Health (CSR)

Debate between Roger Gale and Paul Flynn

Thursday 11th November 2010 Westminster Hall

[Mr Roger Gale (in the Chair)]

Order. There is a very interesting debate to be had on those issues, but the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) has been in the House a long time, and the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson), who has just intervened, has been Secretary of State for Health and both are aware that, while the subject may be interesting, it is not to do with the comprehensive spending review, which is the title of the debate.

[Paul Flynn]

I want to address my remarks to the budget of the health service, and how it matches our priorities.

Perhaps I may move to a different subject. I should like to pursue what my right hon. Friend said. He is absolutely right that the lobbyists determine health policy in America, and will have an increasing effect on the comprehensive review, and on the demands on and priorities of the health service. However, I shall deal with another matter, which is not political in any way, because it involves decisions made by one Government, which were then approved by the pantomime horse of a Government we have now. It is about pandemics past and future. We have had a series of those, which have been costly for the health service. They go back to severe acute respiratory syndrome—a very severe and nasty illness, which killed more than half the people who caught it—through the threatened avian flu, which never lived up to its billing, to swine flu last year.

Swine flu in Britain cost the health service £1.2 billion on antivirals and vaccines. It also had other damaging effects, in that it scared the country greatly. People were frightened by the possibility of flu on the scale of the 1918 flu that killed between 25 million and 40 million people. It distorted all the priorities of the health service for a year. The health service gave attention to that rather than to the other things that it should have given attention to. It also involved the use of a vaccine that had not been trialled. The people who say it was not fully trialled are those who made it—GlaxoSmithKline and the other producers. That was a major event, and we might consider, knowing what we know now, how we got into that situation.

We were told by Liam Donaldson that it was likely that there would be between 3,000 and 750,000 deaths. He gave an average figure. We in the United Kingdom could expect 65,000 deaths, many of which would be among children. Rightly, that terrified the country and the media took it up. What was the source or basis for those figures, and the result? The result was that the number of people who died with swine flu was about 450. The number of people who died of swine flu was about 150. That compares with the 2,000 to 12,000 people—in one year it was 20,000—who die every year of seasonal flu. The swine flu outbreak was thus by any standards a minor event in Britain. Worldwide we were told to expect between 4 million and 7.5 million deaths. The total recorded was 18,000—a minute fraction of what had been expected.

In the context of the spending review, how do we prepare for another pandemic? What if we are given word by the World Health Organisation to prepare for another pandemic? Why did the WHO act as it did? It was for one reason—the definition of a pandemic changed between May and June last year. Scale 6 is the top pandemic; there is no six and a half, and no scale 7. The WHO told the press that there was a scale 6 pandemic; the press immediately went into hysteria mode and said that it was the same as the flu of 1918, and told us to prepare for tens of thousands of deaths. Until May 2009, the definition of a scale 6 pandemic was one that involved a tremendous number of deaths or serious illnesses. In June 2009 the definition was changed to take out that measure of severity and the point was made that it could involve mild flu. A pandemic would be a scale 6 pandemic depending on the geographical area in which the flu was detected. The alarming message came from Madame Chan, who was very much involved in the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong, and who expected something like SARS again. The world was expecting a flu epidemic, because we had one in 1957; there was a world flu epidemic in 1968, and another one in 1977. There was an expectation of a major flu epidemic, but we know the results now.

I want now to consider Tamiflu.

[Mr Roger Gale (in the Chair)]

Order. I am very sorry, but I must ask the hon. Gentleman to make at least a thinly veiled attempt to relate his remarks to the comprehensive spending review. We are not having a general debate about the health service.

[Paul Flynn]

As to the likely spending this year, if there is another threatened pandemic, how are we to fit it into the spending review, and future spending, since we are at present tied? Do we draw the lessons of what happened last year? If another epidemic comes along, will we react in the same panic-stricken way, or act as another country did? Perhaps we should consider the present spending review in the Polish Parliament. Ewa Kopacz, who has responsibility for health, was interviewed by GlaxoSmithKline, who told her, “We are not going to guarantee this vaccine, because we haven’t trialled it properly, and if there are any adverse reactions you, the Polish Government, will be responsible.” Ewa Kopacz said, “Well, if you don’t trust it, I don’t trust it.”

The Polish Government spent about 7 zlotys on the vaccine, compared with our £1.2 billion. The result was that they had half the number of deaths per million of population that we had. I want to point out that huge financial decisions were made in the swine flu pandemic, and we should have drawn the lesson from them, but we have not. We had a review, by one Department, which was a whitewash and was approved by the Government, and which said that the reaction was proportional. It was not proportional if we compare UK spending with the spending in Poland—which was virtually nothing—given the result that they had.

Tamiflu was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in America on the basis of its being a mass placebo medicine. In December 2009 the BMJ published an article alluding, in a reference along the lines of “Somebody stole my Tamiflu research paper” to the traditional excuse that students give for not doing homework. The authors had tried to find the research that said Tamiflu was some good, but it was not there. The BMJ could not find it. The FDA in America approved Tamiflu not because it found it was useful but because it had gone into the research and found that the drug was no better than a couple of aspirins. It had no perceived proved value; but the FDA approved it because it wanted to be able to prescribe something in the event of an epidemic. They wanted to show a man in a white coat, giving a pill. It would have an advantage as a placebo—but there is no advantage.

In spite of that, in this year’s spending review we shall almost certainly spend more money on Tamiflu and the vaccines that have not been properly trialled. I am not against vaccines, which are a huge and miraculous improvement in world health, and have saved thousands of millions of lives, but there are serious doubts about the fact that we spent our money last year, and might spend more next year, on a vaccine the side-effects of which are now becoming apparent in various countries—Japan, Finland and India.

I sense that you are going to call me to order, again, Mr Gale. My point is essentially how we order our finances in the spending review. With the changes in NICE, there will certainly be another increase in drug prices. The drug bill constantly increases, in real terms and as a proportion of the health budget. That has been going on for the past 20 years. It will happen again if we hand over power to the lobbyists and big pharmaceutical companies. We are seeing it now. It has been said that instead of a postcode lottery, we have a one-way escalator to higher prices. If we surrender further to hysteria about another world pandemic or to pressure from lobbyists to buy certain drugs to the detriment of other health services, the spending review will be inadequate. The Department will spend more money on drugs—some required, some totally unnecessary—and further impoverish the NHS, creating a decline in important life-saving services.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Flynn]

On a point of order, Mr Gale. There is a tradition in this place that Ministers making the winding-up speech reply to the debate. This Minister has been speaking for 14 minutes and has not mentioned a single point made in the debate.

[Mr Roger Gale (in the Chair)]

The hon. Gentleman has been in the House long enough to know that the Minister is responsible for his own speech and his own remarks.