Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Viscount Camrose

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

In the example I gave, I was not willing to use a digital system to provide a guarantee for my son’s accommodation in the private sector. I understand that that would not be protected and that, therefore, someone might not be able to rent a flat, for example, because they cannot provide physical ID.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The Bill does not change the requirements in this sense. If any organisation chooses to provide its services on a digital basis only, that is up to that organisation, and it is up to consumers whether they choose to use it. It makes no changes to the requirements in that space.

I will now speak to the amendment that seeks to remove Clause 80. Clause 80 enables the Secretary of State to ask accredited conformity assessment bodies and registered DVS providers to provide information which is reasonably required to carry out her functions under Part 2 of the Bill. The Bill sets out a clear process that the Secretary of State must follow when requesting this information, as well as explicit safeguards for her use of the power. These safeguards will ensure that DVS providers and conformity assessment bodies have to provide only information necessary for the functioning of this part of the Bill.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, can I point out, on the interests of the EU, that it does not go just one way? There is a question around investment as well. For example, any large bank that is currently running a data-processing facility in this country that covers the whole of Europe may decide, if we lose data adequacy, to move it to Europe. Anyone considering setting up such a thing would probably go for Europe rather than here. There is therefore an investment draw for the EU here.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I do not know what I could possibly have said to create the impression that the Government are flying blind on this matter. We continue to engage extensively with the EU at junior official, senior official and ministerial level in order to ensure that our proposed reforms are fully understood and that there are no surprises. We engage with multiple expert stakeholders from both the EU side and the UK side. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, a number of experts have submitted evidence to the House’s inquiry on EU-UK data adequacy and have made clear their views that the DPDI reforms set out in this Bill are compatible with EU adequacy. We continue to engage with the EU throughout. I do not want to be glib or blithe about the risks; we recognise the risks but it is vital—

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, to go back to some of the surveillance points, one of the issues is the speed at which technology is changing, with artificial intelligence and all the other things we are seeing. One of the roles of the commissioner has been to keep an eye on how technology is changing and to make recommendations as to what we do about the impacts of that. I cannot hear, in anything the noble Viscount is saying, how that role is replicated in what is being proposed. Can he enlighten me?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, indeed. In many ways, this is advantageous. The Information Commissioner obviously has a focus on data privacy, whereas the various other organisations, particularly BSCC, EHRC and the FINDS Board, have subject-specific areas of expertise on which they will be better placed to horizon-scan and identify new emerging risks from technologies most relevant to their area.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Is the noble Viscount saying that splitting it all up into multiple different places is more effective than having a single dedicated office to consider these things? I must say, I find that very hard to understand.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I do not think we are moving from a simple position. We are moving from a very complex position to a less complex position.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Viscount Camrose

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Fox, speaking on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Lansley for using these amendments to raise the very important and quite subtle issues of merger reporting and assessment in digital markets. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Tyrie and Lord Bassam, and my noble friend Lady Harding for their thoughtful contributions.

Amendment 59, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would extend the duty to report possible mergers, provided for in Chapter 5 of Part 1, beyond firms designated with SMS to also include firms that are subject to a designation investigation. Firms can use anti-competitive mergers to further entrench their powerful market positions, especially in digital markets, where fast-acting damage to competition can be difficult or impossible to reverse. That is why SMS firms will be required to report certain possible mergers to the CMA before they complete. However—this may be a philosophical objection as much as anything else—it would not be proportionate or in keeping with the targeted and evidence-based approach of our regime to apply this duty to firms before the conclusion of a designation investigation.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that firms under designation investigation may hold powerful positions in the market; some may even have been the subject of previous CMA scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is right that the duty to report should apply only once a firm has been found to have substantial and entrenched market power following a rigorous assessment and SMS designation. To reassure noble Lords, firms under SMS designation investigation will of course remain subject to the economy-wide merger regime. The CMA will be able to intervene where their mergers would harm competition in the UK.

Amendment 60 from my noble friend Lord Lansley—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Before the noble Viscount moves on to the next amendment, there seems to be a slight logical problem here, in the sense that presumably the new enhanced regime was set at the level it was because those mergers are felt to be significant for a strategic market status entity. If it were to do such a merger during an investigation, it would presumably impact potentially on whether the CMA believes that it meets the SMS, and therefore it must be important that the CMA is informed about acquisitions that could impact the investigation itself. It seems that there is a circularity here, but the noble Viscount has not addressed that.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I do indeed recognise it. As I say, it is a difficult one because equally, one cannot treat undesignated firms as designated until the designation has taken place. I am very happy to carry on considering this with the noble Lord, because the point is a powerful and important one. Before moving on, I just point out that over the course of the necessary consultation activities, it would of course emerge that a firm was considering or evaluating a merger.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

As somebody who spent most of his life doing mergers and acquisitions, I can say that they are not always made public.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As I said, I am very happy to carry on with this; there is a sense of rounding up the usual suspects otherwise.

Amendment 60 from my noble friend Lord Lansley is intended to give the CMA jurisdiction to intervene in a merger when an SMS firm seeks to remove or absorb a smaller firm that could reasonably be expected to compete with it in future. I agree that it is important to ensure that the CMA can act against harmful mergers, including so-called killer acquisitions. I reassure my noble friend that the CMA can and does do so under the current legislative framework.

When reviewing a merger, the CMA can already consider whether it removes a potential future competitor. This can be seen in the Meta/Giphy case where, in its forward-looking assessment, the CMA found that the merger removed Giphy as a potential challenger and consequently ordered Meta to sell Giphy. The decision was upheld by the CAT, which I hope and think shows that the CMA has the necessary legislative cover.

It has been suggested that the CMA and other regulators have not scrutinised mergers by large digital firms enough in the past. However, since the Furman review, the CMA has undertaken a comprehensive review of its merger assessment guidelines and updated them in 2021 to ensure that they more clearly reflect the CMA’s current thinking and practice on digital markets, drawing on conclusions from expert reports, analysis and cases.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for raising that point. He has alluded a number of times during our conversations to ensuring that the working culture within the CMA is suitably postured to deal with a fast-moving regime. I can indicate that I certainly have sympathy with the intent of enhancing the accountability both to Parliament and government of the CMA—with this and other ends in mind, but to ensure that it remains assiduous in its identification of opportunities to intervene.

The Bill will enhance the CMA’s ability to act to prevent harmful mergers by SMS firms. The reporting requirement will improve the transparency of merger activity in digital markets. Additionally, Clause 127 in Part 2 and Schedule 4 will introduce a new acquirer-focused jurisdiction threshold, which provides an additional basis for the CMA to review mergers involving large firms, including SMS firms.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Lansley will be reassured for the time being and not press their amendments.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but interesting debate. I should say that I forgot to thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who sadly really is not here at the moment, for supporting my amendment. He is here in the spirit of the noble Lord, Lord Fox.

We have heard some excellent points—in particular the description from the noble Lords, Lord Lansley, Lord Fox and Lord Tyrie, of how regulating acquisitions in this sector is difficult and challenging. It is a sector where even quite small and apparently insignificant acquisitions can end up having a really substantial impact; we had the description from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, of the change in culture that will be required at the CMA to deal with that. This is an area that the Government will have to continue thinking about. We might want to discuss this further between now and Report.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, for correcting me on Google’s desire to co-operate with the competition authorities, which is obviously most welcome. I am grateful for her correction. She is also right that my Amendment 59 is a small one, but I think that it is important, and I very much welcome the Minister’s offer to discuss it further as the process goes on. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 59.

Animal Torture: Online Videos

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Viscount Camrose

Tuesday 27th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I have the numbers prosecuted for animal cruelty in my notes somewhere; I will happily write to the noble Lord.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, at the moment the law we have been talking about has been preventing those who are perpetrating the harm and publishing it, but is there any merit in going after the people who are watching it and paying for it and have it on their computers—the consumers who ultimately are generating the harm at the end?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed. I stress that laws preventing these behaviours are already in existence, and the Online Safety Bill supports those laws in some sense. If content is illegal, platforms are obliged to take it down. If content creates a risk of harm to children, again, platforms are obliged to take it down. In the case of the largest platforms, the so-called category 1 platforms, if content violates their terms of service, they are obliged to take it down.