Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Tyrie and Alison McGovern

Monday 10th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Alison McGovern]

May I take the hon. Gentleman back to his fourth point? He mentioned the Treasury Committee’s ability to get information from the Bank. What specifically is he concerned about, and does he think that his Committee ought to be able to access data from the Bank as part of its oversight role? First, how would he improve on that point? What specifics of governance does he think we must look for? Secondly, is it a question of getting data out of the Bank so that group-think can be laid bare and investigated? Am I right to take those points from what he has said?

[Mr Tyrie]

If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will not linger on those points for too long, because the Committee has set that out in some detail in a number of reports. On her first point, in a nutshell, one need only look at the corporate governance arrangements of almost any public sector body, or indeed any public company, to see that the lines of accountability are powerfully drawn between their non-executives and the executive arm. That is almost completely lacking in the court, whose role is heavily circumscribed and, until recently, involved nothing more than oversight of the Bank’s budget. Indeed, I have been told informally that until recently an unspoken requirement of membership of the court was to have no great knowledge of financial matters, and certainly not to interfere with them. That strikes me as the negation of genuine oversight, but perhaps those who whispered such thoughts in my ear were making mischief.

On the hon. Lady’s second point, it is of course crucial that somewhere in the accountability framework there is a group of people who are capable of asking for detailed information in order to make the scrutiny meaningful. The Treasury Committee, in our investigations into Royal Bank of Scotland, found that we needed to send specialist advisers into the FSA to obtain the necessary papers to ensure that they were taken into account in its report on RBS. I do not think that it would be a healthy state of affairs if the Treasury Committee ends up having to send specialist advisers into the Bank of England to perform such a role. It would be far better to have a group of non-executives in the Bank of England whose explicit task is to look for those documents and to be available to help us do the scrutiny directly. My reply to her questions touches only the surface of the more detailed reply that could be given, but it has been set out in some detail in at least two Treasury Committee reports.

Next year we will have a new Governor. He could, of course, grasp the opportunity to improve all this, and no doubt he will form views about governance, ones that might benefit from legislative change. The Banking Commission will also make recommendations on standards, culture, competition, governance, regulation and sanctions for rule-breaking by bankers. Any or all of those might require statutory action. I would be grateful for an assurance on that from the Minister, so will he commit the Government to broadening the scope of the banking Bill to ensure that further amendments to FSMA, including in the areas I have just mentioned, can, if necessary, be made next year?