Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I join those who have indicated that this has been a very good debate. The House has had the benefit of the experience of many people, from academia and from the other place, who have taken part in votes of confidence—or no confidence—in times past. I certainly wish to join many of your Lordships who have expressed their congratulations to my noble friend Lord Cormack on a notable and distinguished maiden speech. He said that he had been in favour in principle in fixed-term Parliaments for some time. I think that I would describe his speech as that of a critical friend. I served in the other place with my noble friend, I think on a sub-committee of the Administration and Accommodation Committee, which he chaired. Perhaps its most significant task when I was on it was to identify those who would appear in the painting of the House of Commons in session in about 1985 or 1986. That chairmanship was just part of the contribution which my noble friend gave to the other place, not only a concern for its fabric, but a concern for, and a passionate commitment to, its workings. That is the experience that he brings to this place and we look forward to his contributions in the future.

Congratulations are also in order to the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy. Although he said that he was a former Whip, I understand that he has recently been appointed to the Whips’ Bench opposite and I congratulate him on that very rapid rise, which no doubt reflects his abilities as a Whip. That is meant to be a compliment.

We have heard a variety of views, from those who are opposed in principle to this, through to those who are very supportive of it and to those who are supportive of it, but want to see things done in different ways. There are those who have indicated that they do not wish any change whatever. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, indicated a level of satisfaction with a constitution that he did not think needed changing. My noble and learned friend Lord Howe expressed the view that he was getting somewhat sceptical about constitutional change, but I am grateful to a number of my noble friends who indicated their support in principle. My noble friend Lady Stowell indicated that it was not necessarily a silver bullet, but nevertheless was an important contribution to try to revitalise our political system.

My noble friend Lord Dobbs had a slightly interesting, but very practical, explanation as to why he supported this, not least in terms of party finance. That may not seem the most obvious reason why one would support it, but for those of us who think back to the debates we had on the Parliamentary Voting Systems and Constituencies Bill, the point was made on more than one occasion that political parties oil the wheel of democracy and my noble friend made an important point. Certainly, under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, there is a regulation of national campaign spending for 12 months before the actual date of poll. Therefore, it is probably preferable that the parties can have a fixed idea of when that is likely to be, rather than have to guess.

This is important because it lends that stability. It particularly lends stability, as my noble friend Lord Marks said, on occasions when there is a coalition Government. It allows Governments and Parliaments to plan for the long term. I take issue with those who say that it does not give the Prime Minister an advantage. Our late colleague Lord Holme of Cheltenham, who chaired the Constitution Select Committee with distinction at one point, asked as long ago as 1991, in words which my noble friend quoted, what people would think about,

“a race in which the Prime Minister is allowed to approach it with his running shoes in one hand and his starting pistol in the other”.—[Official Report, 22/ 5/1991; col. 245.]

The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, although opposed to what is happening and sceptical about the arguments about the Prime Minister, also made the point about the Prime Minister being able to use Dissolution as a threat. It is not only about occasions when Dissolution has been sought by a Prime Minister, it is often about occasions when it was not sought, but was there nevertheless.

I disagree with those who think that this is a shift to the Executive. I believe that neutralising the threat that the Prime Minister has to hang Dissolution over his Back-Benchers may indeed strengthen Back-Benchers, rather than weaken them. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, and my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising, took the view that the Bill does not do what I claim it does; namely, that we believe it should transfer power from the Executive to Parliament.

I noted that the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, acknowledged that it was the Prime Minister giving up a prerogative that he has had the power to exercise for many years. I certainly agree with my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising that the objective must be to shift power from the Executive to Parliament. That is why I believe the Bill helps. This is a Bill that gives Parliament, not the Prime Minister or the Executive, the opportunity to decide when there should be an early general election. That is because of the flexibility, which I will come back to. No longer will the Executive be able to use the threat of a Dissolution against Parliament or their own Back-Benchers.

It is worth remembering that there have quite properly been references to the report of our own Constitution Select Committee. I also remind the House that the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee of the other place, in its report on the Bill, said:

“It is questionable whether a Prime Minister should be able to use his position in government to give him and his party an electoral advantage by choosing to hold the next general election to a schedule that best suits him. We therefore acknowledge the principle behind the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill”.

My noble friend Lord Norton asked about public demand. I am the first to say that it is not the question that comes up first at hustings. I am sure it was not the issue that lost the Labour Party the election last May. However, as the Constitution Select Committee report points out, the issue has been on the constitutional reform agenda for the past 20 years. The report refers to a report from the Institute for Public Policy Research in 1991; a commitment in the Labour Party manifesto in 1992; Private Members’ Bills, which have been referred to, in 2001 and 2008; Liberal Democrat policy documents; and the Liberal Democrat manifestos of 1992 and 1997. As my noble friend Lady Stowell indicated, an opinion poll from 2009—at the height of the expenses scandal—showed considerable public support for the idea of a fixed-term Parliament. As far back as 1998, Professor Blackburn, giving evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in the other place, gave an argument as to why a fixed-term Parliament should be an issue that the committee might look at. He said:

“But if I could finally select just one reform of election law which does carry popular backing and probably also substantial parliamentary support. This is our system of General Election timing which is an extremely important matter in electioneering terms and which clearly operates to the advantage of the government of the day … The trick is to avoid those times when you are unpopular so far as you can. I believe this Committee”—

that is, the Home Affairs Select Committee—

“should examine the case for fixed intervals between general elections”.

I listened to and take on board the criticisms regarding the lack of pre-legislative scrutiny. As I think I indicated when we dealt with the previous Bill, it is very difficult to have pre-legislative scrutiny of a Bill in a first Session. Noble Lords will remember that the original proposal was to have a binding resolution. That was not proceeded with. It was suggested by some of those who have contributed to the debate that it was questionable whether it would be binding. I certainly do not accept the view that was put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Elystan-Morgan, that the simplest thing would be for the Prime Minister to make a declaration. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, then qualified that by saying, “unless in exceptional circumstances we could not go on to 7 May 2015”. That is the point. It would continue the possible uncertainty. One of the reasons for legislating is to make it clear that that would be the position: there will be an election on 7 May 2015, unless the trigger mechanisms come into play.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am trying to cover quite a lot of ground. I hope that I can do justice to the many important contributions that were made during the debate.

I welcome the fact that the Constitution Committee will look at the process for constitutional reform. It occurred to me that if a Parliament could not do much in the way of legislation in its first Session—it is not just constitutional Bills that call for pre-legislative scrutiny—there would not be much time to do much business at all, particularly since a four-year fixed term of Parliament has also been advocated. There will always be that tension as regards legislation that is introduced in the first year of a Parliament. We look forward to the Constitution Committee’s report on the process that it will recommend for constitutional legislation.

I had not anticipated my noble friend Lord Dobbs asking why the election should be held in May as opposed to June or October. The simple answer is that the most recent elections have been held in May, with the exception of the 2001 election when the foot and mouth epidemic occurred. There is always a difficulty with finding other times that do not clash with traditional holiday periods. However, my noble friend has posed an important challenge and we want to reflect on it. I also note that the annual canvass to update the electoral register takes place in October in Great Britain, so that may not be an appropriate time to place yet a further burden on electoral registration officers.

The noble Baroness, Lady Gould, asked whether there could be an extension of the two months beyond the extension. The answer to that is no. My noble friend Lord Rennard asked about primary legislation in this context. I believe that it is appropriate to introduce the relevant measure by order as the latter would have to be passed by both Houses. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, asked what we anticipate might happen. I have asked myself that question. I am not sure that I have an answer but I think that one could anticipate receiving a lot of criticism if one was seen to be making provision for the Government to extend their life, not to shorten it. I have no doubt that if we did not have this measure something would happen that no one could have foreseen and we would wish that we had had it. In the case of the Scottish Parliament, the Presiding Officer has the power to vary the election date by one month either way and I think that in the case of the National Assembly for Wales, the Secretary of State has the power to vary the date by a short period either way—although I cannot remember exactly by how much. The measure that we are discussing has been informed by those practices.

My noble friend Lord Norton asked why Clause 2(2)(a) refers to “a motion” whereas Clause 2(2)(b) refers to “any motion”. I think that “any motion” was chosen because it is followed by,

“expressing confidence in any Government”.

It is clearly a drafting preference. We think that “any motion” or “a motion” would have the same effect. I shall certainly contemplate that matter further, but I think that it is a drafting preference rather than having any significant constitutional importance.

The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, referred to resetting the clock. If there has been an election and a Government have been returned with a substantial majority and a mandate, they should have the opportunity to see that through for a full term. If the clock was not reset, the electorate might find it odd if, having returned a Government with a significant majority, they were then asked some 12 months later to vote again.

I have noted the points made about parliamentary privilege, which the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, raised, as did my noble friend Lord Cormack. I am sure that we will want to look at that issue in Committee but I certainly share the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that the provisions here would ensure that the courts would not interfere in what we believe is very much the space of Parliament.

The key issue is whether Parliaments should last for four or five years. As my noble friend Lord Rennard indicated, there is no absolutely right or wrong answer in that regard—it is a judgment. I indicated that the longer period allows the electorate to make its judgment—my noble friend Lord Marks commented on this—on the policies of a Government as they are seen to be working out in detail over time. I also believe that it allows a Government and Parliament longer to plan their activities. I cannot accept the argument that inevitably the situation has arisen under our present system whereby the fifth year has tended to be a bit of a lame-duck year and that that would necessarily follow if we had fixed-term Parliaments. As has been pointed out by a number of contributors, the fifth year has tended to be a lame-duck year because the Government in office did not think that they could win by cutting and running after four years. Therefore, it has been against a background where they have probably been at a disadvantage anyway.

The point was made by my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart and by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, and I think indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—although I think he was arguing this point in the context of arguing against a five-year term—that the final year, even though it would not be under the same sort of handicap as perhaps 1976-77 or 2009-10, nevertheless would be under a handicap. Even under a fixed-term Parliament, there would be the looming shadow of the forthcoming election. The last year is not as effective a year as the earlier years of a Parliament. That is why I believe that it would be the same in the fourth year of a four-year fixed-term Parliament or the fifth year of a five-year fixed-term Parliament. A four-year fixed-term Parliament therefore would only really allow three years for the Government to put a substantial part of their programme through. I have no doubt whatsoever we will come back to this.

I also just want to say one point. I cannot wholly accept that under a five-year term accountability disappears in the fifth year. I think those of us who have fought elections and have been elected know only too well as the election comes up accountability is a very, very strong thing indeed. When one is about to go and face one’s constituents accountability is very effective.

Another key issue, to which I am sure we will return in later stages of the Bill, is the mechanism. I absolutely endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said about there being a spectrum from total flexibility, which you might say we have got at the moment with an end point, a maximum turn with total flexibility and on to rigidity. I do not think that anyone was arguing in this debate for total rigidity. There is a consensus among supporters of the fixed-term Parliament over there being some degree of flexibility; if there is a political imperative or the Government completely fail there must be a mechanism for triggering an election. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said that the Constitution Committee broadly endorsed the two mechanisms for triggering an election set out in the Bill but I have listened to the concerns that have been raised. A number of historic examples have been given but it is always difficult to say what would have happened in the past under a future system. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, acknowledged this. Edward Heath in 1974 obviously wanted a dissolution. The Opposition would have agreed and they would have got the two-thirds majority for an election. Likewise, the position in 1924 was also raised by, I think, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon in an intervention on my opening speech.

In January 1924 the Conservative Government resigned after a defeat on the Queen’s Speech address but that did not trigger a general election. It actually triggered the formation of Ramsay MacDonald’s Administration. The draft Cabinet manual which was published in December last year indicates that at the moment the convention is that the Prime Minister either advises Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament or the Government resign and a new Government from the existing Chamber can be found, as indeed happened in, I think, January 1924.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Am I right in saying that the election took place at the beginning of 1924 and Baldwin’s Government failed to win on the first Queen’s Speech and that is why we moved straight from Stanley Baldwin to Ramsay MacDonald? It would have been impractical to have gone straight to an election at that point.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Indeed, and that was the point that I think the noble and learned Lord raised in his speech. What happens in the first Queen’s Speech after an election? I think unless people are prepared to have election after election after election or the potential for that there would be an opportunity for another Government to be formed. The draft Cabinet manual published for consultation in December last year indicated that too. There would either be a dissolution or another Administration would be formed. It is that dual possibility that the Bill seeks to address.

I listened carefully to those who argued that the wording as to what constitutes a vote of no confidence needs tightening up. In response to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place, the Government indicated a willingness to listen to suggestions on how that might be done. Those suggestions were not forthcoming during the Bill’s progress through the other place. I have certainly thought hard about it and wonder whether trying to be too specific might cause more problems than if one leaves the wording as it is. I know that my noble friend Lord Norton has views on this matter which it will be interesting to hear and explore in Committee. However, one recognises an elephant when one sees it. If it waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is generally a duck. There is an issue here, but the more I have thought about it, the more I have found that trying to find a solution might cause more problems than leaving it, as it is at the moment, to the Speaker’s discretion. If it is not to be the Speaker, I do not think that it would be appropriate, given what has been said, for a member of the Executive to sign. I do not believe that leaving it as it is would cause the difficulties that have been suggested.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, talked about manipulation. The Constitution Committee indicated that the position is indeed open to abuse, stating:

“We conclude that, if the Bill is passed, it would not be possible to prevent a government using a vote of no confidence to bring about an early election. To do so would be seen by many as an abuse of the Act's provisions and would undermine the fixed-term principle”.

I accept that that is possible, but I believe that it would be identified as an abuse. It would be a matter of politics. As far as I can see, the only way in which one can stop any kind of abuse is to have a rigid scheme, which no one apparently supports. That is why I have difficulty with those who have advocated that we keep things simple and that a simple majority of one in a vote of no confidence should be enough to trigger Dissolution. That would make the position worse in terms of the potential manipulation that the noble and learned Lord suggested could happen under the Bill. It would be even more likely to happen under a Bill which allowed for a simple majority of one in a vote of no confidence. It could be much more readily arranged.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is the position.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is not the position, because the Bill provides for a 14-day period following a vote of no confidence in which it could be seen whether another Government could be formed. That is not the same thing as going to the Palace the morning after a vote of confidence on a majority of one. If manipulation is possible under this Bill—unless the fixed terms are rigid, it is impossible to avoid—the opportunity for manipulation under a Dissolution on a simple majority of one is even greater. However, the important point is identified by the Constitution Committee: it would be seen as an abuse. That would be a matter for political debate and political comment and the electorate are the ultimate arbiters.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I said that that was what is envisaged because the proposition with which one has to deal is that the Government of the day with a majority procure a vote of no confidence in themselves—I have in mind the Heath example, where the Opposition do not agree. If that is the position, the Government of the day will also be able to stop anything happening in the following 14 days.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it makes it much more of a process and an abuse of that process would be seen. However, as we indicated in our response to the report of the Constitution Committee, we accept that the scenario described would be possible, but, as the committee pointed out, it would be a clear abuse of the Act’s provisions and we do not believe that that outcome would be likely. Such an abuse has been possible in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly—there would be a 28-day period rather than a 14-day period following a vote of no confidence—but it simply has not happened because I think that people recognise the consequences of trying to manipulate a situation to bring that about.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, helpfully confirmed in his winding-up that the Labour Party is still committed—although not entirely with the support of everyone behind him—to the idea of fixed-term Parliaments, but he objected to the way it might be done. I have no doubt that the Labour Party gave this very careful thought and I am sure that in Committee we will see the benefit of that thought in the kind of the amendments that he tables to address this. It is identified by anyone who supports a fixed term that there has to be an element of flexibility in how you do it.

I conclude by acknowledging, as have my noble friends Lord Cormack and Lord Dobbs, and many others, including the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in his winding-up, the importance of scrutiny and the important work that we will do at the ensuing stages of this Bill. It is quite clear that there is a lot of meat for the House to get its teeth into. I look forward to engaging with that, and on that note I urge the House to support this Bill and give it a Second Reading.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.