(10 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeThis, again, concerns a somewhat difficult point. Currently, paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 1 provides that amounts of pre-commencement pension up to the level of the full single pension will increase in line with “the full rate” of the single state pension, while any amount in excess of that will rise only in line with CPI inflation. In other words, the rate of revaluation is on the basis of prices rather than, as in the past, in relation to earnings. This takes us into the whole area of revaluation. We have already heard that, apparently, government policy is in future going to support the triple lock, which I personally have always supported. If the triple lock were accepted, and if our amendment were accepted, that would certainly bring the whole thing into line with the triple lock, because it would increase this section of the pension in line with earnings.
I am rather surprised that the Government continue to imagine that it is possible, in this particular section of the Bill, to have revaluation in line not with earnings, or indeed with the triple lock at all, but in line with prices. That is completely out of kilter with what will, hopefully, be in the rest of the Bill and with support for the triple lock. I therefore suggest that the Minister look again at the amendment and perhaps agree with what we are suggesting: that the amount to be revalued should be in accordance with the full rate of the state pension, which would of course bring you directly into the earnings section rather than looking at prices again. I do not think that we want to look at prices again in relation to any section of the Bill. If we are going to have the triple lock, which I hope we shall, that would of course not arise because the best of three would be payable in respect of all the pension payments referred to in the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, I fully support what my noble friend has just said and have some amendments in this group which point in the same direction. The issue is fairness in relation to expectations. Under this part of the schedule, if your entitlement under the prior system is greater than the reference point, it is index-linked on a different basis from that on which it would be if it falls below the reference point.
The Minister may regard that as part of the overall approach, but in terms of the expectations of the people concerned there is in essence the same point as was in my noble friend’s previous amendment: somebody who is retiring in 15 years’ time may be able to provide other means of savings to make up for the loss of expectation. However, if they are retiring fairly close to the due date of the single tier, then their expectations cannot be made up in that time. A significant degree of unfairness applies there. The same applies in relation to the subject matter of these amendments if you happen to be one side or another, under the old system, of the proposed reference figure of £144 or whatever it turns out to be. There is no particular reason why one group of workers—who have, by and large, not had the most favourable pension schemes but have saved into the state second pension—should be treated differentially in this way, compared with their expectation.
It is an issue of fairness. The triple lock seems to have all-round support except in these clauses. It seems that the Government, at a relatively small cost, could make the adjustment here and save quite a lot of aggro and, I suspect, a significant postbag for most Members of Parliament.
My Lords, Subsections (2) to (5) of Clause 24 and Schedule 14 give employers powers to amend employee contributions and benefits in their occupational schemes to an extent supposed to be limited to the cost of the extra national insurance the employer will have to pay as a result of the end of contracting out. I am totally opposed to this clause and also to Schedule 14. The proposal potentially impacts on 1.6 million active members of private sector DB schemes. It would enable any existing protection for members’ benefits in legislation or scheme rules to be overridden. This includes specific statutory protection given to members in former nationalised industries when they were privatised and also measures of protection that employers in times past have agreed to write into their schemes.
The ending of contracting out and the associated increase in employer national insurance is, in principle, no different from any other risk employers with DB schemes might face and there is no sound justification for the Government to disturb the existing balance of power in relation to these schemes. The extra cost on employers is no greater than as might arise in the event of a small change in market interest rates. There was no suggestion of intervention to protect scheme members who lost out when the Government, not so long ago, amended the statutory basis of the pension increase from RPI to CPI. A number of us objected at the time. Governments should allow the problems arising for employers on this count to be dealt with through the established process whereby changes can be effected by negotiation and agreement. An overriding power based on being able to recover a set amount of cost could result in great unfairness as there may be no correspondence between the variable amounts members may gain from a single state pension and those they may lose if employers are allowed to determine unilaterally the form of contribution and benefit changes in occupational schemes.
I also recall, during my career as a trade union official a number of years ago, how keen we were to negotiate what we then called final salary schemes— DB schemes. As a result of the schemes that we negotiated then, there have been beneficial changes for many pensioners. As we know, though, after a certain number of years there was a bit of a campaign against DB schemes, as a result of which a number of employers decided that they would scale down their DB schemes. I have sensed that there remains not a hostility but a lack of concern and support on the part of the Government for DB schemes. These schemes excellently provided for generations of pensioners, who are very grateful for the fact that they are in existence.
What is proposed here is not in any way acceptable. I very much hope that the Government will take it away and rethink it. I am not the only person to feel this; the Minister will notice that there are a number of other amendments in this group, including my own Amendment 40, which are designed to protect employees who were covered by existing protections when they belonged to former nationalised industries that were denationalised. As a result of that, there was legislation that provided for protection. In fact, the protected persons were first introduced by an Act of Parliament in 1948 and reaffirmed by the Thatcher Government on the denationalisation of the electricity supply industry in 1990.
The Government now propose, in my view, to override the statutory provisions providing these pensions, in order to allow employers to claw back the additional NI contributions. This really is the thin end of the wedge and I do not think we should accept it. The Government should take it away and rethink it, because I regard it as quite unacceptable and so do many people, including individuals who are themselves beneficiaries of DB schemes and the unions that support them. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have amendments in this group that broadly support the line that my noble friend has been taking. She was right to try to prise open what the Government’s strategy actually is.
Everyone recognises that there are consequences of contracting out, but under this clause and schedule the Government are effectively giving carte blanche to employers to change established means of paying occupational pensions among private sector employees. Government Amendments 48 and 49 actually make that worse by making it pretty explicit that the full cost of that will, or at least can, fall on the employees so that not only are the employers given the right not only to avoid the consequences of that cost and place it on to the employees, which is likely to have the knock-on effect of people opting out of the schemes, but they are overriding the long-established system whereby such schemes are governed by trustees representing the employers, the contributing members and often the pensioners in those schemes. To override the whole system of pension trustees that we have had in place for the past 40 or so years with regard to private occupational pensions is a very serious step. There are particular consequences in the area where statutory protections are built in. Past Governments have given guarantees that can be overridden by this clause.
All this can lead us only to the conclusion that the Government have a strategy and are using the excuse of the other provisions of the Bill on state pensions to go further in destroying private occupational schemes. We discussed the knock-on effect in public sector schemes at our previous sitting but here we have, as my noble friend says, more than 1.5 million people still in defined benefit schemes who have benefited from them and have every expectation of continuing to benefit from them. On top of everything else, the Government are attempting to ensure that those schemes now fail.
There are other reasons why some schemes have been curtailed and there are other reasons why the future of such schemes, in some cases, looks fragile. However, this is a deliberate attempt by the Government to make matters significantly worse. The Government must think very seriously about that. This is why my amendments and those of my noble friend would delete the bulk of Clause 24 and Schedule 14. We recognise that we have to face up to the consequence of that, but it would force the Government to rethink this and do it in the context of an overall strategy towards occupational pensions, their governance and their future, which is not there at the moment.
This clause provides the possibility of the Government reassuring us that they have a strategy but, frankly, we need to see the outlines of that strategy before we finish the proceedings on this Bill. Otherwise, I think that the message to those outside will be that, if you are in an occupational pension scheme in the private sector, we will make it cost you more and the benefits will be less and, if you are in the public sector, the Government will not compensate for the costs that they are imposing on well funded public sector schemes, as we discussed last time.
There is an occupational pension dimension to the whole pension issue. In principle we support many of the changes that the Government intend to make to the state pension, but the other part of the equation also needs to be faced up to. Frankly, I have seen no sign of a government strategy to do that. These clauses and much of this schedule will only make matters very significantly worse.
I rise to support these amendments. This section of the Bill is yet more evidence of the opposition of the Government to the interests and desires of ordinary working people—to their need to organise to represent their legitimate interests at a time when employment rights are constantly under government attack. Now we have this attempted legislation, which is a direct attack on unions and their ability to represent their members and provide a service to them. There is already legislation in place as we have heard, in the 1992 Act, which requires unions to maintain a register of members with a certification officer in charge of implementation. As my noble friend has pointed out, there have been hardly any complaints under that legislation and only one with any substance requiring further examination. The Government have not produced any evidence to support the amending legislation they are now proposing.
Government spokespeople often stress the importance of voluntary organisations, but unions are among the largest voluntary organisations in the country. Although the media, most of which seek to demonise unions, refer only to union bosses, most local and workplace work is done by willing volunteers. Yet unions are the only voluntary organisations to have this kind of internal bureaucracy imposed upon them and at their expense. The CBI, employers’ organisations, organisations representing bankers and the fiscal industries do not have this; only unions are to have this additional expensive official, an allegedly independent person, who is not voted for by them but is imposed upon their internal administration.
What of the privacy of ordinary members? What of their confidentiality? It is clear that the Government are intent on making things much more difficult for a union affiliated to the Labour Party. However, not all of them are. Most are affiliated only after a ballot of those who pay the political levy, which is surely a matter for union members themselves. The TUC has made substantial criticism of the Bill, which it regards as an attack upon democracy. It believes that it would make organising a conference in advance of the general election, even its own congress in 2014, a criminal offence, because it would be in advance of an election.
The campaigning organisation, Liberty, has also opposed this section of the Bill, believing it to be a breach of Article 11 of the European employment rights legislation. The Government, of course, disagree. I regard this section as undemocratic and a further attack on the employment rights of ordinary people. The Government pretend that it is not. However, to weaken the ability of the unions to adequately do the job for which their members belong weakens those members. Strong unions mean better pay and conditions, which is one of the reasons why millionaires do not like them much.
We in this House should not be misled by media misrepresentation of unions and should recognise the contribution that they make to the support and welfare of ordinary working people. This section of the Bill should therefore be opposed. I fully support what my noble friend said in his introduction to this section.
My Lords, I declare an interest in that I have been a member of the GMB for 40 years this year and was a member of other unions prior to that. I therefore have an axe to grind—not a pecuniary one—and I share that interest with millions of our fellow citizens and with many who are not in trade unions but who, nevertheless, benefit from the way in which trade unions operate in the market.
My Amendment 118C seeks to delete from the clause the reference to this peculiar new invention of an assessor. The Government have seen fit to invent a whole new profession and office for reasons which, as my noble friend Lord Monks said, are not entirely clear. The role of the assessor is dealt with in more detail in Clause 37, and I will return to make more detailed remarks in that respect. The central point is why the Government think that they need to invent a relatively costly new bureaucratic structure when they already have the powers in the role of the certification officer, who can deal with any complaint received, intervene and censure a union if inadequate documentation is provided. As my noble friend has said, there are already substantial penalties available to certification officers if ever one of the few complaints they receive is upheld. In this section of the 1992 Act, there is also the possibility for individuals to complain, not only to the certification officer but to the courts, about the failure of trade unions to maintain proper records and many other provisions of that Act.
So why is a new structure being proposed? As my noble friend Lord Monks has said, there are problems in maintaining a register of trade unions with names and addresses and accurate records. By and large, most of the population moves every four years, and the impact assessment recognises this. People change their address every four years and tend to move job slightly more frequently than that. In some cases, they change the way in which they pay their union dues, or the name of the company for which they work changes. At any given point, it is difficult to maintain a 100% accurate register, but the Act rightly says,
“so far as is reasonably practicable”.
That is the basis on which the certification officer makes a judgment.
It is not clear in this Bill whether the Government intend to invoke more stringent principles of how to decide whether or not it is an accurate register. If they are, it is not in the Bill. Is the assessor, or whoever advises them, to develop new codes? If so, the House should be told before we proceed. I will return to the role of the assessor, which appears in the next clause.
I also strongly support the aim of the amendment of my noble friends Lord Monks and Lord Stevenson to delete this clause and this whole part of the Bill. We have looked at the impact assessment, which estimates the costs to unions, the Government and employers. For unions, it is assessed at around £400,000. I have had representations from all sorts of unions—my own, the National Union of Teachers, which is not affiliated to this party, and the Royal College of Nursing, to which my noble friend has referred and which is not affiliated either to the TUC or to the party. These indicate clearly that the cost of implementing these provisions and initiating the changes in procedure and rules that is required would be substantially more than that.
Even more interesting is that only £140,000 is allocated to additional costs to the Government, whereas if they were really trying to enforce this, they should give the certification officer significantly more powers. It is arguable that under the present rules the certification officer may need more resources, but that is not what this Bill is about. It is about an entirely new approach to this area. The even more interesting part of the impact assessment is that the benefit at one point is described as nil. That is a pretty telling internal report on a proposal from Ministers: at a cost of £400,000, which I think will be rather larger, plus £100,000 or so to the Government, the benefit is nil.
My noble friend Lord Monks has already cited the Regulatory Policy Committee, which basically says that this is one of the daftest proposals that has ever come before it, and there is no justification for it. Even the Government, who have been scraping around for supporters of this Bill during a rushed consultation period over the holiday month, could not get more than lukewarm support from the CBI, which said that it would not be its first priority. Where are the Government coming from on this? The benefit to restating and providing a bureaucratic infrastructure to enforce the requirement of unions to keep membership records effectively is not justified in anything the Government have so far said about this, either in the impact assessment or in speeches in the House of Commons, which was of course very late in the proceedings.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Monks has made a sophisticated case to the Government for making this whole clause and the invention of the assurer more palatable, or at least more workable. He has had to do so in a very complicated way because of the nature of the proposition. My opposition and that of my noble friend Lord Lea to the clause standing part is a more straightforward proposition: we are basically seeking to delete the clause.
We still have not had a proper explanation of why there should be an assurer. Incidentally, I need to apologise to the Committee and to Hansard: on occasion in the previous debate, I referred to an “assessor” rather than an “assurer”. I also apologise to the Minister. It was almost certainly down to my writing. The term “assurer” has a nice touch about it; it is as though the man from the Pru is coming round to collect your life assurance every now and again. However, it is not quite like that. What qualifications and what legal requirements does the assurer have to have? He or she is going to be employed by the union but approved by the state. This person may well be somebody with auditing qualifications but he or she is not an auditor, an accountant, a lawyer or a scrutineer in the sense of the ballot scrutineer, to which my noble friend referred. The post is an entirely new invention.
I go back to my earlier point. Why do we need this new invention? If the Government’s intention is to tighten things up, why do they not do that? Can we not rationally look at a proposition saying that the certification officer should have more powers or that the requirements on the union should be clearer or more stringent? However, that is not what the Government have proposed. They have simply proposed this intermediary, which is very strange.
I do not know how the general public will take to this. What is the assurer? It sounds to me like a third-rate television series: “The Assurer—Licensed to Check Membership Records”. Even more sinisterly, as in Nineteen Eighty-Four, it could be the kind of person who meticulously took notes of the proceedings of a committee in the old Soviet Union. He sat in the corner and nobody quite knew who he was, but you knew he was reporting on you, and you knew he was reporting to the Central Committee. Such a role is not of the organisation; it is not of the state; and it is not of a recognised profession; it is a new invention. To do exactly what? I do not think that, in all their interventions so far, or in what they have done with their advisers, the Government have come up with a clear definition of what this person is to do.
For the smaller unions—those with fewer than 10,000 members—the requirements in Clause 36 relate to an audit certificate. That is slightly more understandable. It has to be signed off by senior officers of the union. That is a procedure that many organisations know about. They have to bring in external auditors to check it and, if it is complicated, they have on occasion to ensure that their lawyers have seen it.
However, this new profession is not known to science or to society—or, so far as I am aware, is it known to legislation. If the Minister can point to a precedent I would be grateful, but it is not in any part of society that I am aware of, or in any part that bears any relationship to the context in which trade unions and employers operate.
If I were the Government, I would think that the best thing would be to delete this whole new proposition and instead get around to telling us clearly what this part of the Bill is supposed to do. Then we could have a rational debate. We might still disagree, but at least we would know what we were talking about. The main proposition here is to introduce into a very delicate and sensitive area—the issues of human rights and data protection have already been touched on, and will be again—an entity and a role that is unknown to all the players and unknown to the courts. If the Government were sensible, they would approach this in a cleaner way. They would make a proposition as to how they want unions to change their behaviour and what standards they want them to meet, and we would be able to see whether those were reasonable, rather than putting things in the hands of an entirely new concoction.
I therefore propose that Clause 37 should not stand part of the Bill. I hope that by the time we have completed our consideration of the Bill the Government will either have deleted it entirely or put something much simpler and more straightforward in its place.
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by my noble friend. One point struck me particularly, from my recollection of my own work as a full-time official in connection with recruiting in areas where there was no trade union membership. I am referring to people who were new to the trade union movement. The lack of confidentiality implied in this part of the Bill would be a deterrent to recruitment. Obviously, if you are trying to recruit people who have never been in a union before and are not organised, the last thing they want is for their details to be made available to anybody. They want to keep things close to themselves until they have recognition. Obviously that is important to them. A number of us have raised the issue of confidentiality, which is threatened unless this provision is either removed entirely or substantially amended.
I do not see why we should have to vote for yet another official—this so-called assurer. Where is he to come from? What sort of background is he to have? What kind of voice will the ordinary members have in relation to this individual? We do not want this new individual. We do not think the role is necessary, and I personally oppose this clause altogether—although the amendments tabled by my noble friends would undermine to some extent the opposition that some of us have on grounds of confidentiality. This is very important to new members, particularly those who have not been in a union before and who need some assurance of confidentiality if they are to remain with the union and support it as it struggles for membership and recognition. I therefore completely support my noble friends in their opposition to this part of the Bill.