Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. That was the point that I was seeking to make. The last time the online procedure Bill came before Parliament, in 2019, this Committee debated very carefully whether it was appropriate to allow the Lord Chancellor to determine which civil matters should be dealt with online. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee recommended that it was inappropriate for the Lord Chancellor to decide such matters. This House debated and the Government gave way. The Minister’s predecessor —not quite his predecessor—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, who was speaking on behalf of the Government, accepted that it was appropriate for the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice to be required. Why does the Minister think it is different in the criminal context? I suggest that there is even greater sensitivity in the criminal context than in the civil context and that the concurrence of the head of the judiciary is required.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that further explanation of the point and will happily reflect on it. At the moment, I stand by the point I made a moment ago, which is that it is right in principle for the Government to be able to decide which offences are included under the new procedure. Of course, we discuss with the Lord Chief Justice and other elements of the judiciary how these offences will be managed in practice. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, knows, the operation of the courts is run essentially under a concordat agreement between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary. I will look again at Hansard and go back to the discussion which somebody who was not quite my predecessor was involved in. For present purposes, that is my answer to the noble Lord.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister rightly said that his Amendment 38 is a modest one, but this group of amendments raises more general concerns, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, has just explained.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, may be interested to know, in the light of his earlier observations, that Clause 19 gives the Minister a power to make rules that require that specified kinds of legal proceedings “must” be conducted, progressed or disposed of by electronic means. The Minister could say, in principle, that all cases in the Court of Appeal of a civil nature will not be conducted by oral hearings; they will disposed of by pressing a button on the computer, and the judge will then decide. That is quite a remarkable power, the noble Lord may think.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Look at subsection (6).

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister draws my attention to subsection (6), which allows a person to choose to do so by non-electronic means, but that is not easy to reconcile with the provision I have just referred to in Clause 19(1)(b). If the Minister can assure me that the person who is the litigant—either the claimant or the defendant—can always choose in all cases to have an oral hearing in the court, then I would be very pleased indeed to hear that.

When we debated provisions in very similar form in 2019 in Committee and, I think, on Report, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, assured the House that the Government’s intention was to introduce online procedures only for civil money claims up to the value of £25,000. I ask the Minister whether that remains the intention of the Ministry of Justice. Does it have any plans to introduce these online procedures, including those covered by his Amendment 38, for any other civil proceedings?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

That is the point I was going to come to. Here we are dealing with the rules set out by the Online Procedure Rules Committee. That is not the Lord Chancellor. I want to show the Committee that the Online Procedure Rule Committee is set out in Clause 22, and in the usual way it is a committee which is not run by the Government but is run in the way that the procedure rule committees are run, which is ultimately under the control of the judiciary. The central point is that ultimate control rests with the judiciary.

As I understood it, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was that two safeguards are in place in relation to the powers to make amendments in Clause 27, which states:

“The Lord Chancellor may by regulations amend, repeal or revoke any enactment to the extent that the Lord Chancellor considers necessary or desirable in consequence of, or in order to facilitate the making of, Online Procedure Rules.”


I cite—this goes back to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in relation to a different issue—subsection (3), which is a consultation requirement with the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, and subsection (5), which states:

“Regulations under this section that amend or repeal any provision of an Act are subject to affirmative resolution procedure”.


I suggest that that is very important. So the architecture here means that, ultimately, judges retain control, in practice, of what is heard online and what is heard in court.

However, there will be increasingly firm directions and defaults as to what is heard online and in court— I make no apologies for this. In my own area, the Commercial Court, although you can ask for an in-person hearing if there is a good reason, it is now the default that, if you have an application for half an hour or one hour in front of a judge, it will be online, because that saves time and money and provides access to justice.

On family courts, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked about, I had discussions very recently with the President of the Family Division about this. Again, this is ultimately a matter for the judges, but he was saying that it is actually better to have certain hearings online. For example, if everything has been agreed between the parents and it is essentially a consent hearing, that will be done online. I am sure that it would be inconceivable that a public law family hearing, for example, where the court is taking a child away from parents, would be done online. But, ultimately, that is a matter for the judges.

I regret that, during the pandemic, there were cases where that had to be done, unfortunately, because of the need to protect children—because, when push comes to shove, protecting children is more important than having a face-to-face hearing. But, in normal circumstances, one would certainly expect that that sort of hearing would be face to face—but that is not a matter for Government Ministers or the Lord Chancellor.

These provisions seek to set up the Online Procedure Rule Committee, which will have the same sorts of powers for online procedures as the current rules committees have for the current procedures, whether that is the Family Procedure Rule Committee, the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee or the rules committee for the Court of Protection—there are a number of different rules committees—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My concern is not about online hearings, because they do take place and may be convenient in some circumstances; it is that Chapter 2 allows for no hearings at all. It allows for legal disputes, if the Online Procedure Rule Committee so authorises, to be conducted entirely electronically, which means by the submission of arguments in writing. The Minister really needs to recognise that that is authorised by Clause 19. He says that this is only if the independent Online Procedure Rule Committee so decides, but will he accept that, under Clause 22, that committee consists of three people who are appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and three people who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, so the Lord Chancellor has a very considerable influence over the composition of that committee?

The Minister may be coming to this question. Does it remain the intention of the Government—who clearly have a very influential role in this—that these provisions should be used only for money claims up to £25,000? The origin of that origin, as the Minister will confirm, was the report of Sir Michael Briggs, now Lord Justice Briggs. He investigated these matters and proposed a £25,000 limit which would always apply to this category of case. There would be no hearing. It would be conducted entirely electronically—although perhaps, in exceptional cases, the judge would have a discretion to decide that the matter would be conducted in an oral hearing.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. He is absolutely right about the three/three appointments, but I would respectfully direct his attention to two features of Clause 22. First, whom the Lord Chancellor can appoint is circumscribed by subsection (4). One of the three has to be a barrister, solicitor or legal executive. The second must have

“experience in, and knowledge of, the lay advice sector”.

The third is somebody

“who has experience in, and knowledge of, information technology relating to end-users’ experience of internet portals.”

The second safeguard is in subsection (7):

“Before appointing a person under subsection (4)(a)”


there is a requirement on the Lord Chancellor to consult with

“the Lord Chief Justice … the Senior President of Tribunals, and … the relevant authorised body.”

So this does not enable the Lord Chancellor just to appoint three friendly faces—although I am sure no Lord Chancellor would do so. They must be people with a particular expertise, and there is a consultation requirement. I accept that the Lord Chief Justice, the Senior President of Tribunals or the authorised body do not have a veto, but, in the real world, it will ensure that we have proper people on the committee.

If I may, I will come back to the £25,000 point in a moment. I am conscious that I want to finish giving the Committee an assurance about assistance, so I will finish this point and then come back to the £25,000 point.

The assistance currently provided by HMCTS is offered over the phone through our Courts and Tribunal Service Centres. HMCTS has also designed and tested a digital support service to ensure that access is available even for those who need more intense support. The contract was awarded to We Are Digital in late 2021. We expect full national coverage by the late spring of this year. Users will be able to attend in-person appointments. It will also be possible for a trainer to attend an applicant’s home for in-home, face-to-face support. If the noble Baroness passes to me confidentially the name of the relevant individual, I might even be able to arrange a home visit. One-to-one video appointments will also be available for those who already have access to online services, as well as the support over the phone. Therefore, I believe that this level of support, combined with the duty in the Bill, is enough to ensure that the digitally excluded receive the support that they need.

Finally, I turn to the outstanding question from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I have been able to check while I have been on my feet. The position is that the legislation is not limited expressly to those claims. I am told that they are first in line to be used under these procedures. The noble Lord’s question went further and asked what was anticipated would be done after that. I will write to the noble Lord once I have an answer which I am satisfied is absolutely clear. I am concerned to make it very clear to the Committee that civil justice in particular is going to change. It has changed and it will change. For example, there does not seem to be any clear reason why a claim of £25,000 would be done online and not one of £26,000. One always has to have a limit but, once we accept that justice can be delivered online, the question then is what cases are suitable. I will write to the noble Lord on that.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

That is not what Amendment 38 is aimed at. It is not about accrediting mediation services. It is about saying to mediation services, “If you want people who are using your services, if the case does not settle, to be able to integrate seamlessly into the online court space, these are the protocols to do it”. It is a process point, not a mediation accrediting point. There is a separate issue out there about accrediting mediators. The noble and learned Lord will be aware that there are a number of entities that seek to accredit mediators. There are also a number of bodies such as CEDA in that space. That is an important issue but a separate one to the point of Amendment 38.

I will write about what is online because this is a much bigger point than the Online Procedure Rule Committee. Ultimately judges—I emphasise this point—decide what is online and what is not. At the moment, judges decide whether you get a hearing at all. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be aware—to give an example from my background, but it appears in other areas of the law as well—if you appeal an arbitration award to the commercial courts, the judge may say no without giving you a hearing at all, either because you do not pass the permission threshold or because you do but the judge decides to have the hearing on paper. There is therefore no substantive difference between that and what is proposed here.

As to what the Online Procedure Rule Committee will do, I am afraid I will not be able to assist the Committee because the Online Procedure Rule Committee has not been set up yet; there are no people on it and it does not exist. This legislation sets out what the Online Procedure Rule Committee will be looking at. I will, however, look again at what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, and I will write if I can.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. He correctly points out that there are occasions where there is no oral hearing and the judge so decides. Would he not accept, however, that there is a fundamental difference between that and a decision being taken, at the encouragement of the Master of the Rolls and certain others in the legal profession, to do away with oral hearings in categories of case because it is quicker and cheaper to do so?

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has made the point but I join with him; it would be a matter of policy and of great significance were a decision to be taken by the Online Procedure Rule Committee that, for example, all civil claims for money are no longer to have oral hearings but to be determined on paper. There need to be some criteria for the exercise of these very broad powers that Parliament is conferring. There is no parliamentary approval of these new rules as I understand it, so it is a matter of enormous concern.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

With respect, of course I understand the point the noble Lord has made, and I will write to try to put a little more flesh on the bones. The last point he makes is in some ways perhaps the most important because I have seen two sides of this coin. The point the noble Lord has just made is that Parliament should have the final say on court procedures because, ultimately, it should not be for judges to decide whether you have a hearing; there should be a parliamentary override.

In a completely separate issue that I have been dealing with, child trust funds, I have sought to have a better procedure in the Court of Protection. It has been quite properly and very firmly pointed out to me that, ultimately, it is a matter for judges, not Ministers or even Parliament, to decide how the courts are run. This is a difficult topic. I take the point the noble Lord has made. I will write to him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and copy it generally to the Committee.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

First, they may not apply at all, because there may, in a particular case, not be any person who would benefit from, or has relied on, the quashing. Secondly, the court must have regard to it, but only having regard to it, the court can give it such weight as it deems appropriate. Absolutely, some of these matters may be in conflict. That, as we have heard, is nothing novel in the field of judicial review when the court must consider what remedy to issue in every case. Indeed, it goes beyond judicial review. There is nothing new in principle here at all. What we are doing is setting out factors which the court should have regard to. The court can place such weight as it wants on any of these, and the court can have regard to any other factors as well.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. He emphasises that the court can have regard to other factors. Does he accept that it would be permissible for the court to ask itself the question set out in Amendment 2? Is it satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to make one of these orders? Is it permissible for the court to say that it would not be in the interests of justice in the circumstances of this case, therefore it will not make one of these orders?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I was going to come to interests of justice slightly later, but let me take the point now. I do not want to drift into the presumption, but these issues are related to an extent. If it is not in the interests of justice to make the order, there would be good reason not to do so in new subsection (9). Therefore, the noble Lord’s question answers itself.

Amendments 2 and 9 add further factors to the list, including a condition that the court may use the new remedies only where it is satisfied that their use will be in the interests of justice. In addition to the point I have just made to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—perhaps I am putting his question in reverse—I struggle to foresee a situation where the court, having considered new subsection (8) and the presumption, would think it appropriate to apply one of the new powers where the court none the less considered it against the interests of justice to do so. Indeed, I am making the same point: you do not get there, because if it is against the interests of justice, there must be “good reason” not to use one of the orders.

Furthermore, coming back to the amendments, if timeliness is relevant to the case, the court can consider that under the current drafting, in particular the factors set out in new paragraphs (c) and (f).

Those amendments sought to add some factors. Amendments 8 and 11 seek to remove a factor from the list and remove an important provision—the need for the court to consider

“any detriment to good administration that would result from exercising or failing to exercise the power”

and the need for the court to consider actions that a public body proposes or intends to take but has not yet taken. The point of clearly specifying that the court should have regard, not only to actions taken but to actions proposed to be taken, is that actions a public body proposes to take could sometimes be a relevant factor. For example, let us say that a government department recognises that regulations may be quashed but has already stated its intention to make new regulations and has announced the date by which they will be in force. This could help a court to reach a decision on whether a suspended quashing order is appropriate in principle and to determine how long the suspension period should be.

Amendment 10 seeks to modify the fourth criterion, paragraph (d), making it so that the defendant is responsible for identifying the interests of those who rely on legislation being quashed. I suggest this amendment is unnecessary. If a suspended quashing order, or a quashing order with limited retrospective effect or none, might be appropriate, it will always be in the interests of the defendant to set out why that is the case. The defendant would want to encourage the court to use that remedy rather than the ab initio quashing order. So, in effect, the onus is already on the defendant or respondent to demonstrate who will be affected if the impugned act is quashed immediately, ab initio; and that would obviously include identifying who has relied or is relying on the impugned act.

Amendment 12 seeks to modify the same factor in paragraph (d) by providing that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful. I think I said in the previous group that that really is, if I may say so, motherhood and apple pie. Good administration is lawful administration. We all expect our Government and all decision-makers to abide by a set of lawful principles and duties that are conducive to effective administration. I am therefore not persuaded that legislating to say that good administration is lawful administration adds anything that is not already obvious or, indeed, inherent in the drafting.

Amendment 15 seeks to remove the requirement in subsection (10) for the court to take “particular” account of any action taken or proposed to be taken, or any undertaking given by a person with responsibility, in connection with the impugned act. This is intended to draw the court’s attention to any response the defendant may have already provided, or be in the process of providing, to the relevant defect. We see this subsection as a positive measure which could encourage a defendant to consider how to resolve matters proactively by offering suitable redress where it is appropriate, before the court need order it. It is also aimed at ensuring that the court takes particular care in considering any redress already provided so that defendants do not feel that they have to provide redress twice.

Finally, I come back to the point I was making about tax. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked me whether I was satisfied with the phrase “offer adequate redress”. I certainly am satisfied with that phrase, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has an amendment in the next group that focuses on it. He certainly raised it at Second Reading, and I will be coming back to that. When I was referring to tax in the previous group, I was saying it would be very unlikely that a court would want to use a prospective remedy in that situation. I did not say “never” for two reasons. First, it is always up to the judge in any particular case. Secondly, one has to consider other effects even in tax cases. There could be cases where, for example, under tax legislation, somebody has not paid, but they have been given a refund, or they have a rebate or a tax credit. In those situations, it may be right, if it is positive to the taxpayer, so to speak, to use a prospective remedy even in tax cases. That is why I do not say “never” but in the case the noble and learned Lord was putting in the previous group, of when people have paid, in no circumstances does it seem likely that a prospective remedy would be appropriate.

I hope I have dealt with all the points raised. For the reasons I have set out, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The position would still be that proper case management can deal with all of this. The point that the noble and learned Lord makes is no different from the proposition that could apply now. You could have two judicial reviews where one court decides to give a quashing order and the other does not. That point is already out there, so to speak. There is nothing new conceptually added by this Bill.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He expresses the hope that these provisions will enable the judiciary to build up a body of precedent in this area. Can he direct the Committee to any other statutory context which sets out in the way we see here a list of factors that judges are obliged to take into account, and then directs them by way of a presumption as to how discretion should be exercised? I cannot think of any. While I am on my feet, I thank him for being here tonight to deal with these amendments and giving up what would otherwise, I am sure, be an important date in his diary.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I know that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is still recovering from my absence from the dinner, but I am sure he will provide the usual entertainment and speech that my colleagues would expect.

On the wording of the new clause, there are two separate points. First: do we have statutes with presumptions? Well, of course we do. Secondly, do we have statutes which set out a list of factors to which the court must have regard on either an exhaustive—rare, I think—or, much more commonly, non-exhaustive basis? Yes, of course we do. My noble friend Lord Faulks gave the example of the Limitation Act—in Section 33, I think, from memory. The noble Lord’s real question is, therefore, do we have an instance where those two are put together? There is a short answer and a longer one. The short answer is that I cannot think of one off the top of my head, but I will have a look. The longer answer, however, is, with great respect: so what? If a presumption is not objectionable in itself, and if a list of factors on a non-exhaustive basis is not objectionable in itself, what, I ask rhetorically, makes it objectionable when those two features are put together? There is nothing objectionable about it.

I suggest that the real point put to me is not that this is objectionable, wrong or sinister, but that it is unnecessary. The answer to that is that it is beneficial for two reasons. First, to repeat the point, the court’s considering these powers will encourage the growth of the jurisprudence. Secondly, as I said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the fact that the court has to consider them means that they will be considered in all cases, because there may well be cases where it is not in the interests of the party to the case that they be used, but it could be in the interest of third parties.

That ties into the point I was coming to on Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I heard what she said—that she would prefer the other amendment but tabled this one on a probing basis—but let me respond to it. In addition to removing the presumption, it would replace it with a precondition that, before exercising the new remedial powers, the court must be satisfied that the modified quashing order would offer an effective remedy to the claimant and any other person materially affected by the impugned act. This proposed precondition is superfluous, because the remedies available in the Bill are more effective and tailored, taking into account the interests of both claimant and third parties. The problem with the wording of her amendment is, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out, the copyright case. The wording used is not very good for third parties.

However, in that context, I should pick up a point made by the noble Baroness and by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, concerning the phrase “adequate redress”, which was first made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, at Second Reading, if I remember correctly. We have heard the argument that we should replace that phrase with the phrase “effective remedy”, as also used in Amendment 14. I said in my closing speech at Second Reading, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that I would reflect on this point with officials, and, of course, we have. I hope I can take a moment to explain the rationale behind the drafting.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

We must distinguish carefully between whether it is wise, which is a point we can make about any legislation, and whether it is proper. When the point is put against me that this is an attack on judicial discretion and a case of not trusting judges, I hear it as a matter of policy and constitutional propriety first and a matter of wisdom second. So far, I have addressed the point on constitutional propriety. My noble and learned friend is right to say that Parliament can do what it likes; my point is that, here, Parliament is doing what is constitutionally proper as well. As to whether it is wise, I set that out earlier.

In these circumstances, it is proper to endorse the exceptional circumstances test. A system in which 50% of people are not being given the minimum sentence is, I suggest, one in which something is going seriously wrong. Although I pay great respect to anything said my noble and learned friend, the point put briefly but clearly and firmly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, ought to carry serious weight with the House.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister mentioned a Court of Appeal authority on this matter. Can he confirm whether that authority suggests that, if a judge in an individual case believes it would be contrary to the interests of justice to impose the minimum sentence, that is a strong indication that there are exceptional circumstances?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As we found in Committee, it is very tempting for Ministers to start parsing or glossing the term “exceptional circumstances”, and I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not do so. That phrase has been used in statute and considered at the very highest level by the judiciary. The application of statute is properly a matter for the judiciary. In these circumstances, it is not helpful for a Minister on his feet to start parsing or glossing what has been said by the Court of Appeal. With genuine respect, I will leave that matter there and leave it for the Court of Appeal to explain what “exceptional circumstances” means. However, I repeat that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said in terms that he found that test not a difficult one to apply—indeed, he found it an easier and more straightforward test to apply than the interests of justice.

Amendment 82A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, with the support of the noble Lord, Lord German, would require a court imposing a custodial sentence of six months or less to state its reasons for being satisfied that neither a fine nor a community sentence could be justified.

The noble Lord, Lord German, reminded us of the Government’s position set out in 2020, which, of course, I stand totally by. There are plainly issues of rehabilitation and reoffending when it comes to short sentences, and that is why, as I explained in Committee, provisions in the Sentencing Code already ensure that custody should be a last resort in all cases, and for the shortest term possible. Even where the custodial threshold is met, courts retain discretion to impose non-custodial sentences after taking into account wider considerations. The code also places a duty on the court to explain its reasons for passing any sentence, and this can include an explanation of the factors the court has taken into account in making its sentencing decision.

This amendment also sets out a series of principles for courts to have regard to when imposing a custodial sentence of six months or less. For the most part, these are included in the independent Sentencing Council’s Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences guidelines. As courts are already under a statutory duty to follow any sentencing guidelines relevant to the offender’s case, the Government do not consider it necessary to put these principles on a statutory footing.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said, if an alternative sentence to custody can properly be handed down, it should be. While I do not propose again to gloss the sentencing guidelines, I respectfully agree that that is a useful summary of them. Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said with his own experience, it is often only when community sentences have failed that a custodial sentence is handed down. That, again, is in accordance with the approach set out in the sentencing guidelines.

Of course, I listened very carefully to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, with whom I have had discussions on this and other issues, and by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester—I was going to say the “campaigning” Bishop of Gloucester, but I will leave out the adjective, although she might like it. I hope that they will each be satisfied with—and certainly understand—what I have said and the reasons for the Government’s position on these amendments. For the reasons that I have set out, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Any Member of the House can call a vote but, if the Minister is not willing to accede to any of the suggestions that have been made, it is the obligation of the Front Benches to indicate that they are so dissatisfied, in the light of all the debate and the fact that we have only had a week to consider this, that they will divide the House. If they were so to indicate, that might impose a bit more pressure on the Minister.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In the last week, as is my wont, I have had discussions with a number of Members of this House on this matter. Any Member of the House knows that my door is always open to them, metaphorically and often literally. All the discussions that I have had on this amendment have been ones that I have reached out to others to have. Nobody has knocked on my door. In those circumstances, I cannot say that we will adjourn. If I am told differently, that will be for others to decide. At the moment, I will ask the House to vote on my amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, this was an especially thoughtful and constructive debate. I agree with the words that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, used to describe the debate. His reference to the magistrate was interesting, but the problem with all analogies is that they are different. I am going to focus specifically on the jury issue because I recognise that a number of Members of the Committee have made particular points about jurors.

I will start with the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who referred us to the Equality Act; that is an important starting point for the debate, although it may not be the finishing point. We must ensure that the services of the courts are accessible to everyone, including those with disabilities. We must pay due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equality of opportunity wherever possible. That, in a nutshell, is why Clause 165 is part of the Bill. Having said that, and because I know that this will be a debate that is looked at by those outside this House as well as by those inside it, let me place on record what need not be said but I am going to say it anyway: that everybody in this Committee shares that aim. We heard a very personal example from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, of Lady Judge’s work in this area. Again I say this for the avoidance of doubt where there should not be any: I am proceeding on the basis that all who have questioned or opposed our proposals do so with the very best of motives and certainly not for any other reason.

Trial by jury is a fundamental aspect of our criminal justice system, and serving as a juror is one of the most important civic duties that anyone can be asked to perform. I agree with my noble friend Lord Attlee that it is a duty and not a right, but the Government and I want to ensure that as many people as possibly can perform that duty. Reasonable adjustments can be made by our courts to enable most people with disabilities to complete jury service. This, importantly, includes deaf jurors who can lip-read. I invite the Committee to reflect very carefully on the position of the deaf juror who can lip-read and to consider it in respect of each of the objections that have been put. I will come to some of them to which this would not apply, but a number of the objections would potentially apply to a juror who is deaf but who can lip-read. Nobody else in the court is likely to know how good the lip-reading is, whether the lip-reader gets every nuance, or how lip-reading affects the dynamics either in the jury box or in the jury retirement room.

That is the first point we get from the deaf juror who lip-reads, but there is another point as well: it underlines the proposition that there is no bar in principle to a deaf person serving on a jury. This is about one issue only, which is the 13th—I will come back to the 14th—person in the jury retirement room. That is why we need the legislation, because at the moment it is 12 and no more; I put the jury bailiff to one side. The issue at the moment is that, unlike a lip-reader who, if the judge considers that they can effectively discharge their duties as a juror—which I will come back to—can serve on a jury, a juror who needs a British Sign Language interpreter is unable to get that assistance because entry to the deliberation room is limited to the jurors, and no one else may enter. The essential point that this clause focuses on is permitting the BSL interpreter to go in, thereby enabling that juror to fulfil their duty.

I recognise that there have been what I might call practical, and almost philosophical, principled objections and concerns raised about the proposal. I note that the Bar Council of England and Wales has expressed its support, subject, it is fair to say, to the right safeguards, which I believe we have in place. I reassure the Committee that we considered the safeguards very carefully in developing the legislation. We looked at research and current practice in the USA, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland—which is planning to legislate for this form of interpretation—and Australia, where provision is already made for BSL interpreters or the equivalent in its jury systems.

I will first deal with the philosophical or principled objections. I understand the reservations that this might undermine the jury deliberation process, and I understand the argument, although I do not accept it, that interpreters could unduly influence or impact the dynamic of the discussions. There has been a lot of research, particularly in New South Wales, to explore whether deaf people can sufficiently access court proceedings and make informed decisions as jurors. The research suggests that deaf jurors are not hindered from speaking during deliberations and that other jurors seemingly have no issue with the presence of the interpreter or interacting with the deaf juror.

We have put safeguards in the Bill to help to address these issues. Offences relating to research and sharing research during the trial will apply as much to the interpreter as they do to the jurors. As has been pointed out, there is a new offence whereby an interpreter intentionally interferes in or influences the deliberations of the jury or proceedings before the court. I have said “interpreter”, but I accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out—I acknowledge my gratitude to him and others for sparing time to discuss this with me—that there will be two BSL interpreters present in the jury deliberation room, not only because they need to switch over as it is a very intensive process for the interpreter but because it has the benefit that they will be able to monitor each other and maintain a consistently high quality of interpretation. To take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I say that the nuances will be as much picked up by the sign language interpreters as we can anticipate—or not—that they will be picked up necessarily by a lip-reader.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that the jury room is not just confidential but also private; those things are different, and it is both. There is no intention to allow the academics or the researchers in. There is certainly no intention to move from what I think in the judicial review context is called “the judge over your shoulder” to the Minister standing over the juror’s shoulder. We are certainly not going there.

The interpreters will be bound by a confidentiality agreement and be bound by law, and there is an offence to keep everybody honest. They will also be required to swear an oath or affirmation to that effect, alongside their existing interpreter’s oath or affirmation.

I turn to the practical concerns around the nature of evidence and whether a deaf juror will be able to interpret facial expressions, together with audio evidence, effectively. Again, I heard the example from the noble and learned Lord as to how something was said in a tone of complete resignation. The word used in the Act, and in this clause, is “effectively”. The judge would have to decide whether the juror could effectively discharge their role as a juror. This provision does not require judges to admit such jurors on to the jury; it simply removes the blanket ban that would otherwise be present. It means that jurors who need a BSL interpreter can be considered alongside other jurors for whom other reasonable adjustments might be required.

The ultimate decision will be for the trial judge, who will take into account the nature of the case and the nature of the evidence that is going to be heard. No doubt he or she would want to hear submissions from the parties, although they would not be bound by them. As I have said, none of this is new. Again, I ask the Committee to consider how the trial judge should deal with a juror who says, “Well, I lip-read.” The trial judge, again, would have to consider what the evidence in the case was going to be and whether they were going to be able to fulfil their role effectively. There is no difference in principle, and the test and approach of the judge would have to be the same.

I accept that there will be cases where a deaf person would not be able to serve on a jury. I expect that there will be cases where a lip-reading juror might not be able to serve on a jury—for example, if the evidence is audio only and there is nobody to look at; there is just a telephone call playing.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I ask this question out of ignorance. Can the Minister confirm what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said, which is that a BSL interpreter does not interpret in the way that a foreign-language interpreter would, but rather attempts to summarise the gist or essence of what has been said?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I was going to come to that point, but let me deal with it now. BSL is treated as a language. It has its own grammatical structure and syntax; it is recognised as a minority language in the UK. There is not a sign for every word, but words can be spelled out where a sign is not possible. The noble Lord and I have both had cases where we have had simultaneous foreign language interpretation. It is also the case that not every word in every language is easily translatable into another language. Certainly, we have looked at that point, and we do not think that that should be a bar to a deaf juror effectively participating in a jury. For these purposes, BSL is sufficient to enable the juror to participate effectively, but depending again on the nature of the case, that may be a factor in a particular case which the judge would want to take into account.

It is important to start from the proposition that everyone should be able to serve as a juror unless there are good reasons to believe that they would be unable to do so effectively. I underline that word “effectively” in the instant case. I come back to the fact that deaf jurors who can lip-read serve successfully, and we do not believe that there is a reason why there should be a blanket ban on jurors who need BSL interpreters to serve.

Picking up some other points, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, asked about the obligation point and whether there would be a special dispensation. No, there would not be a special dispensation. Like any other juror, the deaf juror who needed a BSL interpreter would have to ask for permission to be excused. Of course, given that the judge would also be considering whether they could effectively participate, perhaps the anterior question would be their effective participation, and then the question would arise as to whether they could be excused. That would also apply, of course, to any other juror who was a lip-reader. One would imagine that a judge would be sympathetic to a lip-reading juror who might say to the judge, “I know that I can serve, but I am very concerned that I might miss something. My lip-reading is good, if not 100%, but I would rather not serve.” Ultimately, however, that would be up to the judge. There would not be a special dispensation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments in my name make two straightforward revisions which will allow these provisions to operate more effectively and support the principle of open justice across our courts and tribunals. Let me divide them into two groups.

Amendments 243, 244, 245, 248 to 261 inclusive and 325 expand the scope of Clauses 167 and 168 so they apply to all of our courts, tribunals and all bodies that exercise the judicial power of the state, with the exception of the Supreme Court, for which there has already been separate provision, and devolved courts and tribunals, for obvious reasons. This is an important amendment. It ensures that all jurisdictions may use these powers to provide transmissions of proceedings to remote observers in order to uphold the principle of open justice, subject, of course, to further regulation, guidance and judicial discretion.

Digital technologies have become mainstream, even in our smaller and what might be called more obscure jurisdictions. It is now evident that these powers should not be limited to HMCTS courts and tribunals but would be best made effective in all courts and tribunals. Importantly, that also ensures that the offence of making unauthorised recordings or transmissions of proceedings is applied universally across our entire justice system and not just in specific jurisdictions. This will shorten the length of the Bill by around six pages by removing the need for a distinct schedule for tribunals. I was going to add, “making this legislation simpler”, but that might test the patience of the Committee.

Ensuring that our courts and tribunals are as open and transparent as they can be is an ongoing task. The president of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, recently published his review of transparency in the family courts. With respect to the president, it is right to say that that was a phenomenal piece of work, which has been well received. The remote observer clauses in this Bill are in harmony with his recommendations, as the Bill allows transparency by permitting journalists to observe family hearings remotely if they cannot attend in person.

The second part of this group of amendments, Amendments 246, 247, 262, 324, and 329, provide technical amendments so that the secondary legislation to enable these powers may be introduced on time. Let me explain what I mean by that. The remote observation provisions in the Bill are intended to replace the temporary and less extensive powers in the Coronavirus Act. They have been vital in allowing our courts to administer justice effectively and transparently during the Covid-19 pandemic.

We want to make sure that there is no gap in the legislative cover. It has therefore become necessary to ensure that these new powers can be enabled in secondary legislation before the date that the existing legislation expires. With this Bill now not expected to receive Royal Assent until only shortly before that date, these amendments take the necessary step of allowing the enabling secondary legislation for these powers to be introduced by the made affirmative procedure. These amendments therefore provide that legislation is continually in place to uphold open justice in remote hearings.

As this morning, I am aware that the group contains amendments from other noble Lords, so I will pause there to allow them to introduce their amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I shall speak to Amendment 259B in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned lord, Lord Judge.

Clause 169(2) would allow a jury to be in a different physical location from the judge, so long as all 12 members of the jury are in the same place as between themselves. I am very concerned about this proposed power. In order to ensure the effective management of a criminal trial, a judge needs to be in the same room as a jury. The judge needs to be able to communicate effectively with the members of the jury. The judge needs carefully to watch the jury to see that they are focused and ensure that their needs are addressed. The judge needs carefully to watch the relationships between the 12 members of the jury. The jury needs to be able to communicate speedily and easily with the judge if it has any particular issue that it wants to raise. Members of the jury need to be able to study the witnesses giving evidence—what they say, what they do not say, and their body language and facial expressions while doing so. All this is so much more difficult through a computer screen, as we have all discovered, whether through court proceedings or parliamentary proceedings, during the pandemic.

I have had very helpful discussions with the Minister about this matter, and I am very grateful to him and thank him for those discussions and the time that he has devoted to them. I understand from him that the Government have no plan to encourage the use of remote juries. Instead, as I understand it, the Government believe that this would be a useful power essentially for three reasons: we may be afflicted by another pandemic; there may well be advances in technology; and, in any event, this power may be useful today if a judge and lawyers, for example, go on a site visit and one or more members of the jury is physically disabled, in which case the site visit can be watched by the whole jury online. That is the example that the Minister gave me.

I have to say that I find these justifications unpersuasive. I am always suspicious of broad powers being taken in legislation “just in case”. I certainly do not doubt the Minister’s good faith, but his assurances as to what is intended to be done under this proposed power do not bind—cannot bind—his successors in office to what he has done; they may have very different proposals or intentions as to the use of these powers. With great respect, the site visit example is, I think, very far-fetched. I am not aware of any such problem in any case in recent years, if ever.

In any event, if Ministers think that provision should be made for such a limited, specific use of remote hearings, with juries in a different place to the judge and the defendant, let it be made clear in the drafting of the clause that a remote hearing cannot take place with the jury in splendid isolation from the judge, the witnesses and the defendant in relation to the hearing of oral evidence, the submissions of counsel or the summing-up by the judge.

Although they have not yet been spoken to, I express my support for Amendments 259A and 259B, both of which concern aspects of the proposed power to be conferred on the court to require a person, including a defendant, to take part in proceedings by audio or video link. I can well understand that this may be a useful power for a preliminary hearing, but not for a substantive trial, unless the defendant consents to that. I am very unhappy about this in relation to young persons.

There are real issues as to whether a defendant would have effective access to a hearing, were his or her presence to be remote, and real concerns as to whether they could effectively communicate with their legal representatives. The Ministry of Justice may be hoping to save some money if it does not need to transport defendants from prison to court, but I am doubtful that it will save much money because it will need to invest in very high-quality computer systems. In any event, I fear the price will be a reduction in the quality of justice, and that price is too high.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful again to the Committee for a very interesting and wide-ranging debate. I thank my noble friend Lord Deben for the most back-handed compliment I have ever received and assure him that, when it comes to justice, I absolutely subscribe to the proposition that justice must be not only done but seen to be done. That reminds me to underline what Clauses 167 and 168 are about: they are about justice being seen to be done. These clauses do not mandate remote hearings; that is for a judge to decide. What they do is permit remote observation of those hearings, which underpins open justice.

When we look at issues such as this, we need to bear in mind that the days when the local newspaper would send people to sit at the back of the Crown Court or magistrates’ court are long gone. In the real world, you will have greater transparency if you have a live feed to journalists from the courtroom than if you say, “You’ve got to come along and take a note”. They simply do not any more, and I am concerned with making sure that we actually have open justice and that it is not just something we talk about.

Amendments 245A and 245B seek to prohibit those transmissions being made to remote observers in all cases where a child is among the parties. Amendment 259A similarly seeks to remove children from the application of Clause 169, which is about video and audio links in criminal proceedings. It would prevent the court, as a blanket ban, from making a direction to enable any participant in a hearing to attend by live link where a child is party to proceedings.

I absolutely agree with the intention of safeguarding children in our courts. We have debated that point in a number of areas of this and other Bills, but I suggest that these amendments are both ineffective and unnecessary. They are unnecessary because we already have in place sufficient tried and tested legislation and guidance to safeguard the privacy of children in these proceedings. Section 47(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 prevents anyone being present at a youth court hearing except members of the court, parties and participants, accredited media representatives or specifically authorised persons.

In other courts, procedure rules provide that it is legitimate to hold a hearing in private

“to protect the interests of any child or protected party”.

Courts have a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of children. Judges, magistrates and tribunal members retain judicial discretion over whether a case is to be heard in private, with full consideration of their duty to protect minors or other vulnerable parties, where necessary. The ineffective or counterproductive point is that there may be cases where it is beneficial for a child, whether as a witness or a defendant, to participate by live link. If one is focusing on cases where children can be affected, one also has to bear in mind that there are lots of cases which affect children where a child is neither a party, nor a witness, nor physically involved at all.

Clause 169, as drafted, gives courts the flexibility to make decisions to direct remote participation where it is considered in the best interests of child participants to do so. I draw the Committee’s attention to the word “may” in the first line of subsection (1) in new Section 51. It is vitally important that we continue to protect children. That is why we have built these safeguards into our provisions.

Amendment 259B, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke to first, seeks to exclude juries from the provisions in Clause 169 that enable a jury assembled together to participate in a trial through a live video link, where appropriate and deemed to be in the interests of justice. The Committee is entitled to a clear statement from the Dispatch Box and I will make one: there is absolutely no intention for this to become a regular feature of trials, with the jury sitting in one room and the judge and the witnesses in another room. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, reminded us, Scotland did put that provision in during the pandemic—I think cinemas were used, so that everything was on a big screen and the audio was very good. That was done in response to the pandemic, and this measure is a future-proofing measure.

I hear what my noble friend Lord Deben says about that and about civil servants tapping Ministers on the shoulder, but, since the pandemic, we have witnessed big changes in how we run our jury system. We have seen —and here I pay my respects again to judges and all others involved in the justice system, who have worked extremely hard to do this—suitable procedures put in place. But we have also seen how legislation tied our hands during an emergency and impeded our ability to progress quickly and make full use of the technological options open to us. We do not want that to happen again. Clause 169 is designed to provide courts with the flexibility to keep pace with new technology as it develops.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, that is the second reason for this clause. Technology is developing in ways that we could not have imagined a few years ago, and we have no idea where it will take us in the future. We want to be sure that we have a statutory basis to take advantage of technology as it develops, so that we can provide a justice system that is fit for the century that we live in and for the way that people live their lives. Those are the two main justifications for Clause 169.

I gave the noble Lord the example of a site visit. Again, I make clear that this is not the main justification for it, but it is important if one has a jury with a disabled person on it. The idea is shocking that, in 2021 a disabled person could be told that they cannot sit on a jury because, at some point during the three-week trial, it will look at the locus in quo, which is a room at the top of a winding staircase, and they cannot climb the stairs. The whole thing could be done very effectively via video, and so that is not a reason to stop them serving on a jury.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. Can he say whether there has ever been such a case?

While I am on my feet, I have another question. The Minister mentioned that technology may develop. I think the concern from those of us who have doubts about this proposal is not advancing technology but human communication. However good the technology becomes, there is still a vital distinction between watching proceedings on a screen and being in the same room as other people. I suggest to the Minister—this is certainly my experience and, I think, the experience of most lawyers and judges—that, although the courts have worked wonders during the pandemic, they have recognised the inferiority of any system that is within our contemplation by means of technology compared with being the same room. The ability to communicate and have an interchange with other people is manifestly weakened by having to do it over a screen.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Absolutely. I do not disagree that face to face is better; no doubt that is what we all feel in this Committee—that it operates much better when we are in the same room than it did when it was all on screens. I absolutely accept that. Let me give an example. Before I became a Minister, I did a three-week trial entirely on screen, with witnesses around the world. After about a day, you forget, and you get used to the new system.

I am not saying that we want this clause here because screens are better; we want this clause in the Bill because screens may be necessary if we have another pandemic and because we do not know where technology is going to go. I do not want to get too techy about it, but there is a very real difference between watching a screen in the sense of a computer monitor and some of the things that I have seen in banks, where there is a big screen down the middle of a table and six or seven of you sit in a row and look at it, while the people you are talking to have the same thing in their office. After about half an hour, you really feel that they are on the opposite side of the table to you. Again, I am not suggesting that that is suitable for courts, but it is an example of how technology can, and will, develop. We want to future-proof it, as I have said.

Amendment 259BA would require anyone taking part in any sort of criminal hearing via live link to submit to a prior assessment of their physical and mental health before the court could consider whether it is appropriate for them to take part in criminal proceedings over a live link. I share the concern of the noble Lord that we must ensure that audio and video links are used appropriately. Again, we have built safeguards into Clause 169, setting out procedures and guidance that courts must follow. The court must decide whether it is in the interests of justice; that includes taking the views of the person who would attend by live link on whether they can participate effectively in the proceedings. The clause also requires that the parties have an opportunity to make representations to the judge.

I also point out that, although the intention behind the amendment is understandable, perhaps even laudable, in practice, it could prevent or deter some people from using a facility that could help them to participate in hearings with as little distress, inconvenience and delay as possible. I therefore urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

With his enormous experience of various areas of the law, can the Minister think of any example of where a sentencing court has decided that it is appropriate to send someone to prison, whether in a health or safety context or in any other context, merely because of carelessness? I ask this out of genuine innocence and ignorance.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I wonder whether health and safety is not, in fact, an example. This is not my area of the law, and I am reluctant to give examples from the Dispatch Box, but I think we have to balance the degree of culpability with the consequences. As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, and as the responses to the consultation showed, it is very difficult to look in the eye the family of somebody who has been killed through careless driving, where the standard has fallen below that of a competent driver—not far below; that is dangerous—and say that the most we can do is fine the driver.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I understand the Minister’s argument. My question is whether there are any actual, practical examples of people being given a prison term because of carelessness. Maybe the Minister does not know. I entirely understand that. I would be grateful if he could write to me with an answer.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Of course, and I will write to the noble Lord with an answer. I just want to be clear what exam question he is setting me. I assume that he is excluding recklessness. He is putting that in a separate box from mere carelessness.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am considering the proposed offence of carelessness. To be clear, my question is whether there are practical examples of sentencing courts sending people to prison for acts of carelessness. Maybe the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Hope, know the answer. I do not. I suggest it may be relevant.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

I would much rather the Minister answered that question.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Attlee indicated that I should come along quietly. I am not going to do that; however, I hope that I will come along realistically and clearly in setting out the Government’s position. There is no dispute in this Committee that the behaviour we are talking about is absolutely abominable and indefensible. I therefore appreciate why a proposed new clause on this distressing subject of breastfeeding voyeurism has been tabled for debate. I start by expressing my unequivocal support for the mothers who have experienced this sort of appalling behaviour.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, we have heard a number of really outstanding speeches, some of which were very personal in terms of people’s history and families. I respectfully endorse the point made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Brinton, that this is not just a matter of protecting privacy or preventing distress; it is also important because we want to promote the very real benefits of breastfeeding. I take all the points made in that regard on board; I also take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, on the bonding time—the quiet time, if I can put it that way—that breastfeeding provides. On whether breastfeeding also benefits fathers because we do not have to get up at night, on that I will—if, as a Minister in a UK Government, I am allowed to dip into a foreign legal system for a moment—plead the fifth amendment.

To pick up a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, I assure the Committee that, depending on the specific circumstances, it may be possible—I underline “may” because I accept that it will not be possible in all circumstances—to capture this sort of disgusting behaviour under some existing offences, including public order offences and offences dealing with harassment and stalking, along with the common-law offence of outraging public decency. However, this is not a complete answer; I do not put it forward as such. We recognise that the law in this area is not always clear, and that consideration should be given to improving it. That is why we asked the Law Commission to review the law around the taking, making and sharing of intimate images without consent, to identify whether there are any gaps—or, rather, what the gaps are—in the scope of protection already offered to victims. The review looked specifically at voyeurism offences and non-consensual photography in public places, including whether the recording and sharing of images of breastfeeding should be included in the scope of “intimate” images for the purposes of any reformed criminal law.

However, a change in the law here will not be straightforward. I will explain why in a moment. With an amendment such as the one moved by the noble Baroness, there may be a variety of situations in which it is still not an offence to take a picture of a person breastfeeding. That is why the Law Commission’s review is looking into intent, the definition of “image” and other circumstances relevant to this issue. As the Committee is already aware, the Law Commission’s work has gone at some pace. It obviously has an important eye for detail; that is why it is there. It intends to publish its recommendations by the spring of next year, so we are certainly not trying to kick this ball into the long grass. We are proactively considering what more can be done to tackle this behaviour and protect mothers now, ahead of the Law Commission’s recommendations for reform of the law in this area.

However, I respectfully disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, that this issue is clearly defined in her amendment. I want to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, if I may; we have had the benefit of some discussions. A number of points look like drafting points but are not, because they really go to the question of the scope of the proposed amendment and what it is seeking to encompass. Let me give a couple of examples, without turning the Committee into a legislative drafting session. Here is example A; I will try to use the initials from the amendment. A takes a photo of his wife, partner or girlfriend on a beach in her bikini, intending to use that image for his own sexual gratification. Another woman, B, is on the same beach, breastfeeding her baby, and is unintentionally caught by A in the picture. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, but I respectfully suggest that this would be caught by the proposed amendment. A would have no defence as, first, he intended the picture for sexual gratification and recorded the image for that purpose. Secondly, he would have no defence of consent by B because B did not consent. A would also not be able to have the second defence of reasonably believing that she was giving consent because he had no idea at all that she was in the picture.

That is one example, but this goes further than drafting. Let us say that A was aware that B was caught in the background of the photo but was not aware that she was breastfeeding. Again, A would not be able to say that B had consented or that he reasonably believed that she had consented. Further, would an image of someone breastfeeding that did not actually include the act of breastfeeding—for example, a photograph capturing only a breastfeeding mother’s face—be captured under this amendment? What parts of the body, if I can put it that way, would we require the image to capture? As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, explained, this is different from the upskirting offence because the law there condescends to particular parts of the body that must be captured in a photo. Would we wish to capture images taken of breastfeeding regardless of whether it is in a private, semi-private or public setting?

I underline to the Committee that I do not raise these matters as drafting points or to be difficult. On the contrary, it is because this issue is so important that we must get the nature, boundaries and scope of the offence absolutely correct.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Does the Minister accept that his second potential problem would easily be dealt with by a drafting amendment to make it clear that the offence relates to a photograph or video of a breast? It would not be difficult to draft that. In relation to his first concern, which, as I understood it, was that if someone takes a photo of their wife or girlfriend breastfeeding for the purpose of sexual gratification and there is some other woman in the background—oh, I am sorry, have I misunderstood?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Before the Minister answers that question, does he not also agree that we have perhaps seven or eight weeks before we get to Report, so the pettifogging points he is making could plainly be dealt with if we all sat round a table and agreed a draft?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In drafting legislation, the first thing we need to do is make sure that we agree on the nature and scope of the amendment. I have tried to make it clear that I am not putting these points forward as pettifogging points of drafting. There are important points underlining this about what we want the amendment to cover. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was about to rise again; should I give him an opportunity to do so?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

It may be thought by the Committee that the first example that the Minister gave was somewhat esoteric and unlikely to occur in practice. The risk of such esoteric events occurring is more than outweighed by the actual mischief that this amendment seeks to address. In any event, the same objections—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, called them pettifogging; that is his word, but I understand why he said that—could well be raised in relation to upskirting, in that pictures could be taken in whose background there is some other unfortunate woman. Perhaps the Minister might wish to reconsider these matters. We would all be happy to sit round a table and agree a draft that meets these points.

Libel and Defamation Cases: Cost to Public Funds

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the Government always take action to protect freedom of expression to safeguard the work of journalists. The forthcoming online safety legislation will enshrine in law protections for journalistic content and free debate. We will, however. also keep a very close eye on what is called the SLAPP jurisdiction. My noble friend mentions Australia and Canada; she may also wish to read a recent judgment from the Western Cape High Court, the case of Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd, in which Deputy Judge President Patricia Goliath set out in very clear terms the advantages of a SLAPP jurisdiction. This may be the first occasion of a David praising the work of a Goliath.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Written Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, focused on the cost to public funds, which the Minister fully answered. The Oral Question contains an attack on barristers and solicitors for representing clients. Does the Minister agree that any litigant, whoever they may be and wherever they may come from, is entitled to legal advice and representation, and that it is the job of the judge to decide what the legal rights and wrongs are?

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

They have vested interests.

Independent Review of Administrative Law Update

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Monday 22nd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we are not disappointed with the report from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his team. On the contrary, it is a very good piece of work. We are consulting for the reasons I have already expressed. The panel did not say that ouster clauses should never be used; it said that, when used appropriately, they should not be seen as an affront to the rule of law. We want to consult on whether and how they should be used. The independent review of the Human Rights Act is ongoing. We will consider its results in due course. While very significant reform of judicial review might require changes to the Human Rights Act, the changes we are proposing do not.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister in public law cases. I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his review team for the very sensible and balanced report which it has produced. The Minister will have noted the wise words of the noble Lord and his colleagues at paragraph 15 of their conclusions:

“Our view is that the government and Parliament can be confident that the courts will respect institutional boundaries in exercising their inherent powers to review the legality of government action. Politicians should, in turn, afford the judiciary the respect which it is undoubtedly due when it exercises these powers.”


Do the Government agree?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I certainly agree that the courts would be expected to respect institutional boundaries, and Parliament and the Government should do likewise. The purpose of our consultation is to make sure that we produce the best system we possibly can so that all those involved in the judicial review process—judges, applicants, Government and everyone else—is party to a system which promotes good government and upholds the rule of law.

Serious Criminal Cases Backlog

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 26th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is of course correct that delays in the criminal justice system can affect not only the defendant but others involved, including victims and witnesses. The listing of cases is ultimately a matter for the judiciary, not the Executive, so I am limited in what I can say. However, I can confirm, for example, that at the moment the majority of cases where a defendant is in custody have been listed for trial before July 2021.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, are the Government considering two possible steps that would help to reduce the unacceptable backlog of cases in the Crown Courts? The first is to reduce the number of jurors to, say, seven, making it easier to ensure social distancing in court rooms, and the second is to allow defendants who are legally represented to choose trial by judge alone in some categories of cases where juries are currently required?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, trial by jury is a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in this jurisdiction. With the support of Public Health England and Public Health Wales, we have made adjustments to more than 290 court rooms and jury deliberation rooms so as to facilitate trial by jury. Reducing the size of the jury is therefore unlikely to free up an additional amount of space for jury trials, and it would also require primary legislation. As to the other point that the noble Lord makes about trial by judge alone, that would, I think, require a significant change in our criminal justice system, and therefore very careful consideration would be required before embarking on that change.