Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Woolf and Earl Howe

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I intervene here only because—like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and, for the reasons she has given, I think the matter requires clarification.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment and I understand both her concern and that of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. However, I stress, as the Government did in their response to the Joint Committee’s first report on the Bill, that this measure to enable biometric data to be retained when an individual is arrested under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—PACE—for a qualifying terrorist offence is both proportionate and necessary to help protect the public.

Schedule 2 contains amendments to the laws governing the retention, review and deletion of fingerprints and DNA profiles by the police for counterterrorism purposes. This is a complex area of law, and it may assist the Committee if I first spend a short while explaining the current position. The relevant statutory framework was introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which established the principle that the biometric data of people who have not been convicted of any offence should no longer be kept indefinitely. This means that for the vast majority of people who are arrested and whose fingerprints and DNA are taken by the police, that biometric data will be promptly deleted if they are not convicted. This system is overseen by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, currently Professor Paul Wiles.

When passing the 2012 Act, Parliament recognised that it would be irresponsible, and would put the public at risk, to make this a blanket requirement in every case, regardless of the risk the individual might pose. So it made limited and tightly circumscribed provision for biometrics to be retained for limited periods in certain circumstances in the absence of a conviction. For example, if a person is arrested using the general power of arrest in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and is charged with a qualifying sexual, violent or terrorist offence, but is not ultimately convicted, it was recognised that there may be a range of reasons why they were not convicted and that they could still pose a risk of harm to the public, despite the discontinuance of the case.

In these circumstances it would be inappropriate, and indeed complacent, to ignore this risk to public safety and to require the police to immediately and automatically delete the individual’s DNA profile and fingerprints once a case is discontinued or the suspect is acquitted. The 2012 Act in these circumstances provides for a clearly limited three-year retention period before the data must be deleted. Similarly, if a person is arrested on suspicion of being a terrorist under the Terrorism Act 2000, whether or not they are subsequently charged, there is also a three-year retention period. This means that the police are better able to identify whether the individual is involved in terrorism, or other activity that poses a threat to the public, during that period. But it also means that the individual’s biometrics will not simply be held indefinitely.

In counterterrorism cases a person’s biometric data can be retained beyond the point when it would otherwise have to be deleted only if the chief officer of police of the area in which the material was taken personally considers that this is necessary for national security purposes. In these circumstances he or she can make a national security determination—or NSD—authorising retention for a further limited period, subject to a maximum of two years currently, and renewable if retention continues to be necessary. NSDs will, of course, be made only where it is proportionate to do so. This determination must then be reviewed and approved by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, who has the power to order deletion of the data if he is not satisfied that the determination is necessary. An NSD can be renewed for a further period, but only if the legal tests continue to be met and if the commissioner approves the renewed NSD. The assessment is made on the basis of intelligence and other relevant information about the threat the individual poses. We shall, of course, come to national security determinations in the next group of amendments, but it is helpful to provide an overview of these provisions up front to inform the debate on Amendment 47.

The amendments to existing legislation contained in Schedule 2 do not depart from these principles. Rather, they are intended to strike a better balance between on the one hand enabling the police to use fingerprints and DNA in an agile and effective way to support terrorism investigations and protect the public, and on the other ensuring that this continues to be subject to proportionate safeguards, regular case-by-case review and robust independent oversight.

We should not underestimate the value of biometric data in helping to secure convictions in terrorism cases. Such information played a vital role in the conviction in June of this year of Khalid Ali. Noble Lords will recall that Ali was arrested not far from this House and was subsequently convicted of terrorism offences, including his involvement in the use of explosive devices against coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2—which Amendment 47 would delete—will harmonise the retention periods for biometric data obtained when an individual is arrested on suspicion of terrorism, but not subsequently charged, under PACE and the Terrorism Act 2000. At present, an individual arrested under the Terrorism Act may have their biometric data automatically retained for three years. However, this automatic retention would not be available if the same individual were arrested in relation to the exact same activity under PACE.

In a terrorism case, retention for national security purposes would require the police to make an NSD with the approval of the Biometrics Commissioner, or would otherwise require the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner under Section 63G of PACE if retention was necessary solely for the prevention or detection of crime generally. However, the noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that this inconsistency between the retention regimes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Terrorism Act 2000 would remain. This could therefore result in the situation where the police are deprived of information that could prove vital to keep the public safe. The measure as drafted will remove this anomaly and ensure a consistent approach to the retention of biometric data for all those arrested on suspicion of terrorism, by providing for the same retention period regardless of the power of arrest used.

I do not accept the noble Baroness’s argument that this is a race to the bottom in terms of civil liberties. I say that because, as the Committee would expect, we have consulted the Biometrics Commissioner about this and other provisions in Schedule 2. In relation to this particular provision, perhaps I may read out what Professor Wiles has said:

“In my 2017 Annual Report I mentioned several issues that I thought the Government might wish to consider reviewing as part of the CT legislation review ordered by the Prime Minister ... I … noted in my Report my concerns about the police applying for ‘pre-emptive’ NSDs, often where a person has been arrested under PACE on suspicion of a terrorism offence. It is proposed in the CT Bill to allow biometric material taken after a PACE arrest for a terrorism offence to be retained automatically for three years (with the possibility of extending this period by making an NSD), as is already the case for the biometrics of those arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences under TACT”—


that is, the Terrorism Act. He goes on:

“It seems to me to be a sensible approach to bring the retention periods for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences into line”.


Given that authoritative opinion, which we sought expressly from the Biometrics Commissioner, and his view that this aspect of the Bill adopts a “sensible approach”, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Medical Innovation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Woolf and Earl Howe

Friday 23rd January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

Perhaps I may deal briefly with the question posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, who asked whether the Bill would apply to patients receiving private treatment. The answer is yes. Any departure from the accepted range of medical treatments for a condition, whether that patient be receiving NHS or private treatment, would be covered under the Bill.

The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would change the test of negligence under the Bill. If accepted—and assuming that the appropriate professional requirements were created—the amendment would require a doctor to comply with any professional requirements as to registration of the treatment; that is, to register the treatment with a scheme for the purposes of taking a responsible decision to depart from the existing range of accepted medical treatments for a condition. In other words, registering details and results of an innovative treatment on a data-capturing scheme would form part of the steps that a doctor has to take under the Bill.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

I hope the Minister will forgive me for saying that I do not think he is right in saying that the amendment would in any way change the standard. It is only adding a requirement to keep records. That does not change the standard of care which is required. It puts on the doctor an obligation to do something in addition, but I suggest with respect that it does not change the standard.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. Obviously, I must take account of his expert view, but the fear that I was about to articulate is that if you require a doctor to register the details and results of whatever innovative treatment he or she may have administered on some kind of data-capturing scheme in the way suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that would constitute part of the requirement for the doctor to demonstrate that he or she has acted responsibly, and thus not negligently. Therefore, if the amendment were accepted, the result could be that a failure to record would be part of the picture when deciding whether a doctor had acted negligently.

If that point is accepted—I expect the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to take me to task on it—my submission is that that would be a disproportionate requirement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Woolf]

There are provisions as to machinery and provisions that deal with standards of care. I think that this is a machinery requirement. You could not sue the doctor because he had not reported something. It is something that the law requires but I do not think it is intended that this should be enforced by criminal sanctions. There is certainly no specific provision of that sort.

However, it would exclude the ability to take advantage of Clause 1. You have to do Clause 1 in a way that complies with the Act, and the requirement that is now being inserted says that if you are going to do so, you have to do this. The implication is that if you do not do it, you will not get the benefit of Clause 1. This does not mean that the doctor is going to be liable for negligence just because he has not signed the register. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has made clear and those who have taken part in the debate so far have emphasised, the common-law position remains the same. This is an additional mechanism to allow innovation. I therefore suggest that a machinery provision does not do anything else than act on a requirement that you have to go through if you want to take advantage of the Bill.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I have been in the House long enough to know that when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, opines on something, it is a matter that all noble Lords would do well to listen to, and I am grateful to him. I agree that the amendment does not change the standard of care, we are agreed on that, but our concern is that a court might look at the requirements under the Act—and this is one of the requirements—as part of the picture that it would form as to whether or not the doctor had acted responsibly. It is merely part of the picture.

If we are agreed on that, and I hope that we are, it does not seem sensible to me that we should impose requirements in the Bill additional to those under the existing law, as that could risk deterring doctors from innovating under the Bill. Let us not forget that a doctor does not have to follow the Bill if he or she does not want to; they can simply rely on the Bolam test later on if they are challenged. Do we want to deter doctors in the form of a test or requirement that obliges them to go further than they would otherwise go? If they were deterred by that, it would defeat the whole object of the Bill and result in less benefit to patients, so I worry about that.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, specifies that the use of a scheme be enforced through professional requirements. We have sought advice from the GMC about whether professional requirements in the form of guidance might be a suitable route to enforce the sharing of learning from innovation. The GMC has been clear that it is very happy to consider anything it can do to be helpful. However, from those initial conversations, it seems that this may not in fact be an effective route. The GMC’s statutory power is to provide advice. Doctors must be prepared to justify their decisions and actions against the standards set out in its guidance.

Serious or persistent failure to follow the guidance would put a doctor’s registration at risk. So on the one hand, were we to go down this route, a doctor who failed only once to use a data registry might not face any consequences; that would be okay for the doctor. However, this would not address noble Lords’ concerns that the results of each and every innovative treatment, whether or not successful, should be recorded. On the other hand, if a doctor persistently failed to use the data registry, this could result in fitness to practise proceedings being brought against him or her for not having recorded information on an online database designed to foster the sharing of learning from innovation. Should a doctor’s fitness to practise be called in question simply on those grounds, that really does not seem a proportionate response.

For the reasons that I have outlined today—namely, the difficulty of relying on professional requirements and the link, which I hope noble Lords will accept, to the test of clinical negligence—the Government would not be able to support this amendment.

Medical Innovation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Woolf and Earl Howe

Friday 24th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, before the Minister replies, perhaps I could just make a comment. I have resisted getting involved in the various excellent speeches that have been made so far. While I am on my feet, I make it clear that I strongly support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. There is a danger in looking at these as alternatives. If the matter comes before the court—of course, one hopes that it will not—the court’s approach would be to say that there is nothing in the Bill, because of the amendment we are now considering, which prevents the Bolam test being relied upon as it is today, without the Bill.

On the other hand, if the situation is one that enables the Bill to be relied on, that is another matter that the person can rely on. In some situations, such as a state of emergency, it may not be possible to rely on the Bill, but that does not prejudice the doctor involved in any way, because the Bill leaves the Bolam test intact. It is supplementing the Bolam test, and the importance of the fact that it is supplementing it is apparent in the fact that it states that if the doctor can comply with the Bill, he knows that he is safe and does not have to wait until the Bolam test has been applied to find out whether he is in danger. I think that that is understood. Does the Minister agree with my approach, which is that these are not alternatives?

[Earl Howe]

I completely agree with the noble and learned Lord’s analysis of the situation. I hope that that has been helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Winston. Earlier, the noble Lord cited an example where a doctor was confronted by an emergency requiring innovative practice. Whether the doctor was acting responsibly or not, and the consequences, will depend on a number of factors. It will depend on the extent to which the doctor is confident in his or her judgment, based on experience in previous clinical practice and can, if necessary, show to a court that what he or she did was responsible and, at least in intent, in the best interests of the patient.

The noble Lord asked whether there was a risk of a doctor being found to be irresponsible in some emergency situations where innovative treatment is practised. Yes, there would be a risk if the process outlined in the Bill were not followed—but that situation obtains today.