Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers

Monday 20th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)]

My Lords, the unhappy cohort of prisoners to which this amendment relates linger in prison years after they have completed terms of imprisonment that reflect their culpability. They linger because of a statutory presumption that they are dangerous, which is discredited, has been repealed, and is surely, in the cases of many of them, unjustified. I find it impossible to envisage any credible reason why the Secretary of State has not exercised the power that he has been given to procure their release. His inertia belies the title of Secretary of State for Justice. This amendment cries out for the support of the House.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I apologise for having missed the first two minutes of the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in moving this amendment. As he and the Minister may well be aware, this subject has been exercised me considerably over many months now, having seen cases arising in Wales, and we had a debate on this matter earlier this year. I pay tribute to the way in which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has persevered with this important battle, by now over many months and years. The facts that he has put before the House this afternoon should most certainly be of concern to anyone who takes an interest in matters of law and who is concerned about the good name of the UK’s judicial system. The case is valid for the whole cohort, but I very much hope that, at least in the limited number of instances he has quoted, where very little risk is at stake, there can be no possible argument, even from the Government’s own standpoint, for not making progress on this matter. I follow the plea made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that noble Lords of all parties across this House take this issue to heart. I very much hope that colleagues on the Labour Benches will stand up and be counted on this matter.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers

Wednesday 22nd January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I, too, support Amendment 94E, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which would correct a provision in the Bill which could make it almost impossible for those who have suffered miscarriages of justice to gain compensation for their time spent in prison.

At present, the test for compensation in cases where a miscarriage of justice has taken place is that a jury could not, beyond reasonable doubt, find them guilty of the crime, perhaps because of new evidence that has come to light or evidence that has been disproven. Looking to the case law which forms the basis of the current test, Lord Bingham argued in the Mullen case that, based on Article 14.6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a miscarriage of justice occurs not only when a person can be proven to be innocent but in cases where it is possible to say that an individual has been wrongly convicted because of,

“failures of the trial process”.

The Supreme Court adopted this view in the Adams case. The Divisional Court stipulated in the Ali case that an individual should be required to prove,

“beyond reasonable doubt, that no reasonable jury (or magistrates) properly directed as to the law, could convict on the evidence now to be considered”.

If Clause 161 of the Bill before us today is passed unamended, it would return the law to a narrower definition of miscarriages of justice, such that the individual has to prove that,

“the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person was innocent of the offence”.

This places a heavier burden of proof on the individual, as he or she must prove their innocence of a crime years or perhaps even decades after that crime has been committed and when they have already served a portion of their sentence. This would result in individuals who have already suffered wrong at the hands of our justice system being denied access to compensation for that wrong. In practical terms, it would be virtually impossible for these individuals to prove their innocence since they are in effect being asked to prove a negative: that they did not commit acts that would have made them guilty of the offence.

Justice has pointed out that the cases of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven, the Cardiff Three and Judith Ward would not have satisfied the innocence test proposed by the Government. It is also worth remembering that the rule of thumb when awarding compensation in these cases is that the individual should expect to receive roughly the same amount as they would have missed out on in lost earnings for the time they spent in prison. The Bill would impoverish these wronged individuals and that, surely, cannot be right. Amendment 94E, which I am glad to support, would instead reinsert the test currently used by courts in determining whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred; that is, that the evidence against the person at trial is so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based on it.

I remind noble Lords that the presumption of innocence is a long-standing principle of our criminal justice system. As Liberty has said, it is a key safeguard. For in cases where the state prosecution cannot provide evidence that proves beyond reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty, a court cannot convict that individual of an offence. Liberty says:

“The criminal law, through the presumption of innocence, accepts that sometimes individuals will not be convicted even though it is not 100% certain that they were innocent: it is guilt that must be proven”.

If the Government introduce this highly significant change to our criminal justice system, it will undermine this fundamental principle, since individuals would never have had to prove their innocence in the original criminal trial. I urge noble Lords on all sides of the House to support Amendment 94E and to signal to the Government that they cannot introduce such a reckless change.

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)]

My Lords, it will occasion no surprise that I support this amendment, nor perhaps need I declare my obvious interest as the author, in my judicial capacity, of the definition of miscarriage of justice that it supports.

The amendment has been recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which has advanced two reasons for supporting it. The first and lesser reason is that, in determining whether there has been a miscarriage of justice as defined in the amendment, the Secretary of State, or the courts in reviewing her decision, will not have to infringe the presumption of innocence that is required by Article 6.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is not true of the definition proposed in the Bill. The second and more compelling reason is that the definition in this amendment better meets the requirements of justice than the definition proposed in the Bill.

I will deal first with the effect of Article 6.2 of the human rights convention. Article 6 provides for the right to a fair trial. Article 6.2 provides:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”.

On the face of it, this is no more than a rule of criminal procedure that has long been part of our law: the burden of proving guilt is on the prosecution. Indeed, the Strasbourg jurisprudence recognises that the primary effect of Article 6.2 is to impose this procedural rule. But the Strasbourg court has identified what it has described as “a second aspect” of Article 6.2, which applies to protect individuals after they have been acquitted in a criminal trial. Shortly summarised, the second aspect prohibits public officials and authorities, including courts, from suggesting that a person who has been acquitted of a criminal charge is, or may be, guilty none the less.