Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Lord Warner and Baroness Royall of Blaisdon

Monday 8th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

In terms of independence, the point was made very forcefully by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and others, that it is not a matter of personalities. The commissioner-designate is clearly a jolly good chap and all that but this is not about him. This is about the role of the commissioner, how the role is seen by other countries, and the ability of the commissioner to interact with other agencies both here and abroad. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to address that point. Might it also be possible for him to organise a meeting with the commissioner-designate for all Peers who might be interested?

[Lord Warner]

When the Minister replies to my noble friend, could he say how what he said about Kevin Hyland’s views squares with Clause 40(4), which makes it very clear—if I understand the English in the Bill—that the Secretary of State is in the driving seat on the staff made available to the commissioner? If I may put this rather unkindly to the Minister, he may be dropping the commissioner who has been appointed somewhat in the cart, in that it may convey to your Lordships’ House that this man actually is a creature of the Home Office rather than the other way round.

Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Lord Warner and Baroness Royall of Blaisdon

Wednesday 3rd December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Warner (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Patel. My concern here is to make a greater reality of the independence of the anti-slavery commissioner by giving the postholder control over choice of staff and accommodation and suchlike within an agreed budget.

I believe that subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 40 give the Secretary of State too much detailed control over the commissioner that will in practice jeopardise their independence and will certainly jeopardise the perception of their independence, which is just as important.

I recognise that on Report in the other place the Government tried to respond to criticism by placing “independent” in front of “anti-slavery commissioner” in the Bill. That is certainly an advance, but it does not go far enough and does not meet the criticisms and recommendations in the report of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, which are summarised in paragraphs 154 and 155 of that report.

As a member of the Joint Committee, let me briefly remind the Committee of a key passage in those paragraphs, which states:

“The draft Bill does not offer sufficient protection for the Commissioner’s independence in the long term. Failure to do will undermine the Commissioner’s credibility and capacity to establish relationships based on trust with NGOs and other stakeholder groups whose role in combating modern slavery is well-recognised”.

That is the central purpose of my amendment: to strengthen trust in the independence of the commissioner, with some specific ways of giving the postholder greater independence.

As the Joint Committee’s report went on to say, the anti-slavery commissioner is being treated less favourably in terms of independence than other comparable commissioners appointed by the Home Secretary: namely, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. A critical part of independence in these posts is the clear right to appoint your own staff, to which I would add the symbolism of not being located in the same building as the government department that appoints you.

Those two issues—independence in selection of staff and premises—are in my amendment. I regard them as critical to conveying to the outside world the independence of the commissioner. That is even more the case if the commissioner’s remit is to be widened beyond the scope of the Home Office—a subject that we shall turn to in the next group of amendments.

My amendment is based on personal experience as a battle-hardened Whitehall warrior; it is not just a theoretical fancy. Let me briefly share with your Lordships my experience as the first chairman of the Youth Justice Board back in 1999, when I had to set it up with a chief executive and a secretary. The board was, in statute, clearly an independent body. However, that did not stop the Home Office encouraging our location within the Home Office, kindly offering us staff and, when we refused that, pushing on with endless reporting and meetings over our independent activities.

Control is in the Home Office DNA—whoever is the Home Secretary and whatever individual Home Secretaries may say. The default setting for the average Home Office civil servant—with due respect to those in the Box—is to protect the Home Secretary, irrespective of whether the Home Secretary needs or even wants protecting. Staff seconded to the commissioner will return to their department, and they will not be welcomed back with open arms if they are deemed to have allowed the commissioner endlessly to flourish attitudes independent of the Home Office on any specific issue. In any case, we put those staff in an impossible position by sending them to a commissioner’s office. They are conflicted: do they look after their future career or do they do what the commissioner wants if he or she wants to strike out independently?

It is this experience that has convinced me to run my own show as Birmingham’s children’s commissioner and politely decline friendly offers of support from DfE officials. I suspect that the newly appointed commissioner will run into trouble at some stage over the staffing issue if we do not give him more freedom to manoeuvre with an amendment similar to mine.

I am very supportive of the other similar amendments in the group. All I would like the Minister to do today is to accept that we have a considerable point and agree to consider with us an amendment which meets the concerns I have expressed. I regard the independent commissioner’s right to appoint their own staff as absolutely crucial to their success. I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 65A and 69A in this group, and I of course welcome Amendment 65. I endorse everything that has been said by my battle-hardened friend, who speaks from experience.

We on these Benches are very supportive of the new anti-slavery commissioner, who will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in our fight against modern slavery. Although we acknowledge and are grateful for the good work that numerous central government departments, local government agencies and NGOs do in this area, a main point of contact to co-ordinate and oversee the entirety of the work to tackle modern slavery is invaluable—vital.

The Centre for Social Justice’s report looking into modern slavery in 2013 stated:

“Such diverse activity requires independent oversight and coordination for it to be effective”,

and:

“There is significant need in the UK for the appointment of a single individual to oversee efforts to fight modern slavery in the UK, in light of the disparate national response”.

So we warmly welcome the introduction of this post. As noble Lords will know, Kevin Hyland has already been appointed as the new commissioner. I am sure that this gentleman will do an excellent job and we welcome him to his post. However, I feel that it is a premature appointment; it has been made before this House has even finished its debate on this role and finalised its discussions. It cannot be right that any appointment is made before the job description is finalised. I just do not think that is the correct way to proceed.

At present, we do not feel that the clause as drafted would ensure that the independence of the anti-slavery commissioner is embedded. We thank the Government for introducing “Independent” into the title of the role but the insertion of the word is simply not enough. By merely calling the role independent without providing the structure to make that independence possible, the Government are almost setting the commissioner up to fail by making it virtually impossible for him to meet the expectations created by the title “Independent Anti- slavery Commissioner”. The funds, staff, accommodation and other facilities will still be determined by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the commissioner.

Amendment 65A, which is similar to that in the name of my noble friend Lord Warner and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, would change the wording of the clause to ensure that the Secretary of State may only determine how much money to give the commissioner, without having any involvement in the appointment of the staff or other matters. At Second Reading, the Minister stated:

“The commissioner’s role is set out in a similar way to other commissioners”.—[Official Report, 17/11/14; col. 239.]

However, I beg to differ. Having looked at the Borders Act 2007, we have used the same language and inserted it into our first amendment to enable this anti-slavery commissioner to have the same independence as others in similar roles. That is the same approach taken by the draft committee, which also adopted this wording in its alternative modern slavery Bill. Alongside this, the independent reviewer of terrorism stressed the need for a truly independent commissioner to the draft Bill committee to put it on an equal footing with himself and similar appointments, such as that of the Children’s Commissioner.

Our second amendment, Amendment 69A, is to ensure that the commissioner has full independence with regard to his activities, timetables, priorities, resources and funding. It has been drafted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, with the help of respected and experienced barristers and legal experts. Rapporteurs in other European countries, such as the Dutch national rapporteur, all cite their autonomy and independence as being crucial to their role. We absolutely have to ensure that the wording in the Bill reflects the true independence of the commissioner. Although we know that the current Home Secretary visualises a strong and leading role for this commissioner, which is terrific, the same may not be said for any future Home Secretaries or Ministers down the line—and her assurances must be consistent with the language in the Bill. I note what my noble friend said about the Home Office as an institution.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission stressed the importance of the commissioner being able to appoint their own staff and said that the perception of that independence, if not its reality, may be affected by its statutory closeness to the department—in this case, the Home Office. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, told the committee that roles such as the one performed by his specialist adviser were essential, and that it was consequentially essential that he made the decision about the appointment himself. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, John Vine, also pointed out the benefits of the commissioner being able to appoint their own staff in that they should be able to advertise for the roles freely and choose from a good mix of skills and applicants.

In written evidence, the Home Office stated that its intention was to have a small team of civil servants supporting the commissioner. If that situation arose, it is all very well to support but we do not want those people to be appointed by the Home Office. Is the Minister able to shed light on how they would be able to work in an independent manner if they were, at the end of the day, accountable as employees to the Home Office? There would seem to be a friction there.

In the Government’s response to the draft committee, they said:

“It would not be effective or efficient for such a role to be supported by an independent human resources function”.

Surely, appropriate assistance could be provided to the commissioner when choosing his own staff, if it were necessary and requested.

Our concerns were also echoed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which said that,

“the Commissioner looks very much like a creature of the Home Office, with very little interaction with Parliament”.

Notwithstanding the matters in Clause 41, which we will speak about next week, the Joint Committee also pointed to the inability of the commissioner to appoint their own staff. The committee recommended that the Bill be amended to change this, otherwise the commissioner’s operations would be largely controlled by the Home Office, as I have said before.