Brexit: Import of Radioisotopes

Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Tebbit

Thursday 7th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tebbit (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Warner (CB)]

My Lords—

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Tebbit

Friday 16th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Warner]

My Lords, I want to pursue the line of argument that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has started. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that this is an important group of amendments. The noble Baroness has raised the issues of practicality and, possibly, unexpected consequences of some of the amendments.

I want to reinforce the point about the impracticability of Amendment 13. It fails to reflect the fact that in many cases of terminal illness a person will move from the place where the illness was diagnosed and the care of their consultant and GP to somewhere else. We have a National Health Service. You still get treatment if you move from A to B; medical records pass from A to B most of the time, reasonably successfully. The care of that person will be transferred to another GP and another medical practitioner. They may well not have had care of that person for six months. It may simply be impossible to operate Amendment 13 in the case of people who are terminally ill. We need to reflect on the practicality of that argument. I do not believe that the noble Lord expected that consequence from his amendments. That was the point that I was going to ask him about if I had been able to intervene a little earlier. I am happy to give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Tebbit]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but does he understand the concern that exists among many of us who saw that there were doctors who would certify that a woman’s health was at risk should her pregnancy continue who had never seen the woman concerned, who were pre-signing packs of such certificates to be used by their friends in the abortion business? How do we deal with that matter?

[Lord Warner]

The amendments would not deal with that matter. They would in many cases make it impossible for a terminally ill person who wanted to explore the issue of assisted dying to meet the requirements to have those conversations—let alone anything else—with a medical practitioner who was responsible for their care when they had moved house. I am not trying to make a wider point. I am on the narrow issue of the words in the amendments. I am with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, all the way on the impracticability of Amendment 13.

I move on to Amendments 20, 21 and 22 in this group. No one who supports the Bill is arguing that we expect doctors to have the gift of foresight about the length of time that someone will live for. I point out that the Bill uses a period which is commonly used in many other areas of public policy, not least in the area of welfare. If noble Lords read Section 82 of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, they will find a definition of terminal illness that is being applied by doctors day in and day out up and down the country—for those who are nerdy in these matters, it is on form DS 1500—to secure improvements in benefits because the person is terminally ill. Parliament, in the past couple of years, has passed legislation which sets out the terms of terminal illness, and doctors up and down the country are applying that legislation for the benefit of people with disabilities. The idea that the Bill is doing something different and novel in this area is, frankly, not true.

I also ask noble Lords to read the GMC guidance for doctors on issues such as end-of-life care and consent. In its admirable guidance, it is clear that there is a reasonable expectation that when a doctor thinks that someone may be terminally ill and may die before the end of 12 months, they may begin conversations with people. It is not unethical, it is not bad medical practice, where a doctor believes that someone may be terminally ill, not to do anything dramatic, but to begin to have a conversation with that person and their family. If you make it a shorter time for the person to have such conversations—six weeks, for example—all you are doing is putting enormous pressure on somebody who has had to come to terms with some catastrophic information about their life and circumstances. It would be inhumane, unfair and lacking in compassion to shorten the timescale within which doctors and their patients could have the conversations that they need to have.

I believe that the balance is struck right with the six-month term. In the United States, where assisted dying is legal, the bar has been set at six months and there is strong evidence to demonstrate that the model there works effectively and safely. Some very interesting work was done by a surgeon and public health researcher, Atul Gawande, who explains in his recent book Being Mortal: Medicine and What Matters in the End that survival statistics form a bell-shaped curve in which there are a small number of people who survive much longer than expected—the tail of the curve. He says:

“We have failed to prepare for the outcome that’s vastly more probable … we’ve built our medical system and culture around the long tail”,

of small numbers of cases. His view is supported by a number of pieces of research. I shall quote one that shows that fewer than one in four patients outlived the prognosis when their clinicians predicted survival for six months or less. In the great majority of cases, you could argue that the doctors have been optimistic about survivability rather than the other way around. Therefore, I think that my noble friend has struck the right balance in this area.

I shall mention one other bit of GMC advice, which relates to Amendment 20. The GMC is very clear to doctors, beyond doubt or peradventure, about the issue of patient consent. In my view, the amendment would be a breach of that advice. The advice is clear that even if the doctor disagrees with the patient’s decision their right to refuse a course of treatment is absolute and doctors are expected to respect that right. Following the GMC’s advice, I suggest that putting another impediment on doctors, as that amendment would, would be unfair to doctors.