happy with the contents of the clause and schedule, albeit with a few questions that I would like answering on governance code and on supporter involvement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

This is in relation to the mandatory conditions that all clubs have to meet under the regulatory regime. If the regulator identifies that a club is not meeting one of the mandatory conditions set out in the Bill on the financial side, it can apply its own discretionary conditions. If the league proposes a solution to the problem and the regulator believes that it will work, it can then allow the league to apply that. However, if the regulator feels that the proposal put forward by the league would not get that club up to the standards required, it can then impose its own rule. I hope that makes sense.

Schedule 6 outlines the procedure for when the regulator is minded to accept a commitment given by a competition organiser, and covers requests to vary an existing commitment. The schedule therefore expands on clause 24. As I say, if it does not accept the commitment, the regulator can impose the original conditions. The intention is that commitments could provide a less burdensome solution for all parties that still addresses the risk. However, for that to be the case, it is important that there is a clear procedure for the interaction between clubs, the relevant competition organisers and the regulator. Schedule 6 sets out that procedure in further detail. The notification processes and timings set out in the schedule allow clubs the opportunity to make representations before the regulator accepts a commitment or requested variation of an existing commitment from a competition organiser, and before the regulator releases a competition organiser from a commitment.

Finally, clause 25 sets out the procedure for the regulator to attach or vary non-financial discretionary licence conditions. Such conditions, set under the non-financial resources and fan engagement threshold requirements, will not be subject to the commitments procedure involving relevant leagues as outlined in the previous clauses. Instead, the procedure is that the regulator must notify only the club and give the club a period of no less than 14 days to make representations. As per previous clauses, this is an important safeguard to allow the club to make its case. However, the clause allows the regulator to take more immediate action in situations that are more urgent and serious. If the regulator believes that giving the club notice and allowing a period for representations will jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the discretionary licence condition immediately, without prior notice.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will start by briefly addressing the broad provisions around discretionary licence conditions in clauses 21, 22 and 23 together, before moving on to a discussion on commitments in lieu of licence conditions, covering clauses 24 and 25 and schedule 6.

Looking first at the discretionary licence conditions, clause 21 allows the regulator to attach licence conditions that are specific to a particular club. This allows the regulator a mechanism to put the principles of proportionality and consistency into practice: every club will be required to meet the threshold conditions for a full licence, providing us with consistency, but where a club falls short, the regulator’s response can be bespoke, allowing for proportionality.

Clause 22 provides strict limits as to what the discretionary licence conditions can cover, ensuring that they are focused on the areas in which they are most needed. Finally, clause 23 requires the Independent Football Regulator to notify a club, as well as the relevant competition organiser, about a proposed financial discretionary licence condition before attaching it to a licence. This is a sensible provision, which allows for a club and the regulator to remain in conversation unless there is an immediate risk that further delay would threaten the club’s financial sustainability.

I will move on to the idea of commitments in lieu of discretionary licence conditions. This requirement, which was not initially proposed as part of the fan-led review or the Government’s White Paper, says that the regulator must invite the relevant competition organiser to give a commitment to make a rule of its own instead of the proposed condition’s being attached to the particular club’s licence. I understand that the reasoning behind that provision is to ensure that competition impacts can be reduced, allowing a competition organiser to try to ensure that one club alone does not have to face a rule that other clubs do not. Further to that, it exists to offer competition organisers an opportunity to improve consistency across clubs in following good practice. However, despite that, a number of concerns about these clauses have been raised with me, so I hope that the Minister can provide some further context in answer to some of the following questions.

First, it would be good to have confirmation that this provision cannot be exploited to delay the regulator from imposing licence conditions. Consultation will be incredibly important as part of the regulator’s functions, but the regulator must have the teeth to make an executive decision where needed. In that vein, it would be good if the Minister could provide some insight on what these commitments might mean for rule primacy.

I understand that the regulator will have the final say on whether a commitment in lieu is accepted, and that the discretionary licence condition must be dropped while a commitment is in force, but it still remains the case that any accepted commitment will mean that both the regulator and competition organiser will have oversight and scope in the same area. That could see clubs paying twice for two sets of overlapping rules. Who has ultimate power in these cases?

Another area where clarification is needed is on the topic of commercial sensitivities. Although the Premier League is in many ways representative of clubs, it is also a competitor to clubs when it comes to gaining big sponsorship deals. Can the Minister confirm that the regulator will be alert to the ways in which discretionary licence conditions are discussed with competition organisers, so that sensitive information is not disclosed? Indeed, in cases involving such commercially sensitive information, it seems slightly odd to think that the competition organiser, which will not have the full picture, would be better placed to create a rule than the regulator itself, which will be privy to more of the financial details.

Finally, it is welcome that the relevant club will be consulted about a commitment in lieu beforehand, as per schedule 6, but, for the other clubs competing in a relevant competition, who will also be impacted by the commitment, there is no right to consultation. That might seem strange to clubs that have done what is required of them to meet the threshold requirements; they face being subject to further regulation due to the specific circumstances of another club’s finances, without a fair say in the matter. I should be grateful to the Minister, therefore, if he would set out how the Bill will ensure that clubs are not ignored in the engagement process when the commitment in lieu being proposed will directly apply to them.

[Stuart Andrew]

The hon. Lady makes important points. The idea is that as we have a regulator on a statutory footing, which will improve standards, hopefully that will bring football along with those improved standards. However, she is right to highlight the point about sensitive information. The regulator will be on a statutory footing and will be able to look at that information.

That is why it is important for the regulator to allow the leagues and clubs to make representations. The leagues may be able to say, “We can offer a commitment in lieu that will address this and look at the detail of that,” but the regulator, having information from the club that may be sensitive and private, can work out that, “Actually, that commitment in lieu will not meet the objectives,” and therefore impose its own discretionary licence condition.

Question put and agreed to. 

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Schedule 6 agreed to. 

Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Part 4: overview and interpretation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart Andrew]

The Government’s White Paper laid out several failings of the existing owners and directors tests conducted by the football authorities. The tests are conducted on a self-declaration basis, and have allowed owners with long histories of business bankruptcies and owners later imprisoned for crimes including money laundering. To address such shortcomings, the Bill includes strong statutory owners and directors tests, a vital part of the new Independent Football Regulator’s regime.

Part 4 gives the regulator the power to test the suitability of prospective new owners and officers of regulated clubs. In certain circumstances, it also gives powers to test incumbent owners and officers. The clause provides an overview of part 4, and signposts the rest of the clauses in this part.

One element of the regulator’s tests is the fitness criteria for individual owners or officers. They will ensure that custodians have the necessary characteristics to run or own an important community asset. Subsections (7) and (8) of the clause specify the fitness criteria: having the requisite honesty and integrity; being financially sound; and, for officers only, having the requisite competence for their role at the club. Alongside other elements of the test, ensuring that owners and directors are suitably fit for their roles will better protect each club against unsuitable custodians, ensuring the sustainability of English football over the long term.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss the owners and directors tests. Football clubs are historical institutions with deep community ties; thus we must be careful to ensure that owners are people who view themselves as caretakers of an asset that has existed long before them, and we hope will continue to exist for years afterwards. As such, it is right that owners and directors are subject to fitness tests to ensure that the custodians of beloved football clubs meet certain standards.

At the moment, the tests are operated by different authorities depending on the league a club plays in. The Premier League, the EFL, and the FA on behalf of the National League all administer owner tests and have powers to disqualify unsuitable individuals. While those tests have been in place, many successful owners have been appointed, making selfless and sustainable investments in their clubs, which have brought about rewards on the pitch. However, not all owners have the same outlook, fortune, capacity or capability. Despite ownership tests, too many clubs and fans still have to deal with malicious, absent or incompetent ownership.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

Everyone is obviously getting so excited that they are getting ahead of themselves. To be fair, I understand why. It is important to acknowledge what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said about the many people who put themselves forward to support their local football club to build and become competitive. They are hugely important to the local communities in which they are based. We should acknowledge that there are many who do that well and with the best of intentions—even those who make mistakes, as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East said. Their intention is right.

We are focusing on ensuring that owners and directors tests get to the heart of the detail that we need. The test will be much stronger with the regulator, which will have access to information from statutory organisations such as the National Crime Agency, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East mentioned. She asked about the Premier League continuing with its own owners and directors test. It can continue with it if it wishes. I note that the EFL has made a different decision, because it recognises that the tests that the regulator will provide will get much more detail and information than the leagues may be able to. Because the tests will be statutory, they will take primacy.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate that clarity. I also appreciated the intervention from the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe. Richard Masters’s comments to the Committee about two green lights are welcome, but it is important that the Bill is clear on this point and that we are clear about it in Committee, so the Minister’s comments are welcome.

[Stuart Andrew]

I thank the hon. Lady. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Duties to notify IFR of prospective new owner or officer

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

I am happy to commit to writing to the hon. Gentleman. He is right that it is really the perimeter of the stadium, the car park and so on. I will happily give him further details.

When the regulator is testing the fitness of prospective new or incumbent owners of clubs, it must have regard to any action of a regulatory or disciplinary nature that is being or has been taken in relation to the individual. The regulator already has the power to consider that as part of an owner’s suitability termination. For those reasons, I cannot accept new clause 3, and I hope that the hon. Member for Sheffield South East will not press it.

[Stephanie Peacock]

This group of clauses begins to set out how the new tests for prospective owners and directors will work in practice. I broadly welcome the clauses and will begin—I am conscious of time—to speak to each of them in turn, addressing new clause 3 last.

Clause 27 will require prospective owners and officers, as well as the club, to notify the regulator. This is an important first step that will allow the regulator to start the work of conducting the test itself.

Clause 28 will ensure that a person cannot become an owner unless the regulator has decided that they are suitable. This decision is called a positive determination and will be given to a candidate based on their ability to meet three main standards.

First, the candidate must pass the ownership fitness criteria, which are based on the idea that an owner must have the requisite honesty and integrity and be financially sound. I understand that those criteria have been based on the work of the Financial Conduct Authority; I hope that there will be an opportunity to share learnings and best practice across regulatory organisations as the regulator finds its feet.

Secondly, a candidate must show that they have sufficient financial resources, judged on the basis of an application that must include proposals on running the club. As with the regulator’s enforcement of financial sustainability more broadly, it is important that this process does not deter investment or require clubs to break even. Rather, I trust that the test will seek to ensure that good practice and long-term planning are embedded in owners’ plans from the very beginning.

Finally, there must be no grounds to suspect that the candidate’s wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. That will prompt a welcome due diligence search on an owner’s wealth sources with the backing of institutions such as the National Crime Agency. Taken together, those standards will provide a comprehensive analysis of a potential owner.

For applications made by registered societies, the regulator will have a slightly different process, making a determination on the basis of sufficient financial resources alone. I am pleased that this recognised route to fan ownership will be treated with a tailored, yet proper, process.

Clause 29 covers officers. As I have mentioned, it is right that officers face a slightly different set of crafted criteria—

Football Governance Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Stephanie Peacock and Stuart Andrew

Committee stage
Thursday 16th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stuart Andrew)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Sir Christopher. I thank members of the Committee for their time and commitment, and I thank all the officials who have done an enormous amount of work in preparing the Bill. It would be remiss of me not to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford for all her work on preparing it.

Clause 1 sets out the purpose of the Bill and summarises what each part of it provides for. Its purpose is crucial: it underpins the regulator’s entire regime, as the regulator will be obliged to act in accordance with it at all times, so far as is reasonably practicable. Since the fan-led review was published, the Government have been clear that the pre-eminent failure in this market is the growing risk of football clubs being unable to continue providing their service. The potential harm that that can cause to fans and the local communities reliant on the clubs is unacceptable, and the industry has not been and is not doing enough to tackle the risk. That is why we are intervening here, and that is the Bill’s purpose.

The clause explains that the purpose of the Bill is

“to protect and promote the sustainability of English football.”

It goes on to define that, for the purposes of the Bill, sustainability refers to a continuation of service in the interests of fans and for the wellbeing of local communities. In essence, clubs should not be lost to their fans and communities now or in the future, be that through financial collapse, relocation 60 miles away or turning their back on their fans to join a new breakaway competition. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

It is great to be here today to welcome the Bill as it enters its next stage of scrutiny. As I outlined on Second Reading, Labour has supported reforming football through an independent regulator for football for a long time. We echo the Minister’s thanks to all the officials for all their hard work, to all Members on both sides of the Committee, and in particular to the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford for all her work on the fan-led review.

We want to scrutinise this Bill appropriately, and I look forward to doing just that in the coming days. However, given how long it has taken for this legislation to be introduced and the number of fans who have had to watch their club pushed to the brink in the meantime, we want to see the regulator implemented as swiftly as possible. I am therefore pleased to see a degree of consensus around the implementation of an independent regulator across the House. With that in mind, I have been focused on tabling amendments and will shape my remarks to be constructive where possible, while of course giving the Bill the scrutiny it deserves. I hope to be able to work with fellow members of the Committee to make sure that the Bill truly achieves its aim of ensuring the future of English football for generations to come.

Getting clause 1 right is crucial to the rest of the Bill. The purpose of the Bill, and therefore the regulator, will underpin all the other measures that we go on to discuss. It will act as a reference point to return to when interpreting the overall sense of intention and direction of the whole regulatory system.

It was the fan-led review that first noted that the regulator would need a clear statutory objective, which it said would be useful for dictating to the board and employees of the regulator what the body is there to achieve, how it should assess any problems and the outcomes it should deliver. If well designed, it should seek to tackle many of the problems identified within English football: the poor management of clubs, substandard corporate governance, the lack of fan involvement and the unsustainable finances that have threatened the long-term health of football. As a result, the fan-led review suggested that the objective should include acting in the interests of both local fans and communities. It said:

“There is no one else more important”,

a sentiment with which I absolutely agree. It must be central to both the Bill and the future regulator that football works in the long-term interests of fans and communities. I am therefore pleased that the clause defines English football as sustainable if it

“continues to service the interests of fans of regulated clubs”

and

“continues to contribute to the economic or social well-being of the local communities”

with which the clubs are associated.

Given the centrality of those concepts, it is curious that the likes of fans’ communities and social wellbeing are not defined in the Bill. The explanatory notes indicate what those terms might mean in practice: “fans” might mean season ticket holders and regular match-goers, and “local communities” might mean the people

“who live, work or trade in the geographic area associated with a football club”.

However, those indications will not become law when the Bill is passed, which leaves ambiguity as to how they might be interpreted. I ask the Minister why fans, communities and social wellbeing are not given clear definitions and whether he believes that there is potential for such terms to be misunderstood or misused as a result.

Further to that point, some clarity is needed that when we talk about the “interests of fans”, we mean their long-term interests. I can imagine quite a few scenarios in which it might be in the fans’ interest for their club to adopt reckless short-term strategies to achieve immediate on-field success. Yet those short-term strategies might lead to the club’s long-term financial demise, which is contrary to the aim of the Bill and against the long-term interests of fans and communities. Can the Minister therefore confirm that the phrase “interests of fans” must be taken to indicate a long-term continuation of the club and its heritage, rather than anything to do with on-pitch results at any given time? I agree with the principle of centring fans and local communities in the Bill and the regulator, but we must make sure that we are clear on what that means right from the very beginning, to ensure that the intended outcomes are achieved.

[Stuart Andrew]

I thank the hon. Lady for her opening comments. She will know from our engagement that we centre fans in the whole of the Bill’s process. She is right that as we go through line-by-line scrutiny, I will be able to give more indications that fans need to be consulted when it comes to important decision making by clubs up and down the country. Some clubs are doing that brilliantly, but we need to raise the bar. I hope that the provisions in the Bill will ensure that that happens and that fans will rightly be at the centre of the clubs they support.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Key definitions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will begin by addressing clause 2 and my new clause 1 before looking briefly at clauses 4 and 3 with schedule 1. Clause 2 provides important definitions that will help make sense of the Bill. Most of the definitions are relatively straightforward, so I will focus on the Secretary of State’s ability to designate which specified competitions will fall under the remit of the regulator.

It is widely understood that the Government’s intention is to identify step 5 and above of the men’s football pyramid as being within scope. That choice is the right one as long as the regulator’s enforcement is proportionate to ensure that clubs in the National League and lower tiers of the EFL are not burdened by compliance. Indeed, at this early stage it is important to set out that regulation does not necessarily need to result in burdensome compliance requirements. As long as the Bill is done right, that will not be the case.

It is important that we leave room for the competitions in scope to be amended in future should circumstances change. I appreciate the Minister’s comments on my new clause 1, but I am sure the Committee will allow me to outline the arguments on why I tabled it.

We should pay close attention to ensuring the healthy growth of the women’s game and whether it should be brought into the regulator’s remit. Despite its recent soaring success, as shown by the historic achievements of the Lionesses and sustained by the growth in support for the Women’s Super League and Championship, the women’s game faces a wide range of issues. The Carney review, commissioned as a result of the need for parity identified by the fan-led review, brought many of those issues to light.

The review raised concerns, for example, about the growing gap between those at the top of the elite game and the rest of the women’s football pyramid. Indeed, the annual turnover in the Women’s Super League, featuring teams such as Chelsea and Manchester City, peaked at around £7 million. Meanwhile, in the Women’s Championship, where teams such as London City and Sunderland play, sides are recording turnover as low as £150,000.

Further to that, the review noticed that there has not been enough progress on ensuring minimum professional standards. Players have been reported as being treated as second-class citizens rather than elite athletes, with everything revolving around the schedules of the men’s teams. Also, women players are three times more likely to suffer an anterior cruciate ligament injury—a serious rupture that strikes top players out for around a year—than their male counterparts, and there is no guaranteed access to even a basic level of mental health support even for those who might be seriously struggling.

Finally and perhaps most relevant to the Bill, the review also identified that the costs of sustaining participation in the women’s game are much higher than the revenues being organically generated by women’s teams. That is true even with the growth of broadcasting audiences and sponsorship revenue. Rather than bringing women into scope of the independent regulator at this stage, however, Karen Carney’s review concluded that women’s football would benefit from the opportunity to incentivise investment and self-regulate first.

Given that the IFR has been designed with the failures of the men’s game in mind, I agree that the women’s game and NewCo should be given the chance to take learnings and to proactively address issues so that it can run on its own two feet. However, I also believe that the option of an independent regulator must remain on the table, not least so that if it is needed, the regulator can act at an earlier point than it has been able to in the men’s game. That is why I tabled new clause 1.

Players, fans and the whole country want to see healthy growth of the women’s game and NewCo, and they now have the opportunity to see just that with the right investment, support and approach. However, if issues prevail, as they have done in the men’s game, it is right that we be proactive rather than reactive this time.

The Government agreed to all the Carney review’s strategic recommendations, but I believe there has been only one meeting of the implementation group. Parity of importance must be given to change in the men’s and women’s game, and I hope the Minister can provide an update on the Department’s progress either in this debate or in writing.

Clauses 3 and 4 and schedule 1 set out some of the other key definitions in the Bill, particularly of owners and officers, and I welcome their clarity. Due to the complex ownership structures of some clubs, it has not always been clear who or what might count as an owner, ultimate owner or indeed who can be held accountable as officers.

The fan-led review identified the example of Birmingham City, who at the time were alleged to be in £100 million of debt. They were in breach of profit and sustainability rules and in a situation where the club and ground were owned by two different people under a complicated offshore ownership structure. Trying to untangle and resolve such difficulties without being able to understand where accountability lies in an opaque structure is no easy task. The detail in clauses 3 and 4 and schedule 1 on how calculations will be made in relation to shares and the like is therefore welcome. In combination with the duty in clause 16 on clubs to provide a personnel statement, the Bill will improve transparency and ensure that the regulator is able to operate from a much clearer standpoint.

I have one question on behalf of the Football Supporters’ Association, which is concerned that the definition of “senior manager” might include football-related posts that were not intended to be within scope of the Bill, such as team managers. Can the Minister confirm that that is not the case and that football-specific posts will not be covered?

[Stuart Andrew]

I completely agree with the hon. Lady on ensuring that clubs, specifically those further down the pyramid, are not over-burdened. That is why we have been careful throughout the drafting of the Bill to ensure that it is proportionate and that our approach is dependent on the size of the club and where they are in the pyramid. I do not think there should be anything for many of those clubs to fear. We heard from witnesses in the evidence sessions that many of those clubs rely on volunteers to do a lot of the paperwork, and we have taken that into account.

I absolutely welcome the hon. Lady’s comments about the women’s game. We all want to see healthy growth in the women’s game, and it has been incredible to see how popular it has become. That is precisely why we brought about Karen Carney’s review, and I put on the record my thanks to her for the work that she has done in this area. What has been useful about that—rather than just doing it through the IFR—is that it has enabled there to be a much broader approach to the women’s game; and she rightly highlighted health and wellbeing as a really important aspect. Although the implementation group has only met once, it was an important meeting for us to set out the questions that need answering, and work is going on behind the scenes in preparation for the next meeting to ensure that we see progress. As she acknowledged, we support all the recommendations of Karen Carney’s review. We want to now ensure that progress is made in implementing them.

The hon. Lady is right that we need to learn from the men’s game at a much earlier stage, which is why we are looking at all aspects, but should we get to the point where it needs to be looked at by the independent football regulator, provisions are in the Bill for that purpose. On the issue of owners, as we have described in the Bill, it is those with a controlling decision-making process within the club that will come into scope.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Establishment of the IFR

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

The provisions in schedule 2 ensure that the regulator has the necessary structures in place to function effectively and efficiently with appropriate accountability as a public body. It ensures that an agreed and transparent process is adhered to when establishing a governance framework, including its board, committees and expert panel. It provides the necessary flexibility to future-proof the regulator and the agility to act quickly where required.

We have made provision for the regulator to appoint an observer from the Football Association. As the national governing body for English football, it will be able to provide insights on behalf of the football industry to support the board if needed in the execution of its functions. Ultimately, the regulator will be accountable to Parliament, but it will be operationally independent and free from undue political or industry influence. The provisions in the schedule are central to creating this framework and strike the right balance between those competing demands.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am extremely pleased to welcome these provisions, which establish the long-awaited Independent Football Regulator as a body corporate. This is a good opportunity to discuss why it is important that the independent regulator has been established in the form it has—a body that is operationally independent of current football governance structures. This independence will be key in ensuring that decision making is impartial, free from conflict and credible. As the fan-led review clearly reveals, public confidence in existing football authorities is unfortunately very low. Part of the reason for this, according to the review, is that the constitutional set-ups of existing authorities are inherently conflicted and

“the rules of regulation being set by the parties that are to be regulated.”

There are two big problems with that. First, it results in clubs being naturally incentivised to prioritise their own interests rather than the long-term view of what is best for the game. Secondly, it means that there is a natural disincentive for disciplinary action to be taken where it might be commercially damaging for the club involved. Though this new phenomenon was identified by the fan-led review, it is not a new concept. It has been over a decade since the 2011 Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s report that made recommendations to improve the accountability of the regulation of football, and it is almost 20 years since the Burns review, which found football governance unfit for purpose.

Opportunities have been presented over and over, but the same problems have prevailed. This is why it is important that we are finally here today. Independence does not mean that the regulator will have no relationship with existing structures. As we will discuss, working constructively with football governance will be vital to the regulator’s success. This does, however, bring up questions of regulatory clarity.

As it stands, I am not entirely convinced that everyone is clear about whose rules will take primacy and when. The Government’s response to the White Paper consultation seemed to be firm on this, identifying that although there needs to be collaboration, the regulator will be the ultimate authority on matters within its remit. However, the Bill is not always clear, so I hope this is something we can come back to and clarify as we progress.

It is also important to note that the regulator will be independent from politicisation and undue influence from the Government, which is important not only for the sport as a whole, but to ensure that the regulator in no way impacts compliance with UEFA and FIFA rules. Overall, however, I am pleased with the institutional location of the regulator and the fact it is finally being established through the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

I agree with the hon. Member for Luton South about the independence of the football regulator; we were really careful to ensure that as we drafted the Bill. She is right that we have to take into account the UEFA and FIFA rules. That is why we have made sure throughout that the regulator will be independent, including from political interference. We would not in any way want to see any sanctions on English football because of any pressure that might be given. As with others, we have engaged with both of those bodies. So far, we feel that they recognise that we have gone to great lengths to ensure that that independence is recognised.

On the board being reflective of society, I am a big advocate of making sure that that happens. There are the usual processes of Government appointments; as hon. Members will know, that issue is very much a consideration. Work is constantly being done to encourage a wide range of candidates to apply. I suppose this gives me an opportunity to shout out to the wider society: get involved! We need a very diverse range of candidates to apply for these positions.

We absolutely need to ensure that the measures on conflicts of interest are in there, just as we would with any other public body, and, yes, there will be a requirement for pre-confirmation of the chair through the Select Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

The Independent Football Regulator

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 14, in schedule 2, page 82, line 20, leave out “is satisfied” and insert “has ensured”

This amendment would strengthen the responsibility of the appointer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I welcome that input, and that is absolutely right. I am trying with these probing amendments to seek some clarity from the Government, so that all hon. Members and everyone who has an interest in the Bill are satisfied. I tabled them to make important clarifications and to ensure that appointments to the regulator are free from vested interests. I believe that that is the intention behind the Bill.

It is peculiar that the process of declaring a conflict of interest does not involve potential appointees making any declarations themselves. Given that potential appointees are the experts on their own history, they must take a level of responsibility for ensuring that time is not wasted as part of their appointment. Amendment 15 would ensure that candidates are obliged to make a declaration if they hold any relevant interests that might give rise to a conflict. That would create a pathway for unsuitable candidates to be easily and quickly dismissed, and ensure that the appointer is not the only person responsible for identifying conflicts. That shared accountability would strengthen the process.

The involvement of the appointer in any investigation of any potential conflicts will also be crucial. I tabled amendment 14 to require appointers to categorically and objectively ensure that the candidate is free from vested interests. It is not enough for an appointer to simply say they are satisfied that there is no conflict; the Bill must require a level of intentional due diligence on behalf of the appointer, so that if any conflicts are identified later down the line, there is a level of objective accountability. Replacing “is satisfied” with “has ensured” will strengthen not only the wording but the entire system of appointments.

I hope that the Minister can accept the changes as a necessary part of achieving the Bill’s aims, or at the very least can provide clarification on why the Bill as drafted allows for subjectivity in decision making when it comes to conflicts. It is only by getting the appointment system right that we will get the regulatory system right. We hope that the process will be watertight.

[Stuart Andrew]

The Government recognise the intent behind the amendments, which is to make certain that the board is free from conflicts of interest—not least given the fact that so many of the witnesses talked about trust, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby just mentioned. It is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from influence from Government or the industry that it will regulate, which is why independence has driven the design of the regulator from the start. That is reflected throughout the Bill and will continue to shape how the regulator is established, including the appointment of its board.

I strongly support the objective that conflicts of interests should be managed appropriately, but the amendments are unnecessary. The current drafting, supported by public law principles, as my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford hon. Friend mentioned, and non-legislative measures already in place achieve that objective. The appointer must already satisfy themselves that a candidate board member is free from conflicts before appointing them, and the board members will have responsibilities to openly and honestly declare any interests that could give rise to actual or perceived conflicts.

In addition to the checks for conflicts at the point of making the appointment, there is an explicit requirement in schedule 2(22) for members of the board to declare their interest in any matters that fall for consideration by the board. That paragraph sets out a process for managing any interests in line with the approach taken for other regulators, and provides assurance regarding the suitable management of board members’ interests. Members of the regulator’s board and their terms of appointment will be subject to the Cabinet Office’s “Code of Conduct for Board Members of Public Bodies”, which sets out clear requirements on the appropriate disclosure and management of conflicts of interests. For the reasons that I have set out, I am not able to accept the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Barnsley East, and I hope that she will withdraw it.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the Minister, and on the basis of what he has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 6

The IFR’s objectives

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to get drawn into an area of further expansion. I understand his point. I have never in my entire life been stopped by so many people to talk to me about football as on the weekend that announcement was made. I of course recognise the importance of the FA cup, but for the regulator to get into areas of match timings, replays and so on may be a bit too far. We will probably look more into that later.

The third objective looks to safeguard the elements I mentioned in the interests of the community and future fans, but not to stand in the way of the natural growth and renewal of a club. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Given the purpose of the Bill, as set out in clause 1, it is important that the regulator’s objectives are shaped carefully and clearly, as they will underpin many of the other measures. Although the fan-led review initially recommended a dual focus on sustainability and competitiveness, when it came to the regulator’s objectives the White Paper streamlined things so that the primary duties were regarding sustainability, with competitiveness becoming a secondary focus. I understand the Government’s reasons for that and have welcomed the subsequent primary duties being in three areas: the financial sustainability of individual clubs, the systematic stability of the football pyramid, and protecting cultural heritage.

I am pleased that the proposal from the White Paper is largely reflected in the Bill. However, I am curious about a few small changes, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East alluded in his intervention. For example, the exact wording in the Bill has “financial soundness” rather than “sustainability”, as was in the White Paper. Will the Minister explain why? It seems strange that the word “sustainability” is not included at all in the objectives. Further to that, the White Paper framed the systemic financial resilience objective in terms of the football pyramid, but the Bill goes only so far as to say “English football”. Will the Minister tell us whether the word “pyramid” has been purposedly omitted? Or does he believe that the definition of “English football” adequately covers things? I have no further issues with the intent of the objectives, but the wording is important if the Bill is to achieve its stated aims.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

My hon. Friend has got it exactly right and articulated it extremely well. We recognise that that is the challenge football has with the obligations it must match with the likes of UEFA and so on. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, and with that I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

The IFR’s regulatory principles

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 8, page 5, line 33, at end insert—

“(iv) supporters and supporters’ organisations”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

The regulatory principles outlined in this clause are designed to guide the regulator to exercise its functions appropriately and in the manner intended by Parliament. They are hugely unobjectionable but fundamental principles that should help to establish the regulator’s mode of operating and culture. The regulator must have regard to these principles when acting. The first principle encourages time and cost-efficiency in everything that the regulator undertakes, encouraging swift action and value for money. The second principle encourages a participative approach to regulation, where the regulator should look to co-ordinate and co-operate with clubs, individuals at clubs and competition organisers. This reflects that the ideal regulatory environment is one where all stakeholders are working towards the same goals. The third principle encourages proportionality. The regulator should always look to choose the least restrictive option that delivers the intended outcome, and be able to justify why any restriction or burden is worth it for the benefits expected.

The fourth principle encourages the regulator to acknowledge the unique sporting context it is regulating within. For example, it should consider the existing rules and burdens clubs are subject to, and that market features—such as transfer windows—impose unique constraints on clubs.

The fifth principle encourages the regulator to apply regulation consistently, while still ensuring requirements are appropriately tailored to a club’s specific circumstances. A Premier League club and a National League club operate in very different ways and face different risks. The regulator must take this into account when regulating. When clubs are equally risky, they should face equivalent requirements.

The sixth principle encourages the regulator, where appropriate, to hold the individuals responsible for making decisions at a club accountable for the actions of the club and its regulatory compliance. For too long, clubs and fans have suffered the consequences of bad actors and mismanagement by the individuals calling the shots.

The seventh and final principle encourages the regulator to be as transparent as possible in its actions. While the regulator will handle some sensitive information that should not be shared, it should look to provide and publish appropriate information on decisions wherever possible. It is important that the regulator, and its regime, are open and accessible to the industry, fans, and the general public.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am pleased to welcome this clause, which sets out the principles with which the regulator will regulate. Along with clear objectives and duties, as well as the guidance which we will go on to discuss, the principles will provide the regulator with clear direction and transparency in its dealings, which have long been missing from football governance. In particular, I would like to welcome the principle of proportionality. This principle should be very reassuring to well-run clubs who may otherwise have feared an over-burdensome regime. The proportionality requirement will ensure that where clubs are running sustainably, with low risk of harm, the regulator will have less of a role. In return, any restriction that the regulator does impose will be linked to a beneficial outcome.

It is also good to see the importance of consistency recognised, so that the regime is applied fairly, while acknowledging the relative circumstances of clubs. It is important that regulation is applied in the same way, where circumstances and risks are also the same. However, there may very well be differing conditions at the very top of the Premier League, in comparison to the National League, where I know there are fears about the burden of compliance, as we heard in our evidence earlier this week. The principles should help to alleviate any fears that the regulator will act without nuance on these differences. It will be an appropriately tailored regime, while maintaining a fair application of the rules overall. This is something that I am sure we will revisit multiple times in Committee.

I have a few questions I would like to clarify on these principles, including how the principles have changed since the White Paper. The initial document set out 10 proposed regulatory principles that were described as “basic and fundamental rules” for the regulator to follow. In the Bill, however, we are left with just seven. Some of this is due to condensing the principles into a smaller number. I understand the desire to not be over-wordy, but I do question whether that was necessary. For example, although the concepts of coherence and being context-specific overlap, each deserves an individual consideration.

Perhaps more concerning is that, looking closely at what has changed, some of the principles have been left out altogether. One clear omission is the principle of bold enforcement. The White Paper described how this principle would work as follows,

“When advocacy is ineffective, or in critical situations, intervention and enforcement should be bold. Sanctions should be strong and aim to deter future non-compliance.”

I am interested to hear from the Minister why this has been left out of the Bill. It is, of course, incredibly important that the regulator is not unduly heavy handed but, given the requirements for proportionality and constructive working, it is interesting that this is not complemented by the principle of bold enforcement, when this is actually necessary in critical situations.

Another omission is the principle that all decisions taken by the regulator should be evidence led. In the White Paper this was framed as being important so that all the regulator’s decisions can be defensible under scrutiny, being backed up by data, investigation, and information. Could the Minister give a reason as to why we would not want to see a regulator that puts data and evidence at the core of decision making? That is surely the intention of the Bill, and we cannot have regulation based on whims alone.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

We are committed to establishing the regulator as fast as possible post the passing of the Bill. To that end, we are building the regulator in shadow form within the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in parallel to the passage of the Bill, to enable the regulator to hit the ground running once it is legally established.

On the creation of the regulator, it will be necessary for property, rights, liabilities and staff held by the shadow regulator within DCMS to be transferred to the regulator. The most appropriate vehicle for affecting those transfers will be a statutory transfer scheme, as has been used in similar situations involving transfers of assets following the transfers of functions between public bodies. The details of such transfers will be determined at the point of transfer.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 10

State of the game report

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 10, page 6, line 21, at end insert—

“(ba) an evaluation of the potential impact of ticket pricing and kick off times on fans and make recommendations in accordance with that evaluation.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I completely understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, and we respect the fact that it is a commercial decision. Obviously, like me, he will have heard the evidence sessions. Fan groups said time and again that this is a really important issue and that they are not being consulted meaningfully. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby gave a good example of the benefit to fans; we are simply trying to highlight that point, because we want that meaningful relationship with fans to be as constructive as possible.

I will briefly move on to kick-off times. The FSA says that one of the biggest sources of complaints to its inbox is match-going fans complaining about the scheduling of games. That is not just grumbling about inconvenience; late changes to scheduling can impact on fans’ lives and finances. With good notice for games, fans can book time off work, access advance rail tickets and accommodation, and budget accordingly. Late changes to kick-off times, which are becoming increasingly common, mean that fans are forced to make expensive cancellations or spend large sums on last-minute public transport and hotel bookings.

If the purpose of the Bill is to ensure that the game continues to serve the interests of fans and contribute to the wellbeing of local communities, the regulator must at least be taking note of the areas that matter most to fans. To reiterate, I do not believe it would be right for the regulator to take any kind of proactive role in dictating to clubs and competition organisers when matches should be played, but as I have said many times before, Ministers have repeated themselves over and over about how important fans are to football, so if that is the case, both the state of the game report and the clubs, when consulting fans, should be looking at the areas that matter most to those people.

[Stuart Andrew]

I absolutely recognise that issues such as ticket pricing are really important to fans. Indeed, match days, as others have said, would not be what they are without the fans. The Government believe it is important that clubs consult fans on key off-pitch issues that impact supporters, including operational and match-day issues. These provisions, and the wider provisions for fan engagement, will ensure that fans have a voice on the issues that are most important to them, but it would not be appropriate—the hon. Member for Barnsley East was alluding to this—for the regulator to be a fix for all of football’s woes. Rather, it will be set up with a tightly focused and defined scope and purpose, to tackle the specific market failures that carry a risk of significant harm to fans and communities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

Again, the clubs will have that engagement and raise those points with their own individual club—the away clubs can raise the issues within their club. This is actually putting it into legislation. It gives them that opportunity, which does not currently exist.

The Government do not believe that amendments 6 and 18 are necessary, as we expect that

“operational and match-day issues”

will already capture ticket pricing, and kick-off times are ultimately a sporting decision. It is not for the regulator to intervene on the sporting calendar, but I do recognise the issues that it causes for fans. It has been raised in Culture, Media and Sport questions with me on a number of occasions, and I have raised it with the authorities. They have promised to come back to me although, in fairness to them, these decisions are sometimes out of their control too. It is quite a challenging area.

The Government would welcome any club that chose to go beyond the relevant matters and consulted fans on kick-off times and everything else. However, as I have just mentioned, it is not always an issue that clubs have enough control over to adequately consult fans and respond to opinions. Therefore, to mandate them to do so could be problematic.

For those reasons, I am not able to accept the amendments and I hope the hon. Member for Barnsley East’s will therefore withdraw them.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate the Minister’s comments. I am happy not to move amendment 18 but I would like to proceed to a vote on amendment 11.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

The purpose of the state of the game report is to allow the regulator to better understand the finances and economics of English football, and is currently intended to include the top five tiers of men’s professional football. That, in turn, informs the regulator’s approach to the exercise of its functions and decision making across the regulatory framework.

The amendment would require the regulator to, in addition, consider the state of women’s football in England in the state of the game report, but we have been clear that that is not the intended scope of the regulator’s functions. As we set out in the White Paper, consultation response, and the Bill’s accompanying explanatory notes, we intend this to be for the top five tiers of the men’s professional game. That reflects the fact that the regulator’s scope has been carefully targeted at addressing harm where industry has failed to reform.

That said, where appropriate, the regulator has the ability to share relevant information, guidance and best practice with relevant industry bodies to deliver an effective framework of regulation. Indeed, the Government expects that that could include sharing information with NewCo, the independent entity responsible for managing the women’s professional game. The women’s game is at an exciting and pivotal stage, and should be afforded the opportunity to self-regulate in the first instance. That is why it is not part of the regulator’s intended scope, nor would it therefore be appropriate for it to be within the scope of the state of the game report.

But, even without an explicit statutory requirement, there is nothing to stop the Government or industry looking into women’s football and the unique challenges that it faces. Indeed, this Government have remained committed to supporting women’s football at every opportunity, including with the review that I mentioned a moment ago. In our Government response to that review, we demonstrated our support for all 10 strategic recommendations, and we believe that those need to be acted on to lift minimum standards and deliver bold and sustainable growth for women’s football at both elite and grassroots levels.

If, in future, the women’s game was brought into the scope of the regulator, it would then fall within the matters to be covered as part of the state of the game report. I would like to reassure Members that the future of women’s football, and addressing the challenges that it faces, is hugely important. However, we think that considering that as part of the state of the game report would not be appropriate, given that the report is focused on matters within the scope of the regulator. For those reasons, I am not able to accept the amendment from the hon. Member for Barnsley East, and I therefore hope that she will withdraw it.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the Minister for his explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Football governance statement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 12 stand part.

Clause 13 stand part.

[Stuart Andrew]

Clause 11 provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue a statement on the Government’s policies relating to football governance. A football governance statement can be used only to flag issues within the scope of the regulator’s regulatory regime and should not be used to direct its day-to-day operations.

The regulator’s general duties, set out in clause 7, require it to “have regard” to any football governance statement when exercising its functions under the Bill. It is common practice for the Government to issue a similar statement with other regulators. The clause is an appropriate and proportionate power, which will help to give assurance to the Government and Parliament that the regulator is acting within its regulatory scope and has regard to arising issues. It will not interfere with any daily operations or affect the independence of the regulator.

On clause 12, the football industry should not be left to piece together what is expected of it based on the legislation alone. That is why the clause empowers the regulator to prepare and publish guidance on the exercise of its functions. That guidance will be crucial to translating the legal framework in the legislation into a detailed and practical explanation of the regulator’s regime. It will ensure that the industry understands the regulatory system, what to expect from the regulator and what is expected of it. Not only will that reduce burdens but it should, hopefully, improve compliance. The clause sets out that the regulator must publish guidance about the exercise of its functions under specific sections of the Bill and also permits the regulator to publish guidance about the exercise of any of its other functions. The regulator must consult any persons it considers appropriate before publishing guidance for the first time and before revising guidance in future, unless those revisions are minor. That will ensure the regulator takes into account the views of all relevant stakeholders and experts when preparing its guidance.

Clause 13 permits the Secretary of State to prepare and publish guidance on the regulator’s functions. That guidance is an opportunity to provide some additional detail as to how the Government intend the regime to be implemented, which was not suitable for inclusion in legislation. The industry and fans alike have been clear that they do not want to see ongoing Government involvement in football. That is why the regulator must have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance but is not obliged to follow it.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 11 allows the Secretary of State to prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a football governance statement setting out the policies of the Government that relate to the governance of football, to which the regulator should have regard. First, I want to acknowledge that it is right that the regulator’s processes are independent of political influence. The core purpose of the new body is to be given independent jurisdiction over a remit focused on the sustainability of English football and it should have autonomy over its decision-making processes. I know that the likes of the Premier League are concerned that the statement might jeopardise that independence. Can the Minister confirm otherwise? I am sure he spoke about that in his remarks, but he can add more when he gets to his feet again.

Regardless of that, the independence of the regulator does not mean that there will be no interaction between its work and the will of the Government on football governance more broadly. It will therefore be helpful for the regulator to have a clear statement from the Government on relevant policies that might have an impact on its work. It is right that the statement is non-binding, to hopefully give the regulator the contextual information it needs without compromising its independence. It is also right that the statement cannot contain policies that are inconsistent with the purpose of the Bill or the regulator’s objective. That means that Government policy and the regulator will be united on the cause of ensuring the sustainability of English football. I am hopeful that the clause will therefore act as another confirmation that the independent regulator will work collaboratively within the many existing structures that have an impact on the game.

As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford said on Second Reading, clauses 12 and 13 will be key to how the regulator evolves. Indeed, many of the questions I will ask the Minister in Committee are on topics that I believe will likely be answered more fully as part of the guidance that will accompany the Bill’s provisions. In short, the Bill is intended to provide a robust framework, and the guidance will flesh out how that framework can be translated into a real-life explanation of how the regulator will work in practice.

The guidance will improve transparency while also providing clarity for the competitions and clubs that will have to comply with the new regime. On clause 12 in particular, which relates to guidance that will be published by the regulator itself, that set-up will also enable the regulator to have some autonomy in the detail of its approach, subject to proper consultation and clear parameters set by the Bill. The IFR guidance on how it will exercise its functions relating to the discretionary licence conditions will be mandatory, with further guidance in other areas being optional. That will be incredibly important for clubs, allowing them to understand what the regulator seeks to achieve through the use of club-specific licence conditions and to become familiar with the detail of how the regime will be enforced.

There are many further areas in which I believe the IFR guidance will be beneficial so that the minimum standards are set. One area that springs to mind, and that I am sure we will go on to discuss, is how clubs can ensure their fan consultation meets the regulator’s expectations, as well as the requirements in the Bill. I would be interested to hear from the Minister on any other areas in which he believes guidance would be helpful. As with the state of the game report, the timely publication of the guidance will be crucial. Clubs and competitions will want clarity at the right time as they prepare for and adjust to the new regulatory regime. Can the Minister provide some insight on the timelines to which the IFR will or should be working to with regard to the guidance on passage of the Bill?

Clause 13, “Guidance published by the Secretary of State”, will primarily benefit the IFR. It is important that the regulator is able to understand the full intention behind the framework that the Bill provides so that it can exercise its functions accordingly. It is right that the guidance involves consultation with the IFR and relevant parties so that the resulting guidance is genuinely useful for facilitating the IFR’s work on football governance. In combination with clause 12, this will provide the colour to the clear boundaries that we are working to set through this Bill.

[Stuart Andrew]

I absolutely want to assure the hon. Lady about independence. It is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from any undue influence from industry or Government. However, as is the case with other regulators, it is appropriate that the regulator is accountable to both Parliament and Government. Holding it to account is also important to industry, which is why the Bill provides for that in a way that is proportionate while also protecting the regulator’s operational independence.

It will be for the regulator to determine when and where it publishes its guidance. We do not specify where it should be published, but we strongly expect that it will be published on its website in an easily accessible format in the way that most other regulators do, such as the Financial Conduct Authority with its handbook.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

The clause requires the regulator to report annually to Parliament on its activities for that year. As with all public bodies, the regulator must arrange for the report to be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State for purposes of transparency and scrutiny. The Secretary of State will have some flexibility to direct additional material to be included in the annual report to reflect further specific activity undertaken by the regulator or wider industry that year. That will help to ensure that the regulator produces its annual report consistently each year, and it will also ensure that it captures all relevant information, thereby allowing Parliament to have adequate oversight.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is right that the independent regulator be required to submit an annual report on the exercise of its functions. In the interest of transparency and accountability, I believe it is standard practice for regulators to produce such annual reports and accounts, and the Independent Football Regulator should be no exception, so I have no particular worries or further questions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mike Wood.)

Football Governance Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Stephanie Peacock and Stuart Andrew

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

Q Are there any particular topics that you would expect fans to be consulted on but that the Bill does not require?

Kevin Miles: We have had a long discussion with officials about exactly what the scope of engagement with fans should be. We think the fan engagement regime needs to be robust, it needs to be appropriate to the circumstances of all the regulated clubs and it needs to be based on democratic principles, with the composition of the fan representatives being determined independently of the clubs themselves. We have had some conversations about what the particular terms of the content of fan engagement should be and we have been talking to officials and Ministers about that. The list includes strategic direction and objectives of the club, the club’s business priorities, operational matchday issues, the club’s heritage and the club’s plans relating to additional fan engagement. That is as it currently stands.

When we have asked officials about specific examples of that, they have come back, for instance, on ticket pricing, saying “We expect those to be included in business priorities and operational and matchday issues.” However, there is currently a set-up in the Premier League of fan advisory boards that are required, under the Premier League’s rules, to engage with clubs. It seems to officials in the DCMS, as a matter of common sense, that ticket pricing would be one of the things that fans would discuss with their clubs. It seems to me a matter of common sense that ticket pricing is one of the things that fans would discuss with their clubs.

Yet, in the Premier League system, our members tell us that at Newcastle United, the fan advisory board was given three days’ notice of the ticket price increases without any consultation. At Fulham, there is no fan advisory board, but the supporters’ clubs there got four hours’ notice with an embargo before the announcement of ticket price increases. Nottingham Forest announced its prices without any discussion with its fan advisory board or the trust. Similar representations have been made to us about similar experiences at Bournemouth, Tottenham, Arsenal and Liverpool. That is happening already, and that is why we think that perhaps it would be useful to have in the Bill the additional words “including ticket prices”, just to make it explicitly clear.

The general point is that there is a lot in the Bill that depends on the view the regulator takes about what is included and the guidance that is given to the regulator. We would appreciate really strong statements from Ministers in the course of this process. That might help us to avoid the necessity of amending the Bill, but a strong direction from Ministers about what should be in scope and what is required of fan engagement to fill some of those gaps would be really useful.

[Stuart Andrew]

Q First of all, thank you, Kevin, for what you said about the officials. You are absolutely right; they have been superb throughout this whole process. Thank you, too, for your engagement.

I remember when I was first appointed, the first meeting I had was with you and with other fans. It was clear from that meeting that some clubs do engagement extremely well and, as you have just alluded to, there are others that do it differently. Given that fan engagement is part of the licensing regime, do you think that that is going to be sufficient to bring about a significant impact on the quality of fan engagement that we are currently seeing across the board? That is, are we levelling up, to coin a phrase?

Kevin Miles: I very much hope so, and I am optimistic in that regard. It is the first time that we will have had a requirement from clubs to engage with the fans and, to use the Prime Minister’s words, to put the fans’ voice “front and centre” of all those discussions. I do think, though, that there are a lot of details still to be worked out about how that actually looks.

There are some clubs, as you say, that are very good, but one of the illustrations of the limitations of self-regulation has been that when the leagues have been trying to put together their own requirements on fan engagement, because it has to be voted on by their members and agreed by their rulebook, the lowest common denominator tends to be put into the rulebook. We know that there are clubs that will resist the idea. There are owners who think they have nothing to benefit from in listening to the fanbase—their customer base, if you like. We know from experience that there are some who will do everything that they can to get around this. We will need to have an underpinning of that in the regulatory system, and some monitoring of it through the club licensing system. We recognise that this is challenging, because it cannot simply be a look at what structures are put in place. The regulator will have to do more than just monitor that there is a fan advisory board notionally in place. There will have to be some evaluation and examination of the content and spirit of the fan engagement. We are not expecting a fan veto on club decisions, but we are expecting that the fan voice is not just heard but listened to and given due consideration.

Evaluating that is a more complex process. Somebody referred earlier—I think in the first witness panel—to the possibility of Ofsted-type investigations. Maybe in some cases it will require the regulator to be able to consult the fan groups to see how they think it has been done, and to make its own evaluation about whether the spirit of what is intended here is actually being carried forward. That will need to be underpinned by requirements in the licensing condition.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Stephanie Peacock and Stuart Andrew

Thursday 18th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

Everyone deserves to feel safe playing the sport that they love. In the context of, sadly, too many former professional players suffering from dementia, what steps is the Department taking to ensure that sports governing bodies have the guidance they need to ensure the safety of professional players?

[Stuart Andrew]

The hon. Lady has raised an important point, as have other Members. The Government are leading work on concussion in particular. We have worked with stakeholders and developed the first guidelines to be distributed to the grassroots, which have also aided professional sports. The evaluation of this is ongoing and will be invaluable in helping us to improve sport-related education and health. We have also convened a sports concussion research group to identify the questions that still need answering, as well as an innovation and technology panel, whose members are looking at the practical, technical solutions that will aid safety and mitigate concussion. However, as I have said, this is an incredibly important area and one on which we will focus.