Consumer Interests: World Consumer Rights Day

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Monday 17th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I regret that I was not in my place when my noble friend Lord De Mauley answered the Question, but I will take note of the noble Lord’s point.

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, I think that the Minister will agree that consumer rights and consumer interests are best served by having strong consumer bodies. In this country, as a result of the statutory instrument passed last week, that will now mean primarily Citizens Advice, and we wish it well in that task. However, will the Minister take this opportunity to respond more clearly to questions raised in the debate on that statutory instrument? First, does the redesignation by ONS of Citizens Advice as a public body in any way threaten its charity status, its independence or its ability freely to campaign? Secondly, will the Minister set out more clearly the totality of grant in aid from BIS to both Consumer Focus and Citizens Advice over the past five years, so that we can see clearly what resources are available in the new consumer landscape?

Public Bodies (Abolition of the National Consumer Council and Transfer of the Office of Fair Trading’s Functions in relation to Estate Agents etc) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Tuesday 11th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I should like to write to my noble friend to clarify that question and give her more detail about the transfer. I hope that I will be able to give her some figures and will copy in other noble Lords to provide further details. I hope that that gives my noble friend some reassurance.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, suggested that the provisions in the order do not provide—

[Lord Whitty]

Before we leave the issue of the transfer of money and personnel, is the noble Viscount saying that he rejects my view that less than half the number of posts in Consumer Focus three years ago will actually reappear in Citizens Advice, and that the non-post, non-energy side has been cut significantly—almost by half—in that period? That is a considerably larger reduction than the general cut in public expenditure to which he referred.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I will be writing to my noble friend Lady Oppenheim-Barnes to clarify the position on the transfer, and the letter will be sent to the noble Lord. That should directly address the issue of how many staff are likely to be transferring.

[Lord Whitty]

I accept what the noble Viscount said regarding transfer, but I was referring to the point about the transition over the past three years when compared with what the NCC was previously doing.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I will write to the noble Lord. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, suggests that the provisions in the order do not provide adequate parliamentary or ministerial accountability. However, I dispute that, as the noble Baroness will know. In making an order under the Public Bodies Act, a Minister must have regard to a number of tests, including the requirement to secure appropriate accountability to Ministers. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee considers compliance with all these tests. I remind the noble Baroness that in the case of this order the committee concluded that it was content to apply the 40-day affirmative procedure rather than the more stringent 60-day process. However, I will again set out the measures that we have put in place to ensure clear lines of accountability, and I will do that in a separate letter on grounds of time.

I conclude by addressing the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, at the beginning concerning quango-cutting. On the one hand, we are being accused of having too many bodies; on the other hand, we are accused of being forced by the Cabinet Office to cull quangos. We think that our redesign of the consumer landscape strikes the right balance, including representation across all parts of the UK. The changes brought about by this order will deliver more effective consumer advocacy and more joined-up supervision of the estate agency regime.

Public Bodies (Abolition of the National Consumer Council and Transfer of the Office of Fair Trading’s Functions in relation to Estate Agents etc) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Monday 24th February 2014 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I thank noble Lords for their valuable and detailed comments on an issue that I recognise holds some sensitivities in terms of these changes for certain members of the Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for his broad support and some reassurances on the estate agency part of the changes.

I start by paying tribute to the work and experience of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, over many years and indeed decades. I listened with some care to his comments but he will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with much of his general analysis of the consumer landscape. We believe that these changes are beneficial. I shall start by addressing some of his overall comments, and I hope that that he will forgive me if I duplicate what has been said already.

He started by saying that the reform landscape and the changes set out under the order do not achieve the clarity that he had hoped for. We firmly believe that the reforms we are making are a great improvement. Consumers will have a single port of call for Government-funded information, advice and guidance. The Citizens Advice service will be well placed to use its expertise to direct its advocacy and speak up on behalf of consumers. I recognise that some of the detail of the order is complicated, but that is the nature of legislation. It is the outcome that is important.

The noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, expressed sadness at the abolition of the NCC. I will say, if I have not said it in the past, that I personally recognise the great contribution that the National Consumer Council has made to consumer issues over the years, and the no small part that a number of noble Lords have played in contributing to that. I believe that I said this earlier, but the NCC’s strong track record of consumer advocacy was one of the key reasons for the body being folded into Consumer Focus when it was created by powers under the Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007. The great track record of the NCC was enhanced and expanded when it joined with Energywatch and Postwatch to form Consumer Focus in 2008. It will be further enhanced when it joins the Citizens Advice service as a result of this order.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked how the consumer journey will work under the new arrangements. He cited the word “confusion” relating to other regulated issues. We believe that the consumer journey will not change significantly under these new arrangements. We are simply joining up the policy-making and regulatory oversight expertise of Consumer Futures with the existing consumer complaint-handling abilities of the Citizens Advice service. As a result of these changes, anyone needing impartial help or advice on a consumer issue, whether that is a general matter or on a regulated issue in a sector, will be able to phone the national helpline, contact their local bureau or use the interactive help on the Citizens Advice web pages.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, raised the issue of the failure, as he put it, to bring other related sectors within Consumer Futures. The order is more about better working and not simply about moving bodies around, which may have been the expression he used. Citizens Advice will work closely with other consumer panels, joining up on regulated issues of common interest and concern.

The noble Lord also raised an issue about the citizens advice bureaux and whether they had the expertise to deal with the work. I can reassure him that the Citizens Advice service is already fully engaged on policy and research across a very wide range of consumer issues. It has both the experience and expertise to provide a highly effective voice for consumers, and this capability will be bolstered by the expert staff transferring from Consumer Futures. The Citizens Advice service will benefit from its close connection to the citizens advice bureaux and its management of the new consumer advice helpline that is replacing Consumer Direct.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, also raised the issue of the funding of the citizens advice bureaux, and stated that it had been cut. I refute that by saying that the Government have not cut Citizens Advice funding. In 2014-15 we will maintain the core grant funding to the Citizens Advice service, which is a combined total of £21.8 million, at a time when other public bodies are seeing their funding cut. That will ensure that the vital central services provided by the umbrella bodies to the bureaux network are maintained. Funding to the service to deliver advocacy on energy—

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, my question was slightly different. It concerned the addition of what was the Consumer Focus function, particularly the function that was not funded by industry, which has been handed over to Citizens Advice. Has the amount of money that was previously spent by Consumer Focus on that area of its work prior to 2010 been reflected in a proportionate increase in the funding of Citizens Advice? My impression is that it has not, and that while the aggregate amount for Citizens Advice may have been maintained in difficult times, the full reflection of what was previously done elsewhere is not reflected in that total figure. It would be useful to have the figures.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Monday 13th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

It is certainly not to confuse, my Lords. As I explained, the role of the assurer is to provide that element of credibility which is not there at present. The assurer will also be working closely with the union and a contract will be drawn up with the union, notwithstanding the core powers that the assurer must have. That is why we believe this is necessary, in particular for the larger unions with 10,000 members and above.

The current statute does not provide an assurance of the union’s compliance as there is no sufficient enforcement mechanism. The Bill addresses this shortcoming by allowing the certification officer to investigate instances of possible non-compliance where there is good reason to do so. The certification officer will require access to the register and other relevant documents in order to determine whether a union is diligent in maintaining a register that is up to date so far as is reasonably practicable. The current system relies on individual members making formal complaints to the certification officer before he can investigate. As members can have no way of knowing the state of the register as a whole, the route for the certification officer to determine whether a union is compliant with its statutory obligations is not that effective to ensure that the existing duties are complied with. There may be a good reason for the certification officer to investigate a union’s compliance with the overarching duties even in the absence of a complaint including, for example, where a membership audit certificate has not been provided by the union or it is unsatisfactory.

We want to give members and the wider public an assurance that all unions are complying with their existing statutory duties. If the measure is applied only when the certification officer receives a complaint, we will not achieve this objective. Just because there are few formal complaints that we are aware of, it does not mean that there is no problem and this is an important point to make bearing in mind the comments that were made earlier by the noble Lords, Lord Whitty and Lord Monks. The access to and handling of union data is a concern that has occupied a great deal of time and debate. The Government understand the sensitivity of union membership data and agree with the importance of protecting them. However, for the reasons discussed at length previously, I reassure noble Lords that this amendment is unnecessary. Membership data will be well protected by both the existing and new legal safeguards. The assurer will owe a contractual duty of confidentiality to the union as set out in the Bill. The assurer, the certification officer and the inspector will be subject to the obligations of the Data Protection Act whenever they handle union membership data. Furthermore, the certification officer is obliged to act in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, which includes the individual’s right to privacy.

These two amendments between them would undermine the Government’s policy objective in Part 3 of the Bill. Amendment 29 would remove the independent scrutiny that is fundamental to the credibility of large unions’ annual reporting on duties. Amendment 30 would remove the provision for the certification officer to proactively investigate and assess a union’s compliance with Section 24 of TULRCA where there is good reason to believe that there may be an issue. For these reasons I cannot accept the amendments.

Just before I ask the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to withdraw his amendment, I want to respond to a question he put to me. He raised the important issue of who would be appointed to be an assurer. We have already said that we will consult on who will be eligible to be an assurer, and further to this consultation the Secretary of State will make an order setting out who is eligible. They are likely to be qualified professionals such as solicitors and lawyers, which was alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, auditors or independent scrutineers. This is similar to the system in place for independent scrutineers, and furthermore the unions will have discretion over whom to appoint from the list of eligible assurers and to remove them from the role on agreement with their members. Unions will be able to define the detailed terms of contract and their relationship with the assurer. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that lengthy reply, in which he repeatedly referred to the Government’s key policy objective. However, it is not clear to me what the policy objective of the whole of Part 3 is, and in particular the invention of this new category of assurer. I am glad that there is to be a consultation on it, but I do not see that anything is likely to emerge at the end of that consultation which could not be written into the terms of the annual audited return from the trade unions, whereby the external auditor would be required to certify that their membership system complied with the requirements. Why we have to invent a whole new structure is creating grave suspicion among the unions. The whole of Part 3 is very difficult to understand, but its effect will be a significant cost on union administration. The creation of an intermediate level between them and the certification officer is bound to increase distrust, and there is a suspicion that the Government’s motive in this is, at the very least, suspect.

Some of the motives that we have to tried to impugn have been denied by the Minister. It is not about tightening up on strike ballots. It is not about assurances on internal elections. It is not about the political fund. It is about imposing a cost and a bureaucracy on trade unions that will increase the likelihood of conflict between them and their regulator. I do not think that that is in the interests of trade union members and I cannot see that it is in the interests of wider society. The suspicion therefore has to be that other, sinister motives are involved here—that the Government wish to impose someone right in the heart of the administration of the trade unions, someone employed or contracted theoretically by the trade unions but who is actually a different type of person. I do not want to go too far down the paranoid road but I am quite a long way down it.

It seems to me that all the objectives that the Minister has mentioned can be achieved by a tightening up of the audit and by the certification officer and his or her powers. This intrusion of an assurer has not been justified. Had we not been voting so much today and we are all getting very tired, I would have asked the opinion of the House. I think that this is a bad part of the Bill and this is the worst part of that bad part. Before they put it into operation, the Minister and the Government need to think about this very carefully again. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Wednesday 20th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Whitty]

No, my Lords, my assertion was that the Minister clearly did not agree with the independent research.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My understanding was that the noble Lord was querying the letter that I wrote and I just want to clarify what I said in the letter. I said that,

“it did not take account of other factors which would have an effect on wages … for example, the supply and demand for labour, prevailing economic conditions and so forth”,

which are points that I have already made.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, questioned the position regarding Wales, which was also debated at some length in Committee and earlier. We have been clear throughout that we regard agricultural wages as a non-devolved matter tied to employment and wage setting. Wales Office and Defra ministers have had regular discussions with Welsh Ministers on the issue since the abolition was first proposed in July 2010. Those discussions will continue so that the transition from the Agricultural Wages Board is as seamless as possible for workers and farmers in Wales. I hope that, in part, that answers the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, which concerns the need to look after the interests of farm workers during the transition.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, raised the issue of seasonal or migrant workers, who he stated would lose protection with the abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board. I remind him that it is the gangmasters licensing legislation that specifically protects migrant workers from exploitation, not the agricultural wages regime. General employment law provides for a high level of protection for all workers.

The noble Lord raised another issue which has been raised in the past which has no particular relevance to impact assessments. That is the issue of tied cottages. Workers in tied cottages will continue to be protected by the terms of their tenancy agreements and tenancy legislation. The Bill’s provisions will not alter the status of protected tenancies under the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976.

We therefore do not see what purpose it would serve to publish yet another impact assessment. That point was made by my noble friends Lord Cathcart and Lord Deben. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, with due respect to the Minister, it might have been better had a Defra Minister replied to the debate, because some of the information that he has just given is not accurate—for example, on tied cottages and the provisions for migrant workers. The requirements under the agricultural wages order and related matters were set by the board. They are enforced by the gangmasters authority these days if they involve gangmaster labour. I think that the noble Lord needs to get back to Defra to clarify some of those things.

However, let us get to the main point. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, said that he thought that I was pushing the traditions of the House. One of the problems with this is that Ministers collectively have ignored what the House clearly decided in debate on the Public Bodies Bill only in relation to this quango. Whether we agree with its abolition or not, the Government have ignored what was clearly laid down two years ago after, as I said, bitter debate in this House and have not provided the House with adequate information or time to discuss this issue, as they have on all other quangos that they are abolishing, or else there has been a bit of new primary legislation.

That is why there is such a hoo-hah about the assessment; it is not good enough. The Minister has said that he does not agree with it. The assessment itself says that the estimate it contains was the best estimate, not, as the noble Lord, Lord Curry, and the Minister have said, the worst estimate. If we accept that Ministers have signed off on an impact assessment—this was all signed by the Minister—Ministers cannot then come to the House and say that they do not believe a word of it.

We have to start from that point. If the Government had gone through the normal procedure, we would have had a detailed Explanatory Memorandum and it would have gone through the enhanced scrutiny procedure under Section 11 of the Public Bodies Act. Instead, they have tried to cut corners. That is the problem.

That is why I do not apologise for raising the issue again. Yes, we are going over some old ground, but we are also hearing some of the old arguments. Under that procedure, what my noble friend Lady Donaghy has asked for—namely, a monitoring process so that when abolition occurs we can see what actually happens to agricultural wages—is required for other bodies that are being abolished, but it is not required here.

I find it difficult to understand those who argue that after this body disappears, nothing will happen to wages and no one will notice, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, says. The noble Lord, Lord Curry, says that wages will probably increase. However, the only document that we have had says that although some people’s wages will go up, on average and on aggregate they will fall. That is why we need a better assessment.

This is a very minimal requirement. If we had gone down the route that the House agreed, the Minister would have been subject to far more detailed requirements and debates. He would have had to explain himself far more convincingly than he has today. All I am asking is that before we implement this measure, we get a document from the Government that does what they are required to do for every other body apart from the one that protects some rural workers.

That does not seem to be a position that the House of Lords ought to be taking in the 21st century, and it may be seen that way. Although the noble Lord, Lord Deben, says that no one will notice, there are some people who will. The noble Lord obviously has conversations with the grain barons of East Anglia and maybe they would not notice, but a lot of small farmers have objected to the abolition—in the West Country, the north and Wales—saying that this was a bigger problem. They will notice because they will have to engage in rather difficult negotiations with their one or two staff.

The people who will really notice, though, will be those who are employed relatively casually and seasonally by the element of the agricultural sector that is really pushing for this change—that is, horticulture. The people who will notice are probably not so much those who are paid above the minimum rate but those who are on the lowest wages, at the minimum rate or even below it. Those at the bottom end of the agricultural labour market are going to notice. If the Minister persists in resisting this today, we will not even be able to assess properly whether I or the Government were right. That does not seem to be a sensible position to adopt in the tradition of this House.

Although it is late at night and I do not expect to win it, I think that I need to test the position of the House so that it is quite clear and our Commons colleagues can at least look again at the arguments, because the other way in which we are breaking with tradition is that this measure has come in on Report and the House of Commons has not even had a look at it yet. I will test the opinion of the House, for what that is worth.

Public Bodies (The Office of Fair Trading Transfer of Consumer Advice Scheme Function and Modification of Enforcement Functions) Order 2013

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Tuesday 12th March 2013 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I hope I can answer the noble Lord’s question. Trading standards play a critical role in protecting consumers and business in their local authority areas, in particular from rogue traders, but the responsibility was split between local authority trading standards services and the OFT creating an enforcement gap. While BIS provided some support for regional and national enforcement schemes, the NTSB has been formed specifically to tackle cross-boundary and national threats.

The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, asked whether members of the local authority are members of the NTSB, which goes a little further in answering his original question. The answer is no. Heads of local authority trading standards comprise the NTSB. There is a political oversight group made up of representatives of local government and the LGA which connects local decision-making with national enforcement.

The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, was concerned that the OFT will not oversee enforcement supervision. In this case, the OFT, Trading Standards and other enforcers will share a power to enforce. This will ensure that while the OFT will be able to continue to use its expertise in this area, other enforcers, including Trading Standards, will take up cases that more appropriately fall to them. Trading Standards will act as the lead enforcers of this legislation and will retain a duty to enforce the regulations, except in the case of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. That is complex, but I hope it explains that slightly more clearly.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked how Citizens Advice will be accountable for Consumer Direct and consumer education. The work of the Citizens Advice service on Consumer Direct will be accountable to the Consumer Minister through grant arrangements set up by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. These grant arrangements will set out challenging performance targets which will be closely monitored by the department. I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that Citizens Advice will take on the role of consumer education.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, also asked whether Citizens Advice could be subject to a judicial review. There is a low risk that Citizens Advice may be subject to a judicial review in relation to the function transferred. However, it is more likely that other legal claims will be brought, such as negligence. The Citizens Advice services have taken their own advice on this risk and have given their consent to the transfer of the consumer advice functions on that basis.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, wanted to clarify who SMEs will receive advice from. Most business-facing advice and education will transfer from the OFT to the Trading Standards Institute from 1 April 2014, but businesses seeking advice as consumers will be able to access Consumer Direct as before.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, also asked for clarification on whether the NTSB will quality control Trading Standards. The NTSB itself, and the teams that it sponsors, are subject to tight funding terms and conditions to ensure that they deliver against business priorities. Local trading standards are subject to local government procedures. The noble Lord also raised concerns about cuts to local trading standards services. The provision of local trading standards services is a matter for individual local authorities, and even in the current climate, they will continue to take local and pan-local cases.

The intention is that there will be specific funding for enforcement against national threats separate from the budget for local issues. There are plenty of examples of cases where local officers have dealt with complex cases successfully. The NTSB will ensure that resources are allocated to large cases as and when appropriate. In addition, local officers often have a culture of working with business to resolve problems. I believe that trading standards services have already demonstrated their ability and professionalism over many years, and I hope that the noble Lord would agree with that.

[Lord Whitty]

Can the Minister say how much of what had been the OFT budget for dealing with these national, cross-boundary and complex issues will be fed down to the NTSB and trading standards services?

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Wednesday 6th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I thank my noble friend for his comment. I understand that the code adjudicator is called in in this particular case. But I owe my noble friend a full answer to his question and I will follow up after this debate.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and everyone who has participated in the debate, particularly those who supported my amendments. Those who objected to my amendments, including the Minister, seem to have two points—that we have to get rid of archaic bureaucracy and that this will not have any effect because wages will be paid well above the rate and that farmers as employers will not notice the disappearance of the Agricultural Wages Board.

As for bureaucracy, most of us are on the same page. We are happy to see the abolition of the 31 bodies. Our amendments would allow significant modernisation and simplification of the procedures and substance of the Agricultural Wages Board. To answer the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, that is why that form of phrasing is there—to move to annual salaries and so forth.

Indeed, when I was Minister, as the noble Lord, Lord Curry, will recall, I tried to get a lot of modernisation through on the Agricultural Wages Board but to retain essentially the legal underpinning which is needed in this unique industry for an isolated, sometimes exploited workforce. We have had a benign picture of the way that farming operates, but actually we know that in large parts of farming and probably most obviously within horticulture, there is still some serious exploitation of workers in all their terms and conditions including their minimum wage. The Government have not answered my points regarding amendment and reform of the Agricultural Wages Board rather than abolition.

On the point about wages, we are facing a serious dilemma. By abandoning the Public Bodies Act route, the Government have not presented to the House detailed information. The impact assessment to which we have all referred is an authoritative document. It says that the Government’s best estimate—not the most extreme case, not the worst case, not the lowest case, and not the highest case either—is that in aggregate £240 million will be taken out of the pockets of current and future workers within the agricultural sector. That is the view and best estimate, not of the Minister’s department, but of the department of the noble Lord, Lord de Mauley, of what is going to happen. Obviously, there is a range of probabilities, but the Government’s best estimate is that this measure will lead to a reduction in wages in the agricultural sector by £250 million. That is the bare fact of this.

No doubt, in many of the enterprises of the noble Lords, Lord Cavendish, Lord Cameron and Lord Curry—I am sorry to fall out with him, but at least we are both being consistent on this issue—there will be better pay and little impact. But all the Government’s statisticians, agronomists and economists are looking at the total situation and saying, “The net effect of all this in aggregate across the whole of the agricultural and horticultural sector will be a loss of wages of that order”. That is their best estimate and that is at odds with the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish, and the circle of farmers in which he moves. Although clearly they are in the same geographical area, they are a different lot from those among whom the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, moves. But, even if he is right for all those farmers, the Government’s view is that is not the total effect on the sector. Either the Government’s impact assessment is utterly wrong, or the anecdotal evidence from those who are close to land-owning interests in this House is not accurate.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Tuesday 26th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Viscount Younger of Leckie)]

My Lords, the smooth transition from the current competition authorities to the new CMA will be essential to ensure that competition enforcement and consumer protection are not undermined. Amendments 49, 50, 55 and 88 are minor and technical, and seek to assist with that process.

Amendment 49 amends Schedule 4 to make clear that the CMA will not be required to publish certain reports, such as an annual plan or concurrency report in relation to the period before it takes its competition and consumer functions. Amendment 50 makes it clear that when a member of the Competition Commission panel is also appointed to the CMA panel during the transitional period, the period when he or she holds both appointments will not be double counted. The Bill requires that the total length of the two appointments must not exceed eight years.

Amendments 55 and 88 add a new clause which seeks to allow the OFT and Competition Commission to consult on behalf of the CMA on, among other things, new guidance before the CMA becomes fully operational, and make clear that this new clause comes into force on Royal Assent. This is a time-limited provision that seeks to enable full and timely consultation on guidance, rules, statements of policy and other matters relating to competition reforms in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Whitty]

I certainly have no objection to any of these amendments. The Minister referred to a smooth transition. There is one other aspect necessary for a smooth transition to which we referred earlier: greater clarity about those OFT functions which are going outside of the CMA. Clarity on this is necessary over and above what is provided in the Public Bodies Act orders, which we are about to consider. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that there will be a further White Paper on the consumer landscape. I know he cannot confirm that there will be a consumer Bill in the next session—he cannot pre-empt the Queen’s Speech—but I assume that Government policy is moving in that general direction. With those caveats, I am fully in support of the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I shall speak also to the other amendments in the group, all of which deal with broadly the same issue: the regime on cartels.

In Clause 41 the Government have made a bold and necessary step, despite criticism from significant sections of business, to make the cartel criteria work. They seek to delete the requirement that for any cartel operation to be an offence under the 2002 Act it has to have been committed dishonestly. That is an unnecessarily high threshold of proof, which has greatly restricted the competition authorities’ ability to use their cartel powers to deal with cartels. The issue should be whether a cartel has been established that restricts competition and is to the detriment of consumers, not whether lies, fraud and deceit can be proved. Scrapping those dishonesty criteria in the first three subsections of Clause 41 is very welcome.

However, there is a “but” coming. The rest of Clause 41 rather spoils and undermines it. Subsections (4) and (5) limit the occasions when an offence can be committed and provide an absolute defence. New Section 188A in subsection (5) states that an offence has not been committed if, despite a cartel-like arrangement, customers are told; or, in the bid-rigging situation, the assessors of the bidders, the clients, have been told; or the arrangements have been published; or that they are made in order to comply with another legal requirement. I fully accept the last defence—it makes sense—but the rest do not make sense. A damaging cartel arrangement can exist whether or not customers are told; a damaging cartel arrangement on contracting bids can be damaging to consumers and can exclude new entrants—small business mainly—whether or not the client has been told; and consumers and small business can suffer detriment whether or not such arrangements are published.

The purport of the notion about publication seems to go back to the old days when registered cartels were recognised and protected. It goes back two or three turns of the competition law provisions and is not sensible in this day and age. It is out of kilter with the rest of the Bill.

Unfortunately, it goes further than that. Even when an offence has been committed, new Section 188B in subsection (6) provides in absolute terms that it is a defence if there was no intention to conceal the cartel arrangement; or, extraordinarily, that it was disclosed to legal advisers. Again, cartels can damage consumers and potential small business new entrants whether or not concealment was intentional and whether or not my learned friend has been informed. The effect of the cartel is therefore the issue, not the motivation and not the way in which it has been communicated.

My amendments would delete all reference in subsection (5) to no offence being committed under new Section 188A(1). That is, the only context in which an offence could be deemed absolutely not committed would be where it is to fulfil another legal requirement. The rest of the amendments would delete all references to a defence and replace it with a relevant mitigation. I recognise that there is some mitigation if you have told the customers or the client, but it is not an absolute defence. It needs to be taken into account by the court, but it does not prevent the court reaching a “guilty” verdict. Otherwise, if you do not adopt those two deletions, the positive move by the Government in the first couple of subsections of Clause 41 will be seriously undermined. I therefore hope that the Minister will recognise the sense of that and understand that the very positive consensus on the main issue in relation to this clause will be undermined unless we modify it broadly speaking according to this group of amendments. I beg to move.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, there is wide agreement in both Houses that having to prove “dishonesty” makes the criminal cartel offence unnecessarily hard to prosecute, so it is right that Clause 41 removes the dishonesty requirement. However, in the Government’s view one cannot simply remove that requirement and leave the offence otherwise unchanged. Rather, we have had to think through the implications. In place of the dishonesty requirement, the clause provides that the offence is not committed if customers are notified of relevant information or if that information is published in a prescribed manner. These are the provisions which Amendments 56 and 57 would remove.

The reason for allowing this protection is that a limited number of agreements may technically fall within the terms of the cartel offence once the dishonesty requirement has been removed but are lawful under the anti-cartel provisions of the civil anti-trust regime that governs which agreements businesses may enter into. In such cases, it is right that we allow individuals to ensure they do not commit the cartel offence by checking that under the arrangements customers would be informed or the arrangements would be published as prescribed.

This approach builds coherently on existing provisions of the offence in Section 188 of the Enterprise Act. Subsection 6 provides that,

“arrangements are not bid-rigging arrangements if, under them, the person requesting bids would be informed of them at or before the time when a bid is made”.

All the arrangements caught by the offence involve price fixing, market sharing, output restrictions or bid rigging. These are all potentially damaging. Where such arrangements are put in place, the parties should be prepared to justify their actions. In principle, and in most cases, it is reasonable that they provide notice of the arrangements to those likely to be affected by them, their customers, either directly or through publication as prescribed; and it would be unreasonable to prevent, as these amendments would, individuals entering into perfectly legitimate activities which they are prepared to publicise in one of the specified ways, just as the present offence provides in the case of bid rigging.

In the majority of cases, of course, the types of agreements caught by the offence will be clearly detrimental to consumers, and the participants will know that they are engaged in unlawful conduct. In those cases, the arrangements will not be published but will be kept secret, and quite rightly the individuals involved will be exposed to prosecution and punishment. Our intention is to remove the prosecutorial difficulties with “dishonesty” while ensuring that only conscious participation in hardcore cartels, which ought to be blameworthy, is caught by the offence.

Notwithstanding those provisions, however, businesses and their legal advisers continued to have some concerns that the amended offence would criminalise the participation of individuals in commercial conduct that would otherwise be lawful. I hope that there is widespread support for the view that it is right to crack down on cartels, but that we ought not to chill businessmen from engaging in legitimate business activities that serve and benefit customers.

Concerns were also expressed about the practicality in certain circumstances of disclosure or publication and the protection of commercially confidential information. In a limited number of cases, for example in relation to arrangements for the joint underwriting of certain insurance contracts, prior disclosure of the arrangements might be difficult. In such cases, customers would be aware that such arrangements were common even without notification or publication and would be untroubled by it. In other cases, the information would already be publicly available in an appropriate forum, such as technical standards. To meet these concerns, the Bill was amended in another place, including by providing individuals with a defence where they did not intend to conceal the nature of the arrangements in certain circumstances or they took reasonable steps to disclose them to professional legal advisers for the purpose of obtaining advice. This builds upon the present approach in the Bill of blessing arrangements that have been publicised or notified.

Amendments 56 to 61 would drastically dilute the protections that these provisions afford by removing the circumstances where the offence is not committed and transforming the defences into relevant mitigations. This would not provide protection to those who were engaged in otherwise lawful behaviour but who, for example, had neglected for whatever reason to give the arrangements the appropriate publicity. It would also discourage parties from entering into agreements that are exempt from the anti-trust prohibitions because they bring gains to consumers where prior disclosure would compromise the benefits the company gains from the agreement. Rather, the individuals would have no defence, but they would be able to plead a relevant mitigation in order to reduce their sentence. That is an unattractive prospect that is likely to chill legitimate business activities, contrary to the Opposition’s stated intention.

I thought it might be helpful to address some points that were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, concerning the Government’s approach. What characterises the kind of hardcore cartel activity that we wish to make it easier to prosecute from legitimate behaviour is that it is clandestine to a high degree. That is where the bar is set. Those responsible meet in secret, use code words and communicate through unofficial channels, thus bypassing a company’s normal procedures. This element is already recognised in the Bill by the provisions that take outside the offence arrangements that are disclosed to customers or publicised. We therefore think it appropriate to give further comfort in relation to the offence by providing individuals with a defence that they did not intend to conceal the nature of the cartel arrangements from customers or prosecutors, or that before making or implementing such arrangements they took reasonable steps to disclose them to professional legal advisers for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. In the light of these explanations, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I find that reply very difficult to understand. I appreciate that there will be circumstances in which it is sensible for a restrictive practice to be agreed, communicated and, in one sense, registered in order to meet certain other objectives. Those may be legal requirements, quasi-legal requirements, safety requirements or in the broadest sense in terms of people protecting investments and so forth. However, I do not think that it is an absolute defence. It is something that the authorities will need to take into account in terms of motivation and judging whether the companies involved were acting reasonably, but it is not an absolute defence. I find that part of it particularly difficult to understand and particularly undermining of the Government’s general approach on this.

In terms of cartel offences not actually being committed, from the way the Minister has described it, it looks as if, in the bidding arrangements, any restriction would be on the bidders that the client was prepared to consider. It would not depend on their technical ability or their financial viability, but could be purely arbitrary; that is, the old boys’ network. That is effectively what the cartel offence in relation to bidding was attempting to stop. You go to the usual suspects only to bid for a contract and as long as you tell those bidders that you are restricting it to them then there is no problem. It is not even committing an offence. It is not even that there is a justifiable move. It is absolutely the case that an offence is not committed.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Tuesday 26th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I thank my noble friend for that point. Given that it is a very specific question, I will most certainly write to her.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply and the noble Baroness, Lady Oppenheim-Barnes, for her interventions. I am afraid that I am not hugely reassured. If the Minister is correct in saying that the issue of the consumer interest or the protection against consumer detriment runs through the Bill, it is important that that is reflected in it at various points. I did not expect him to accept all my amendments, but I thought that he might be a little more benignly disposed towards one or two of them than he appears to be. Part of the problem is that the detailed prescriptions as to how the CMA will work, running to 50 pages with no mention of consumers at all, will be seized upon by corporate lawyers and people representing those who wish to continue anti-competitive and anti-consumer activities. They will say, “You have to abide by this and never mind about the general broad principles. That is what it says here, and it does not mention consumer detriment or protection at all”.

There is a lack of specific reference in the procedural aspects to consumer experience in terms of the membership of the board and the panels. I would not mind so much if other expertise was not mentioned, but consumer expertise is not mentioned. As the noble Baroness, Lady Oppenheim-Barnes, has said, early on there were reassuring noises that the access that consumers have to OFT services will not be diminished, but nothing in what the Minister said actually explained how that would be the case when everything else is shifting things away from the OFT down the line to trading standards offices, citizens’ advice bureaux and so forth. They may well be able to do a decent job. I hope that they will, and that they have the resources, funding and staffing needed to do so, but there must be some responsibility centrally to make sure that that happens. That is not reflected in this Bill and it is not reflected in the terms of the new CMA. I think that the Minister really ought to accept at least some of my amendments. Amendment 40 summarises all of this, and therefore I shall seek the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, the Bill strengthens the regime for the competition powers that will be held concurrently by the Competition and Markets Authority and sector regulators. The CMA will have stronger powers to co-ordinate Competition Act enforcement work and sector regulators will have explicit duties to consider using the Competition Act.

As part of these arrangements, and to ensure appropriate transparency and accountability, the CMA will be obliged to publish an annual report on the operation of the concurrency arrangements and the use of concurrent competition powers by the CMA and the sector regulators with concurrent powers. Amendment 45, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, would exclude Monitor from the scope of this report.

After lengthy debate on the Health and Social Care Act, Parliament decided that Monitor should have concurrent competition powers. Under the reforms being implemented through that Act, competition will not be pursued as an end in itself. We have said that competition will be used to drive up quality and will not be based on price. Nothing in this Bill affects this—certainly not the requirement to publish a report on how the concurrency arrangements have worked and the use of concurrent powers—or the Government’s commitment that Monitor will have concurrent competition powers so that a sector-specific regulator with healthcare expertise can apply competition rules.

However, Monitor’s concurrent competition powers in relation to the provision of healthcare services in England need to be co-ordinated with the CMAs, which can apply competition law in wider markets than Monitor; for example, in cases affecting the whole of the UK and in markets for pharmaceutical products or mobility aids. It is therefore quite right that Monitor be included within the concurrency regime and the CMA’s report on concurrency in particular.

I will address the question raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I hope I can go some way towards allaying his fears, particularly regarding the application of competition law in health services, which was also alluded to strongly by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. Competition law will not apply to the NHS Commissioning Board or clinical commissioning groups in their roles as commissioners of services because the case law is clear that, where public bodies carry out an activity of an exclusively social nature, neither that activity nor the bodies’ purchase of goods or services for the purpose of that activity will generally be treated as an economic activity. Also, a significant proportion of services delivered by foundation trusts would not be subject to competition law, as these NHS services are not provided in a market. They include accident and emergency, trauma, maternity, obstetrics, critical care and many others, particularly in remote rural areas.

A foundation trust will typically deliver some services to which competition law potentially applies and some to which it will not. If the intention or effect of an agreement was to prevent, restrict or distort competition, Monitor will, in considering a case, look at the benefits to patients alongside the detrimental effects to competition. When deciding on a remedy or penalty, Monitor will take into account the beneficial deterrent effect of a formal decision and possible fine against the impact that its payment might have on the public body and ultimately the taxpayer. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to withdraw Amendment 45.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, for his intervention, which posed the question more succinctly than I did. The Minister has not effectively answered it. He has underlined that the situation in the health service is complex, but saying that the commissioning groups and others are exempt in their monopsonic dimension as buyers does not mean that other entities in the health service are exempt as providers. The aim of the health service is to look after the interests of patients, whereas consumers in most markets are served, with some exceptions, by greater competition. In the vast majority of situations the default position must be that consumers are better off if there is more competition. That is not the case when you need integrated and specialist services, and a whole chain of different services for different conditions in the health service. This is not equivalent to railway companies competing through franchises, or to gas and electricity companies, or even banks, competing; they are covered by the other concurrent regulators.

This situation is different and the report would have to be different. I am not against the CMA and Monitor co-operating but you should not have the CMA, with the kind of approach that it has to competition policy, being a sort of prefect, marking Monitor’s extremely complex task in relation to its competition powers. I know that I shall not persuade the Minister tonight but I ask him to reflect on this, and on how this could look to the public and to the professions in the health service. The Government are adopting an unnecessary rod for their own back and they would be wise to reconsider. However, for the moment, I withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 46, which also deals with concurrent regulators. There are two aspects to my amendments. Amendments 46 and 64 deal with the opposite issue to the one that I was discussing with Monitor. Amendment 69 deals with general relations between the CMA and concurrent regulators. The Government have also introduced a raft of amendments in this area and, broadly speaking, they are welcome. As they deal to a large extent with Amendment 69, I shall leave that to the end.

The first two amendments deal with the issue of the Financial Conduct Authority, which has just been established by the Financial Services Act. Strictly speaking, this is not quite about concurrent powers, but if we establish a new competition and marketing authority with wide-ranging powers across markets in different sectors, it is odd that the financial sector is not mentioned in this Bill. Some of the biggest consumer, competition and quasi-cartel issues that have arisen in the financial sector, particularly over the past few years, are among the most important issues of market structure and consumer protection. Somehow, the CMA does not seem to have a relationship with that new authority. Indeed, there are two authorities here. There is the Prudential Regulation Authority, which has some impact on the consumer side as well, but let us focus on the FCA.

If they are not to be put together at the end of a list of other concurrent regulators, there ought to be a reference somewhere in the Bill to the role that the CMA plays in relation to the FCA and the financial sector. Its omission is very odd. Maybe the Treasury has seen off BIS in a way that bodies such as DECC, Defra, the DCMS and the Department for Transport cannot in relation to their regulators, but it is wrong. If you talk to the average consumer at the moment, the markets, consumer interests and consumer protection issues are primarily about the financial sector—from the failure of the banks through to debt and insurance issues. To exclude mention of that sector from the Bill is very odd. Simply adding it to this list may not be the correct solution, but I hope that the Minister can tell me why it is not there and how it could be included.

Amendment 69 deals with general relations between the CMA and the sector regulators. That is important because, as it stands, prior to the Government’s new amendments, Clause 46 suggests a relationship rather like that between the hammer and the nail. It actually provides for the Secretary of State to take all the competition powers from the sector regulators and hand them over to the CMA. Stated starkly in that way, it seems wrong. My amendment began from the point that the relationship should be based on co-operation and perhaps reporting systems, and should move only in extremis to the possibility of the CMA taking over those powers. As I read the noble Lord’s Amendment 70 and some other amendments, it goes a long way towards that. I shall listen to what the Minister says but I will withdraw my amendment in favour of his. I beg to move.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, the Bill will strengthen the concurrency regime. I have already noted that the CMA will have stronger powers to co-ordinate Competition Act enforcement work and sector regulators will have explicit duties to consider using the Competition Act before taking regulatory enforcement action. We also expect that the CMA will work in close co-operation with the sector regulators in applying their concurrent powers.

Consistent with this approach, the Government also want to send a further signal about the need for strong and effective use of competition powers across the regulated sectors. They have proposed that, if the new concurrency arrangements do not work and if a regulator, other than Monitor, which the Government have excluded from the scope of the power, fails to produce better outcomes, the Secretary of State will have a power to ensure that the OFT and then the CMA take sole responsibility for applying concurrent competition powers in that regulated sector.

There was a debate in Grand Committee about providing a more explicit focus on co-operation between the CMA and regulators, and ensuring that the power is not used without early warning to the regulator. We have considered these points carefully and have therefore proposed Amendments 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68 and 70. These amendments require that regulators, the CMA and relevant devolved Administrations be consulted on the potential use of the power prior to the launch of a more public consultation on a proposal to use it. This ensures that there will be early discussions with regulators on any concerns giving rise to a proposed use of the power and allows them an opportunity to respond.

The amendments will also set out a purpose for the power: the promotion of competition within any market or markets in the United Kingdom for the benefit of consumers. This prevents the use of the power for any purpose other than improving the competition regime and ensures the focus of the competition regime remains benefitting consumers.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Thursday 31st January 2013 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, I welcome the general support given to Midata by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in her initial remarks. I listened carefully to the large number of points that she raised. She has clearly put a lot of thought into the issue and I would like to address as many of the concerns that she raised as possible. It may well be that I do not cover them all, in which case, I will write to her.

The first issue I want to address is the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, raised concerning the British Retail Consortium and the objections that they have expressed on Midata. To re-emphasise the point—the focus of the power of this Bill are the four core sectors of energy, mobile phones, current accounts and credit cards. We cannot say that there will never be circumstances where Ministers believe including supermarkets within the regulations is worthwhile. But, before they do so, they will have to take account of the factors set out in proposed subsection (7) in Amendment 58C. The relevant legislation to effect such a change would be subject to enhanced parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative procedure.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked whether it was true that consumer bodies had been warning about the risk of this programme for some time. It is true that the Government continue to work with consumer representative groups and business to tackle any potential risks to consumers—the point that she raised. A range of consumer bodies endorsed the principles of Midata published by the Government in 2011, such as Citizens Advice, Consumer Focus and the Office of Fair Trading. Members of these consumer organisations also sit on the Midata strategy board, which is responsible for driving the direction of the overall programme. However, the Government are taking these concerns seriously and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills will continue to work closely with consumer groups to ensure that consumer privacy is protected.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked whether the Information Commissioner actually wanted the role of enforcement. I can reassure her that Ministers have discussed this with him directly and he was, indeed, willing to take on the role. The noble Baroness also asked if this was an appropriate role for the Information Commissioner and whether he had enough resources to undertake this particular role. We have had detailed discussions with the ICO on how the enforcement regime could work for Midata. If regulations are brought forward in the future, we are confident that the ICO’s existing expertise in data protection will help it to effectively enforce the Midata right for consumers. In addition, we did not want to place any additional cost burden on business, but we have included provisions enabling other bodies to be designated as enforcers, if that is later decided to be more appropriate than the ICO. For example, if we were to regulate for one sector only, it might be appropriate to designate a particular sector regulator.

The noble Baroness raised the issue of data protection. Existing consumer protections would still apply under Midata. All organisations that process personal data in the UK, including for the purposes of the Midata initiative, must comply with the Data Protection Act’s eight data protection principles. The DPA is enforced by the independent Information Commissioner’s Office, which has powers of prosecution and can issue monetary penalty notices requiring organisations to pay up to £500,000 for serious breaches of the DPA.

The noble Baroness also raised the issue of exclusions for smaller companies. I mentioned earlier that she will remember the issue of micro-businesses. The power allows flexibility for smaller companies to be excluded at the regulation stage. I hope that reassures the noble Baroness on that particular point.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also raised the issue as to whether consumers would be charged. The regulations could allow for consumers to be charged if that is considered appropriate at that particular stage. The new clause already limits such charges to the cost of complying with the request for data.

There are two more questions raised by the noble Baroness. First, she asked why there has been no government lead on providing public sector data. These measures will not apply to the public sector. However, in parallel, the Government are looking at issues of public sector data. The Open Data White Paper sets out the Government’s position and plans on public sector data release.

The noble Baroness also asked what form the regulations would take. The Government want first and foremost to encourage voluntary progress on this particular Midata programme. If regulations are subsequently brought forward, they will be shaped by consultations with stakeholders first.

The Government will continue to engage with business, consumer groups, regulators and trade bodies involved in the voluntary programme to accelerate progress as well as to broaden our engagement with other sectors. In bringing forward these amendments, we are conscious that a balance needs to be struck between the rights of individuals, the costs to businesses and wider benefits to the economy. This balance also needs to reflect the digital age and the increasing amount of data that is now unavoidably available.

We believe that giving consumers the right to obtain their own transaction and consumption data in portable electronic format, thus enabling them to use tools to manage this information in a smart way, is an effective way to empower consumers in the 21st century, which is good for business and good for the economy.

[Lord Whitty]

It seems to me that the Minister was talking about charging by the current owner of the information, or provider—the person with whom you are dealing through your mobile phone company. But I understand that the Government envisage there being new intermediaries in this area that will obviously be looking for a profit out of it for themselves and to use that data in different ways. Would that restriction on charging apply to them? In a sense, you have doubled the administrative time with a provider and an organisation that is being subcontracted by that provider to deal with the consumer. It also complicates data protection and potential liability and redress.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, makes an interesting point. I will need to double check and revert to him to clarify his point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, given that this is the last group of amendments in our Committee discussions, I would like to place on record my thanks to our Deputy Chairmen and the clerks who have masterfully steered our way through all the amendments; to the Bill teams involved; to the Hansard writers who have admirably recorded our discussions and, indeed, were obliged to stay somewhat later than the extended time allotted last week; and to the Doorkeepers for their unstinting assistance.

We have given the Bill careful and detailed scrutiny and I pay tribute to noble Lords opposite as well as my noble friends who have participated in our debates. Although there have been areas on which we have not wholly agreed, which we will discuss further on Report, as one would expect from this House, they have brought a depth of knowledge and analysis to the wide range of issues covered by the Bill. I would also like to thank my noble friend Lady Stowell for the part she has played and my noble friend Lord Popat and many other noble friends who have assisted and supported me and my officials.

The Government’s amendments to Clause 79 have two effects. The first is to commence all powers to make subordinate legislation by statutory instrument on Royal Assent. This is to assist with the orderly commencement of the Bill’s provisions. I should make it clear that these amendments should not be seen as suggesting that all the powers in the Bill will be exercised straight after Royal Assent, or indeed at all. Some are reserve powers which will be needed only if certain circumstances apply—for example, Clause 45 on the powers of sector regulators. Amendment 60AD adds further provisions to the list in Clause 79(2) which are to come into force automatically two months after Royal Assent without the need for a commencement order. I beg to move Amendment 60AA.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, it is probably totally inappropriate for me—as I am probably the person who has been here least in recent days—but I would like to join the Minister in thanking the clerks, the support staff and everybody who has participated on all sides during these debates. I also thank the various Chairs, including our current Chair. I extend that to the Minister and his colleagues and to the noble Lord, Lord Marland, who, many moons ago, started us out on this course.

Lest the Minister think he is going to get away after that, I have a couple of questions on this virtually final clause. As he says, the powers do not necessarily come in at the first date that is stipulated here in terms of implementation, but the Secretary of State will be able to implement them. In Amendment 60AB, he has already referred to proposed new paragraph (b), which relates to concurrent powers in Clause 45. The Minister may recall that during the debate on this there was considerable concern expressed about how the balance between the sector regulator and the new CMA would work. My understanding is that there will be different times in practice when each of the concurrent powers cease or are otherwise redefined; does that mean that, as it stands, Clause 45 would come in all at once on whatever date the Secretary of State determined after the first date? In fact, there may be a different date for Ofcom and the CMA or Ofgem and the CMA or the other sector regulators. It would be heavy work for the Government if they were all to come in at the same time, because there are different considerations in each of the sectors and there will be some inquiries which are still ongoing and some which need to be completed. In any case, we will probably have to return to the substantive issue on Report to get further clarification—if not to move further amendments—but it would seem that if all of Clause 45 were brought in applying to all sectors at the same time, it would be a problem.

My second point is about proposed new paragraph (f) in Amendment 60AB. This effectively says that anything that does not happen to be listed here can nevertheless come into play on the first day after Royal Assent. It seems, since Her Majesty will be signing them off, that this is getting fairly close to his late Majesty, King Henry VIII, in that if you do not specify the date in which various sections come into operation, then bringing any Section forward to an immediate date—even though it is not specified in this commencement clause—could seriously disturb the arrangements of the particular bodies that apply. For example, if there is a commencement of a particular power to either commence or cease, people need to know that in advance. Therefore, it is important that the Bill specifies that rather than have a catch-all ability for the Secretary of State, or some future Secretary of State, to bring any clause into play on the first day. If the noble Viscount tells me that this is normal, of course I shall withdraw it, but it is not something that I see in many pieces of legislation. Perhaps he could clarify the position.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Wednesday 16th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

The Agricultural Wages Board and Agricultural Wages Committees were set up in their current form nearly 65 years ago. The board was established at a time when there was little statutory employment protection for workers. Today the situation is very different and all workers are protected by the National Minimum Wage Act and working time regulations. Before I proceed any further, I want to reassure noble Lords that this Government firmly support the national minimum wage.

The Agricultural Wages Board is the only remaining sector wage council—all others have now been abolished. There is now no compelling reason why the agriculture sector alone should continue to be subject to a separate statutory employment regime. Let me explain why.

The agriculture industry today is very different. First, such businesses are often not just dependent on agriculture. Technological developments and increased mechanisation mean that there is no longer such dependency on manual labour in order to carry out agricultural functions. This has enabled businesses to expand and take on other, complementary work. The sectors within agriculture are therefore becoming increasingly diverse and many farm businesses now carry out non-agricultural activities alongside more traditional farming enterprises—for example bed and breakfast, and farm shops, where workers would not necessarily be covered by the agricultural wages order.

The agricultural wages order, which is made each year by the Agricultural Wages Board, takes no account of these changes within the agriculture industry. The process is one of “one size fits all” and this imposes a rigid and no longer appropriate structure on what are in reality nowadays myriad businesses that come under the umbrella term of “the agriculture sector”. The order is overly complicated and its provisions are wide-ranging and restrictive, hampering the ability of the industry to offer more flexible, modern employment packages. These amendments will end the separate statutory employment regime for agricultural workers in England and Wales and make amendments to the National Minimum Wage Act to bring the agricultural industry within the scope of the national minimum wage. The Government will also make amendments to secondary legislation to ensure that agricultural workers are adequately protected by the working time regulations.

The abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board and the associated agricultural minimum wage regime will enable farmers to offer terms and conditions for new workers that suit their particular circumstances and take account of the requirements of the specific farming sector. They will also be able to agree more flexible terms with existing workers by mutual consent. It will make it easier for farm businesses to employ workers, including taking on new workers, and encourage longer-term employment, thereby boosting growth and creating job opportunities.

The abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board will also mean that a single employment regime applies to all types of activities. This will bring transparency for both employers and workers, which is increasingly important given the diversity of farm businesses, not least in the interests of fairness and as the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural activities becomes blurred. Even within the agricultural sector there can be confusion as to whether activities are covered by the agricultural wages order. For example, where a business packs and trims salad produce that is both grown on the farm and bought in, the packing of the home-grown produce is covered by the agricultural wages order, whereas the packing of the bought-in produce may not necessarily be. There are similar examples of confusion in the dairy and livestock sectors. Abolition will lift administrative and regulatory burdens from farm businesses and enable them to focus on their core business activity. It should encourage farmers to offer more in the way of longer-term employment, including the payment of annual salaries. All of this will encourage the development of a sustainable and prosperous industry for the future.

For the avoidance of any doubt, let me offer some further reassurance. Agricultural workers who have contractual rights reflecting the terms of the agricultural wages order at the time of the abolition of the board will continue to have those rights until such time as the contract might be varied by agreement between the employer and the worker or until the contract comes to an end. Moving forward, it is important to bear in mind that if agriculture-based businesses want to retain and attract able and well qualified people, they need to offer remuneration packages that are competitive. We know that the majority of workers in the agriculture sector already benefit from terms and conditions that are above the agricultural minimum wage rates. Currently, about 60% of permanent agricultural workers over the age of 22 are paid above the agriculture wages order minima. There is no reason why they should find themselves in a worse position in the absence of the board. The Government have asked the Low Pay Commission to include agricultural workers in its considerations when providing recommendations for all of the elements of the national minimum wage in order to achieve the smooth integration of agricultural workers in England and Wales.

Most of the functions of the 15 Agricultural Wages Committees in England have now lapsed in practice or been replaced by wider legislation. Their only remaining active function is to appoint members of the 16 Agricultural Dwelling House Advisory Committees in England, which are sometimes known as the ADHACs. The committees were established under the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 and their function is to give advice to local authorities on rehousing agricultural workers. As a result of changes in housing legislation, the number of requests for advice from ADHACs has declined significantly, to fewer than 10 in each of the last two years. There is no statutory requirement to consult an ADHAC and many local authorities happily take decisions on rehousing without such advice. I hope the Committee agrees that these 31 regional committees in England are now effectively defunct bodies and their continued existence at public expense cannot be justified. With regard to the abolition of the ADHACs in England, I want to assure noble Lords that there are no plans to change the provisions in the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 which give security of tenure to protected tenants, and therefore the amendments will not in any way jeopardise the position of tenants with protected tenancies under the 1976 legislation.

In summary, these amendments will bring employment practices in the agricultural industry into the 21st century, enabling sustainable growth for the future. They will also remove a number of obsolete public bodies and contribute to the Government’s wider programme of public body reform. I hope that, in the light of my remarks, noble Lords will accept them. I beg to move Amendment 28ZK.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, the Minister must realise that this is a bit of a controversial item. That is not surprising because in their latest impact assessment of the outcome of this measure the Government’s own best estimate is a cut in the living standards of rural workers in England by £236 million over the next decade.

Before I get on to the substantive points, of which I have many, I need to make a procedural point. I am not clear why we are debating the abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board in this Bill on this occasion. The amendments were put down two days before Christmas, without any prior warning. The Bill has been through the House of Commons. There was no indication in the House of Commons that the Government were going to come forward with this amendment in the House of Lords, which is very unusual, and, of course, everybody in the industry—on both sides of the industry and in Parliament—thought that the wages board was dealt with at primary-legislation level under the Public Bodies Act well over a year ago.

To implement that, the Government have to follow Section 11 of the Public Bodies Act, which lays down certain stipulations for bringing forward secondary legislation. It requires a full explanation to both Houses, a proper consultation period, the consideration of alternatives and a special memorandum to be laid before the House before it considers it. Why is this before us today when a procedure is already laid out and it appeared that the Government were prepared to go along that road until very recently? There was no explanation in the letter we got from the noble Viscount’s predecessor nor has there been any explanation from the Minister today. I can think of a couple of procedural reasons why the Government are in a bit of bother on this one. One of them is the Delegated Legislation Committee and the other one can be summarised by saying “Wales”.

Under the Public Bodies Act, the Government are already in serious trouble on a range of ways in which they have tried to bring forward the secondary legislation. The report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee indicates that the Act requires a proper 12-week consultation, not the four-week consultation that Defra has sprung on us, and a full impact assessment followed by a government response to that consultation and a memorandum to Parliament. The Government seemed to start down that track, but the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee criticises their behaviour in relation to other public bodies on a number of grounds: the lack of robustness of the government case; inadequate evidence; an inadequate approach to consultation with stakeholders; a failure to consider alternatives; and a lack of arrangements for future monitoring of the outcome. On pretty well all those counts, Defra and the Government are failing in the implementation of the Public Bodies Act in relation to the Agricultural Wages Board, so it must have occurred to the Government that it might be a bit easier to slip it into another piece of legislation, almost when nobody was looking over Christmas.

However, probably the biggest reason relates to Wales. This is, of course, an England and Wales body. As I understand it, the Welsh Government object to its abolition. The Welsh Government would like to see a continuation of statutory provision in agriculture which the Scottish and Northern Irish Governments have decided to have in relation to their own agricultural sector. Of course there is confusion here. If this was dealt with under agricultural legislation, and as agricultural policy is devolved, the Welsh Government would have equal rights to the Westminster Government and we would have to reach agreement with them on this.

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[Lord Whitty]

I am grateful to the Minister for confirming that one of the reasons for the change of tack by the Government is the Welsh situation but he is surely wrong in his remarks on devolution.

The Agricultural Wages Board has always been dealt with by the agriculture department. Well before political devolution, there was a separate devolution to the Scottish agriculture department. There is a separate arrangement in Northern Ireland. The employment issue falls to the United Kingdom. There is no difference in agriculture between Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, so why is the Minister prepared to accept that there should be devolution to Scotland and Northern Ireland, quite rightly, but to deny Welsh Ministers’ request, in the light of the decision in relation to England, to have a devolved body in Wales?

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, it is not for me to say it is only that. This is an historical fact, and I was just setting out the background to this. This is why the Agricultural Wages Board has remained separate. Now, in this Bill, we are looking to sort this out.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

With respect to the noble Lord, I did not say that I was discounting them. I was just producing some facts. However, it is strange that such a high number of responses came from the same website. I hope that that is a reasonable view to express. As I say, I shall be delighted to get back to the noble Lord with some clear figures and a response to that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, raised the question of whether Northern Ireland or Scotland had been asked for a view on the abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board. I should clarify that the Agricultural Wages Board in Northern Ireland and the Agricultural Wages Board in Scotland constitute separate bodies and it is for their respective devolved Governments to take a view on their future.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked about the terms and conditions of farmers and their pay and sick pay under the current regime. Having two systems which may apply on the same site for the same organisation is not ideal. This measure obviously covers agricultural workers and will cover others who fall into the non-agricultural sector. Surely it is more confusing and difficult to operate such a system. As I said in my opening speech, farm businesses are increasingly diverse and carry out non-agricultural activities.

The noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, asked why there was a difference between the first and second impact assessments. The first impact assessment was informed by independent research which compared the agricultural sector with the forestry and fisheries sector in order to assess the effect of the Agricultural Wages Board minimum wages. However, this did not allow for the fact that forestry is covered by an agricultural wages order. Since the consultation, the contractors have revised the analysis to correct this.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, does that mean that the Government stand by the second impact assessment? If it does, it undermines everything that has been said in favour of abolition of the wages board and the argument that that will make no difference, given that the second impact assessment says very clearly that over the next 10 years agricultural workers will lose £250 million worth of employment income. Let us be absolutely clear: if the Government, the noble Viscount’s department and Defra—the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, is present—stand by the assessment, the removal of the Agricultural Wages Board will clearly lead to a serious reduction in wages in the agricultural sector.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

The intervention of the noble Lord allows me to move on to focus on the impact assessment. I do not recognise the figure that he has brought up. The impact will be between nought and £150 million.

[Lord Whitty]

To clarify, there is a range, but I am using a figure close to the best estimate which amounts to about £250 million.

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[Lord Whitty]

I am quite happy to have another debate about hunting. I understand, however, that the Prime Minister is not prepared to pursue it. I have not seen the devastation in jobs in hunting since the hunting Act was passed, but let us put that to one side. All I was asking the Minister was whether he stood by his own department’s calculations of the effect on wages in the agricultural sector of abolishing the board. It is a straightforward question on which I would like a clear answer: if he does still accept it then everything we have been saying on this side is correct and there will be a serious detrimental effect. If he wishes to change it, however, I suggest he produces a different impact assessment before we reach Report.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I will do my best to answer the noble Lord’s question. Our figures tell us that the impact assessment for new workers will be from nought to a worst-case scenario of £150 million. However, as I mentioned in my opening speech, there is no reason to suppose that the 60% of workers who are currently on a contract will not remain on their existing contract. Noble Lords will know that, if you are an employer, you cannot suddenly change or reduce a contract between two people.

The reality will depend on how farmers use the increased flexibility that will result from the abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board. Many workers are already paid above the agricultural minimum wage, so there is no reason why there should be a change. Moreover, the underlying labour market conditions suggest that workers will be in demand and farmers will need to offer competitive packages to attract and retain skilled and qualified staff. I am afraid that the evidence is against the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, who was claiming that the jobs would not be available and farm workers would be leaving the sector. I do not believe at all that that will be the case.

I am also grateful for the intervention from my noble friend Lord Plumb. It is encouraging to note his comments and all the efforts that he has been making in encouraging new workers into farming. I am also grateful for the intervention from my noble friend Lady Byford who, quite rightly, pointed out the importance of ensuring that there were some good working practices that will be retained within the agricultural sector.

The noble Lord, Lord Myners—who is now back in his place—spoke about the difference between the Low Pay Commission and the Agricultural Wages Board. This is exactly the point: there is no need for two different bodies both assessing low pay issues. That plays into our hands as to why we believe that it is right to abolish the Agricultural Wages Board.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Wednesday 12th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I thank noble Lords for their suggested amendments and I appreciate the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, regarding this part of the Bill.

Beginning with the amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, Amendments 24ZA and 24ZC seek to add specific references to some of the CMA’s competition functions and duties into its overarching duty, which is,

“to promote competition, both within and outside the United Kingdom, for the benefit of consumers”.

These include, for example, references to the CMA’s role in tackling mergers and abuse of dominant positions, and in reducing cartels and monopolies.

The CMA’s duty to promote competition reflects its unique position as the UK’s principal competition body, its leadership role in tackling anti-competitive behaviour as part of ensuring markets work well for consumers, and its domestic and international advocacy role. It does not seek to set out all the CMA’s functions. In addition to this overarching duty, the CMA will inherit the full range of the competition functions of the OFT and the Competition Commission, as well as additional consumer enforcement powers.

These functions and powers include: strengthened Competition Act enforcement powers to enable the CMA to tackle anti-competitive monopolies, monopsonies and cartels; strengthened merger controls to enable the new authority to address more effectively anti-competitive mergers that can lead to high prices and poor quality for consumers; a wide range of investigative and remedy-making powers to ensure that markets work well for consumers; and finally, the use of consumer enforcement powers to address business practices that distort competition or impact on consumer choice, even where markets are competitive. We are also providing more speed and rigour in market studies and investigations, and anti-trust cases, to give consumers faster and more robust decisions.

Given that the CMA will have a range of powers to ensure that competition and markets work well, it would not be appropriate to legislate for the CMA’s overarching duty to focus on one of these important competition and consumer tools over another. It is also important to preserve the independence of the CMA to choose the right tool to promote competition and tackle anti-competitive practices. We therefore do not consider that it is necessary or right to specify the particular kinds of anti-competitive features set out in these amendments.

There is also a particular concern over the way in which Amendment 24ZC seeks to gloss the meaning of a dominant position by specifying that it is normally to mean control over a quarter or more of a market. This would contradict European Union jurisprudence on dominance and therefore introduce, by way of a provision in the CMA’s overarching duty, a conflict with the CMA’s actual powers and responsibilities and with the European Union law which underlies them.

Determining whether an undertaking is dominant requires an economic analysis of the state of competition in a market as it is best defined. Market shares can be important indicators but may not be decisive—for example, where there is significant buyer power or low barriers to entry such that the undertaking’s exercise of its power is constrained by the threat of new entry. By introducing this more mechanistic approach to dominance, the amendment would conflict with the way dominance is assessed under European competition law. So it would be wrong for us to introduce this scope for inconsistency and uncertainty by way of an amendment to the CMA’s overarching duty. I hope that noble Lords will accept my explanation, which has taken a little time, for why the overarching duty is just that and why I do not believe that more specific additions are appropriate.

Amendment 24ZCA, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lucas, and bearing in mind his reference to and comments about Amazon and its great buying power, seeks to empower the CMA to investigate any company or arrangement to establish whether a cartel, monopoly or monopsony exists or is being abused without receiving prior complaint. The CMA will, as the OFT can now do, be able to make inquiries whether or not it has received a complaint and will be able to take action on its own initiative in markets where it observes a problem. Indeed, it will inherit the function of obtaining, compiling and keeping under review information about matters relating to the carrying out of its functions under Section 5 of the Enterprise Act 2002.

However, for the authority to use its far-reaching powers of investigation under the Competition Act 1998—such as powers to require the production of specified documentation or information and powers to enter business premises with or without a warrant—Section 25 of the Competition Act 1998 requires it to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that an anti-trust prohibition has been infringed. This strikes the right balance between giving competition authorities effective powers and protecting businesses from overzealous enforcement. If the amendment is intended to undermine this threshold, it would represent a significant weakening of a protection for businesses. As such, as the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, mentioned, I do not consider that the amendment is required. I understand the noble Lord’s concern that allegations of anti-competitive behaviour should be properly investigated and the facts established. Decisions on individual cases and priorities will be for the CMA, which will of course be independent of government.

At the end of the day, it will be for the management of the CMA to ensure that it is a highly effective competition authority, vigorous in the pursuit of anti-competitive behaviour, and the provisions of the Bill, including the creation of the CMA, will assist in this. They are designed to deliver greater coherence in competition policy and practice and a more streamlined approach to decision-making through stronger oversight of the end-to-end case management process, more flexibility in resource utilisation and better incentives and powers to apply the anti-trust and markets tools to deal efficiently with competition problems. In addition, this clause will give the CMA a duty to promote competition, something which neither the OFT nor the Competition Commission have. I hope that my noble friend Lord Lucas will accept that these changes should go a long way to securing that the CMA will be the active champion of competition that we all wish to see.

In the light of my explanation, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, because he gave an example that I should have thought of. It is clear that Amazon has a dominant position in a buying and selling market. It is exactly the kind of case that we need to be absolutely sure that the provisions of the Bill cover. My noble friend Lord Borrie and the Minister both said that it already does and I hope that is right, but we need to underline the Minister’s words for future use. In a situation such as that of Amazon, in relation to both the suppliers or subcontractors from whom it derives its products and the people to whom it sells, this is a growingly dominant force in all our lives. That is a good example and one we need to test against all the provisions of the Bill.

My thanks also to my noble friend Lord Borrie and to the Minister for rightly saying that monopolies and market dominance are not always a bad thing. That would usually be my line because the assumption that a free market will ultimately always deliver the best outcomes for consumers is not necessarily true. Nevertheless, I would argue that there is a tendency for the less competitive markets to give consumers a worse deal and that improving competition in almost all circumstances—not all, I agree—will give consumers a wider choice. There are situations where broadening competition in practice reduces choice, but in general the consumer benefits from more competition and choice and less market dominance. That means that we have to be quite subtle in defining the overarching role of the CMA. I was slightly puzzled by the Minister saying that we should not augment or unduly prescribe the overarching role. The problem with the way that the Bill is currently set out is that, whereas the OFT and the CMA had clearly defined major roles in the beginning of their respective statutes, this does not. All it says is:

“The CMA must seek to promote competition, both within and outside the United Kingdom, for the benefit of consumers”.

Nobody will argue with that. It is one and a half lines. It does not say what the CMA should look into and how it should judge it. I certainly agree that all market situations into which it looks should be judged as to whether they are an abuse of power to the detriment of consumers.

There are other issues involved in looking at market structures, including international competitiveness et cetera. There are wider issues as well but my amendments attempt to say what the subject matter of the new CMA would be. I do not think that we have yet got that situation. However, clearly my amendments as drafted do not meet universal acclaim. I hope that the Government will, before the Bill finishes, think about whether they need to be a bit more definitive in this area so that we in Parliament and the public in general know exactly what this new organisation is setting out to do.

On the threshold point, there are references in existing legislation to 25% so it is not a new thing. I accept that that should probably not be in the overarching aim. I suspect that we will return to the threshold as we move further into the Bill so I will not prolong that one. I have made the point. I hope the Government will at least give this some consideration and perhaps come up with a different drafting when we move to later stages of the Bill. For the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, these amendments recognise the fundamental importance of consumer support and consumer protection, whether it comes in the form of education, advocacy, advice or enforcement of legislation. I therefore thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for the opportunity to discuss this important issue.

Competition is one of the pillars of a strong and vibrant economy. It makes businesses efficient and innovative, allowing the best to grow, innovate and enter new markets. It also drives investments in new and better processes, pushing prices down and quality up for consumers, but competition is only one side of the coin. To reap fully its benefits, consumers must be informed and have the confidence to exercise choice effectively. Unless consumers have the ability to make effective choices, vibrant competition will be inhibited and the businesses offering the best price or the best quality will not necessarily grow.

The current landscape provides consumers with a bewildering array of public, private and voluntary bodies with overlapping responsibilities. Each individual organisation does a very good job and is highly regarded but, taken together, they form a complex landscape that can be difficult for consumers to understand. The complexity and split of responsibility on enforcement cases has also led to a gap in enforcement. The National Audit Office’s 2011 report, Protecting Consumers, which reviewed consumer protection in the UK, found that consumer detriment occurs at national and regional level but the incentives are weighted towards tackling local issues. This contributes to an enforcement gap where large regional and some national cases may not necessarily be addressed.

The OFT estimated the cost to those affected and to the wider economy of activities such as unfair commercial practices and scams to be at least £6.6 billion annually. Any gap in enforcement is therefore significant to consumers and to the economy. The combined competition and consumer landscape reforms aim to deliver a better deal overall for consumers by setting out clearer responsibilities and better co-ordination between enforcers and the consumer advisory bodies.

Specifically, we will better equip trading standards departments to take greater responsibility for consumer law enforcement, and we have created a new National Trading Standards Board with responsibility for prioritising national and cross-local-authority boundary enforcement, tackling issues such as scams, illegal moneylending and rogue and incompetent traders, to provide a more coherent approach to trading standards enforcement.

The CMA will have primary expertise in unfair contract terms legislation and additional consumer enforcement powers to tackle business practices that distort competition or impact on consumer choice, even when markets are generally competitive. This could take the form of tricking consumers into tie-in contracts that might inhibit them from switching suppliers, subjecting consumers to unclear surcharges, or using misleading reference pricing. The CMA will also operate the combined OFT and Competition Commission’s markets regime to ensure that markets work well for consumers. As such, it will have powers to investigate markets such as payment protection insurance, which is a live issue. Business education will be shared between trading standards departments, which will deal with most business-facing initiatives, and the CMA, which will lead on competition advocacy and business education on unfair contract terms legislation.

In addition, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, we have created SIPEP, the Strategic Intelligence, Prevention and Enforcement Partnership, involving the CMA, the National Trading Standards Board, the new Financial Conduct Authority, Citizens Advice and representatives from Scotland and Northern Ireland collectively to identify issues causing consumer detriment and agree priorities for enforcement, information and education.

These landscape changes have been welcomed by a number of consumer experts. For example, Gillian Guy, chief executive of Citizens Advice, said that this reform, “is good news for consumers”. Ron Gainsford, chief executive of the Trading Standards Institute, said to the committee in the other place that the current proposals strike about the right balance on the relationship that the institute was seeking. Mike O’Connor, the chief executive of Consumer Focus, said of the new strategic partnership:

“Consumer Focus welcomes the creation of SIPEP and we believe that it can make an important contribution to promoting consumers’ interests”.

In order for this new landscape to work in practice, it is essential that there is clarity of responsibility and accountability. Requiring the CMA to provide strategic direction on consumer support functions for which other bodies will be responsible, as provided for by Amendment 24ZB, would undermine in this area and risk further confusion for consumers across the landscape.

I shall now address Amendments 24F, 24G, 24H and 24J collectively. They would widen the transfer scheme set out in Clause 22 to enable the transfer of the OFT and Competition Commission’s functions to bodies other than the CMA and a Minister of State. It would therefore be helpful for me to set out how we intend to enable the transfer. We will be relying on Clauses 20 and 22 and Schedules 4, 5 and 6 to create the CMA and transfer the functions, including those I set out earlier, from the OFT and Competition Commission to the new authority.

In addition, we will be using two orders under the Public Bodies Act to enact changes to the wider consumer landscape. The first order is being laid in draft before Parliament today and we hope that it will come into force in April 2013. This order will transfer the OFT’s function of supporting a public consumer advice scheme to Citizens Advice services in England, Wales and Scotland. We will then transfer the levy for this service. We are also making amendments to a range of consumer legislation to modify the enforcement functions of the OFT.

The second Public Bodies Act order will transfer Consumer Focus’s statutory functions and powers to the Citizens Advice service, and wind up Consumer Focus. It will also transfer the OFT’s estate agency functions to trading standards. We expect to lay this order late in 2013 for it to come into force in 2014.

Finally, Amendment 24 seeks to transfer the OFT’s function of “promoting good consumer practice” to the CMA. We do not consider that this function needs to be transferred to the CMA. In the current regime, Section 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 gives the OFT a general function of promoting good consumer practice, which recognises its leading role in providing consumer education and its function in relation to approving consumer codes. It is also the provision on which the OFT relies to conduct its international consumer advocacy work.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, was concerned that Section 6 of the Enterprise Act 2002 would not be transferred to the CMA. Paragraph 61 of Schedule 5 to this Bill transfers to the CMA the OFT’s function for the provision of information to the public.

[Lord Whitty]

Either I mis-expressed myself or the noble Viscount has misunderstood. Section 6, which deals with education, is indeed being transferred and then devolved to Citizens Advice and, to some extent, trading standards offices, but Section 8 is being deleted in its entirety, as I understand it.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I note the point that the noble Lord has made and I will come back to that technical issue shortly.

As I have mentioned, in the new consumer landscape, the Citizens Advice service will take on the lead role in providing consumer-facing education from the OFT, as well as taking over responsibility for consumer advocacy from Consumer Focus. The role of approving consumer codes will be transferred from the OFT to trading standards. The CMA will continue to have an international consumer role; for example, to represent the UK at the OECD’s Committee on Consumer Policy. A specific provision has been made for this in paragraph 19 of Schedule 4 to the Bill.

I will pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, about how trading standards offices will provide a high standard of support against a backdrop of reduced funding. Local authorities make their own decisions about what proportion of their budget to invest in local trading standards services. This had led to variations in the costs and resources allocated to trading standards services. While we are unable to pre-empt local funding decisions, in 2011 the National Audit Office assessed that local trading standards services vary significantly in capacity and annual budgets range from around £240,000 to more than £6 million.

The Government recognise the impact of the current financial climate and our structural reforms, supported by central government funding, for national leadership and co-ordination of enforcement activity will help local services to target high-priority cases for maximum effect. We will continue to ensure that national expenditure complements the local authority contributions and offers as much leverage as possible to ensure overall efficiency.

The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, asked whether the Citizens Advice service would receive additional funding for taking on the consumer advocacy function. Citizens Advice will be allocated an additional £3.72 million to carry out general consumer advocacy work and consumer education and information, previously undertaken by Consumer Focus and the OFT.

I hope that noble Lords will accept my explanation of the relationship between the competition and consumer reforms as to why additions to the CMA’s role and widening of the transfer schemes in this way would not be appropriate. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, we now come to what may prove next week to be an interesting area: the relationship between the CMA and the sector regulators. This is the first point where it arises in the Bill, and it relates to the list of sector regulators. It is not a substantive point in terms of the nature of that relationship, but because the Government seem to think that that relationship is not entirely right at the moment and we know that we will be getting a hefty amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marland, next week on the Secretary of State’s powers in relation to the sector regulators and the CMA, it is important that the list of designated sector regulators is in fact the right list.

This amendment and a later one on the more substantive issues attempt to alter the list as set out in the Bill in two ways. The first is to remove Monitor from the list. The second, which I will deal with first, is the issue of how we will deal with the Financial Services Bill, which has yet to receive Royal Assent, and the establishment of the Financial Conduct Authority, because that will be the equivalent sector regulator for financial services and its powers will not be quite the same in some respects as those of the sector regulators that regulate the one-time nationalised industries such as water and gas. Nevertheless, it is the equivalent body and should therefore have an equivalent relationship with the CMA. There is no reference to any financial regulator in any of these lists. That may simply be for the technical and probably constitutional reason that the Financial Services Bill is not yet in law but, if that is the case, then presumably the FSA should appear there. I would like to know the Government’s intentions on that.

There is another complication regarding that Bill: in some respects, the prudential regulator could have an effect on the structure of markets as well. There is therefore a crossover there with the role of the CMA. We will come back to the substance of that, but it would be interesting to know the Government’s intention in that respect.

The other point relates to Monitor. Monitor is the economic regulator, and various other things, under the new National Health Service regime. The issue of competition in the health service was one of enormous complexity during the passage of the NHS reform Bill. It was one over which the Government gave substantial reassurances that the role of competition would not cut across the primary concern of NHS patients, which was that they would be treated effectively, resources would be deployed effectively for them and there would be seamless integration of the health service regarding their treatment. That will cut across the competition criteria that apply to the other sectors covered by the other regulators. Indeed, Monitor itself in its own objectives set out that integration and co-operation are its main priorities.

I think I am right in saying that at least once during the course of the NHS Bill the noble Earl, Lord Howe, indicated that in issues where there was conflict between competition and co-operation in providing a seamless service to the patient, then co-operation would trump competition. I am not arguing that the role of Monitor in increasing competition in the health service should be reopened, but I am saying that it is an entirely different situation from that which applies, for example, to Ofgem or the railways, where there are clear criteria, either continuously or at the point of franchise, about competition. Here, though, it is not the main aim of the health service to maximise choice; choice can be a contributor to patient comfort and outcomes but the main purpose is actually to provide an effective service for the treatment of that patient. The interaction between the CMA and Monitor in the health service, therefore, would be entirely different from the interaction between it and the other sector regulators. That is why I wish to remove Monitor from the list. There may be a separate reason for a relationship, but it is not the same as the rules being proposed for the overall relationship between the CMA and the sector regulators.

I advise the Government, gently, not to reopen this matter—health service reform was difficult enough for them. People are settling down now to make it work but the idea that another authority might come in under this Bill and overrule a health service body trying to square off competition and co-operation would reopen huge anxieties among health service professionals, patient groups and the new commissioning body. The Government would be wise to take it out. They can do it at this point without too much attention but if what they are proposing gets out there, they will be in serious trouble. I beg to move.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for tabling Amendments 24BFA and 24BG.

Amendment 24BFA would remove Monitor from the list of sector regulators covered by the CMA’s duty to publish an annual concurrency report. The concurrency arrangements to be reported on are the arrangements for co-operation between the CMA and sector regulators in relation to their functions under the Competition Act 1998, in other words anti-trust cases, and under Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002, in other words market investigation references.

The concurrency report is part of a wider package of concurrency reforms designed to give the CMA stronger powers to co-ordinate competition work. The Bill will also give the regulators more explicit duties to consider using their general competition powers instead of sector-specific powers. The concurrency report ensures that there is transparency about how the CMA and sector regulators have worked together and how concurrent powers have been used in the regulated sectors. Monitor, whose role is to protect and promote the interests of patients, as the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, has mentioned, will have both regulatory powers—for example, the provider licence—and concurrent powers to address anti-competitive behaviour that is against the interests of patients.

The regulatory powers will reflect the Government’s commitment to retain sector-specific rules for health, building on those put in place by the previous Administration. Monitor will be subject to the new arrangements on the co-ordination of concurrent powers provided for in Clause 45, subject to one exception. The Government have been clear in response to the consultation on competition reform that Monitor’s new explicit duty to consider Competition Act enforcement before taking enforcement action through the provider licence provided under Schedule 14 to the Enterprise Bill will not be commenced until a future date, reflecting the unique characteristics of the health sector.

Subject to this, Monitor will become part of the same concurrency regime as the other sector regulators. So it is right that the concurrency arrangements between the CMA and Monitor and the use of concurrent powers in the health sector should be covered by the concurrency report. This will provide greater transparency and assurance that concurrent competition powers are being used effectively and in the interests of users of health care services.

Turning now to Amendment 24BG, I believe the amendment is intended to ensure that the CMA will have to report on how concurrency arrangements and co-operation and scrutiny of financial services more generally have worked with the FCA and the PRA. However, neither the FCA nor the PRA will have concurrent powers, so the amendment will in practice have no effect.

I know that noble Lords have questioned whether the FCA should have concurrent competition powers. However, the Government accepted the recommendation of the Treasury Select Committee that the case for market investigation reference powers had not yet been made and that the issue should be reviewed when the FCA had bedded into its new role. The Financial Services Bill instead gives the FCA a new competition remit which provides the mandate for the FCA to use its powers to promote effective competition and it will be able to carry out reviews of financial markets. The Financial Conduct Authority will have a tailored power to refer matters to the CMA, which may conduct market investigation or bring Competition Act enforcement proceedings. This mechanism was widely supported by consumer groups and industry and by the Treasury Select Committee.

In addition, the Financial Services Bill includes provision for the competition authorities independently to scrutinise the impact of both the FCA’s and the PRA’s actions on competition. It will of course be important that the FCA and OFT co-ordinate. The FSA and OFT already have an MoU in place and a new one will be put in place between the FCA and the CMA. The CMA, FCA and PRA will be required to report on their performance in their annual reports. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not really accept either of those two propositions. On the financial side, it is true that the FCA does not have the whole range of concurrent powers that all the other regulators do, or in the same form, but it has a substantial number of powers in relation to its treatment of market abuse and consumers and its ability to conduct market studies. I hoped the Minister would say, “We will wait until the Financial Services Bill has passed and then at a later stage in this Bill we will produce a clause that deals with the relationship between the CMA and the FSA as will be, and possibly other parts of the financial regulation side”. I fear that what he actually said is that the abyss has been rolled over by the Treasury.

Quite often in consumer law, we find that general consumer propositions are deemed by the Treasury and the Bank of England not to apply to them. That may indeed be part of the reason why the previous system of regulation of the banking system fell flat on its face. The Minister and his colleagues in this need to be a bit braver in facing up to the Treasury and ensuring that it is subject to the same possibilities of market and consumer abuse as other sectors and therefore should be covered by the same propositions, even though there would be some slight variation in the range of powers. I hope that at some stage in the Bill there will be a point where we take on board the final version of the Financial Services Bill and put that back in.

On Monitor, I fear the Minister is making a serious political misjudgment. It is true that during the course of the NHS Bill the House eventually accepted that there should be a significant increase in competition within the health service structure, but when you look at the actual decisions that will have to be taken by the individual bodies within the health service, their prime concern is that patients and patient groups get the best integrated service for their condition. Therefore, for example, commissioning bodies will need to ensure that, where they commission services from one particular trust or specialist service, that will continue without competitive challenge through the course of treatment for those patients for a number of years. Otherwise, the specialisms within the health service will be destroyed and the seamless journey that is part of Monitor’s objectives for the individual patient will be interrupted by somebody saying, “Actually, you have not observed competition rules in this respect”.

That is not to say that there are not some aspects where there is an overlap. I am saying that the relationship between the CMA and Monitor is different from that for the other sector regulators. I would take it out of that list and the other lists that appear here. If there needs to be a separate memorandum of understanding, let us provide for that, but it will not be the same. If the Government hint that it is the same, I am afraid that there will be a reaction out there that they will find difficult to contain. That will be at best an embarrassment and at worst a threat to the other changes they are trying to make within the health service. I plead with them on this. It is in the interests of Monitor to devise its own structures and relationships and not to assume that it will operate in the same way as a competition authority in other markets. I hope that the Government will change their attitude on this in the course of the Bill. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.