Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Wasserman Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wasserman (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by drawing attention to my interests in policing, as set out in the register of Members’ interests. Some of those are straightforwardly commercial; others, such as my work with the Police Federation of England and Wales, which is relevant to the Bill, are non-remunerated.

I am delighted to see that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has been able to take time from his police and crime commissioner duties in Leicestershire to participate in this debate. The noble Lord is the first Member of your Lordships’ House to become a PCC. I wish him well and hope he will be followed by many more noble Lords in due course.

Much of the Bill before your Lordships’ House this afternoon may be seen as simply the sequel to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. I refer, of course, to the clauses which extend the powers of police and crime commissioners, introduced under that Act, and make a number of other useful changes to the legislation under which PCCs operate. As a strong believer in PCCs, I welcome these provisions and hope they will not be too severely mauled in Committee.

As those noble Lords who participated in the debates preceding the passage of the 2011 Act will recall, a good deal of heat was generated at the time by the proposal to replace police authorities with directly elected police and crime commissioners. Re-reading some of those debates the other day, I was struck by the vehemence with which the idea of PCCs was condemned in this House, including by members of the party which at that time was sitting on this side as a member of the coalition Government. Much water has flowed under many bridges since then.

It is fair to say that, today, the introduction of PCCs, although not yet accepted by everyone as a roaring success, is generally seen as having been a positive change in how local policing services are delivered. In particular, it is generally agreed that PCCs have brought the police much closer to the communities they serve; brought a much more holistic approach to crime reduction; encouraged innovation in operational policing and the management of police forces, with the collaboration between forces and joint working with the other emergency services, both facilitated by the provisions of this Bill, being examples of this; and encouraged much more accountability for police expenditure and better value for money.

PCCs have achieved all this while presiding over a significant fall in most types of crime across England and Wales. I say “presided” because I believe that the real credit for the reduction in crime goes not to them but to the men and women of our police forces who actually do the crime fighting. PCCs of course play a part in reducing crime, and it is a very important part. Their role is to make their police forces more efficient and effective by providing them with adequate resources, clear strategic direction and political leadership. However, the real work is done by their police officers, police staff, specials and other volunteers. It is they who deserve the real credit. These are the men and women who, as we will have seen in reports from the United States in recent days and weeks, put their lives on the line for us every day, placing themselves in harm’s way to keep us safe.

In so far as the Bill, in Part 1, makes PCCs more effective by encouraging them to work more closely with the other emergency services and gives them powers to take responsibility for the fire and rescue service in their areas, I commend it. I can see no sensible argument for preventing these services coming together to save money and serve the public better, provided, of course, that the proposal comes from the local community to the centre and not the other way round.

I commend the Bill also for its support for the National Crime Agency. The NCA is, without doubt, one of the most important achievements of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister during her period in the Home Office. In 2010, when she took charge in the Home Office, local policing in England and Wales was governed largely by bureaucrats in Whitehall, while national policing—that is, fighting serious and organised crime that crossed local boundaries—was the responsibility of local chief constables acting together in ad hoc arrangements managed by ACPO. My right honourable friend understood the absurdity of this arrangement and turned it on its head. She gave responsibility for local policing to local people and responsibility for tackling national threats to a new NCA reporting directly to her and, through her, to Parliament. The provisions in Part 9 of the Bill, although hardly earth-shaking, are welcome, because they facilitate the work of the NCA in a number of important ways and will thus make it even more effective in keeping us safe.

I also welcome the provisions in Part 2 dealing with complaints, the work of the IPCC and police discipline. In 2011, when your Lordships debated the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, police complaints and discipline were nothing like the hot topics they are now. In those debates, one speaker after another was at pains to point out that our police forces were the best in the world, including when it came to integrity, and that any change to the arrangements for governing them was bound to make things worse. To make this point, many speakers referred to America. There, they claimed, elected mayors tolerated, if not encouraged, corrupt police chiefs in an unholy symbiotic relationship which the introduction of PCCs would encourage here.

How things have changed since those days. The Hillsborough verdict was simply the most recent of the many revelations during the past five years which have shocked us all out of our complacency about the state of police integrity. The provisions in Part 2 propose changes to the way in which the IPCC operates and the arrangements for dealing with police discipline. These changes reflect the present view that our police are no better than other professionals when it comes to integrity and the handling of complaints, and tough arrangements are needed to encourage best practice and ensure the highest standards of behaviour in public office.

I want to welcome Clause 38 in Part 3, which deals with defensive sprays, already mentioned and a key element in the police’s armoury of less-than-lethal weapons. The clause gives special constables as well as police civilian volunteers unambiguous authority to carry and deploy defensive sprays such as CS and pepper spray. Thanks to the encouragement of PCCs across the country, volunteers and special constables now play a key role in keeping their communities safe. This clause provides these public-spirited men and women with much-needed protection.

There is another short clause to which I want to draw your Lordships’ attention. This one has me a little worried. I refer to Clause 48 in Chapter 2 of Part 3, dealing with police workforce and representative institutions. As I mentioned, I have been advising the Police Federation of England and Wales for the past few years, but I make it clear that what I am about to say is not prompted by the federation; indeed, it is not even supported by the leadership of that organisation.

My concerns stem from my experience as a civil servant trying to make practical administrative sense of legislative provisions which are not always as clear as they might be. Clause 48 places a duty on the Police Federation, in fulfilling its core purpose, to act to “protect the public interest” as well as to,

“maintain high standards of conduct, and … maintain high standards of transparency”.

The core interest of the federation is set out in primary legislation—the Police Act 1919. It is to,

“consider and bring to the notice of the police authorities and the Secretary of State all matters affecting … welfare and efficiency”,

of members of the police forces of England and Wales.

The Bill does not change the purposes of the Police Federation; it simply states that, in carrying out those purposes, the federation must “protect the public interest”. That sounds simple and sensible enough. However, it is not only vague and unhelpful but potentially dangerous, as it could be used by the federation to justify an extension of its remit into matters that are more properly the responsibilities of PCCs, chief officers or the Secretary of State.

This is not the time to go into great detail about the origin of this subsection except to say that it is a recommendation of the independent panel under Sir David Normington, which the federation itself set up in 2015 to review its workings. Normington was concerned to improve the federation’s image and the confidence which the public did or, more commonly, did not have in it. His report therefore recommended:

“The Federation should adopt … a revised core purpose which reflects the Police Federation’s commitment to act in the public interest, with public accountability, alongside its accountability to its members. This should be incorporated in legislation”.

That is the origin of Clause 48.

Looking at the words in the clause, I have no problem with the requirement that the federation should act to maintain high standards of conduct and maintain high standards of transparency. But for the reasons that I have already stated, I have difficulty with the proposal that it should “protect the public interest”. The federation is, at bottom, a staff association and its job is to represent its members. It is clearly in the public interest that it should do so effectively—that is why it was established—and it is clearly in its own interests that it should act, in Normington’s words, to maintain exemplary standards of conduct, integrity and professionalism and retain public confidence. But I do not understand how the federation is to act “to protect the public interest”. This may seem a trivial point and I do not want to say any more about it today, but the wording of this subsection would benefit from further consideration. Perhaps my noble and learned friend the Minister can help me, either when he replies to this debate or at a later stage in consideration of the Bill.

I have spoken so far about provisions that are set out in this Bill. I shall now speak briefly about a provision that is conspicuous by its absence—a provision to give electors a power of recall for PCCs who are clearly failing to perform their duties adequately. This failure to perform may be due to any number of reasons—personal or even medical. The bottom line, however, is that the electorate should not have to wait for up to five years to put things right. I appreciate that this is tricky territory which would need very careful drafting. I know that a power of recall was considered when the idea of PCCs was first being developed, but was rejected because it was felt that it would not command sufficient parliamentary support, particularly in another place. This is something that will need to be considered at some time in the future, whether at a later stage of our consideration of this Bill or in the next policing Bill, which I am sure will not be very long in coming. Having said that, I welcome the Bill.