Passport e-Gates Network Outage

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 13th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will address the last points first. As I said, it was not a software issue that caused this particular outage, so I can deal with that relatively straightforwardly. As regards government contracts, as the noble Lord will be aware, I think they are all published on GOV.UK. I am not sure if this one was or if I am wrong there, but I will check and find out and come back as required.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Is it redacted?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I will also check on that.

I did not know about the Amadeus takeover of this particular Portuguese company, but I will make further inquiries and, if there is more to be said, I will write to the noble Lord.

Police Uplift Programme

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 2nd May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness will be aware that a number of ongoing reviews on matters such as dismissals are due to conclude very shortly. She makes some very good points about victims, and we are committed to delivering justice for victims and putting some of the vile offenders referred to behind bars for longer, but there is obviously still a long way to go. We have previously discussed at the Dispatch Box some of the factors the noble Baroness mentioned and, while I will not go into them in detail again, I note that programmes such as Operation Soteria are delivering meaningful results.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The noble Lord was quite right in saying that I was going to mention fraud. The Statement says that crime is falling, excluding fraud. Fraud remains a substantial growth industry and now accounts for over 40% of all crime against the individual. The noble Lord agreed last week that the current level of law enforcement resources aimed at it is insufficient. He skilfully shot my fox earlier by referring to the national fraud strategy that is to be issued this week, which is an improvement on “imminently” and “shortly”. How many of these 20,591 officers who have been recruited have specialist fraud skills?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord asks a question which I cannot answer at the moment. I will endeavour to find out those statistics and I would hope that some of those questions about resourcing will be dealt with on publication of the strategy this week. As regards the overall uplift, as I said earlier, 91% of the new intake, as it were, are involved in frontline policing.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Thursday 27th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords—too numerous to mention—who have participated in this debate, and I shall try to address all the points put to me, but I apologise if I do not name everybody individually.

I feel I should declare an interest: I have owned and been a director of small businesses, not all of them successful—like my noble friend, Lord Leigh—and to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, I declare an interest as a tall man.

I will start with the amendments linked specifically to failure to prevent offences. I welcome the broad support today for the government amendments, which would, I emphasise, cover all sectors, and that includes telecoms companies. I hope that they deliver most of what the other amendments intend. However, I have noted that concerns remain. Obviously, I listened to the debate very carefully, including on the scope and reach of the new offence.

Before I turn specifically to the amendments, I reassure my noble friend Lady Morgan that the fraud strategy really is imminent. She is absolutely right: I am really keen to see it. I say to my noble friend Lord Leigh that his point about accounting principles was very interesting, but the design of the definition of large companies comes from the Companies Act 2006.

I note the wider offence lists put forward in Amendments 96, 97, 98 and 99, tabled in the names of my noble and learned friend, Lord Garnier, my noble friend Lord Agnew, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. In particular, noble Lords seek to ensure that money laundering is covered by the new failure to prevent offence. The Government have consulted with law enforcement and prosecutors, and we are satisfied that all the priority offences have been included.

We have carefully examined the wider offence list and determined that they are not appropriate to include because they would duplicate existing regimes, cause repetition with other existing offences, are too broad or relate to preparatory offences. It is also worth noting that the Law Commission report published in June 2022 agrees with this. It highlighted that Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, as Amendment 98 suggests, while a good starting point for considerations, would be too broad.

I turn to the proposed failure to prevent money laundering offence, as in Amendment 99, tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. The UK already has a strong anti-money laundering regime which requires regulated sectors to implement a comprehensive set of measures to prevent money laundering. Corporations and individuals can face serious civil and criminal penalties if they fail to do so.

A failure to prevent money laundering offence would duplicate the systems, controls and penalties of the existing regime. Furthermore, it would extend anti-money laundering obligations to organisations with very low risk, which would be disproportionate. Any necessary anti-money laundering measures can be implemented through the existing regime. The Law Commission agreed with this point, noting that any offences to cover breaches of money laundering would create additional positive duties on organisations which would overlap with the duties under the anti-money laundering regime.

The Government’s review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime, published in June 2022, concluded that existing regulatory requirements allow for businesses to take a risk-based approach to their obligations, meaning their compliance activities can be targeted at areas of highest risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. The review also committed the Government to further analysis and public consultation to identify the best path for reform of the anti-money laundering supervisory regime. Further improvements to the UK’s anti-money laundering framework are therefore best targeted by strengthening and improving the existing regime, rather than by the creation of a new parallel regime. The Government have already committed to undertake further consultation on the anti-money laundering supervisory regime and continue to review the anti-money laundering framework.

Amendment 99 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier also proposes a failure to prevent sanctions evasion offence. The UK can already impose a range of criminal and civil penalties against corporations and individuals for breaches of UK sanctions. Powers were strengthened last year when we moved civil penalties for financial sanctions on to a strict liability basis. Introducing a failure to prevent offence would duplicate the existing regime. On the scope of the offences, government Amendment 84B contains a power in secondary legislation to update the list when required.

I turn to Amendments 84AA, 84CA, 84CB and 84CC, on the threshold for the new offence, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I thank him for talking me through his concerns last week and I note that most other noble Lords have supported its intention. I will endeavour to set out the Government’s position on this. Our analysis shows that small businesses would be disproportionately affected by the costs of complying with a failure to prevent fraud offence. The total cost to small and medium-sized enterprises would amount to billions of pounds in year one and hundreds of millions in each subsequent year. This would significantly increase the cost of the measure, which is £98.5 million per annum with the threshold included. An affirmative power—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

If the Government have done some analysis on that, could they share it with us? That would be very helpful.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am happy to investigate whether that is possible. If it is, I will do so.

An affirmative power to add a threshold in future, as proposed by the noble Lord’s amendments, would have limited impact on this burden, with the highest costs already borne should the offence apply to smaller organisations in year one. It is also important that we consider the cumulative compliance cost for SMEs across multiple government regulations, rather than seeing these fraud measures in isolation. Excluding SMEs from the new offence does not mean they can get away with fraud; powers already exist to prosecute small companies, their owners and their employees for criminal acts. It is currently easier to hold these companies to account than larger organisations with complex structures.

The Government’s proposed failure to prevent fraud offence will strengthen powers to tackle fraud by large organisations, ensuring that companies with the biggest customer bases which risk causing the most harm take extra steps to prevent fraud.

We will keep the threshold under review and can amend it through secondary legislation, if required. I know that some noble Lords argue that this power should be used the other way. However, given the potentially chilling impact on small businesses, I hope that noble Lords will agree that it is better to understand the impact on large companies once the measures are implemented, as my noble friend Lord Leigh has highlighted—as well as any trickle-down effect on smaller companies—before applying it more widely. The regulation-making power in the Government’s Amendment 84C enables this approach. The Government therefore firmly consider that the proposed failure to prevent fraud offence strikes an appropriate balance between the crime prevention benefits and the burden placed on business.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

We will come on to this in more detail on a later group. Perhaps we should leave the detail of this debate until the third group, which we will get to at some point.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The Minister referred earlier to questions about groups of companies and the fact that an employee of a subsidiary would still be an associate of a holding company. That does not address the question that I was asking. Are the thresholds in Amendment 84C on an individual entity basis or a consolidated basis? There is a big difference between the two. A group could happily have a small subsidiary and say, “An employee of that did it, so we are off the hook”.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I appreciate the point that the noble Lord was making and apologise for not addressing it more directly. I will refrain from answering that now and will write. I think I know how it is done, but I am not an accountant and I do not want to say something that he will pick apart. If he will indulge me, I will write on that subject with greater clarity to make sure that I am not making a mistake.

I thank all noble Lords for their participation in this debate and for their patience as I have taken them through a fairly long speech on the Government’s positions on these issues. We agree that reform is needed and, as we have made clear, the Government’s amendments represent a major step in delivering it. I hope that further explanation has reassured noble Lords on why we have presented the amendments with the scope and reach that they contain, and that the Government are committed to reform of the identification doctrine. I therefore very much hope that noble Lords will support the government amendments and not seek to move their own.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes for their amendments on failure to prevent economic crime, and all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

I hope that my comments during our debate earlier today will have provided some reassurance on the Government’s ambitions to take action in this area, including the introduction of a new offence of failure to prevent fraud. These amendments obviously cover some of the same ground so I will seek not to repeat myself too much on issues such as the scope and threshold of the Government’s amendments but to focus more on what I understand to be the wider thrust of Amendments 91 and 94.

Before I get on to that, I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that the fraud strategy is a couple of hours closer. I remind noble Lords that there is an all-Peers drop-in session on 9 May to discuss the three Bills that are currently under way through Parliament: this Bill, the Online Safety Bill and the Financial Services and Markets Bill. That will bring some of the discussions together, as suggested by my noble friend Lady Morgan. I refute the allegation that the Government are not doing very much. Those three Bills themselves prove that we are indeed intent on fixing many or all of the problems that have been identified—the Government of course take these problems seriously.

I turn to the amendments in this group. The Government’s offence does not extend to services that facilitate fraud—that is, companies whose services are misused by third parties to carry out fraud. Examples include social media and telecoms companies whose services are used to promote fraudulent schemes, as has been pointed out, and banks and crypto exchanges, which fraudsters use to process the payments. If these companies or their employees commit fraud, they will be in scope, but not where their services are misused by others.

The Government agree that companies that facilitate fraud, even if they are not complicit in the offending, must do more to prevent and detect it. In doing so, they can protect their customers and the wider public from fraud, which, as has been discussed at length, causes significant damage to wider society and individuals —we must not forget them. However, we intend for this to be achieved by seeing through existing plans for regulatory and voluntary activity, rather than by creating a new offence which risks duplicating those existing approaches.

Amendment 91, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, proposes a regulatory duty to prevent economic crime, enforced by regulators. In relation to organisations that commit fraud, we can achieve a similar effect that incentivises organisations to put fraud controls in place through the Government’s approach: an offence enforced by law enforcement. Our approach allows all sectors to be in scope, not just regulated bodies, and is less resource-intensive for business and the public sector than establishing new regulatory approaches. In relation to the facilitation of fraud, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that action is already under way to tackle this. I will address some of the sectors mentioned in today’s debate and Amendment 91, which I hope will provide some further reassurance.

The Online Safety Bill will require all in-scope tech companies, including social media companies, to take action to tackle fraud where it is facilitated through user-generated content or via search results. They must put in place systems and processes to prevent users encountering fraudulent content through their platforms and to swiftly remove any such content available through their platform. Without wishing to single out any particular company for attention, I reassure my noble friend Lady Morgan that Airbnb, which she referenced, would of course be in scope.

Additionally, there will be a duty on the largest social media and search engines requiring them to prevent fraudulent adverts appearing on their services. The Bill gives Ofcom, as regulator, robust enforcement powers, allowing it to impose significant financial penalties on services that do not fulfil its duties. Ofcom will publish codes of practice to set out further details on what platforms must do to meet their duties under the Online Safety Bill.

The “failure to prevent” offence operates in a similar way to the Online Safety Bill, by setting out reasonable steps to be taken, with the ability to fine companies that fail to fulfil their duties. Expanding the “failure to prevent fraud” offence in the ECCT Bill to cover facilitation of fraud would create duplication for tech companies, which would have to follow two parallel regimes in relation to facilitation of fraud, potentially creating confusion for businesses.

Noble Lords also raised the role of telecoms companies, including the content of messages passed over their networks. The telecoms industry is already extensively regulated by Ofcom, which is active in encouraging the industry to tackle scam calls and texts, including through regulation and guidance. This includes new measures that will take effect shortly to tackle the spoofing or disguising of UK telephone numbers from overseas. As it should be, the telecoms industry has been an active partner in the fight against scams, with broadband and mobile providers signing up to the Home Office’s Telecommunications Fraud Sector Charter and committing to work with the Government to reduce the use of their networks by criminals.

However, it is important to recognise that telecoms operators are not able to view the content of messages passing over their networks. While they employ sophisticated algorithms to identify and block hundreds of millions of fraudulent or scam messages and calls, the rapid evolution of threats creates challenges to pre-emptive action. This means that a facilitation offence could potentially have a disproportionate effect on the industry and the operation of telecommunications in the UK.

Amendment 91 also references the Financial Conduct Authority. The FCA is working closely with banks and other financial institutions to reduce the role they play in facilitating fraud and to identify further controls that can be put in place to protect the public from scams. In addition, the Payment Systems Regulator is introducing new requirements for financial institutions to reimburse fraud victims, which will create strong incentives to improve fraud controls, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

In respect of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, noble Lords will be aware from Tuesday’s debate that Clause 183 of the Bill already inserts a regulatory objective in the Legal Services Act 2007, focusing on promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime. This measure affirms the duties of the regulators, the Legal Services Board and the regulated communities to uphold the economic crime agenda.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also referenced the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. Amendment 91 also references that organisation and other relevant regulators of accountants. As I said, I am aware that several noble Lords have declared their association with that organisation.

As noble Lords will be aware, ICAEW is a professional and supervisory body for chartered accountants. Its work in areas regulated by law—for example, audit, anti-money laundering, local audit, investment business, insolvency and probate—is monitored by oversight bodies such as the Insolvency Service, the FCA, the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Legal Services Board. ICAEW has been proactive in the industry fight against fraud, leading the sector in negotiating and delivering the Accountancy Fraud Sector Charter, published in 2021, and is an active member of the counter-fraud community, contributing to all levels of governance across the threat landscape. It is a co-signatory to the Economic Crime Plan and associated actions.

As I set out in our earlier debate, the offence introduced via the Government’s amendments covers fraud and false accounting, while keeping money-laundering responsibilities contained under the existing regulatory regime. That ensures that the offence is targeted, focused on offences most likely to be committed by corporations and where prevention can have the most impact and not duplicative of existing regimes.

I note the wider offence lists put forward under the noble Baroness’s amendment, but—as we debated at length earlier today—we are satisfied through discussions with law enforcement and prosecutors that all the priority offences have been included. There is a power in secondary legislation to update the list when required. We have also touched on the issue of the threshold in the government amendment that means it applies—at least initially—only to large organisations. As I set out earlier, this is to avoid disproportionate burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises and ensure our economy encourages people to open and grow businesses. Of course, we encourage small organisations to take steps to prevent fraud and there are, as I mentioned in an earlier group, existing powers to prosecute small organisations and their employees if they commit fraud, but we need to keep the total regulatory burden in check.

There have been cross-party calls for the Government’s failure to prevent fraud offence both in this House and in the other place, as well as across civil society. The Government have listened and introduced amendments. In addition to the legislative measures proposed, the Government continue to work closely with regulators and wider sectors to tackle fraud and set out the actions expected of industry. I am afraid that the Government therefore view these amendments as duplicative of measures already being taken forward—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am a little confused, because we seem to be talking now about the previous amendments, where an associate of the body commits fraud with the intention to benefit the body, which is a very different thing to the amendments we are looking at at the moment. The situations we have been talking about—the scams, and so on—would not, as I think we established fairly clearly in debate on the first group, be covered by that. Will the Minister please address the issue of scams and what these amendments are trying to address, rather than the rather different offence that was created by the first group of amendments?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have already addressed that a little earlier when I was talking about the various codes that we are asking telecoms companies to sign up to via Ofcom. I am wrapping up now, so I am bringing it all together—or attempting to.

The Government therefore view these amendments as duplicative of measures already being taken forward and not achieving their intentions. I of course commit to read page 22, in answer to my noble friend, but I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lady Morgan not to press their amendments.

Corruption

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 26th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness will be aware that the publication of the new fraud strategy is imminent. As I referred to in my earlier Answer, the second iteration of the anti-corruption strategy is also being worked through at this moment. There will be a lot more to say on that in the very near future.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, may I push the Minister on resources, as 41% of all crime against the individual is fraud and 1% of law enforcement resources are applied to it? Is that really sufficient?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

When put in numbers like that, no. However, as I have just said, the fraud strategy is due to be published next week. That is a multiagency approach to tackling fraud. It will be outlined in considerable detail.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I have to say that I am becoming increasingly concerned as we go through this process that, every time we raise concerns about things, we are told that everything is fine. That is what we are being told now—that HMRC is doing a really good job of the ML regulation. The truth is that we have massive quantities of money laundering going through the UK market, and in many cases that is enabled by people who are regulated by the HMRC—a lot of the small entities particularly. So there is a problem, and we keep being told that it is not that serious. It worries me substantially that we are not really taking this seriously or trying to solve the serious problem that this country has. We have become a laughing stock and are known as the “London laundromat”. It is embarrassing.

Can I ask a supplementary question? As I mentioned before, the ACSPs are going to be performing the verification processes, which are not actually going to be covered by the anti-money laundering regulations. The people doing it have to be registered with an anti-money laundering regulator, but the regulators themselves do not actually have any process set out for ensuring that the verification processes put in this Bill are covered. How do we bridge that gap?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have to say to the noble Lord that I did not anywhere say that the Government say that everything is under control and perfectly fine. As the noble Lord will be aware, the anti-money laundering regulations themselves are due to be looked at.

The second part of his question relates to why HMRC does not supervise the TCSPs properly, allegedly —but it does.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am looking forward to when this Bill goes through and becomes an Act as to the verification processes being put in place by the Bill by the ACSPs.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Ah, the noble Lord said ACSPs—my apologies. I misheard an acronym. In that case, I shall have to write on that, because I do not know the answer.

Scammers

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have already said, the National Audit Office report is going to inform the new fraud strategy. I reassure noble Lords that this is taken incredibly seriously. Alongside the fraud strategy that is due to be published shortly, we are providing more than £10 million to the City of London Police to upgrade Action Fraud, which has come under some criticism in the past. Next year, a new user-friendly and accessible reporting tool and website will be launched, offering an improved experience for victims and simpler pathways to access further support and guidance. Overall, £400 million is being allocated to economic crime, of which £100 million is being spent on the prevention of fraud.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have been privileged to be a member of your Lordships’ Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee which reported on Friday. I commend the report to the Minister and hope he has read it. One of the findings, which I think surprised all of us, is that it is not in fact the elderly who are most at risk from fraud but young people, who are also at risk of becoming money-laundering mules. Will the Government consider strengthening financial education for primary and secondary school children to equip them with the tools they need to stop being victims?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is quite right: in the year to March 2022 people aged over 75 were less likely to be a victim of fraud than those aged between 16 and 74. He makes an extremely good point and I will take it back to the Department for Education.