(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too want to focus on line 27 of Clause 6:
“The Board is subject to the duty under section 1(1) concurrently with the Secretary of State”.
This raises all the issues that we have debated at length. I know that the Minister has taken away Clauses 1, 4 and 10, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, it would be extremely helpful to the Committee if he agreed to take away Clause 6 as part of the package on which to consult. Otherwise, those words in the Bill continue to provide a fault line that at some point will need to be addressed. I hope that my noble friend feels that it would be more productive to address this point in the spirit of co-operation and cross-party support that he has engendered for Clauses 1, 4 and 10 and include Clause 6 as well.
My Lords, I rise to speak on this amendment, mainly because of my puzzlement over why the Government want to give the national Commissioning Board a concurrent duty with the Secretary of State under new Section 1(1), given all the other provisions in the Bill which try to shape—if I may put it that way—the relationship of the Secretary of State with the national Commissioning Board. This is especially the case with Clause 20, the mandation clause. One interpretation of this concurrency is that the Secretary of State can pick and choose how he interprets his responsibility.
My noble friend Lord Hunt has mentioned, as delicately as he could, what has happened in the Home Office recently about the sometimes rather strange boundary between policy responsibility and management responsibility and the confusions that could arise. This is not the first time that the Home Office has got into this kind of territory. Your Lordships will remember the difficulties that Michael Howard, when he was Home Secretary, had with the chief executive of the Prison Service, Derek Lewis. It boiled down to this problem of uncertainty about where the remit of Ministers ended and where responsibility began, in this case with the Prison Service, an executive agency. Equally, though, I suggest it could have been a non-departmental public body.
There is a lot of history in this area where one should be extremely wary about passing legislation in particularly high-profile areas and giving concurrency of responsibility to a Secretary of State and to a powerful arm’s-length body, in this case a non-departmental public body, the national Commissioning Board. It is fraught with difficulties. I thought that the Government were trying to clarify this with Clause 20. I think the clause has been misunderstood a little bit by the new chairman of the national Commissioning Board, but the wording as it stands gives the Secretary of State the right, before the beginning of each financial year, to set out a mandate for the board.
There are a lot of safeguards in Clause 20, on both sides of that discussion and agreement. The national Commissioning Board has a lot of safeguards. The Secretary of State cannot keep coming back and adding bits and pieces as the year progresses. The Secretary of State also has quite a lot of safeguards. He or she can expect the national Commissioning Board to stick to what has been agreed in that mandate. There is no doubt about the Secretary of State’s ability to give instruction to the board and there is no doubt about his ability to change those instructions on an annual basis after proper discussion and consultation. That is very clear. One of the strengths of Clause 20 is that it does make the relationship clear between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.
I have tabled an amendment that tries to restrict the number of requirements that the Secretary of State can place on the national Commissioning Board. I can well remember the time when the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, was a Minister with responsibilities for health, along with his colleague the noble Baroness, Lady Bottomley, who is not now in her place. We had somewhere in excess of 50 priorities in the NHS that we were required to deliver each year. In practice, we had no priorities, because no one could hold 50 priorities in their head, so there is an issue about how far you go on mandation. Nevertheless, the structure of Clause 20 clearly states what that relationship is, on an annual basis, between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.
We would do well to stick with that kind of relationship rather than muddy the waters with a concurrency of responsibility. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say on this issue.
(12 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, I should like to speak to Amendment 37 as my name has been added to it.
Before getting down to the precise wording of the amendment, I want to give some context to my remarks by talking about what I regard as the total incoherence of Clause 4. I note from the letter of 7 November from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to my noble friend Lady Thornton that the Government now seem to want to treat Clause 4 in the same way as Clause 1. I have to say that that is hardly a ringing endorsement of the drafting of Clause 4. I wonder, privately, how many other clauses we will have this problem with as we progress through the Bill. In effect, the Government are seeking to take these clauses out of the normal consideration of a Bill in Committee. We are getting into rather strange territory where, as we wander through the Bill, we find that, when the Government find themselves under pressure with regard to bits of the Bill, they sweep those bits aside to have another go in some procedure, which is less than clear to the House, and promise to come back later. Before I go any further on the amendment, as I am already unclear as to how the Government are going to handle Clause 1—and, it now seems, Clause 4—procedurally, I would welcome any light that the Minister can shed on how we are going to deal with these clauses and have a proper discussion of them in Committee.
I turn now to Amendment 37. I am completely supportive of reducing or even stopping ministerial and Department of Health micromanagement of the NHS.
I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord. Is he aware that the concern which he has just expressed is held by other noble Lords as well?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. The more the merrier, I say, on this theme and I hope that noble Lords will speak out about this issue in our debate today.
As I was saying, I am completely supportive of reducing or stopping ministerial and Department of Health micromanagement of the NHS, which, as I understand it, is the Government’s purpose in framing Clause 4. However, I struggle with reconciling the clause in its present form with the other duties and powers that the Secretary of State has taken unto himself in the Bill. I do not mean just the relationship between Clauses 1 and 4, which itself seems to have produced a hefty dose of confusion and uncertainty, not to mention, in the case of Clause 1, many attempts at drafting alternatives. How will Clause 4, for example, fit with Clause 3, which most of us in the previous session in Committee—except, perhaps the Minister—seemed to favour strengthening in terms of the duty on inequalities? How will it fit with Clauses 16 and 17, with their very extensive regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State, or indeed Clause 18 or Clause 20, which gives the Secretary of State extensive mandating powers, which seem to me to be rather stronger than the new chairman of the NHS Commissioning Board seems to think?
Many people who have looked at the Bill do not understand what the Secretary of State is trying to do in relation to the issue of central control, central powers and autonomy and delegation. Is he trying to let go or to tighten his grip? I do not see, at present, how the Government can retain in the Bill a clause as loosely drafted as Clause 4 and, at the same time, retain all the other powers of the Secretary of State that we will be discussing later. Apart from anything else, this is a recipe for confusion in the minds of many local decision-makers.
Are people to take Clause 4 as drafted at face value? If they do, will they not be wondering whether the Secretary of State or his henchmen and henchwomen in the Department of Health or the NHS Commissioning Board will come down on them like a ton of bricks using other powers in the Bill if they think that they are not acting in the interests of the NHS? What will the courts make of all this? If people do not like a decision taken higher up the line, as the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Foundation Trust is demonstrating now over paediatric surgery changes, do they seek judicial review of the central decisions, praying in aid Clause 4 as drafted? Will not Clause 4 in its present form simply encourage legal challenge and create local uncertainty?
I turn to the wording of the clause and why Amendment 37 is at least an improvement. It is an attempt to improve what is a highly defective clause. As I read Clause 4, it seems to place little inhibition on local decision-makers,
“exercising functions … or providing services”,
in any manner that they consider appropriate. If that means what it says in the dictionary, if people want, for example, to provide a wide range of alternative therapies for which there is no scientific evidence of clinical benefit, they can do so, praying in aid the powers under Clause 4. If they want to remove tattoos or do a bit of cosmetic surgery, I cannot see that there is very much to stop them. Under the clause as drafted, the Secretary of State can intervene only after the event. If he finds out what has been going on, he can, in effect, try to stop it happening again, but that is ex post facto. He cannot intervene earlier, as I understand the drafting of the clause. I am happy to be corrected by the noble Earl, but I am not the only one who thinks that these powers will have that effect.
Amendment 37 is an attempt to require those behaving autonomously locally to apply the test that their actions are in the interests of the NHS before they take their decisions rather than relying on the Secretary of State deciding that they were not in the interests of the NHS after the event. I see that my colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, is now with us. I suspect that we both agree that it is a far from perfect solution, but it is better than the way that the clause is currently drafted. I know that some noble Lords are very attached to the clause—like me, they are attached to the idea of autonomy—but I hope that they will consider whether in its present form it is really in the best interests of the NHS. I suggest that the Government rethink the form of Clause 4 if they want to proceed with it. As I see it, what would get nearer to their intentions but not create some of the loopholes that I have identified is a kind of drafting that gives a commitment that the Secretary of State would not exceed the powers provided elsewhere in the Bill, would impose only burdens that are totally consistent with those powers and would maximise operational freedoms for those delivering NHS services consistent with public accountability. That seems to me to be the direction in which the Government are trying to go, but the way the clause is drafted does not do that.
I would prefer the Minister to accept that the clause is seriously deficient and either abandon it altogether or take it away for a serious makeover. In the mean time, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and myself, I move Amendment 37, which goes a modest way to improve the shape and drafting of the clause. I beg to move.
Moving on, I remind my noble friend of the times we sat with a cup of coffee and a private secretary or two—just to make her feel better—and we wrestled over some fairly difficult and complex issues. Either she or I would say, “We need a bit more information about that”, the civil servant would say, “Yes, Minister”, and in due course, when diaries permitted, we would sit down again with a bit more information. That can be said to be good ministerial governance—or it could be said to be politically motivated delay when others in the health service knew better, and if only we had got out of the way they would have done what they wanted, but they would do what those in power at the time happened to want, ignoring the contrary views of those who did not happen to hold the management positions at that moment.
I want my noble friend to accept that I still hold her in as high regard as I did before this debate started, but we part company fairly fundamentally on the issue of the accountability on a spend of £128 billion a year. As I said in an earlier debate—I have expressed this privately to the Minister, and my noble friend had the grace to say that he understood—my difficulty is that if you are spending £128 billion of public money, the public whose money are spending are simply not going to say when big problems arise, “Well, that’s okay, we’ll listen to him or her because he or she is chairman of a quango”—even a quango as highly thought of as my noble friend no doubt hopes the national Commissioning Board will be.
There is no debate in this House about the fact that the Secretary of State must be held accountable by Parliament. My noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames made the point, which has to be right, that the Secretary of State must also be held accountable by the courts. However, the Secretary of State also needs to be held accountable by the public and the patients, who have not had a huge showing in our debates thus far. I have concerns about this clause because I am not at all clear how the Secretary of State is going to satisfy X billion people by putting in £128 billion that he is accountable to them for if they are absolutely determined that they want him to be accountable to them.
To help the Minister when he takes this clause away and thinks about it, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that I was not convinced by the amendment. I am happy that he has made that part of his contribution to the review that my noble friend will conduct, but I hope that he does not press it to a vote because I for one would not be able to support it.
There are parts of the clause that the Minister really needs to look at, such as the phrasing in new Section 1C(a):
“any … person exercising functions … or providing services … is free to exercise those functions or provide those services in the manner that it considers most appropriate”.
From that, I am not clear—I do not necessarily want the Minister to tell me this today, but I ask him to think about this—at what point these actions start to become health service policy in their own right. We quote precedent in here. If someone takes an action because they think it is right in the circumstances, does that become a policy or a guideline? Where does the Secretary of State play any role in developing a policy for the NHS?
New Section 1C(b) goes on to say,
“unnecessary burdens are not imposed”.
I have to say to my noble friend that I do not understand what that means. Who decides whether it is a burden? Who decides whether the burden is unnecessary, and where can you challenge the decision whether a burden is a burden and when it becomes unnecessary? It is okay if you consider your action to be the most appropriate in the circumstances. My party occasionally gets criticised for being inclined to being a bit too individualistic, but you cannot run a health service in which everybody can make the decision that they think is most appropriate in the circumstances without a well defined political framework within which they would be expected to act.
I will tell my noble friend something that I have said to him in private but do not mind sharing in public. I spent 26 years at the other end of the Corridor. In all that time I never once voted against my party. Some in this House will see that as wimpish and craven, and some will see it as a fine expression of loyalty. Frankly, I do not mind how you see it. It is how I see it that is important to me.
I have not done a Committee stage of a Bill since I left the Cabinet in 1997, so I want Members of your Lordships’ House to understand that I am not having much fun in these Committee sittings. This is not something that comes naturally to me, and I have tried to reassure my noble friend that my participation in these debates is because of my commitment to the health service and my desire that it should be as excellent as possible. This is for the sake of my former constituents, who are patients. In that spirit, I hope my noble friend will take away Clauses 1 and 4 and think about them again.
My Lords, I compliment the noble Lord on his speech and say that we hope to see him every day of this Committee.