European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Committee: 10th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I apologise for taking my seat after the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, started but I heard most of what he said from outside the Chamber. I add my voice in support of the comments that have been made. There is an old saying in Wales: you can lead a Welsh workforce through hell and high water but once you start driving them, woe betide. I think we should bear in mind the psychology of this situation. If these amendments are made to the Bill, I do not think that they will undermine the main purpose in any way. I hope the Government can look again at the Bill between now and Report.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, I respectfully agree with the sentiments articulated by the noble Lord. In relation to Wales, a totally new attitude has been taken toward reservations. The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, suggested that reservations were somewhat limited on the whole in devolution legislation. That is not so; in the Wales Act there are 197 separate reservations, believe it or not. Some are massive; some apply to sovereign powers that should belong to the mother Parliament; others are very trivial. For example, dangerous dogs, sharp knives and axes, prostitution and half a dozen similar situations are included. Why they were ever included in that context I know not, but there they are. Therefore, the area that has been reserved regarding Wales is massive and comprehensive.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, my understanding is that about a fortnight ago an undertaking was given in the House of Commons to the effect that this matter would be visited and that a suitable amendment would be made to enable consent Motions to be passed by both devolved Parliaments in this matter. It seems to me a matter of a strict undertaking. I do not know whether the Government are in a position to say how soon that undertaking will be brought into force.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for moving Amendment 5. I had intended to add my name to it, but then I started to look at the Northern Ireland dimension and how that could be covered. I therefore want particularly to speak to my Amendment 356, which is linked with Amendment 5 and which tries to deal with the unfortunate situation in Northern Ireland. I shall be brief because noble Lords have probably heard enough of my voice today.

At a time when the devolved Governments feel that they are facing what they call, rightly or wrongly, a power grab, surely it is important that the UK Government should carry those Administrations with them in such a major project as this. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said. As always, he was totally consistent, but he must accept that there is a conflict between the perception of a legislative consent mechanism at Westminster—which tends to regard it as a convention, as I said—and the understanding that has developed among the devolved bodies, which see it more as the norm and a mechanism required as part of the legislative process. I understand the noble Lord when he says that there may be parts of the legislative process without it, because of their international connotations et cetera, but when there is an impact, as has been mentioned in certain cases, on the powers coming back from Brussels and going to wherever they go to—Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast—then there clearly needs to be a mechanism to sort that out. That is not just at this point in time; that mechanism needs to be ongoing for the future, because I entirely accept that there is a UK single market and that there must be some rules for it.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness mentioned, it is still St David’s Day—just. I have my name on Amendment 21 and support what was said about the absolute need to ensure that the devolved Administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are at the centre of reaching a consensus—meaning, of course, some give and take—across the UK on what will be the proposed terms of withdrawal from the European Union and the future frameworks for our relationships with the EU.

As the noble Baroness mentioned a moment ago, the National Assembly for Wales already indicated its good will in this matter by publishing the White Paper, Securing Wales’ Future. It is an excellent and very constructive White Paper and I invite the Minister to endorse the positive approaches taken in it as a basis for the co-operation and consensus the Government pledged to seek. I hope that they can do that either by accepting Amendment 21 or in other ways.

If the Minister cannot or will not do so, that will undoubtedly be seen as an indication that, although warm words may be said about securing a UK consensus, it will not be underpinned by a legislative guarantee. In those circumstances, the provisions of Amendment 36 would be needed, preventing the Government from exercising the powers of this Bill until all devolved Administrations have agreed. However, if the Government can move along the lines of Amendment 21, I would see that as a positive way forward.

The noble Baroness also referred to the powers that, post Brexit, should be transferred to the devolved Administrations. Clearly, if Brexit goes ahead and powers are repatriated from Brussels, some will deal with matters that are totally devolved, such as agriculture. To my mind, these functions should immediately be directed to Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast as appropriate. Clearly, there needs to be some mechanism to resolve any disagreements about what should be passed on to the devolved Administrations. In that context, I await the words of my noble friend Lord Elystan-Morgan, whose Amendment 43 possibly addresses that.

In conclusion—these will probably be my last words in Committee—what matters so much is that, in Edinburgh as in Belfast and Cardiff, there is a feeling that the Government are working with them as partners in this project. Clearly, the power rests in London, but if it is a question of “London knows everything better” and if it does not take on board the objectives and tactics put forward by any of those devolved regimes, and does not give them serious thought, then it creates problems for itself in its relationship with these organisations.

I seriously suggest to the Minister that he please consider this White Paper as a basis. It has cross-party agreement in Cardiff and it is not impossible also to form a cross-party basis here.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, in proposing Amendment 43, I accept totally everything that has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Wigley in respect of their amendments. Those amendments are social and political in their nature. They constitute an overwhelming case for why, in order to preserve the unity of the United Kingdom, the reality of devolution and the harmony between the various constituent parts of the United Kingdom, respect should be shown by the mother parliament to the parliaments of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Those are political and social considerations; the matter that I wish to propose is in no way contrary to that but runs parallel. It is a constitutional point. It is a marvellously simple constitutional point, and I think I can deal with it in very short compass. It concerns the reserved powers constitution that Wales achieved under the Wales Act which became law a few weeks ago. The purpose of that Act was to change the whole pattern of devolution for Wales from a conferred pattern of devolution—bit by bit over the years, a confetti type of development—to a reserved powers constitution.

It is axiomatic as far as a reserved powers constitution is concerned that two matters should be dominant. The essence of a reserved powers constitution, as we appreciate, is that there is a transfer in the first instance of the totality of power from the mother parliament to the subsidiary parliament, but that at the same time there should be a reservation of a strict number of exceptions and reservations. It is axiomatic, therefore, that two conditions must prevail. First, the mother parliament must be seized of all the legislative power and authority that is relevant to the situation. That is obvious. Secondly, the mother parliament must be cognisant of the powers that it has and must be in a position to know exactly where to draw the line between that which is transferred and that which is reserved. Neither of those conditions exists in this case.

Why is that so? I remember a piece of dog Latin that I learned many years ago when I was a law student in relation to the sale of goods: “nemo dat quod non habet”—no man can give that which he does not have. Nobody can transfer that which they do not have. When it came to the question of deciding what powers Wales should have, the mother parliament did not have a mass of those powers that are relevant to the situation. There is a huge area that is missing. It may be 25%; it may be 30% or 40%. It is massive in relation to the totality of legal authority. That authority was missing from 1 January 1973, ever since the European Communities Act 1972 came into force. It never was with the mother parliament to dispose of. It could not possibly give it to Wales, or to Scotland for that matter—in Northern Ireland, the situation was entirely different, because its constitution goes back to 1922.

What, therefore, is to be done? The following matters have some relevance, broadly. Of course, there is the question of the Sewel convention, which has been written into both the Scotland Act and the Wales Act. That will have its effect gradually over the years. There is also the question of the joint ministerial committee, which meets in confidence and is able to discuss in a situation of total secrecy matters which are of the utmost importance to the mother parliament and the devolved parliaments. There is also the question of protocols, which was greatly promised in the late 1990s when legislation in relation to Scottish and Welsh devolution went through but has been as dead as the dodo, I am afraid, and should be revived.

I think—this is where we have the amendment—there is the necessity for something that is much more focused. That is why I have proposed that the Prime Minister and the First Minister for Wales should be responsible within a period of two months for forming a body that will look carefully at the situation to determine: first, what is the scope of legislative authority that is missing here; secondly, what is the nature of that authority; thirdly, what entrenched rights—what established rights—have come into being in relation to that since 1 January 1973; and, lastly, what situations are there where there has been legislation under the 1972 Act which has been deemed to be incompatible with the European instruments. That is a very substantial job, and I suggest that the period that I have nominated of 12 months is not unreasonable in the circumstances.

Many people will say that this is not necessary and that Wales from Cardiff and the Westminster Parliament from here can negotiate at arm’s length. I do not believe for a moment that that is possible. We have seen exactly over the last few months when we were dealing with the Wales Bill how almost impossible it was to persuade Parliament that much of what had been reserved was utterly trivial and was an insult to the Welsh nation. Things such as sharp knives, axes, dogs, licensing, prostitution, hovercrafts—all those matters which scream for domestic consideration—had been reserved.

Years ago, a very famous Welsh statesman said, “Why look into a crystal ball when you can read the book?”. We know exactly what happens when Wales and England deal with each other in that way. It is not the basis of partnership and equality at all. The cobwebs of colonialism still exist in the relationship between Wales and England, I am afraid. Something better has to be done, and I believe that my amendment can bring that about.

Wales Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 7th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, these two amendments, Amendment 45 and Amendment 46, are intended to stimulate thought—particularly the first of those amendments, which relates to dominion status—and to try and deepen and broaden the whole issue of the constitutional future of Wales. The second, which deals with the constitution of reserved powers, is intended to seek to repair and ameliorate some very serious flaws which, in my submission, exist in this part of the Bill.

Dominion status is not about a rigid pattern of government. The principle is enunciated in the Statute of Westminster 1931 and has developed politically, broadly and indeed fruitfully over the 85 years thereafter. It is full of possibilities for meeting different situations in different parts of the world. Obviously, when one is speaking of dominion status in the context of Wales, one is not speaking in any way of a replica of the constitutional situation of New Zealand or Australia. Nevertheless, the common refrain which runs through it all is that it involves a territory that was once under direct British rule and which still accepts the sovereignty and the titular authority of the Queen. Beyond that, the possibilities are almost illimitable. Indeed, my appeal in this situation, when we are thinking of the future of Wales, is to think big. If you think big, you will achieve something worth while; if you think small, what you will achieve will be small, or even perhaps smaller than that which you have set out to obtain. That is the situation that confronts us now.

The possibilities of dominion status are almost illimitable. It is an open secret that about 10 years ago the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Spain almost came to an understanding—this is hardly believable—about the future of Gibraltar, with a plan for some form of dominion status. In other words, the concept is so flexible, so malleable and so adaptable that it was possible for the ancient conflicts there to come very near to a friendly settlement. That is an illustration of exactly how pliable dominion status can be. It is in that context that I would ask for imagination to roam and for the spirit to be broad and liberal and inspiring in relation to the possibilities here. There are endless plans and changes that can be considered, but within them there is the possibility of Wales playing a full, dominant, honourable and splendid part in the life of the United Kingdom. Who knows what the situation will be in five to 10 years’ time? It is a situation of total flux, and it is therefore incumbent upon us as Welsh people, and indeed upon all of us as British people, to consider exactly what this possibility should be, side by side with many other possibilities.

I turn to the second matter, the question of the creation of a reserved powers constitution for Wales. Normally I would jump with joy at this development because it places Wales upon the same constitutional basis as Scotland and Northern Ireland. It also tidies up a great deal of what is now in a state of confusion and, if I may so describe it, confetti. When you deal with a long period of transferring small powers, day in and day out, coming from hundreds of different sources, you create a situation that almost guarantees some constitutional neurosis on the part of many generations of Welsh lawyers. Avoiding that would in itself be utterly worth while.

However, I am far from happy with the situation because I believe it is deeply flawed and a blueprint for failure and disaster. The fact that there are 200 or more reservations—I am wrong, actually; it is about 198 or 199—and the very nature of the reservations themselves makes the matter a nonsense. Consider the matters that are reserved, though I touched on this at Second Reading so I will not go into all the detail: licensing, something that Wales had devolved to it in 1881; dangerous dogs; sharp axes and knives; hovercraft; prostitution; charitable collections—one could go through dozens of examples here of what are mere trivia, matters that are clearly domestic in their nature. The inclusion of them by way of reservation is to my mind an insult to the people of Wales.

It is on that basis that I ask the House to consider very carefully whether in any way this can fit in with what I have described as the moral and constitutional geometry of the situation. By that, I mean that when you have a settlement such as we are now seeking in relation to Wales, one that one hopes should last for a long time or at any rate be a basis upon which further development can be built, there has to be mutual trust and some sense of balance. The subsidiary parliament states straight away, “We are not concerned with the question of succession to the Crown, defence or foreign policy and perhaps three or four allied questions of that nature, but we are concerned with matters that are purely and classically domestic in their character”. If the current Parliament refuses to accept that, the whole moral geometry of the situation is affected.

How did this come about? Not, I think, on account of any mendacious conspiracy on the part of Ministers against Wales; I do not think there is any conscious machination at all in regard to it. It came from a long history of prejudice that has formed what you might describe as a permafrost of attitude towards Welsh devolution. I do not believe that the situation was anything different from this: the Secretary of State for Wales, perhaps rather deferentially, went to various colleagues and said, “What would you like reserved, my dear chap, from your department?”. Each one said, in his mind and his heart if not indeed in actual words, “Practically everything. It doesn’t matter how meagre, niggardly, small or utterly local it might be, we will reserve it if we possibly can”.

Why? I believe that it has a lot to do with the fact that Wales was England’s first colony. That was the situation in the 13th century. In the Act of Union of 1536, Wales was said to be part, inevitably and as it always had been, of the United Kingdom, and its affairs were to be assimilated, incorporated and included within the greater realm of England. We have not broken through that mould.

On Second Reading, I made this—I think, not invalid—point. When you think of some of these reservations—there are dozens which, to my mind, are utterly ludicrous—can you imagine the Colonial Office of the United Kingdom 60 years ago, particularly when James Griffiths was the head of that department, going to a British Caribbean or African colony and saying, “These are the reservations that I demand of you”? It simply could not happen.

It is against that template that one has to consider this matter. For that reason, I have drafted this new clause, which of course I shall not press to a Division tonight, but it could well be revisited before we finish with the Bill. It calls on the Secretary of State to be responsible for setting up a working party to report to Parliament within three years on the question of how the reserved powers are operating in each case. The purpose of that—allied, no doubt, with recommendations from the working party—would be, first, to narrow the gap between the situation now and that which existed on the very day in July 2014 when the Supreme Court gave its judgment in the agricultural workers case. The gap is immense. The powers that we have under the Bill are, strictly speaking, immensely inferior to what we had then, when it was discovered that silent transferred powers, which no one had ever appreciated, had given immense authority to Wales.

I think that the Government were reluctant to accept the reserved powers constitution that they had enforced on them; their hands were forced. I do not believe that there is even now a messianic commitment, and most certainly there is no incandescent enthusiasm for this reform. It is something to which they feel that they must surrender.

The effect will be, secondly, to get rid of many of these anomalies; and, thirdly, to set out a coherent pattern, for in fact there is no theme—no coherence—to this. For that reason, I beg to move.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I support my friend, the noble Lord, Elystan-Morgan, on Amendment 45, which he moved so eloquently, and Amendment 46, which is coupled with it. The noble Lord has throughout his political life been a strong advocate of the merits of dominion status, as defined by the Statute of Westminster 1931. In his way, tonight, he has, even at this late hour, elevated the debate above the uninspiring contents of a rather unambitious Bill.

Since the United Kingdom became a member of the European Community in 1973 and now—at least for the time being—of the European Union, I must admit that I had tended to look at Wales’s future in European terms more than in terms of the Commonwealth. I had no difficulty in regarding Wales as both an historic nation in its own right and a European region. As the EU grew to its present strength of 28 member states, with eight of them smaller in population than Wales, now including in their own right small countries such as Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Luxembourg, I looked on our legitimate aspiration as being a member state of the EU in our own right.

That was not in any sense a separatist argument. If England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and indeed, the Irish Republic, were also member states, we could co-operate within a new relationship covering Britain and Ireland. We would have our own presence in Europe. It was indeed the converse of a separatist approach. I regarded a pooling of sovereignty on a European level, subject to the principle of subsidiarity, where decisions are taken as closely as possible to the community on which they impact, as being most appropriate to the modern world, in which the physical barriers between nations should be regarded as a thing of the past.

Wales Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) : House of Lords
Monday 31st October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, this amendment goes to the heart of the Government’s intentions relating to the permanence of the National Assembly. The Bill as it stands contains the words:

“In view of that commitment it is declared that the Assembly and the Welsh Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Wales voting in a referendum”.

But what is the Government’s intention, and what do they really mean by those words?

I am aware that the introduction of those words follows a similar declaration in relation to Scotland’s Parliament—that it is a permanent part of the governmental system of that country. In Scotland, the demand for that grew from the Scottish assertion of a claim of right: that sovereignty in Scotland comes from the people. That is fundamental to the developments in that country over the past 25 years. It was central, indeed, to the initiative taken by the late John Smith when Labour leader, and it was the background to the Scottish convention which brought the question of a Scottish Parliament back on to the political agenda in the late 1980s.

I believe that this principle should equally apply to the National Assembly. As it was established—and later emphatically confirmed—by referenda of the people of Wales, it is only right that the National Assembly can be abolished only by the democratic vote of the people of Wales.

My amendment deals with the circumstances in which such a referendum can take place. I believe that it would be totally unacceptable if Westminster were to decide, against the wishes of the National Assembly, to hold a referendum on its abolition. That would make a total nonsense of the provisions in Clause 1 about the permanence of the Assembly. It would be a creature only in existence at the behest of Westminster. Equally, if the rules for such a referendum were drawn up by Westminster, there is no knowing what impediments might be contained within them. One has only to think back to the 1979 referendum, with its 40% rule, which meant that on a 50% turnout, there had to be a four-to-one majority in favour of the Assembly for it to be established. That rule applied in Scotland too, where, unlike Wales, there was a majority in favour of the assembly, but it was overruled because of the 40% rule.

My amendment, therefore, does two things. First, it provides that the right and responsibility for holding any such referendum should lie exclusively in the hands of the Assembly itself. Secondly, Amendment 1 provides that the rules for that referendum should be drawn up by the Assembly in co-operation with the Electoral Commission. These two safeguards ensure that this Bill does indeed legislate for the permanence of the Assembly and recognises—as, I think, do all true democrats in this Chamber—that the future of the Assembly should lie in the hands of the people of Wales alone, and not be beholden to the whims and wishes of the Government of the day here in Westminster. As such, this is fundamental to our vision for the status and future of the Assembly. I ask the Government to accept this amendment or, if it is in any way technically deficient, to bring forward their own amendment on Report to reach these objectives. I beg to move.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with the submission made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. He has adumbrated all the arguments that I can possibly think of in support of this amendment. It goes to the very heart of the question that this is essentially a contract, not inter-institutional in terms of the mechanics of Westminster, but a contract with the people of Wales.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government and Wales Office (Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for introducing this amendment, and the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, for his contribution. The amendment seeks to define the trigger for a referendum to abolish the National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government, and would provide that the rules for such a referendum be drawn up by the Assembly in co-operation with the Electoral Commission. Clause 1 meets the Government’s commitment in the St David’s Day agreement and delivers the Silk commission’s recommendation that it should be recognised that the National Assembly is permanent so long as that is the will of the majority of the people of Wales. New Section A1(3), in Clause 1, states:

“In view of that commitment it is declared that the Assembly and the Welsh Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Wales voting in a referendum”.

As matters stand, referendums are governed by the law relating to referendums, as passed by this Parliament, and I do not consider that there is any suggestion that that should be varied. The principle in the Bill establishes in statute what is already recognised to be the case—that the National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government are permanent parts of our constitutional fabric. The referendum provision strengthens this commitment and delivers on the second limb of the Silk commission’s recommendation. Although there has never been a question about whether these institutions are anything but permanent, it is only right that if they were to be abolished that would have to be on the basis of a decision by the people of Wales. Let me be clear that such a referendum is not envisaged, and so the noble Lord’s amendment deals with entirely hypothetical circumstances. I therefore believe that it is unnecessary. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.