(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on the second point, a noble Lord asked me earlier—it may have been my noble friend the Duke of Montrose—whether it would be possible to have a Section 30 order that applied to just one referendum. The answer is that that is precisely what we plan in our draft.
The issue that the amendment seeks to address is that for some powers it may be thought expedient or wise to give the Scottish Parliament a temporary extension of power. I think I am right in saying that such a power was granted under a Section 30 order following the case of Somerville. We seek to make it very clear that if the Scottish Parliament passes legislation—as indeed it did under that power—under a temporary transfer from reserved to devolved power, it does not automatically repeal any legislation that has been properly and competently enacted when the temporary transfer of power ends.
My Lords, my noble friend has suggested that as I have sat here all night, I should at least say something. It seems to me that the amendment puts the issue of competence beyond doubt. However, I am not wholly convinced that this is necessary because it seems to me that once you confer competence, the legislative provision that flows from it will always flow from it even if you subsequently take back the competence, as it is the point at which the competence is exercised which is important, not what happens subsequently. Nevertheless, I note what the Minister says. For our part, we are content that he has put the matter beyond doubt.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble and learned Lord threw me that one and I will just take it up. It is true that there are a whole range of United Kingdom statutes that nevertheless require different evidential standards on both sides of the border. There is the Misuse of Drugs Act, for example, where corroboration would be required in relation to those offences that were prosecuted in Scotland but not—I think I am right in saying—in England and Wales. The same, of course, is true of the Road Traffic Act. If I may say so, that possibly just reinforces the point that different jurisdictions will have different rules of evidence and in theory, or at least in principle, there is nothing to stop them having different penalties and limits for particular offences.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which has given rise to a number of important issues. I share with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd of Duncansby, his analysis of how the Calman commission went about its work. My noble friend the Duke of Montrose suggested that we were trying to deliver what the Scottish Executive wanted us to. If only the Scottish Executive had made any connection with the Calman commission—they studiously did not give us any evidence or indication of what they wished—their engagement might have been productive.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, indicated, this was done on the basis of evidence. It was recognised by the commission that there are already different speed limits; there are already powers to set speed limits on local authority roads devolved to local highway authorities through road traffic regulation orders. They are free to use their knowledge and assessment of local roads and may set different speed limits of 20, 30, 40, 50 or 60 miles per hour where they think it appropriate.
There was a view on drink-driving that it was part of criminal law, which is already devolved—but perhaps more importantly there are serious alcohol abuse issues in Scotland. I do not think that anyone is running away from them. The view was that this might be one other measure that could be part of how alcohol abuse could be tackled in Scotland.
Before we get on to some of the more specific issues on speeding and drink-driving, I shall take up the important points that have been raised by my noble friends the Duke of Montrose and Lord Younger as well as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, on the highway code and the driving test. The amendments to which they spoke seek to ensure that provisions of the highway code reflect the content of regulations made by the Scottish Ministers on speed limits and the drink-drive limit under the powers devolved to them in the Bill, assuming that those powers are actually used and changes made.
I fully agree that the highway code should reflect any changes made as a result of the powers being devolved, but it is important to note that there is no other legislation on the content of the code, either in the Road Traffic Act 1930 or in the supplementary provisions in Section 38 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. It would be disproportionate if the only specific statutory requirement on the content of the code were the few provisions in the Scotland Bill when there is no other such requirement to include any specific items of English, Scottish or Great Britain legislation. The code provides guidance, but it is not a comprehensive description of all road traffic legislation. However, I assure my noble friends that the mechanism exists to ensure that the highway code is accurately and adequately updated. It was referred to by my noble friend the Duke of Montrose that Section 38(2) of the 1988 Act gives the Secretary of State the power from time to time to revise the code by revoking, varying, amending or adding to the provisions in the code in such manner as he or she thinks fit.
Section 38(3) places the Secretary of State under a duty to lay proposed alterations to the code, other than those that are merely consequential on the passing of an amendment or repeal of provisions, before both Houses of Parliament at least 40 days before she proposes to make the changes.
Under Section 38(4), if the House resolves that the proposed alteration should not be made, the Secretary of State must not make the proposed revision to the code. Perhaps significantly, Section 38(5) of the 1988 Act states:
“Before revising the Highway Code … the Secretary of State must consult with such representative organisations as he thinks fit”.
That would include the Scottish Government as was the case during the last major revision in 2005 to 2007.
I can quite understand the noble and learned Lord’s wish to progress matters.
I am not entirely clear where to start. The amendment before this House is that:
“Before commencing discussions with representatives of foreign governments or inter-governmental organisations, Scottish Ministers are required to obtain consent to the discussions from a Minister of the Crown”.
It seems that we have ranged a little beyond that.
Perhaps I should start by declaring that I have had discussions with my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. He is at liberty to tell the House what these were. I did not actually warn him about cybernats. I should perhaps advise him that he should not read what they say because they will just make him upset—and at his age he really ought to be careful.
I will try to pick up some of the points that have been made, and make one or two of my own. First, it seems desirable to ensure that there is good co-operation between the UK Government and Scottish Ministers when they are engaged overseas. That has not always happened, and even when the Scottish Ministers were of the same political persuasion as the UK Government it did not always happen. I am not saying that there were any undue difficulties, but sometimes the co-operation broke down. I must however say that, personally, I was always grateful for advice from the Foreign Office. My noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, when he was Attorney-General, and I represented the United Kingdom at a conference in China between the European Union and the ASEAN countries on the issue of serious crime. I was due to chair a session of the conference which included the Attorney-General of Burma. I was unclear as to what role I should take in relation to the introduction of the Attorney-General of Burma, and I remember being very grateful for the advice that I got from the Foreign Office on that.
Secondly, it is right that both Governments respect the jurisdiction of the other, and that we recognise the frustration where it is felt that Scottish Ministers go beyond their responsibilities, particularly where it appears that they are pursuing a broader political strategy. However, Scottish Ministers have legitimate areas of activity which involve interaction with foreign Governments and intergovernmental organisations. They have responsibility for implementing directives of the European Union in the devolved area. They need to address vital European Union interests, not just in terms of directives but in terms of policy, and in doing so they interact not just with foreign Governments but with other devolved Administrations. The noble Lord, Lord Morgan, referred to the experience of the German Länder, and the way in which they go about their business.
Ministers also have responsibility for promoting trade, tourism and investment, and that of course necessarily brings them into contact with foreign Ministers and Governments. They also take an active part in intergovernmental organisations and conferences. I recently participated in a conference at the London School of Economics on what was called sub-state diplomacy. I found that quite instructive in finding out the way in which devolved Administrations work, not just in Europe but in other places; learning how Quebec, under both nationalist and liberal Governments, had promoted Quebec, and looking at the experience of Catalonia and the Belgian states in Europe.
It seems unrealistic, if I may say so, to suggest that each time Scottish Ministers were to speak to Ministers of other Administrations they should first get the consent of the Government. First of all, if you are at a conference and you are approached by a Minister of another Government it is not always possible to get that consent. Do you say “I’m very sorry, I can’t speak to you because I need to get consent from the relevant Minister”? As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, sometimes not even the Foreign Office is able to co-ordinate.
With respect I also ask: what exactly are we attempting to do in this amendment? What sanction do we impose on Scottish Ministers if they do not get consent? We risk giving the Scottish Ministers a tool with which they can claim, yet again, that they do not have the respect of the UK Government, and that they are being gagged while they go about what they consider their legitimate business. That is not just a question of consent. If my noble friend is thinking of coming back with an amendment that they should advise or consult before they do that, the same question arises. What sanction does my noble friend suggest should be visited on a Scottish Minister who does not consult, get consent or obtain whatever other permission is required by this amendment?
We should think long and hard. I endorse a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, said, because he made much the same point in his interesting comment, which of course comes from his long experience, mainly in the other place but also here. We should listen very carefully to these voices before we go down this road.
My Lords, it has been useful to have this discussion on foreign relations and the devolved Administration and devolved Parliament in Scotland. I share a lot of the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd of Duncansby, that in fact what this amendment proposes is largely unrealistic. He questions the sanction; we can readily anticipate how it would be spun if indeed it was accepted. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, accepted himself that the amendment was flawed. That said, the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell of Coatdyke, indicated that certain sentiments were associated with this that we should not lose sight of and quite properly referred to the initiative pursued by the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, when he was First Minister, in promoting Scotland’s links with Malawi. That was done in full consultation and co-operation with the United Kingdom Government and has been widely applauded and respected. It shows that it is possible to have that kind of relationship. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, indicated, there are legitimate areas of responsibility that fall on the devolved Government in Scotland involving interaction with foreign Governments.
It is important, therefore, that the Committee should be aware that there is a memorandum of understanding or concordat on international relations, which deals with devolved Administration engagement with other Governments and which is therefore relevant to the Scottish Government’s interaction with foreign Governments. Two areas are identified that are of relevance here. Bilaterally, the Scottish Government may, in co-operation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, make arrangements or agreements with foreign Governments or international organisations on devolved matters,
“provided that such arrangements or agreements do not purport to bind the UK in international law, affect the conduct of international relations or prejudice UK interests”.
Indeed, I can think of educational agreements that have been reached. It also says:
“The Scottish Government is, however, obliged to consult the FCO in advance about any contact, correspondence, or proposal that is novel or contentious, might create a contingent international liability or may have implications for international relations”.
On international organisations it is sometimes appropriate—and this is recognised in the concordat or memorandum of understanding—for,
“Ministers or officials from the devolved administrations to form part of a UK negotiating team”.
In these circumstances,
“The UK lead Minister will retain responsibility for the negotiations and will determine how each member of the team can best contribute”.
This brings us to the issue that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and that was spoken to by a number of other noble Lords following his intervention. He asked what the position is. The Scottish Government—his memory served him well—have put forward a proposal to have a statutory right to attend and speak at all Council meetings that relate to devolved matters. It was one of the six proposals that the Scottish Government put forward in the summer of last year. My colleagues in the UK Government are considering this request along with the other requests from the Scottish Government and will respond, but it should be clear that a statutory right to attend would inevitably have an impact on Welsh and Northern Irish representation.
Perhaps we may therefore look at what happens in practice. At present, Scottish Ministers can and do attend Council meetings when devolved matters are under discussion and do so as part of a United Kingdom delegation. My noble friend Lord Stephen indicated that there have been occasions, although perhaps not many, when a Minister from the Scottish Executive, as it then was—and still is—has led. Indeed, on more than one occasion he represented the United Kingdom, albeit as a Liberal Democrat Minister in a coalition Government representing the United Kingdom. When I was the Justice Minister in Scotland, I sat alongside Mr Blunkett when he was Home Secretary. At an appropriate point when Mr Blunkett thought that the matter under discussion was more relevant to Scotland than it was to England, I spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom.
The crucial point is that we spoke to an agreed United Kingdom line. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is right that on issues such as fisheries there often can be great tensions, but every effort is made ahead of the Fisheries Council to ensure that there is a United Kingdom line to which whoever speaks is expected to, and does, follow.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment is minor and technical in nature and has been laid following work undertaken with the Scottish Government to clarify the scope of Clause 13. The United Kingdom’s intended policy remains unchanged; we have always said that while we intend to re-reserve the regulation of health professions to Westminster, the regulation of social care professions should remain a devolved matter within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. Likewise, the Scottish Government’s position on Clause 13 remains unchanged. They remain opposed in principle to the re-reservation of the regulation of health professions.
To give some background, health profession regulation is currently reserved by reference to specific Acts of Parliament, all of which were obviously in place when the 1998 legislation went through. Other health professions have been subject to regulation under subsequent statutes. Under the architecture of the 1998 Act they would not have been caught up in this. A considerable number of bodies made representations to the Calman commission that this was an unsatisfactory position, which is what we sought to address.
Despite the differing policy positions of the United Kingdom and Scottish Governments on the clause generally, this amendment clarifies the intent behind the clause and is an example of where we have listened to the technical concerns, which the Scottish Government have raised, and have sought to act on them. The Scottish Government’s concern was that, as originally drafted, Clause 13 might have an unintended consequence for the social care professions that might in the future become regulated by the Scottish Parliament under the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001 or a successor Act. The concern was that the regulation of these new social care professions would fall within the scope of the new re-reservation, which is not the United Kingdom Government’s intention.
This minor and technical amendment makes it explicit that regulation of the social care professions is, and will remain, a matter that is devolved to Scotland. I hope that that clarifies this amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, we welcome the clarification that this amendment gives to this clause. It was never the Calman commission’s intention that the regulation of residential care workers should be reserved as opposed to health professionals. Perhaps I may add to the background. The Calman commission received evidence from the royal colleges, which are concerned at the possible fragmentation of standards as a result of the Scottish Parliament on the one hand and the UK Parliament on the other having responsibility for the regulation of health professionals. Common standards for health professionals are of evident benefit to the UK as a whole, and the Government’s implementation of this recommendation is to be welcomed.
On a final point, the re-reservation of powers to the UK Parliament in this case is a signal that devolution is about finding the right balance between the powers that sit with the UK Parliament and those that sit properly with the Scottish Parliament. It is important that we get a system that works well not only for the people of Scotland but for the people of the UK as a whole.
The question that I was going to pose was why we did not extend the ban on smoking in public places to Antarctica. Clearly, that was an oversight on our part. We could also have extended the scheme for insulation of older persons’ homes, which was one of the then Scottish Executive’s schemes. Of course, we are now spared the question as to whether the referendum on independence should also extend to Antarctica. The noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, has pointed out that if independence was ever to come, the First Minister would not have to consider whether to expand his navy by adding an ice-breaker to it. We fully support the clause.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Duke of Montrose for giving us the opportunity to discuss this matter and to all those who have welcomed this clause. I join my noble friends the Duke of Montrose and Lord Forsyth in saluting Captain Scott and his four fellow adventurers who on 17 January 1912 reached the South Pole. We are all conscious that theirs was a long struggle that ended very sadly, but, nevertheless, 100 years on, we remember the extraordinary feat of those explorers. I also join those who have paid tribute to and saluted my noble friend Lord Forsyth for climbing Mount Vinson last year. We all remember getting the reports and his managing to raise substantial funds both for Marie Curie Cancer Care and Children in Need India.
If the former First Minister knew that he had responsibilities for Antarctica, it is clear that he was not advised on it by his senior law officer, and he certainly did not share the fact with his Deputy First Minister.
My noble friend the Duke of Montrose asked about the draft Antarctic Bill. It was in the context of preparing for that draft Bill that it became apparent that, while outer space had been reserved, Antarctica had not. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, will tell us why that was the case.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling the amendment, which was debated in the other place. It seeks to rectify what appears to be an omission from the Scotland Act 1998 and subsequently the Railways Act 2005, which devolved significant powers over the ScotRail franchise, including its funding and licensing as well as responsibility for new rail lines for the network, yet neglected to devolve the power to determine the model of that franchise. Of course, it would not be appropriate to devolve responsibility for cross-border services, but that is not what the amendment seeks to address. It is clear that the amendment relates to services that begin and end in Scotland.
When this matter was debated in another place, as my noble friend indicated, we seemed to get side-tracked—if that is not an inappropriate way of putting it—down a spectre of renationalisation, which was not the purpose of the amendment. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary failed to address the central issue that the amendment poses regarding whether it is consistent with the spirit of the devolution settlement that the power to determine the nature of a discrete Scottish franchise, in relation to which the Scottish Government already have considerable responsibility, should be reserved.
I ask the noble and learned Lord the Minister to say what the position is in Wales and, more fundamentally, why the Government believe it is necessary and proper to retain powers to determine the franchise model of a self-contained Scottish rail service where the franchise is granted by the Scottish Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, gave a fair analysis or description of what his amendment is intended to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, said that this might just be an oversight in the original arrangements. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said that it was too small a matter for the Calman commission. I think that quite a significant change is proposed; it is not a small matter at all. The fact that I do not recall any representation on or consideration of it as part of the Calman commission may say something about whether there is widespread support for it.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, asked why legislative competence has not gone hand-in-hand with executive competence. I think I am right to say that executive devolution was not present in the 1998 Act, but was subsequently negotiated between the then Scottish Executive—I think that Mr Henry McLeish took a role in that—and the Labour Government. The agreement reached was one of executive devolution. The Labour Government did not think it right at that stage to extend legislative devolution, and that continues to be the position of this Government. The Government are committed to maintaining a GB-wide national rail network which is publicly specified and funded in the public interest but which is provided by the private sector.
It is important to recognise the substantial executive devolved powers which Scottish Ministers have in relation to railways. They include giving general guidance to the Office of Rail Regulation, giving notice of their requirements for the outputs of the rail network in Scotland and the level of public funding available to the Office of Rail Regulation and publishing a Scottish railway strategy. They also have power to designate, let, fund, manage and enforce Scottish franchises and publish a statement of policy on franchising; to set fares; to publish a code of practice protecting the interests of disabled passengers; to appoint a member of the Passengers’ Council; to give financial assistance to any person for the purpose of developing Scottish railways; and to publish freight grants schemes for Scotland. Indeed, they have considerably more powers than that. Of course, the Scottish Executive have also taken considerable initiatives in building and constructing new railways—my noble friend Lord Mar and Kellie is probably a personal beneficiary of the railway from Stirling to Alloa—so substantial powers are already available.
However, as I said, we believe that devolved powers are best exercised within a coherent GB structure, as provided for under the Railways Acts 1993 and 2005. It is essential that the overall regime for the provision of rail passenger services and their regulation remains a reserved matter. It would not be sensible to run the railway in such a way that the Scottish Parliament through legislative devolution could overturn the framework that governs the operation of passenger services in Great Britain as a whole.
The noble and learned Lord raised the question of Wales. I will certainly confirm the position, but the fact that we wish to keep a GB structure means that there is no legislative devolution to the Welsh Assembly.
Indeed, I can confirm that the Lord Advocate has referred cases directly to the Supreme Court; the so-called “sons of Cadder” cases were on references by the Lord Advocate to the Supreme Court within the last 12 months. So it clearly has been done. Those were cases clearly where there was a wish to get clarity in some of the implications of the original Cadder judgment. So there are certainly good arguments as to why that should be there, and ones that I am certainly prepared to listen to further.
I referred a case about the independence of justices of the peace, for the very reason to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, referred—because of the importance in getting clarity at an early stage so that the system as a whole did not seize up.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, for that because there are arguments there and I will give further reflection to them.
A good number of issues have been aired on certification. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Cullen, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom and Lord Boyd of Duncansby, who indicated on certification that although there have been issues against it, in fact the case that the Government have sought to make against certification can be justified on a number of grounds. It is right, as a number of your Lordships have indicated, that we are not comparing like with like. As I indicated in my opening remarks, in England and Wales the whole criminal justice system of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure is the potential subject matter of appeals to the Supreme Court, whereas here we are dealing with what are essentially constitutional issues that arise in the context of a criminal case—namely, convention compliance or European Union laws.
Also, as I indicated before, the original justification for certification was very much administrative. It was an Administration of Justice Act in which it was introduced, to ensure that there was not a great flood of cases. I believe that it was brought in not for any reason of jurisprudence—as the quotes from the then Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, suggest—but as an administrative break. Again, not least because of the representations which we have received from the Lord Justice General, we will treat these matters very sensitively and seriously, giving proper weight to the arguments that have been advanced again. It would be fair to say that the arguments advanced in the course of your Lordships’ debate this evening have not really prompted me to change my mind on this, but no doubt these matters will be returned to.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, for giving us a focus for some of the debates which we have had, and I very much hope that on Report—
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps I can clarify for my noble friend that Section 31 of the Scotland Act 1998 is relevant in this regard. It states:
“A member of the Scottish Executive in charge of a Bill shall, on or before introduction of the Bill in the Parliament, state that in his view the provisions of the Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Parliament”.
Subsection (2) says:
“The Presiding Officer shall, on or before the introduction of a Bill in the Parliament, decide whether or not in his view”—
or in the case now, in her view—
“the provisions of the Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Parliament and state his decision”,
so the Presiding Officer has to state their decision as to whether it is within competence.
Let us take this away from the question of the referendum Bill, because our ambition here is not to get into that position; it is to reach an agreement, preferably on a Section 30 order. However, in general, the Presiding Officer has to decide whether the provisions of the Bill would, in their view, be within the legislative competence of the Parliament, and has to make that decision public. It is still the case that the Parliament could proceed to debate and process the Bill notwithstanding that, but there are obviously political ramifications. I could imagine some pretty lively debates if that was to be the case.
Could I clarify something which I think I asked? I am not entirely sure that I have got it over. On the provisions on the statement in Section 31, I said that in my time as Lord Advocate the law officer had to give their approval to that. That is a matter of public record and has been said many times before. I do not know whether that has changed in any way and I cannot recall whether it was part of the Ministerial Code that the Minister could not make that statement without the law officer's approval. If it was part of the Ministerial Code, I cannot think that it would be departed from. If it was simply an internal arrangement, it could of course have been departed from and one could speculate as to what procedures would now be in place.
The noble and learned Lord is right. We cannot speculate on what happens in an Administration of whom we are not members, but I can confirm what my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord said about the Administration of whom the three of us were members. The procedures and proceedings in these matters were as they have described.
To return to Clause 7, the limited reference procedure that we are seeking would therefore allow the law officers to refer to the Supreme Court only the provisions with which they have competency concerns, while, as I said, allowing the rest to go forward to Royal Assent. We believe that this is an appropriate and sensible method of helping to ensure that the work of the Scottish Parliament runs as smoothly as possible.
On the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Selkirk to Clause 7, through our engagement with the Law Society of Scotland the Government have, as my noble friend indicated, tabled amendments that reflect the intention behind his amendments. I wish to thank my noble friend for looking at this clause closely and for tabling his amendments. The government amendments have the same effect; I am advised that parliamentary counsel think that they have a more appropriate form of wording, but the effect is exactly the same. We therefore very much support the amendments that he has tabled, and I hope he will withdraw his amendment in respect of the other amendments that have been tabled.
Indeed, what we have here is a better outcome than what was there before. We reflected on what had been said, the representations that we had received and the amendments that had been tabled, and came to the conclusion that this was the best way forward on this point.
I was not quite sure if the Minister was now coming to an end. I wanted to press him on one point. Whatever view he may take of the utility of the measure that he is putting forward, what weight does he put on the view of the Scottish Parliament—whose legislation this is, after all—that it does not want this? Does he think that it is right to press it in the face of that opposition? Or does he think that, because he as Advocate-General and his successors in that office will have to operate this, this is something that the UK Government want, despite what the devolved Administration think?
I also need to address some of the points regarding the amendments in my own name. I indicated that this was intended to help give effect to Scottish Parliament measures where perhaps only one small part of a Bill was in contention, rather than hold them up and frustrate them. If that were to happen and a whole Bill was referred because there was one clause in it over which there was some doubt and some cause for a Supreme Court determination, I rather think the Scottish Parliament might have a view to express at the point. The Bill being held up might contain other measures that it was agreed on all sides were very valuable; indeed, the measure under reference might be one where there was agreement about the policy intent but some doubt about whether it was within competency.
The six amendments that the Government have put forward are intended to achieve a number of important changes as well as technical improvements. As I have set out, and my noble friend has made this point, we think that the law officer who is making the limited reference should be responsible for publishing notice of it, rather than the Presiding Officer.
Amendment 12 implements recommendations made by the Subordinate Legislation Committee of the Scottish Parliament. We are taking on board what it said in its report on the delegated powers in the Bill in its 10th report of 2011, Session 3, where it stated that it,
“could envisage situations where the delay in commencement of the specified provisions would possibly require further provision to be made to enable the Act to function as the Parliament intended”.
The new power in subsection (9) is added in response to those comments to give the Scottish Ministers the power to make appropriate consequential provision in that scenario.
Amendment 12 deals with a point that the noble and learned Lord picked up: it modifies Section 28 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 in its application to commencement orders made by the Scottish Ministers under new Section 33A(6). The effect is that those orders, which are to be subject to negative procedure in the Scottish Parliament, must be laid for a minimum period of 40 days rather than the standard 28-day period before they can come into force.
It may be helpful if I also write to noble Lords about this; I spent many sessions trying to get my head around a lot of its implications. The measure is designed to eliminate the risk that the Scottish Parliament passes a negative resolution after provisions in a commencement order made under Section 33A(6) have come into force. In this scenario the resolution would have no effect, as the provisions commenced would by that time already have the force of law. By increasing the laying period to 40 days, if the Parliament passes a negative resolution within that period then, in terms of Section 28 of the 2010 Act as modified, the instrument is not to come into force after that resolution.
Amendment 12 also allows the Supreme Court to provide that an order under new Section 33A(6) may be laid before the Scottish Parliament less than 40 days before it comes into force, in acknowledgement that there may be circumstances where it is desirable to bring provisions of an ASP that were subject to a limited reference into force more urgently.
Amendment 13 amends Section 113 of the 1998 Act so that the useful supplementary order-making powers contained at subsections (2) to (6) and (11) of that section also apply to the powers of Scottish Ministers to make orders under Section 33A(6), (9) and (10). For example, that would allow a consequential order under new section 33A(10) also to make supplementary or incidental provision under the power at Section 113(4)(a).