Care Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Warner
My Lords, I also thank the Minister for his persistence within Whitehall in actually getting progress in this area. I think we all feel that he has put a lot of personal effort into it and deserves a great deal of credit.
If I may, I will ask a couple of slightly nerdy questions. I think that the issue of where this stands in the pecking order is vital. Is it down at NVQ levels 1 and 2? Is it up at level 3? How far away is it from the degree-level professional qualifications? In some ways, the title that has been given to this rather diminishes its standing up the food chain, so to speak. A certificate of fundamental care sounds a bit basic, and I am not quite sure what signals are given about the level that Health Education England should strive for in overseeing this particular work. A lot more work needs to be done on that.
Perhaps I may also pick up the point that my noble friend Lord Hunt hinted at. At the end of the day, if employers are to make this operate, they need some kind of register of who has the certificate. They also need to know what happens when they fire somebody and take disciplinary action against someone who has this certificate. Who do they tell? That seems a quite critical issue, because this is a very large workforce and it would be quite surprising if each year we did not get a steady flow of bad cases where an employer has fired someone for a breach of good practice of one kind or another. This would all be set to nought if there was no record of where these cases of disciplinary action have been taken, and people with a certificate were still floating around the system when they have actually been released by an employer for poor practice.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 158. I also thank the Minister for pulling a rabbit out of the hat, so to speak. However, I am not as gobsmacked as the noble Lord, Lord Willis of Knaresborough, because I have lost count of the number of times and days in this Chamber that we have debated the need for training healthcare support workers. I am at least glad that it has now paid some dividends.
I am also glad that the noble Earl said that Health Education England would take the lead on this, and will involve the NMC in devising the standardised training programmes, because it has the expertise to do it. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and others that this inevitably means there will need to be some sanctions for those who do not fulfil the requirements for training and therefore fail to be regulated. I am not sure whether that is for this Bill or subsequently, but it will inevitably lead to that. However, I thank the noble Earl for his amendment.
Care Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Patel
My Lords, I rise to speak to this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Willis of Knaresborough, with some trepidation. It is not because I do not strongly support his amendment, but because I hope that I can do justice to it with the kind of passion that he would have demonstrated when presenting the argument if he had been here. However, I have no doubt that while resting in his bed, he has probably turned on BBC Parliament and is watching to see that I do the task adequately.
I think the reason why the noble Lord, Lord Willis, has demonstrated such passion is because he recognises that there is a need to reduce bureaucracy. Too many regulatory bodies mean more bureaucracy. To give an example, we have the second-highest number of competent authorities in the EU. Joint highest are Poland, Romania and Italy. However, on top of that, we have more regulatory authorities—over a dozen—than any other EU country. I see noble Lords look rather surprised, but I believe that to be true.
One issue is reducing unnecessary regulatory bodies. Another issue is reducing bureaucracy. The third issue is reducing duplication. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s key role is to improve clinical services related to patients with fertility problems. The key reason that the authority was set up, following the birth of Louise Brown, was to reduce public anxiety about in vitro fertilisation. No such public anxiety now exists related to in vitro fertilisation.
Further functions were added to that authority in terms of embryo research. There may still be a need for that, but a reducing one. To give an example, we have enough clinical grade embryonic stem cell lines to last us a century and supply the world. I think the derivation of more embryonic stem cell lines is probably unlikely, unless there is some kind of major breakthrough. Research on embryos and embryonic stem cell lines is also now slightly superseded by induced pluripotent cells, dendritic cells and adult cells. However, I agree that there might still be a need for some embryo research and that function needs to remain.
The duplication is likely because the CQC will have a licensing role for those trusts that provide clinical services in infertility. Of course, I accept that the majority of infertility services relating to in vitro fertilisation—and I have no doubt that the noble Lord, Lord Winston, who is listening to me carefully, will correct me wherever I go wrong—are in the independent sector. Unless that service is provided for an NHS patient, the CQC does not have a role, and there must be a way of overcoming that. If we do not overcome that, the services provided within the NHS will run the risk of duplication of effort by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the CQC.
There is also a fourth argument, and that is the reduction of cost. The noble Lord, Lord Willis, wrote a letter to the Times asking why all these regulatory authorities have a whole army of communication officers. What do they communicate? Why do they need so many? The noble Lord referred to the cost, and there are also other back office costs that are increased unless we reduce the number of regulatory authorities. His proposal is that there should be a reduction and that a body called the Human Tissue and Embryo Authority should be established rather than the HTA and the HFEA. The noble Lord lists where the changes would be required in their functions and in subsection (15) sets out the role of the Care Quality Commission to streamline all these efforts and reduce costs.
It is interesting that initially, in an attempt to reduce the number of quangos, the Government in the Health and Social Care Act decided that the HFEA and the HTA, with other quangos, would be abolished. Now, with the high profile of patient safety, we wonder whether some of the others should have been abolished. If I remember correctly, we debated the HFEA and the HTA during the passage of the Health and Social Care Bill and, in fact, we had a Division on it.
However, the Government decided to go to consultation, and I understand that Justin McCracken has been commissioned to review the operating functions of the HFEA and the HTA to see how they might deliver greater efficiencies. I think that this amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Willis of Knaresborough, would deliver those efficiencies, and I should be interested to know whether the Minister agrees that this would be a better way forward in dealing with the Human Tissue Authority and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. I beg to move.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I rise because I gave an assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Willis, that I would speak on this amendment as I have form, as they say, in this area.
Ten or so years ago, when one person accused me of being rather like Vlad the Impaler and we were slaughtering, as well as merging, a number of quangos, two of the candidates for merger were the Human Tissue Authority and the HFEA. Much of the argument for doing that was very similar to the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Patel, has advanced, although I did not know as much then as I know now about the number of bodies that we had compared with other countries regulating in this area. However, I assure the Committee that we had a lot more in 2003-04. Therefore, there is a case for this merger, and it has been made.
By backing away from this merger in the face of the arguments that were put forward, I ceased to be Vlad the Impaler and became Warner the Wimp. To their credit, this Government decided to have another go, but they seemed to get themselves in roughly the same position as Warner the Wimp and withdrew. Really, they withdrew because at the end of the day the savings were—certainly so far as I was concerned—not significant compared with some of the other savings that could be made. However, we have grown to appreciate more the importance of health research and the role of the life sciences in our economy, and I think that there is still a case for going the extra mile, when you can, to streamline the regulatory system in this area.
I hope that the Government will look sympathetically on this amendment, even if they do not want to accept it in its present form. I hope that some of us speaking out on this in the review will give the Government some courage to be a bit braver than they were, and than I was, in the past. Therefore, I support the spirit and the ideas behind this amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(12 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Patel
My Lords, I wish to speak to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. Of course, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is attractive. It would give Public Health England independence as a special health authority. However, the Government are obviously not ready to accept that, otherwise why would they have abolished the HPA? We would be recreating the HPA if it were a special health authority.
However, I commend the Government on giving public health a high profile, indicating that they want Public Health England to be closely associated with, and be accountable to, the Secretary of State. Public Health England needs to be a body that is nationally and internationally recognised for the authoritative work that it does, as the HPA does now, for the advice that it can give and for attracting high-profile public health specialists. For that, it needs high-calibre leadership. An executive agency that does not have an independent chair or non-executives who will support a high-calibre chief executive will not be recognised or gain people’s confidence.
I have wondered where the model comes from and I think that I now know. I wonder whether the Secretary of State has made a trip to Atlanta, because the model is exactly like that of the CDC. The Centers for Disease Control is a federal executive agency. It has a board but it does not call itself that; it calls itself a committee of advisers. It has a high-profile chairman, and the other non-executives are also high profile. However, it is an independent body. It is able to give policy advice and is not restricted in doing so. However, that model does not quite fit in for England because, apart from being different, our system is different when it comes to having an independent chair with non-executives. Its function is advisory because it belongs to an executive agency and not a special health authority; otherwise its function would be different. That does not preclude Public Health England from having an independent chair, and I should like to hear why the department thinks that it does. I do not see that the accountability changes at all. Public Health England, being an executive agency, will still be accountable to the Secretary of State. In fact, that would strengthen it.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that executive agencies are constitutionally part of their parent body, and those employed within them are governed by the Civil Service code of conduct. This includes rules and restrictions on what they may say in public, including before Select Committees, about government policy. I think that an independent chair helps to mitigate this. Because of the critical role that Public Health England will have, this will be important. If it is to be an executive agency, it is vital, for the sake of public trust and confidence, that the Government ensure that the arrangements for the new body provide it with a sufficient guarantee of its independence. Only through being perceived to be independent of government will Public Health England establish a reputation for independent, evidence-based and, above all, trusted expertise.
The model of a single independent organisation employing a large number of public health specialists is an attractive one—one which has worked to great effect, as in the case of the Health Protection Agency. We have an agency that is partly independent: the MHRA. The MHRA has an independent chair, it is accountable to the Secretary of State and it gives policy advice. Perhaps the mechanisms for delivering that policy are different, so that it can be managed without breaking any rules. I do not agree that there are EU rules that forbid it to bid for external funds. I would like to hear which EU rules those are. There are mechanisms for getting external funds through a different arrangement, but that does not forbid it to access external funds.
The HPA has built up an international reputation. Its expertise in carrying out contract research is such that it attracts half its current budget from external funding. Are we going to allow a system based on somebody’s whim to end all that? If we are, we will have to ask ourselves a question. Do we want a structure that seems closer to the Civil Service and to politicians but that weakens an internationally recognised body which is powerful and able to deliver the high-profile agenda which the Government have set for Public Health England? We need to examine that. I feel that there is room for discussion so we can arrive at a compromise solution that will achieve all this.
The amendment addresses other issues to which the noble Baroness has already referred, including independent research, published researched findings et cetera, all of which should be possible for Public Health England, as an agency of the department, to accomplish. I hope that the Ministers and the noble Baroness will consider these suggestions. Let us give this serious thought. Let us not reject it out of hand simply because, at half past 10 at night, we do not have time.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I rise because I have added my name to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. I did so because there is a part of me which actually wants to save the Health Secretary from himself. He is going down a path—for good reasons, in some ways—by which he wants to be accountable, through the department, for public health in this country. I understand that, and I understand some of the arguments that the Government have put forward about ministerial responsibility and accountability which were at the heart of some of the thinking behind the Public Bodies Bill. I can understand why that will happen. However, this is an area where science is of the essence. The Secretary of State and the Department of Health’s management and credibility in public health would be seriously damaged if the scientific underpinning of it were not sound.
The CDC in America—and I have been to the CDC in my visits to America—is an executive agency but it is a very special executive agency. It has a route into Congress to secure its funding. That makes it very different from executive agencies in this country. It has that route into Congress because it has a very strong scientific reputation. It is the credibility of its scientific reputation that enables it to be both independent and a part of the federal Government.
We cannot create that quite as easily with an executive agency here. I believe that the Government made a mistake, almost in a casual way, by abolishing the Health Protection Agency without being sure that they had another model to put in its place that would preserve that scientific independence and the kind of funding that the HPA was able to raise. We do not live in such splendid financial circumstances that we can casually toss away £150 million a year—which is the danger that we are in. I have not yet heard assurances from the Government about how they will protect access to that funding, and how they will protect the ability of people working in Public Health England to undertake independent research and be sure that their findings will be published without being censored in any way. We need absolute guarantees on that, and they should be in the Bill. That is why the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, is so convincing. I would prefer to have a special health authority, if we thought we could get one. We have compromised by going for an executive agency. However, the agency must have the kind of dimensions that are set out in Amendment 162.
I will say a few words about the issue of the chair. I heard the story that the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, mentioned—namely, that the Secretary of State would be interested in the Chief Medical Officer being the chair of the committee overseeing the work of Public Health England. I am a member of the Science and Technology Committee. In two inquiries we came up against the issue that in the Department of Health, uniquely across Whitehall, we have a Chief Medical Officer who is also the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government. Both jobs seem capable of keeping someone gainfully and happily occupied full-time for most weeks of most years. Adding the chairmanship of Public Health England would be an incredible proposition. There are already concerns in the Science and Technology Committee about combining the posts of CMO and Chief Scientific Adviser. There is an unresolved issue about how we will proceed on that. However talented Dame Sally Davies is, we do not want to muddy the waters further by asking her to take on the chairmanship of Public Health England.
We need to get to the bottom of the guarantees that are required to preserve the integrity, scientific independence and public credibility of Public Health England. If we are to have an executive agency, we need something very like what is proposed in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. I hope that the Government will accept it and give us some certainty that the money that the HPA has raised in the past will be guaranteed as something that the new executive agency, Public Health England, will also be able to secure.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(12 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Warner
My Lords, briefly, Amendment 342 is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, who will speak to Amendment 343, which I also support and to which I have added my name.
Amendment 342 was prompted by the rather slow progress that seems to have been made so far on developing clinical quality standards. I accept that these are very important, so there is nothing between me and the Government on the virtue and value of those standards. However, the rate of progress seems to be about five a year, on the information that I have managed to obtain, and at the present rate of progress it looks to be well over a decade before the exercise is completed—and then, I suspect, the whole process will have to start again because standards are likely to be out of date, and science and clinical practice will have changed. This exercise could become rather like painting the Forth Bridge.
I am all in favour of taking care in the preparation of clinical quality standards and of the need for proper consultation to ensure that a spectrum of expertise and discussion is brought to bear on each clinical quality standard. It is important to get clinical support for those standards, but in this area speed is also important if patient care is not to suffer. I wonder therefore whether the processes for preparing these standards do not need some review. It is possible that the resourcing of the work may need to receive some attention. In addition, I believe much work has been done in other jurisdictions—certainly, a lot has been done in the United States—and I wonder whether the Government and NICE could not draw on this work in an effort to speed things up.
To buck things up a bit, Amendment 342 requires the Secretary of State to “agree with NICE” an annual,
“programme of clinical quality standards to be completed or revised”,
in that year. This should ensure that the process and resourcing are kept under review and that faster progress is made. These clinical quality standards are critical to delivering improved quality and efficiency in the NHS at a time of great financial challenge and rapid clinical and scientific advance. We need to press on with their preparation and to ensure that the Secretary of State and NICE give proper priority to this issue. I hope the Minister can agree that an amendment of this kind will help to achieve this. I beg to move.
Lord Patel
My Lords, briefly, I support this amendment and Amendment 343, which has been tabled in my name. Although the amendments refer to “clinical quality standards”, I am well aware that the Bill itself refers to them as “quality standards”. It was I and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, who suggested in previous amendments that “clinical” should be introduced, but I recognise of course that these quality standards will concern not only clinical but social care, and there should therefore be a reference to clinical and social care.
I have also made the point before that these standards ought to cover the patient’s journey of care, which goes from diagnosis through primary, secondary and tertiary care and on to social care.
I believe that I know something about clinical quality standards, and while the noble Lord, Lord Warner, referred to standards written in the United States, closer to home there have also been hundreds of standards written over the past eight years. I bet your Lordships now that the methodology that will be used by NICE will be exactly identical, but that is an argument which I will have with the chairman or chief executive of NICE—no doubt over a dinner some time.
What is important about these standards is that they are evidence-based so that it is possible to defend them, just as technological appraisals are evidence based and therefore possible to defend. The evidence that we are looking for is that which will deliver the best outcome for the patient, in terms of safety of treatment, diagnosis, patient experience and outcomes in terms of diseases.
It is also important that they should stand the test of time—that they are written and based on evidence that is tested over time, so that they do not have to change every three months and have people complaining that treatment has moved on. Experience has taught us that it is possible to write those kinds of quality standards, which stand the test of time but, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, they are time consuming to create and therefore they have to be resourced. If you are creating standards for over a patient’s journey of care, it will require several months and expertise to do so. If you intend to have more than five or six standards a year, you require to resource them fully.
Another important issue is that standards have to be tested before they are finalised so that, just as with the technological appraisal of drugs, you do not get complaints from clinicians or anyone else. I can tell noble Lords that doctors are very good at complaining afterwards if they are not consulted. There have to be consultations with both clinicians and the public so that they will feel happier that the standards are evidence-based and will deliver the outcomes that we expect.
A third important aspect is that the standards should be easily understood. I was clear when I did the job that every one of the standards written should get a crystal mark, so that they were written in a language that people could understand. If we are going to evolve and develop information standards, a further value is that each of the quality standards is an opportunity to inform the patient about what they should know about their disease and its treatment. There can be simply written questions that the patients or relatives can use to ask about the problem in question. That gives us an opportunity to use the standards not only to manage the care of the patient but to inform the public and the patients about their disease. That way, you make the public better informed and able to demand the kind of quality care that they should get, so the systems will be operating in a way that delivers care.
My Amendment 343 says that standards should also cover long-term conditions. To me, that deals with the problem of complex long-term diseases, which need to be managed in both the acute sector and the primary or community sector. The standards should therefore be written as a patient journey of care over a longer period of time. Those are the quality standards that we should be embarking on and the numbers that we should provide for.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(12 years, 12 months ago)
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Lord Warner
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendments 129 and 129A in the group. First, I will take up the point made by my noble friend Lady Thornton about the long-standing problem of the slowness of the NHS to take up innovative ideas, and the frustration often felt by people in this country who have invented new approaches and created new innovations, only to find that they have had to go abroad to get them projected, promoted and sold, with the NHS being one of the last to take up the innovation, which was often funded in one form or another with public money by the British taxpayer. It is a long-standing problem and not a party-political issue; it has been a challenge for successive Governments. One of the most embarrassing moments one has as a Minister is when one meets foreign delegations or travels abroad to back Britain and is asked, “Has this innovation been taken up in the NHS?”, whereupon one has to shuffle one’s feet and think of a suitably weaselly form of words to avoid answering the question directly. It is a very long-standing and difficult issue.
Amendment 129 draws attention to the importance of the procurement of goods and services in the promotion of innovation, and to the duty that that places on the national Commissioning Board. There are many reports about the importance of public procurement in advancing innovation and in ensuring the take-up of UK inventions and innovative practices. The latest one was by the Science and Technology Committee of your Lordships' House, of which I was a member. The report brought out some of the dilemmas around using procurement to take forward innovation. Yet again it cast doubt on central government's use of their purchasing power and muscle to drive the take-up of UK innovations in public services.
The NHS is not alone in having this problem, but it is part of the problem and it is a big part of the public sector. A major and long-standing problem is that too many purchasing decisions are taken too far down the organisational food chain, with too little intervention at senior level and too little willingness to use large-scale purchasing to spread the use of innovative approaches. Whatever else the national Commissioning Board has, it has a lot of financial muscle. It must use that, through the NHS’s purchasing capacity, to drive innovation, which often comes from publicly funded research. I hope that the Minister, who is well aware of the issue, will see the sense in putting something like Amendment 129 in the Bill. We cannot say too often that public procurement is a way of helping to establish and drive innovation in the NHS.
Amendment 129A seeks to add the idea of an innovation fund to the board's armoury on innovation in new Section 13K. There is nothing novel in this. The amendment continues and builds on the proposals of my noble friend Lord Darzi, which led to regional innovation funds that strategic health authorities currently manage. Again, we need to strengthen the mechanisms in the Bill for driving innovation in an NHS that historically has been slow to take up innovations and apply them to scale for the benefit of patients. We are not talking about huge sums of money in the innovation fund, but relatively modest amounts in relation to the scale of NHS expenditure. However, an amendment of this kind would ensure the continuance of the useful work that has been started by the strategic health authorities following the promptings of my noble friend Lord Darzi.
It is typical of what we sometimes do in this country. We start an initiative with a fund at strategic health authority level and then shuffle the cards so that somehow, along the way, some of the initiatives and their benefits get lost. I hope that we can get some reassurance from the Minister that some kind of innovation fund will be available so that we can continue the work that my noble friend Lord Darzi so ably started to ensure that patients can secure the benefits of UK innovations.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, to which I have added my name.
First, I will speak very briefly about innovation and procurement. I also contributed to the report by the Science and Technology Committee on procurement. The public sector could learn a lot from the private sector about using procurement to drive innovation. Perhaps the Minister can comment on this. The NHS is a huge organisation that uses about £20 billion-worth of procurement a year and if that was done in a co-ordinated way, it could drive an immense amount of innovation within the NHS.
My second point is about how to drive innovation into clinical care. There are lots of examples I could give, but I will give one from my own specialty. It took us 20 years to take the learning from research into the kind of treatment to be given to the mother in premature labour that would considerably reduce the incidence of respiratory distress syndrome, which causes a lot of harm and death in neonates, and embed that into practice. There are lots of examples of such innovations not being embedded into the NHS and we need to look at ways of doing that faster.
My third point is how to use tariffs to drive innovation. If I as a provider will not be given a higher tariff if I drive innovation or innovate a different way of providing the service, and all that will happen is that the tariff for procuring my services as a provider will be less the following year, there is less incentive for me to use innovation in clinical care to improve patient care and also to make it cheaper.
The fourth issue is about an innovation fund, which I support. Together with the Wellcome Trust, the Government have an innovation challenge fund that asks for tenders in particular areas of innovation. The one I know about is in reducing infection rates. Innovation funds of this kind will drive further innovation; for example, in the United States Medicaid and Medicare have a joint innovation fund to drive improvements in healthcare. So I support that amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(13 years ago)
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Lord Warner
My Lords, I apologise as I seem to have a series of amendments to this part of the Bill with my name on them. Amendment 103 is the first amendment in this group in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. It brings us to the first of what I suspect will be a number of debates on the complex and difficult issue of a national tariff and the need to use that tariff to ensure the most appropriate forms of care and care pathways for patients.
This is a time for confessions. The current tariff system, which I am afraid I was deeply involved in implementing to scale seven years ago, was designed for a different era when there was considerable financial growth and we were trying to drive acute hospitals to increase capacity to dramatically reduce waiting times for treatment. Those long waiting times, which had been a feature of the NHS for a long period, were the part of the NHS that led to the most complaints being made. They were the issue to which any Government needed to pay attention. The tariff was one of the ways of helping to progress that. The other was, of course, the much maligned targets, which we need not go into at this point.
In some ways, the current tariff has been too successful. It has helped to create overcapacity in in-patient hospital provision and has propped up poor and unsustainable hospital provision in some parts of the country. The current tariff does not promote well co-ordinated, integrated care for people with long-term conditions, which is the bulk of the NHS’s workload, given our demographic profile and some of our lifestyle choices. A significant proportion of services, particularly mental health and community services, are simply not covered by the national tariff and are often still dealt with on the basis of block grants. In 2012-13, the plan is to focus mainly on developing currencies rather than mandatory tariffs. This means that the majority of non-acute services will remain outside the national tariff. What is more worrying is the fact that the continuation of an acute hospital-dominated tariff based on episodes of care without any counterbalance risks these hospital trusts sucking in a disproportionately large amount of our NHS budget, which is shrinking in real terms. This is not a jibe at the Government except to say that they should stop pretending that the NHS can continue with real-terms growth and deliver the Nicholson challenge, as should any political party, including my own.
Tariff-setting is a technically complex business. There are plans to expand it into fields such as mental health where there is no international track record of success in doing that. There are no quick fixes, particularly if there are insufficient people working on a new tariff system. Tariff-setting relies totally on a good understanding of costs, an area where the NHS does not have great strengths, as I think we have just discussed. The current reference cost system has considerable shortcomings and excludes independent sector providers. Most of the rhetoric on price competition is just that—rhetoric—because reliable data to make price competition work effectively within the NHS are usually absent, so we are having a row about something that we probably could not deliver anyway.
The best that this Bill can do is to try to set a direction for future tariff design. The elements of that design should be fourfold. First, it should enable integrated care, not just within the NHS but across the health/social care boundary. This almost certainly means moving away from the tariff based on episodes of care to a year-of-care approach for long-term conditions, or a bundling of the services across care pathways. Secondly, a future tariff system should not be based on average cost, as now, but on best practice for particular conditions. Thirdly, the currencies in a new national tariff should cover the full range of services, not just acute care, which needs to diminish its dominance of the tariff. Fourthly, it should cover unavoidable costs and avoid windfall profits to providers. Unless we start designing a tariff system around those ideas, we will not progress towards a new NHS.
It will take at least three or four years at best to complete a national tariff covering a full range of services. However, I believe that we should set a clear direction of travel for the national Commissioning Board in the Bill. Given the responsibility of commissioners for demand management, it is right that if we are to have a national Commissioning Board it should set the currencies for a new tariff system. That is why Amendment 103 seeks to place the duty on the board to progress this work and to create some momentum by securing annual increments of progress. We can discuss later whether the board should also price the currencies rather than Monitor, but that is a subject for a debate on another day.
In the mean time, I wish to speak in support of Amendment 290 in my name and others in this group of amendments. This amendment would enable whoever is setting the prices in the tariff—currently Monitor in the Bill—to pay incentives to providers to integrate the delivery of health and social care services to individuals. It seems to me that we use the word “integration” without realising that it probably requires someone to do a bit more work than they are doing now to integrate the services, and that has a cost. This should be recognised in setting the tariff for the future so that service providers can be encouraged to take on the difficult job of integration without losing money in doing so. I hope that the Minister will see merit in these amendments and, indeed, others in the group, which move in a similar direction to mine. We need to set the agenda for the board in taking this difficult area of tariff work forward. I beg to move.
Lord Patel
My Lords, my name is added to Amendment 103 and other amendments in the group. Amendment 197E, which is a new amendment relating to commissioning, also stands in my name. Some of the points that I will make are similar to those made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, but I have a slightly different way of looking at tariffs. I see them more from a clinical or patient care pathway point of view than that of integrating services. It is true that tackling the financial physiology of the NHS is critical to enabling the more influential and focused commissioning of integrated care. The payment by results tariff was designed by the previous Government to support the introduction of choice and competition, and specifically to create incentives for providers to increase elective activity to bring down waiting times for treatment and reward them for work undertaken. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has just said, that has been a bonanza for some of the acute trusts.
The tariff has played its part in that process with the consequence that access to planned care has improved significantly. Progress in elective care has enabled—or should enable—attention to turn to other priorities, such as providing high-quality care for people with long-term conditions where continuity and co-ordination are key objectives alongside access. This includes shifting unplanned care from secondary to primary care settings, where this will help deliver improvements in efficiency.
As currently designed and operated, payment by results does not appear to be well suited to support the implementation of these priorities, and there is a need to develop incentives that will facilitate integrated care for people with long-term conditions and for other services where this approach is likely to bring benefits. Experience in the United States offers valuable learning in this regard, but it is not the only place, particularly in the development of new forms of payment that go beyond fee for service and case-based reimbursement.
The idea behind episode-based payments—something that my noble friend Lord Warner also referred to—is to remove incentives to deliver increasing volumes of care by bundling together payments for a range of services relating to a particular episode of treatment. One example from the United States is the ProvenCare programme of the Geisinger health system under which a global fee covers the entire cost of cardiac care from pre-admission and surgery to follow-up for up to 90 days after surgery. Episode-based payments are designed in part to improve the quality of care by placing the responsibility on providers for avoiding and correcting errors. You do not get paid if you make a mistake and it takes the patient longer to recover. This encourages care to be done right the first time, and hence offers a more co-ordinated and positive experience for patients.
Capitation payments on the other hand go much further than episode-based payments in potentially covering all the costs of care for a defined population over a certain time period—a year, for example. Integrated healthcare systems such as Kaiser Permanente in California have pioneered the use of capitation funding—or pre-paid group practice as it was originally known—as a way of creating incentives to support prevention and primary care and to avoid the inappropriate use of specialist care. Kaiser Permanente sees acute care as a cost centre, but it sees community care and primary care, particularly for long-term conditions, as where the costs should be maintained and the quality driven. It monitors the performance of the providers of that care more intensively on a one-to-one basis than it does for acute care.
Although capitation funding has a long history, there has been renewed interest in it. In the NHS, various options could be pursued. These include combining payments to cover an episode of care or a care pathway, taking forward the idea of the year of care that has been tested in three national pilots for diabetes—I say this to the noble Baroness, Lady Young—and exploring how it might support integrated care; contracting with local clinical networks of primary and secondary care clinicians or foundation trusts to deliver integrated care for a specific population—some of the foundation trusts are experimenting with this and are quite innovative; and, lastly, accelerating work on personal health budgets to enable patients to commission care packages for themselves, with support from carers and families.
In practice, it is likely that all these options, and others, will have to play a part, and a period of active experimentation and evaluation is now needed to work through the consequences. All healthcare systems use a mix of payment systems related to the service that is provided, such as episodic or long-term, and where care is provided, such as primary or secondary care. The NHS is no exception and attention is needed for the way in which financial incentives can be developed to support integrated care where it will bring benefits to patients. The prospect of four years in which the NHS budget will only increase in line with inflation underlines the urgency associated with this work and the need to focus on improving the quality of care and not simply incentivising extra activity at a time when resources are not available to do this. As my noble friend Lord Warner said, it will require tariff flexibility, even tariff bonuses for providing care quicker and of a higher quality. What is needed is system leadership and innovation, which we expect the NHS Commission to deliver boldly, in tariffs for integrated care, with the explicit promotion of systems of integrated care.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(13 years ago)
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Lord Warner
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. The more the merrier, I say, on this theme and I hope that noble Lords will speak out about this issue in our debate today.
As I was saying, I am completely supportive of reducing or stopping ministerial and Department of Health micromanagement of the NHS, which, as I understand it, is the Government’s purpose in framing Clause 4. However, I struggle with reconciling the clause in its present form with the other duties and powers that the Secretary of State has taken unto himself in the Bill. I do not mean just the relationship between Clauses 1 and 4, which itself seems to have produced a hefty dose of confusion and uncertainty, not to mention, in the case of Clause 1, many attempts at drafting alternatives. How will Clause 4, for example, fit with Clause 3, which most of us in the previous session in Committee—except, perhaps the Minister—seemed to favour strengthening in terms of the duty on inequalities? How will it fit with Clauses 16 and 17, with their very extensive regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State, or indeed Clause 18 or Clause 20, which gives the Secretary of State extensive mandating powers, which seem to me to be rather stronger than the new chairman of the NHS Commissioning Board seems to think?
Many people who have looked at the Bill do not understand what the Secretary of State is trying to do in relation to the issue of central control, central powers and autonomy and delegation. Is he trying to let go or to tighten his grip? I do not see, at present, how the Government can retain in the Bill a clause as loosely drafted as Clause 4 and, at the same time, retain all the other powers of the Secretary of State that we will be discussing later. Apart from anything else, this is a recipe for confusion in the minds of many local decision-makers.
Are people to take Clause 4 as drafted at face value? If they do, will they not be wondering whether the Secretary of State or his henchmen and henchwomen in the Department of Health or the NHS Commissioning Board will come down on them like a ton of bricks using other powers in the Bill if they think that they are not acting in the interests of the NHS? What will the courts make of all this? If people do not like a decision taken higher up the line, as the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Foundation Trust is demonstrating now over paediatric surgery changes, do they seek judicial review of the central decisions, praying in aid Clause 4 as drafted? Will not Clause 4 in its present form simply encourage legal challenge and create local uncertainty?
I turn to the wording of the clause and why Amendment 37 is at least an improvement. It is an attempt to improve what is a highly defective clause. As I read Clause 4, it seems to place little inhibition on local decision-makers,
“exercising functions … or providing services”,
in any manner that they consider appropriate. If that means what it says in the dictionary, if people want, for example, to provide a wide range of alternative therapies for which there is no scientific evidence of clinical benefit, they can do so, praying in aid the powers under Clause 4. If they want to remove tattoos or do a bit of cosmetic surgery, I cannot see that there is very much to stop them. Under the clause as drafted, the Secretary of State can intervene only after the event. If he finds out what has been going on, he can, in effect, try to stop it happening again, but that is ex post facto. He cannot intervene earlier, as I understand the drafting of the clause. I am happy to be corrected by the noble Earl, but I am not the only one who thinks that these powers will have that effect.
Amendment 37 is an attempt to require those behaving autonomously locally to apply the test that their actions are in the interests of the NHS before they take their decisions rather than relying on the Secretary of State deciding that they were not in the interests of the NHS after the event. I see that my colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, is now with us. I suspect that we both agree that it is a far from perfect solution, but it is better than the way that the clause is currently drafted. I know that some noble Lords are very attached to the clause—like me, they are attached to the idea of autonomy—but I hope that they will consider whether in its present form it is really in the best interests of the NHS. I suggest that the Government rethink the form of Clause 4 if they want to proceed with it. As I see it, what would get nearer to their intentions but not create some of the loopholes that I have identified is a kind of drafting that gives a commitment that the Secretary of State would not exceed the powers provided elsewhere in the Bill, would impose only burdens that are totally consistent with those powers and would maximise operational freedoms for those delivering NHS services consistent with public accountability. That seems to me to be the direction in which the Government are trying to go, but the way the clause is drafted does not do that.
I would prefer the Minister to accept that the clause is seriously deficient and either abandon it altogether or take it away for a serious makeover. In the mean time, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and myself, I move Amendment 37, which goes a modest way to improve the shape and drafting of the clause. I beg to move.
Lord Patel
My Lords, first, I offer my sincere apologies to the House for being delayed. I was also thrown by the fact that that the first two amendments were not moved. I am sorry about that. I am grateful to my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Warner, for moving the amendment in my absence, and I join absolutely in his comments. I shall try to cover some other points. My name is also on the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and I support that too.
As I interpret it, under the clause, as long as the Secretary of State does not think that it is inconsistent with the interests of the NHS, he or she must act positively to allow any other person exercising health service functions to do so in a way that that person thinks appropriate. Although the Secretary of State keeps some form of oversight, it is the views of other persons and bodies delivering health services on how those services are to be delivered that are important.
This duty would therefore require the Secretary of State, when considering whether to place requirements on the NHS, to make a judgment. The challenge for the Secretary of State would be to justify why these requirements were necessary. Does this mean that the Secretary of State has the power to act only when the steps to be taken are really needed or essential, rather than because he or she thinks that something is desirable or appropriate? He or she would have to demonstrate why no other course of action will be followed. Is that a high test to meet on the part of the Secretary of State?
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Warner and Lord Patel(13 years ago)
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Lord Warner
My Lords, as they say in commercial television, welcome back after the break. In moving Amendment 12, I shall speak also to Amendments 16, 17, 182, 183 and 184 tabled in my name and those of other noble Lords. I have also added my name to Amendment 18 to which my noble friend Lord Rooker will speak—I hope. The theme of these amendments is that of giving greater prominence in the Bill to the issue of service integration not just within NHS services, but across the health and social care boundary. At the same time, I will try to give some clearer meaning to this term by offering a definition in Amendment 184. This is a very complex issue and it has not been helped, if I may say so, in some of the public discourse by the way that the term “integration” has been used in a wide variety of ways by different people.
I shall start with some remarks about integration and its relationship to competition, which has been the subject of quite a lot of debate around this Bill and NHS reform. In recent months, the term “integration” has been bandied about as a kind of panacea for the NHS in the challenges it faces, but with little clarity about what it means. The Future Forum put the issue of integration on the map in its report. Some of this affection for integration has grown because it has been seen as a useful term by opponents of competition. They have tried to make the argument stand up that somehow if you have integration of services, you cannot support competition because the two are incompatible. I do not believe that to be true. It is perfectly possible to have the right kind of integration within a competitive market. Kaiser Permanente, among others, has shown this to be the case in the United States. Indeed, it was the very competitiveness of that market which caused Kaiser to offer patients more clinical integration in order to survive and flourish in the marketplace. That integration was done on the basis of reducing the use of in-patient hospital services. It is worth noting that there are NHS-Kaiser Permanente partnerships in six areas of the NHS which are adapting lessons from Kaiser’s experience in the US to apply in this country.
Having got that off my chest, I turn now to the issue of how integration and competition can coexist and how we need to be clear on what we are talking about when we use the term “integration”. There is, I suggest, good and less good integration. Much so-called organisational integration is effectively mergers of providers with little benefit to patients and often involving a reduction in choice. We see this in integration horizontally across organisations of the same kind and vertically between community and hospital services. The former is often done to save costs and reduce competition, while the latter is too often a way of securing patients for in-patient services and maintaining hospital income. Some will disagree with that, but it is certainly a perspective we should think about. Organisational integrations of this kind have sometimes fallen foul of the competition and collaboration panel. They are to be viewed with a sceptical eye, although I accept that integrated commissioning can be a major benefit for patients.
The integration, however, that is likely to benefit patients the most, and the cost structure of the NHS the greatest, is integration that brings together the assessment and delivery of health and social care services at the point of assessment and delivery to the individual person. This is the type of integration we have attempted to define in Amendment 184. At a time when such a large part of the NHS’s work involves patients with long-term conditions, who often require social care as well as healthcare, this is the type of integration that NHS and social care organisations and personnel should be focused on, particularly those commissioning services. These commissioners need to look for a new breed of service integrators who can take responsibility for integrating services for individuals across the health and social care boundary or divide, depending on your perspective. The Conservative’s community care reforms of 20 years ago produced care managers as integrators of social care in a mixed economy of providers. We now need to apply the same thinking to the whole spectrum of health and social care, especially for those with long-term conditions.
None of this will be easy, but if the NHS is to meet the financial and other challenges it faces and reduce its dependence on expensive, often unsustainable and often inappropriate, acute hospital services, it must begin the process of improving service integration at the level of the individual and not just the organisation. It is important that we use the Bill to set a new direction of travel on service integration for both the NHS and the social care worlds. The word “integration” needs to move from a term of rhetorical flourish to a reality that benefits people at the local level.
Of course, simply putting words in a Bill will not on its own change things; they will need to be backed up by changes in the professional culture, the use of IT and the financial reimbursement system. Later in the Bill I shall move amendments to help integration in the areas of tariffs and the use and extension of an electronic patient record. In the mean time, I want to establish a bridgehead in the Bill with this group of amendments that give more prominence to integration and try to define it. My co-signatories will expand on some of the arguments.
I should make it clear that I do not regard the wording of these amendments as the last word on the subject. I am sure they could be improved and they may have consequences for other parts of this leviathan of a Bill that we have failed to spot. I also recognise that the Labour Government had integrated care organisation pilots and that the Department of Health and the King’s Fund are working on the issue of integrated care following the Future Forum report. It is no purpose of these amendments to pre-empt or damage that work. I and my co-signatories are seeking to establish today whether the Minister is up for amending the Bill to give more prominence, more precision and greater reality to the term “integration” to shape the future commissioning and provision of services in ways that will benefit patients. We will be glad to sit down with him and his officials to improve the wording of the amendments and their placement in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Patel
I support the amendments to which my name is attached. This is an important issue. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, mentioned, at some of the seminars we heard the word “integration” used in different forms with no clear definition of what it meant.
Future Forum, of course, put integrated care at the heart of NHS reform, but who will ensure that integrated care is not crowded out by the emphasis on competition and any qualified provider? What can clinical commissioning groups do to stimulate providers to work together to meet the needs of the patient?
As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, mentioned, integrated care takes many different forms and may involve whole populations; care for particular groups or people with the same diseases; and co-ordination of care for individual service users and carers.
There is good evidence of the benefits of integrated care for whole populations and for older people. There is mixed evidence of its benefits for people with long-term conditions such as diabetes and for people with complex needs. I will return to that later. Of course, Kaiser Permanente is one of the good examples of managing integrated care for long-term conditions but there are not that many.
The commissioning groups will need support from the NHS Commissioning Board as they set about commissioning integrated care. That includes advice on matters of contracting and procurement, outcomes and quality measures to include in contracts, and the tariffs and incentives to use. Work is also needed on how to create the right incentives to support integrated care. Payment by results was designed primarily to support choice and competition in relation to elective care. Alternative forms of payment are required to support integrated care, especially for people with chronic diseases and to support more co-ordinated, unplanned care when funding is tight. That will have to involve the providers.
Other factors that appear to support integrated care commissioning include robust performance management, sufficient time and resources from the provider side, and adequate investment in the main stages of the commissioning cycle, such as needs assessment, service design, contracting and tendering, and outcome-based evaluations. As management and resources shrink, there are obvious questions about whether clinical commissioners will have the necessary time and support to plan and contract for changed services in profound ways. To be more specific, there need to be resources at a national level to avoid commissioners at a local level reinventing the wheel many times over.
To turn briefly to long-term conditions, in the next decade the health and social care system will have to contend with an ageing population, increasing numbers of people with complex long-term conditions, budget constraints, increasingly sophisticated and expensive treatments, and rising expectations of what healthcare services should deliver. An integrated care approach to meeting these challenges—through better co-ordination of health and social care services, reducing the fragmentation or duplication of care—has the potential to improve support for the management of these complex needs.
Let me share a true story as an example of the issues here. Somebody approached me just before Second Reading of the health Bill. I mentioned this at one of the seminars and have since checked the authenticity, and visited the person in the hospital where care is currently provided. This person has insulin-dependent diabetes and was found to have an ulcer on the leg. He saw his GP who suggested that dressings would be required to try to heal the ulcer. During the process of that treatment, a specialist diabetic nurse who came in contact with the person suggested that they might be better getting advice from a specialist unit. While the GP suggested that the care provided was satisfactory, the person demanded to be referred to a hospital. By the time he got to the hospital, three of his toes were necrotic. They had to be removed last week. The patient needed an angiogram to decide whether the blood flow was satisfactory so as to put stents in so that he would not lose further parts of his limbs.
As we all know, it is crucial for diabetic patients to avoid certain complications. Good glycaemic control is required to manage that, so that their sight and renal functions do not deteriorate, their cardiovascular functions remain good and they also do not lose limbs because of necroticism. This shows the need for integrated care that requires the whole team to work together. For a start there need to be good records and IT that can transfer information between different carers, GPs, practice nurses, specialist nurses, and specialists in diabetes. There needs to be screening for eyes, kidneys, blood pressure, diet, cardiovascular disease and so on. Most importantly, there needs to be joint training for people who look after these patients, whether that is in the community or in specialist units.
If you are looking for good outcomes for patients, integrated care is what matters. It should be based on the journey of care—the patient pathway of care. That is what we need to establish. I hope, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, that we can have further discussion to try to improve this Bill and see if we can deliver that.