Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Lipsey

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Tyler (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I wish particularly to speak in support of Amendment 16 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rennard. Inevitably, I need also to refer to some of the others in this group which offer slightly different solutions to the fundamental problem with this Bill that we all agree is so apparent. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, will break the habit of a lifetime and support a Liberal Democrat proposal, because I think that it would absolutely and precisely meet the circumstances to which he has just referred.

All those who have been carefully examining the psephology on which this Bill is predicated will have been hugely indebted to the independent and non-partisan academic analysis by the late Professor Ron Johnston and his colleagues. This was the core of the evidence presented to the Commons Public Bill Committee. In brief, it proved conclusively that the proposed very limited 5% permitted variance in almost all constituencies, except of course for the five exempted ones, was not an essential requirement in the context of the Government’s anxiety to improve the equality of vote value that they repeatedly claim to be their objective in this legislation. My noble friend Lord Rennard will give further details of that analysis.

Meanwhile, there is common ground across your Lordships’ Committee that the insistence on the 5% variance straitjacket, imposed on the four Boundary Commissions, will result in the following problems: first, more changes with 650 constituencies than were proposed with the previously proposed 600 constituencies; secondly, more regular changes for more constituencies and more reviews; thirdly, more consequent knock-on changes even to adjoining constituencies that are themselves within the prescribed limits; fourthly, more disruption of historic and naturally cohesive communities; and, fifthly, more disconnection between MPs, councillors and the public, at more regular intervals, than is either necessary or desirable. It is disruption which is going to be the name of the game if we let the 5% stand.

We were told during the coalition that these latter reasons were basically those that motivated the then Conservative Leader of our House to recommend to the Prime Minister that the variance be 10%. I mentioned on Tuesday that some 20 of those who contributed to the Second Reading debate, from all parts of the House, expressed concern about the 5% limit at present in the Bill. We can, perhaps, take it as read that there is a strong argument for more flexibility. The question in this debate is how we should adjust the figure.

Our Amendment 16 recommends a normal 8% variance but permits each of the Boundary Commissions to explore the validity of 10% where exceptional circumstances demand it, in each of the nations of the UK. That would be very relevant to the concerns expressed about local problems to be addressed in the previous debate. This might include avoiding crossing major administrative boundaries—for example, in English counties and unitary authorities—or greater problems of rurality and limited transport links, or other special factors. Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 2 to the 1986 Act makes detailed references to which we can refer and to which our amendment refers. My noble friend Lord Rennard will pay special attention to some of those.

I recall that in my then North Cornwall constituency, before boundaries were redrawn, to drive from one advice surgery at one end to the next one at the other end could take 90 minutes in winter but up to 150 minutes at the height of the summer holiday season. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, might note that that involved getting around an estuary. Let us compare that with some inner-city constituencies where a similar electorate can be conveniently served by a short cycle ride or even an energetic jogger.

As has been emphasised by all participants at all stages of the Bill, our prime concern should be for the effect on the individual residents, groups and communities in a distinct area rather than their political representatives or local political parties. That is why we prefer our formulation in Amendment 16 to those in Amendment 15 or Amendment 17. The former seems to us too restrictive and not to recognise the special local circumstances to which I have referred. Some areas will certainly require more variation than 7.5%. I think that is widely acknowledged across the Committee. The latter provides so much variation universally that it fails to accept the significance of a smaller number of potential constituencies with unusual requirements. However, the common cause we all recognise is that the unacceptable level and regularity of disruption, implicit in this current 5% straitjacket, must be avoided. Between now and Report we may be able to achieve a consensus on the optimum solution.

Finally, I suspect that the author of Amendment 19 has not had the advantage of educating himself by reference to the exhaustive independent academic analysis to which I referred earlier. The rest of us hope that the Minister will accept the strength of the case for greater flexibility that so many of your Lordships are advancing. I hope that he is listening.

[Lord Lipsey (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord True, had only just entered the House, in 2010, when we did the 2011 Bill late into the night, night after night. I do not know how that relates to his extreme reluctance to draw any time limit to business tonight or determination to get to the Government’s target. We may well make it anyway, but it would be very disappointing if we were left short of time to have these important arguments. Indeed, it would only prolong Report in a way that none of us would really want to see.

I will focus, because I do not want to speak for any longer than I have to, on the central logic that underlies the Government’s proposal of 5% in this Bill, which, as the Minister said earlier—I thank him giving me the text—is that each vote must have the same value. The Government realise that they cannot achieve that just through boundary changes. The only way for each vote to have equal value would be to have PR on a national scale, and then each vote would have equal value indeed. I suspect that there is no majority even in this Committee that would favour that approach; most of us would like to see a preservation of the constituency-based system, for very good reasons. Therefore, we do not want to see complete equality of votes.

The more you look at this proposition of the equal vote, the less it stands up. First, the Bill does not pretend to provide equality of votes; within the 5% each way margin, it provides equalities of electorates, which are very different things, because turnouts are very different in different seats. The Government are not even potentially achieving the objective that they have set themselves of equality of votes. Equality of electorates is no doubt a useful surrogate, and you could imagine a system—I could design one, given a few months—in which the Boundary Commission was told to project the likely turnout in each seat, and do that within 5% each way. I do not think that that would prove a very comprehensible system, although it would certainly be a sensible and logical one if you really wanted to equalise votes. But the Government do not really want to equalise votes—they just say they do. They just want to equalise electorates, and there it can.

The second problem with this argument about equalising votes is that only some votes count. Only votes in marginal seats count; all the rest of the seats are in large piles. The occupants of safe seats build up huge majorities, and they make no difference whatever to the national result—nor, when people go and cast those votes, have they any reason to think that it is even remotely possible that their act of civic discipline will change the result of the general election one iota. This is not a sensible goal when most votes do not count under the system that the Government provide.

Thirdly, if you start to look at results and not just high theory, we actually have a gross inequality in votes. Each Conservative Member at the last general election had the support on average of 38,300 voters. For each Labour MP there were 50,800 votes. But to get a Liberal Democrat in required 336,000 votes nationwide, so there is a factor of 10 in the efficiency of vote use against the Liberal Democrats. Interestingly, with all this talk about Scottish and Welsh representation, it may be said that the present system greatly favours Plaid and the SNP. The SNP needed only 26,000 votes per seat, and Plaid only 36,000—less, even, than the Conservatives, so they were favoured by it. But it is a grossly unequal system. There may be good reasons for that, but it is not an equal system. It takes the wind out of the argument that this is somehow a Bill about inequality.

Let us get away from electoral theory and go into the practice of the matter. What you are trying to do with boundaries is to weigh up various important factors and reach some kind of balance. There is no religious solution or mathematical formula that does it for you; you are trying to get to a reasonable solution. Yes, reasonable equality of votes is one factor that should be taken into account. We do not want to go back to Old Sarum, with its two voters choosing a single Member. There has to be reasonable equality between the sizes, but there are many other extraordinarily important factors that have to be weighed.