Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Eatwell

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, very briefly, I support the noble Baroness’s amendments. Perhaps I would say that as a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—as one of the majority of us in this Room, I should say, who are members of that committee.

I see this as working closely alongside the reporting amendments that we discussed on Thursday. When we were talking about the reporting requirements the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, mentioned that it is all very well issuing reports, but not if there is no one to read them. This gives us somebody to read them. It is a fairly light-touch requirement: it is an obligation to notify but does not give any obligation on anybody to do anything with it, unless they feel they need to and that it is important. I hope that this simple measure, alongside the reporting discussions we had last week, will be something that the Minister is minded to accept.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, perhaps I might suggest that it would be wise of the Minister, if I may be so bold, to look warmly on the amendment. Discussions around the accountability issue were a persistent theme in the debates on what is now the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and led as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, to the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House, charged with the responsibility for maintaining parliamentary accountability of financial services regulators. I can assure him that if the Treasury does not accept this amendment, he will become weary of the number of times that it will come back again and again—the reason being simply that the committee feels strongly that its role is now a crucial part of the regulatory framework in the UK and that the reports to the committee effectively establish the groundwork of its role in pursuing the accountability agenda.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Eatwell

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments, including my Amendment 10, probes the reasons for including all banks in the scope of the Bill, rather than just the smaller banks, as originally envisaged in the consultation that started in January. The first sentence of the consultation was very clear:

“This consultation sets out the government’s intention to enhance and keep up to date the UK’s Special Resolution Regime … providing a new mechanism to facilitate use of certain existing stabilisation powers to manage the failure of small banks”.


But, as we have heard, it is not restricted to small banks. Most of the amendments in this group would remove from the scope of the Bill those banks that are required to hold MREL and would be subject to bail-in procedures using those MREL resources. I think the number of separate but similar amendments that we seem to have is probably down to the fact that this all happened in recess, and we did not have the opportunity to get together. I am sure that if the Minister is not able to satisfy us, we will be able to coalesce around something in common.

It is worth quoting from paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes:

“This means taxpayers are exposed if a small bank failure is judged to require resolution action but the firm in question does not possess sufficient MREL resources to provide for recapitalisation, unlike larger banks that do possess these resources”.


If larger banks possess those resources, as they are required to do, why do we need them to be subject to the process envisaged by the Bill? The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, talked about the glide path situation where a bank has not quite got there—yes, I see that point—but for those that are there, does this not imply that we are not confident that the existing MREL scheme is sufficient? If there is a problem with the MREL scheme, surely it would be better to fix that rather than adding a new process on top of it.

So could the noble Lord please clarify under exactly which circumstances he sees the recapitalisation process in the Bill being used for a failing MREL bank? Is there a concern that the MREL resources are insufficient? Other than glide path situations, that is the only logical reason I can see to include big banks in the scope of the Bill.

Secondly, not having the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I do not really understand how the two processes would work together. Is this an either/or situation; is it either a bail-in using MREL resources or a recapitalisation? If that is the case, surely there is a risk that the industry would be required to fund the recapitalisation of banks with large balance sheets instead of the costs being borne by the failed bank’s shareholders and subordinated debt holders. That would create a potential moral hazard. Or is it a combined process where the MREL resources would be used first and, if insufficient, the recapitalisation would follow on top? If that is the case, it implies that there is a concern that the MREL funds are insufficient. The best way forward would be to fix that problem rather than add another process, as I said before.

So could the noble Lord please clearly explain how he sees the two processes working together? I am drawn to the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, of a worked example between now and Report to help us see how that could work. In particular, can he clearly confirm that the recapitalisation process can never be used to reduce the losses of a failing bank’s shareholders or creditors?

In the absence of a strong explanation of why, contrary to the originally stated intention, the scope of the Bill has been extended to larger banks, I would be minded to support amendments on Report that restrict its scope to exclude MREL banks.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 11 also—I think rather neatly—confines the Bill to what are defined as small banks. However, my concern is somewhat different from those voiced by noble Lords until now. It is that the whole approach to the resolution regime suggests that banks fail one at a time and not all together. Anyone who went through the experience of 2007 to 2009 knows that, in a systemic crisis, it is possible for all the banks in the country to be suffering major problems at the same time. In the circumstances of a systemic crisis, I fear that the mechanism proposed in the Bill could be a source of contagion, in the sense that the cost of the collapse of a bank, or of many banks together, would be seen by the market as imposing costs, which are now unbearable, on other parts of the banking sector.

This comes down to two issues—that of contagion and, I am afraid, that of persistent complacency. The Treasury and the Bank of England refuse to face up to the fact that, in the end, it is the taxpayer who will pay in a systemic crisis.

I will deal first with contagion. The levy links the financial failure of a bank or number of banks to the banking sector as a whole. Does this create a contagion effect? It must be remembered that much of contagion is created by the expectation of a cost, not just the reality. Expectation then becomes the parent of reality. It can reasonably be expected that the failure of a small bank would be manageable under the resolution regimes set out by the Bank of England and discussed in this Bill and its explanatory documents.

However, there are two fundamental problems where one could have significant contagion. One would be multiple failures, an issue I will address in a moment. The other is the potential failure of a big bank, because the Bill and the Explanatory Notes explicitly refer these mechanisms to big banks as well as small ones.

I will take the issue of the failure of multiple banks or a big bank. I wrote to the Financial Secretary about this and he very kindly wrote back a very valuable explanation. I presume that his letter has been circulated to the people who took part—no, I see that it has not. Well, I will quote a bit of it, because it seems to reveal the problem that I am identifying. He refers to multiple bank failures, but I would apply the same thing to a big bank failure. He says that there will be levies when the bank fails and adds:

“These levies are subject to an affordability cap”—


I did not know that—

“by the Prudential Regulation Authority based on how much the sector can safely be levied in a given year. This cap is currently set at £1.5 billion. If multiple firm failures resulting in a recapitalisation requirement is under £1.5 billion, the Government would expect the FSCS to borrow from its commercial borrowing facility and be able to safely levy from the banking sector and repay that commercial borrowing within 12 months. However, if the amount exceeds £1.5 billion, or if it is below £1.5 billion and the PRA has determined that the FSCS is unable to raise the levy on affordability grounds, the Government would expect levies to repay any borrowing from the National Loans Fund to be spread out over multiple years”.

But, no, you do not have multiple years in a systemic banking crisis; you have to operate now.

The cap of £1.5 billion is worth comparing with the measures that the Government had to take in 2007-08—Lloyds Bank, £20 billion and NatWest, £45 billion. So the failure of one of those banks could be somewhat above the affordability cap, as set out in the Financial Secretary’s letter to me. Indeed, today, those numbers could be multiplied by a factor of roughly five.

Even when MREL is taken into account, the £1.5 billion cap seems to me to expose the fact that this scheme is not applicable to large banks. For example, if we look at the largest MREL plus required capital, it is that of Barclays, which is 30% of risk weighted assets—the largest of all the major banks. That leaves 70% of risk weighted assets to which the taxpayer is exposed. There would not be a collapse of all of those, but there can be very large numbers very quickly. So the idea that with an affordability cap of £1.5 billion, one could handle the Lloyds Bank situation or the NatWest situation as the Government confronted them in 2007-08 is, it seems to me, fanciful.

This brings me to my final related point. There is a persistent reluctance in all the documents concerning the resolution regime to admit that the resolution of a large bank will always fall on the taxpayer. Given the need for the maintenance of confidence in the banking sector, this persistent reluctance and the pretence that MREL has eliminated the taxpayer from exposure is damaging to confidence. It would be valuable for the Purple Book to make clear that, in extremis, Bagehot’s rule comes into effect, the Bank lends without limit and the Treasury will step in to resolve those banks that are “too big to fail”. My amendment clears away a dangerous ambiguity in the Bill. The threat of multiple small failure will continue to exist, but it takes away the ambiguity that this could be involved in the resolution of a big bank in the circumstances of a systemic crisis similar to that which we have faced in the past.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this weather sounds like the reason I ended up tabling a load of amendments in south-west Scotland: I had nothing better to do for a few days.

Again, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raises a really important point. I have tried to attack it in a different way in Amendment 16, where I look at the recovery of money from shareholders. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I had in mind the sort of scenario where a foreign company sets up a bank in the UK, it does not go very well and it decides just to walk away from it, having perhaps removed all the assets in the meantime. Clearly, it does not seem fair that the costs of sorting that out should fall on the industry or, indeed, the British taxpayer. It would be really interesting to understand how we can ensure that foreign shareholders behave properly and how, when it does go wrong, we can recoup the money from them.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I am somewhat puzzled by the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in this case. Surely, under the Basel accord, the UK regulator is responsible for the regulation of a subsidiary that is legally established in the UK. If “subsidiary” were changed to “branch”, the foreign regulator would indeed be responsible for regulation in that case. It seems to me that this particular amendment would violate the Basel accord to which His Majesty’s Government are committed.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Eatwell

Report stage
Thursday 8th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, there is a certain amount of confusion about the competitiveness objective and it is important to clarify it in discussion on Report. To illustrate this point, we have to understand that London is a rather peculiar financial centre, because it has a very limited hinterland of domestic savings. It is unlike the United States, where New York has a huge hinterland of domestic savings. It is therefore necessary for London to attract savings and funding from around the world, and it does that brilliantly well.

An important component of that is that London is seen as a well-regulated and efficiently regulated centre. The primary objectives set out in FSMA of maintaining market confidence, financial stability, public awareness, protection of consumers and the reduction of financial crimes are competitiveness goals in and of themselves. They make London more competitive and are a crucial component of the success of London at attracting funds from around the world.

The competitiveness objective that was introduced as a subsidiary objective is rather different, because there competitiveness means being allowed to take more risk. As everyone knows, in financial affairs the balance of risk and return is one of the key elements in making sensible decisions. This is true as much in regulation as it is in the operation of financial services business. It is particularly true in regulation when it applies to systemic risks, which only the regulator can understand and deal with.

It is therefore important that we do not overegg the competitiveness objective. It is important—it has introduced an important element in discussing the relationship between risk and return—but we should recognise that the primary objectives are the key to London’s competitiveness as a financial centre.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will comment briefly on government Amendment 11. The competitiveness and growth objective is a long-term, ongoing objective and, with the best will in the world, it is highly unlikely that we will see any discernible change in measurable competitiveness or growth in just two years. The objective does not end in two years and yet the amendment put forward by the Government has only two years’ worth of reporting.

As usual, the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has put together an elegant solution in Amendment 12, which would create an ongoing annual reporting requirement, as well as being a bit more specific about what should be included within the reports. I understand from the Minister’s earlier speech that she expects this to be covered off in the normal annual reporting thereafter, and I think we can probably live with that.

I will add to the comments made by noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, with this caveat: I support the competitiveness and growth objective, but only as a secondary objective. The primary objective of stability must remain paramount. Can the Minister confirm that, as part of the reporting on the competitiveness and growth objective that is expected, the regulators will consider and report on the impact it is having on the primary stability objective? The two are not unconnected, as we have just heard, and it is really important that when we report on one, we also report on its impact on the other.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Eatwell

Report stage
Thursday 8th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this is the first of two groups that seek to improve the level of parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. Arguably, I think the groups are the wrong way around from a logical point of view, but we are where we are. We had long debates on this in Committee, and it was clear that accountability and parliamentary scrutiny was probably the single biggest issue on which Members from across the House felt that the Bill fell woefully short, particularly given the huge amount that is being transferred to the responsibility of the regulators by the Bill.

We heard in Committee of the need for three legs to the whole process of scrutiny and accountability: reporting, independent analysis and the parliamentary accountability elements. This group is about the second leg—the independent analysis that will support the parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. The Government have listened, and that is welcome, but I am sure I am not alone in finding what they have proposed to be rather thin gruel.

The Government have introduced a number of amendments which enhance the role of the various policy panels, in particular the cost-benefit analysis panel. These are welcome, but I am afraid they really do not go far enough. Other noble Lords, especially the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, have tabled further amendments to enhance and support the role of the panels. Again, that is very welcome but not, I think, sufficient. Despite these improvements, the panels remain appointed by the regulators and are not genuinely independent.

I remain strongly drawn to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges of Headley, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name, to create a genuinely independent office for financial regulatory accountability. As I said, so much responsibility is being handed to the regulators that it must make sense to have a genuinely robust system of oversight over the regulators, not just responding to consultations about proposed changes to regulations that the Government have put into the Bill but a much more holistic oversight of the whole regulatory direction—something that deals with what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to as the multiplicity of panels. We need to draw this all together, and we need to be much more forward-looking about the direction of regulation, rather than backward-looking as to what is proposed.

This is such an important matter and such a huge volume of work that, if we are to scrutinise it effectively, we need to have something such as the proposed office for financial accountability to enable parliamentary committees and others to carry out the meaningful scrutiny. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, talked about the need for resources; we will come on to that in the next group, but she is quite right. This would really help because, if the independent information were available to the committees, it would save them the job of doing all the sifting and all the rest of it, and they would be able to concentrate on the bits that really matter.

Even with the amendments proposed by the Government, I do not think that we get anywhere near that real scrutiny. I am sorry to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, does not intend to push these amendments; I would have liked him to do so and would have supported him if he had. I hope that he will continue to use his influence as the chair of the Economic Affairs Committee to push for a similar approach.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I totally agree with what the noble Lord has just said and therefore I will not repeat his words. The office for financial regulatory accountability proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, would become an important part of the whole regulatory architecture in this country. The reason why I have proposed a couple of amendments—I am delighted to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, actually likes my amendments to his amendments—is to enhance the position of the office within that architecture.

We have to recognise that there will be virulent opposition to this in the Treasury. The Treasury’s darkest day in recent years was the day that the Office for Budget Responsibility was established as an independent entity evaluating the performance of the economy. In the same way, having gone through that dark day, I can imagine the horror with which the Treasury observes the possibility of an independent entity evaluating the performance of regulators and the performance of the Treasury in its activity in guiding regulation. It is no surprise at all that we have what the noble Lord has quite appropriately called “thin gruel”, instead of something that would be truly effective and would create both an independent assessor and a sounding board for the industry, consumers and others who have an interest to express in regulation to get their views on to the front line.

With my Amendments 67 and 72 I am again in slight opposition to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, in the sense that I want to remove the lines in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, that specifically focus on the competition objective, because I do not want to second-guess what the office might do. The office could choose to travel over any part of the regulatory countryside. I regard my Amendment 72 as much more important because, as part of the architecture, the office should be funded through the levy in the same way as other parts of the regulatory system; the FCA, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and so on are all financed via the standard levy on the industry. After all, this would be a trivial amount of money because—as has been pointed out—it would be only a relatively small entity. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, liked my amendment to his amendment. I hope that he will be able to carry forward these proposals in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested.

I will comment on Amendments 44 and 47 from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, on the membership of panels at the FCA and the PRA. I support his view that placing practitioners on panels can have a very positive effect. I say this because I was an independent member of the board of the old Securities and Futures Authority, which was a practitioner-run regulatory authority with independent members, of which I was one. I was very impressed by the way that practitioners, when required to be regulators and placed in a regulatory role, assumed the role of regulators—they were not just representatives of their special interests. In fact, their special interests were left at the door; what came in with them was their specialist knowledge. I was sceptical when I first joined the board of the SFA but was won over by the performance of practitioners there. The proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, for practitioners will add to the regulatory effectiveness and knowledge of these panels.

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[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I will comment briefly on the proposal which has emerged and is contained in Amendment 30 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Penn. It refers to the possibility of parliamentary committees being

“the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons … the Committee of the House of Lords”

or a Joint Committee. It says “and” but I presume that they would be mutually exclusive.

What is extraordinary about this amendment is that it contains a seriously bad idea which might lead to an extremely good outcome. The seriously bad idea is that the two committees, one in the other place and one here in the Lords, would be sitting at the same time and looking at the same material, requiring the same levels of expertise to advise them and the same commitment of time by the regulators—and, perhaps, producing divergent opinions which would lead to regulatory uncertainty. That is a very bad outcome. Why I fully support these amendments, however, is that the seriously bad idea will lead to an extremely good outcome, because people will see that the possibility of having a committee in the other place and a committee here doing the same thing, with all the negative connotations that I have just discussed, will lead to the rational outcome of a Joint Committee of both Houses.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, so I thought I would stand and associate myself completely with his comments. I am delighted that the noble Baroness has effectively accepted the proposal. I will add my voice to say this: the subject of financial services is so huge, complex and important that it really requires a dedicated committee, whether a Joint Committee or committee of this House, not just to be part of, say, the Industry and Regulators Committee or the Economic Affairs Committee. It is much too big a subject to be covered by a committee that is not dedicated to the subject—and, if you have a dedicated committee, it must be properly resourced.

The Government rightly say that this is a matter for Parliament, but let us be realistic: they have huge influence on what happens there. I really hope that the Government and whoever the powers-that-be in this House who make these decisions are—even as the chair of the Finance Committee, this is still slightly opaque to me—are listening. This is so important. We must go ahead and must resource it properly.

Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Eatwell

Committee stage
Monday 14th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the theme of what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, just said, which is the general weakness of the definition of beneficial ownership in this Bill. It is very striking that in other jurisdictions within the British Isles that hold registers of beneficial ownership and have done for some years, the beneficial owner is always defined as an individual and never as a firm or a trust. An individual who ultimately owns or controls the entity must be identified. The Bill as currently constructed has significant weaknesses, which will prevent the identification of individual beneficial owners in the way that the Government apparently intend but have not as yet achieved.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we find ourselves in an unusual position. Normally, this House is trying to knock the edges off overzealous legislation and limit the powers the Government have a tendency to give themselves. In this Bill, we are trying to achieve the exact opposite: to strengthen the powers and close the loopholes so that the powers are as effective as possible.

We are trying to move quickly because of the awful situation in Ukraine. As the Minister said at the outset, the overseas entity register is not an emergency measure—although it will be useful in this situation. In normal times, it would be subject to much more detailed scrutiny, and we would not normally debate such wide groups as we are today. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister to confirm that the follow-up economic crime Bill would be sufficiently wide in scope to allow the matters we are covering now to be considered further, if necessary, as part of that Bill. While the Minister nodded vigorously at the time, he did not give that confirmation in his response. The House clearly accepts the need to move fast, and matters which would normally be voted on will not be pushed to a vote. I hope that the Government will reciprocate that flexibility. Speaking for myself, it would be much easier to accept the flaws and gaps in this Bill, if it were clear that there will be the opportunity to give the more detailed scrutiny which these important issues deserve in due course. Will the Minister please provide that confirmation today?

We all welcome the additional clauses that the Government are proposing on trusts, one of the more common methods to obscure ultimate ownership. Of course, trusts can be—and, as the Minister said, they usually are—perfectly legitimate. However, they can be misused. As such, I commend the Government for introducing these new clauses. That said, and in addition to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, there is still one area where an important gap remains: the classic way of camouflaging the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner is by the use of discretionary trusts. These will often have a stated beneficiary, such as a charity, but, because they are discretionary, the benefit can be passed to others who are not identified. That might be under a formal agreement, but it is often something less formal or traceable. In such situations, it can be difficult to ascertain who the real beneficiary is. The identity of “the settlor or guarantor” is one clue— government Amendment 15 rightly requires those to be identified.

The Minister kindly wrote to me yesterday afternoon—I apologise for spoiling his weekend. He said that HMRC already has access to information about beneficiaries through new data-sharing gateways and existing exchange of notes mechanisms. However, this is true only for UK resident taxpayers and for situations where money actually flows. It does not cover all jurisdictions, so the gap remains. Many of the ultimate property owners are not UK residents, and value can pass in different ways—for example, the simple right to use the property rent-free would not be picked-up by HMRC.

One other way of trying to see through such discretionary trusts is to identify who has benefited in the past, including those who have had the use of the underlying property at less than market rent. It would be relatively easy to add a subsection to the Government’s Amendment 15 to cover that, and it would not be difficult information for innocent parties to provide. Is this something which the Government could consider, even if it is in later regulation?

As a general theme, we should not be allowing overseas entities to register unless they are fully transparent. To be honest, the Government’s apparent reluctance to accept clauses which would improve that transparency is somewhat concerning. On that theme, I also wholeheartedly support Amendment 17. It seems rather pointless to have information on the overseas entity, if that still fails to show us who owns the property. I urge the Minister to look at that seriously.