Energy Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Whitty and Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke(9 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Whitty
My Lords, in moving Amendment 24, I will speak to the others in the group. We move on to information and samples. These relatively small amendments are intended to ensure that the information and sample regime takes account of the role of carbon capture and storage: in other words, that it is reflected within this part of the Bill in the way that it should be reflected—the Minister has indicated some sympathy towards this—in the earlier clauses relating to the activities of the OGA.
Amendments 24 and 25 are very small and are intended to ensure that the definition of “petroleum-related information” is kept as broad as possible, so that it is not limited to the fulfilment of the principal objective—it is narrowly defined at present—and not time limited to activities which continue to be relevant to that objective. In other words, it could be used, either in parallel with extraction processes or after they have taken place, to provide samples and information to CO2 licence holders and storage operators. The use of “and” between the two subsections creates an ambiguity here, and if the Government’s intention is to ensure that the information could be provided to and required of CO2 storage operators, they need to make these amendments.
Similarly, on Amendment 25, which relates to the transfer of such information, there are many within the potential CCS market who regard the inability to access samples as one of the barriers to using former gas and oil facilities for carbon storage. In order to ascertain whether the facility is appropriate and can technically be operated as a storage area, information that is held by the OGA as a result of it having been provided by the extraction operators ought to be made available to the CCS operators. Amendment 25 is designed to ensure that that can happen and that the Government have the powers to transfer such data. The Government have already indicated that they hope to be able to transfer such information, and this would give a proper legal base to that and make it enforceable. In addition, Amendment 28 clarifies that the OGA could require information and samples for the purpose of carrying out any of its relevant functions, not just its principal function. Again, that would ensure that storage licensing was included in that provision.
I hope the Government can look at these amendments and, taking account of the points made earlier in Committee about CCS, consider whether these relatively minor amendments to the Bill would help to encourage and give some degree of confidence to potential operators of CCS making use of our North Sea facilities. I beg to move.
Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke
My Lords, we are all getting very excited about these amendments so we are anxious to speak. I want to add a couple of sentences. There is a history in the oil and gas sector of not sharing information, for whatever reason: sometimes it is competitiveness but sometimes, although I hate to say it, it is sheer awkwardness. Although CCS technology has been around for a long time and has been proven, there is nervousness about transmission, so it would make a great deal of sense if the OGA had the authority to require the sharing of this information, whether for safety reasons or any other reason. Those of us who have had to deal with the oil and gas industry know that it is very shy about passing on the kind of information that my noble friend Lord Whitty has spoken so eloquently about.
Energy Bill
Debate between Lord Whitty and Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke
Lord Whitty
My Lords, Amendment 51ZA is a probing amendment, although it is one that the Government could give some commitments to taking forward, if not precisely in this form.
The Government are rightly giving Ofgem the power, in cases of breach of licence condition, to require licence holders—that is, supply companies—to pay compensation to the consumers who have suffered detriment, as well as raising a fine. I am not entirely clear whether that power also covers Ofgem requiring compensation for straightforward breach of general consumer law, rather than strict breach of licence, but it would make sense if it did.
The level of consumer complaints in the energy sector is one of the highest—in some years, the highest—of all sectors in our economy. The level of complaints dealt with by the consumer organisations, the ombudsman and, on occasion, by the courts, as well as by Ofgem, remains high despite significant improvements made or claimed by the supply companies.
It is clear that the complaints systems of several of the large energy companies are not really up to scratch. The ombudsman and Ofgem remark on this from time to time. Tens of thousands of consumers suffer from the effects of mis-selling, misleading information and misleading advice on choice of tariff and other conditions relating to tariffs; for example, on the cost determination. If you switch tariff, you have to pay a significant cost but that is rarely conveyed to you up front in an understandable form when you sign up for the tariff. It is a significant inhibition to many consumers switching and therefore to there being a proper consumer-led market in this sector.
One of the other areas of complaint is contested bills, particularly the estimated bills. As we were saying the other day, these are by definition wrong but are often insisted upon by the companies. On many occasions, eventually a settlement is reached, but it is on an individual basis. It may involve an ombudsman case but it reflects the general approach of the company to its consumers. In the impact assessment of the Bill, the provisions to improve Ofgem’s powers in this area are not given an accurate assessment. However, it is implied that the effect will be positive, and certainly I think that it will be. However, the size of detriment in the energy sector is potentially very large, and the inhibition on taking individual cases is also substantial. You have to go through a complaints process, and if you are not satisfied, you have to go to the ombudsman, take a case to court or get help from the various consumer and interest group organisations. That ends up costing a lot of time and often a lot of money, with not necessarily a coherent outcome to each case.
This situation is not confined to energy but, because of the high level of problems within energy, there are general aspects of provider behaviour from which a large number of consumers suffer. It is difficult to prove on an individual basis, but it is important that we recognise that there ought to be better systems for getting redress for consumers. By and large, consumer law in this country does not include collective provision, unlike in the United States, where there are significant class action provisions. Successive Governments have gone part of the way down the road towards greater collective provision, recognising that, for example, the PPI scandal in financial services would have been much better dealt with had there been a collective redress system rather than often quite aggressive complaints-handling companies taking up cases of varying degrees of authenticity, which led to differential outcomes case by case.
That was recognised by BIS in some of the discussion that surrounded the presentation of the draft consumer rights Bill that is now under pre-legislative scrutiny in another place. You have to get quite a long way into the Bill before you find it, but it is a significant breakthrough. It comes in paragraph 7 of Schedule 14 to the Bill and is the beginning of a provision for general collective redress in this area. It is on an opt-in basis, which is still somewhat narrower than the provision in the Financial Services and Markets Act of the previous Government, which unfortunately had to be dropped in its original form. It had a whole section on collective redress in the financial sector, which could have been taken out and generalised into other sectors and was particularly apposite for areas such as energy, where there is a regulator, regulated provisions and licence conditions, as well as general consumer law.
I attempted to get that written into the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, given that parliamentary counsel had already cleared it two years earlier. I have not bothered to provide the three pages for this Bill, because it covers esoteric matters relating to energy. I have set myself the slightly less ambitious target of requiring the Secretary of State to come forward 12 months after the Act is passed with some provision for collective redress in this area. I am encouraged by the fact that the Government have provided for at least one form of collective redress through the consumer rights Bill. Therefore, I hope that in 12 months’ time, the attitude of the House of Commons to that Bill and the Government’s reflection on it will give some guidance on how to do this with energy.
Therefore, it is an open-ended requirement on the Secretary of State in terms of the precise provisions. However, it is a signal that in this area of quite substantial consumer detriment and very substantial consumer distrust of the whole system we take this opportunity to make it clear that the Secretary of State must, at some future date, provide a means of collective redress within this sector.
There is a second amendment in this group to which I should refer. Amendment 51ZE seeks to delete the limit of the redress to detriment that occurred more than five years ago. The reality is that some of the mis-selling in energy, just like some of the mis-selling in the financial sector, started a long time ago, and the decision to apply a five-year limit is completely arbitrary. Indeed, that does not apply in the financial services sector. If a practice started seven years ago and was still happening within the last five years, there is no reason why the earlier detriment should not be taken into account. I am being quite modest in suggesting a 15-year limitation. I would be delighted if the Minister accepted my substitution of 15 for five; I would be even more delighted if he said that on reflection the Government would prefer to delete the limit altogether, because there are some long-standing wrongs in this area and the five-year limit does not seem sensible. I beg to move Amendment 51ZA.
Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke
My Lords, I support my noble friend in his amendment. The amendment seems particularly sensible and apposite, because at the time that this legislation was being crafted we were not aware of some of the mis-selling issues that were to emerge from the customers of energy suppliers. The last time I checked, there was something like 27 cases still pending with Ofgem, and that was before the announcement of the fines relating to mis-selling affecting Scottish and Southern Energy. Given the number and complexity of tariffs, many people will be checking whether they have been mis-sold.
It has been suggested that there is a danger that the mis-selling of electricity and energy in general could reach a stage where it matches the mis-selling of PPI and some of the financial services mis-selling. This would be useful for the Government to have in the armoury should that situation emerge. It is not radical; it is actually quite a simple measure. If we take into account that the most recent instances of mis-selling had been in the pipeline at Ofgem for around four years, my noble friend’s proposal to extend the time period from five to 15 years is measured and logical. I do not see this as greatly controversial but as a way of dealing with a problem that may be coming over the horizon and that would save recourse to additional legislation in the future. If the Minister cannot make a commitment today to support my noble friend’s amendment, perhaps this is something we might be able to return to on Report.
Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke
I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving way but the noble Lord, Lord Deben, referred to the financial services industry. The whole issue around the mis-selling of personal pensions covered a period of between 15 to 20 years. One of the reasons why there had to be redress there was because the entire financial services industry had been damaged. Our energy suppliers are being damaged at the moment. I remind noble Lords of the statement by Warren Buffett that it takes 20 years to build a reputation but five minutes to lose it. We owe a debt to the industry to make sure that it operates with the highest possible standards. One way of doing that is to support the amendments that my noble friend has put forward.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, my noble friend has expressed the position far more precisely than me. I underline her comments. I will not pursue the point today but I ask the department to reflect on it and on how it will justify to the public that there should be a lower level of potential redress in the energy sector than there is in the financial services sector. I just ask that question.
In relation to collective redress, I believe that the Government, the Minister for Consumer Affairs and the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, who is replying for her department, have moved some way to recognise the need for consumer redress to be dealt with on a collective basis on occasion. It is particularly important that that is provided for in the regulated sectors. The amendment that I am proposing would allow the Minister to come forward with a whole range of potential forms of collective redress. Most of those would be less expensive than individuals taking cases themselves and would take less time. They could, indeed, be pursued by intermediaries, but the aggregate cost to consumers and the industry would be significantly less than if every single consumer, or even 10% of consumers, started to take individual cases through the courts, with each one taking time to reach a conclusion. I cannot see that collective redress is ever going to be more time-consuming and costly than having a range of thousands of individual redress cases, whether they are taken through the ombudsman, the economic regulator or the courts.