Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Baroness Boothroyd

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Boothroyd]

My Lords, having heard that, I hope that I am now in order in rising to support the amendment, so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth.

I begin by making the point that the removal of the Speaker’s certificate as a requisite for calling an early general election certainly meets my principal objection to the original wording in Clause 2. I take this opportunity to thank the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and the Government for accepting the need to safeguard the non-partisan position of the Speaker in their proposed legislation. I think that the noble and learned Lord realises that I should have liked them to have gone a little further on this clause, but I would not push my luck in such circumstances, and I am thankful for small mercies.

I hope that all parties in the other place will take the opportunity, when the Bill returns to the Commons, to place on record the importance of a Speaker’s independence and never again put it at risk, as did the original clause. It gives me particular satisfaction to know that some of us were able to use our membership of this House to help remove a defect in the Bill that, to put it perfectly bluntly, should have been corrected in the other place—the elected Chamber. It proves, yet again, the indispensible role that your Lordships play in the legislative process, particularly in constitutional matters.

We have talked about perfection, and I regret that the amendment is not as precise or as perfect as I would wish. That is life. However, when considered along with other amendments, it is a reasonable way forward and we can make the best of what I regard as a poor and unnecessary item of legislation.

I wish to place my view on record in relation to the leeway, or what I call the 14-day cooling-off period, following a vote of no confidence, to give time to the Executive to cobble together and approve a new Government. That requirement in the Bill strikes at the very roots of my belief in the way our democracy works. For reasons that we all understand, we have a coalition Government who govern on the basis of a two-party agreement. I have no quarrel with that. I accept the need for coalitions when no party has an overall majority. Nor am I opposed to the principle of self-preservation—I practise it myself. However, if the Government were to lose the confidence of the Commons, this legislation would allow a different coalition, a coalition mark II, to replace it after 14 days of hard bargaining, wheeler-dealing or horse trading—call it what you want—without reference to the electorate by calling an election. That is wrong.

In that event, the Bill would be seen as the “elections avoidance Act”—and rightly so. Some might call it a “fixed Parliaments Act”—using “fixed” in its pejorative sense. I confess to belonging to the school of democrats who believe in the unfettered right of the Commons to send a Government packing, as it did in 1979, and in the integrity of the Prime Minister to come to the Dispatch Box to say what he would do. I also believe in the sovereign right of the people of this country to elect their Governments at elections. I maintain that these two rights are not incompatible and we should not tamper with them. They have served us well and are the basis of our parliamentary democracy.

This time, the Commons is the target of the constitutional meddlers. However, proposals for the abolition of this House will soon be put before us. The bottom line of my concern now is that the legislation restricts the traditional freedom of the elected Chamber to get rid of a failed Government and for a Prime Minister to go to the country to seek a mandate. Snap elections have become a derogatory term in some quarters. Many countries that I know are under the yoke of dictators and would love to hold a snap election. I would rather have a snap election at any time than a Parliament that is well and truly fixed in the way that many are and in the manner now proposed by this coalition.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I have listened with great interest to people who have a great deal more experience and expertise in this matter than I, and I think that we are gradually moving towards a very sensible conclusion. On all sides of the House, we need to express our thanks to my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness, whose personal intervention has moved us in a sensible direction. That is evidence, contrary to what was being said at earlier stages of the consideration of the Bill, that the Government are listening to your Lordships' House and have moved.

However, it is equally true, and I commend it for this, that the coalition has not been prepared to accept wrecking tactics which would undo what is, after all, a Bill which came to your Lordships' House from the other place, which, as we have already heard this afternoon, we all regard as retaining primacy in our parliamentary system. I very much welcome the constructive dialogue that has taken place during the interval between different stages of the Bill. One of the most important points that has arisen since we were discussing this last week is an emphasis on simplicity. Several colleagues on all sides of the House said that that is an important part of how we can improve legislation. Frankly, on that ground alone, the Government may well be fully justified in seeking to reverse the amendment passed on such a narrow majority last week, because it adds a whole new layer of unnecessary complexity.

By contrast, Amendment 20 has clearly benefited from the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin—two distinguished former Speakers—among others. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, was generous in saying that it seems to meet many of his criteria. I think that his phrase was that it was the nearest to being completely foolproof of the amendments before us. The simplification of Clause 2 also certainly meets the major anxieties that my noble friends Lord Rennard, Lord Marks and I had over the rather cumbersome process originally set out.

At this point, it is important to emphasise that the sole purpose of the legislation is to give new responsibility, new power to Parliament, rather than to reinforce the current opportunity of the Prime Minister of the day—who is, after all, a party leader; we should never forget that—to pick and choose the most favourable date for an election for his or her party. There was some confusion last week on that point. By legislating for a parliamentary safety valve to enable an early election to take place within the normal five-year period, the Government are right to insist that that must be on the basis of cross-party support in the House of Commons. We should not revert to a No. 10 partisan fix.

It is important for us all to recall that we do not elect Governments in this country. The noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, perhaps led us slightly astray on that point. We elect Parliament, which then gives or takes away confidence from an Administration. Therefore, the simple decision of the head of a Government that he or she can no longer continue personally to lead a Government is not the critical issue. The critical issue is: what is the decision of our Parliament and, in this case, the primary House, the House of Commons?

Last week, there was some anxiety—some amusement, in fact—about the special circumstances of October 1974 and May 1979 and the fact that such circumstances might not provide a proper opportunity for an early general election and for the people to speak. I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, in his place; he should be reassured. If the Bill had reached the statute book then, I am convinced that an early general election would almost certainly have been triggered by the House of Commons in those circumstances. He would have been elected and I would have been unelected. I think that the Bill proves able to deal with the circumstances we were discussing last week.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Baroness Boothroyd

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Boothroyd]

My Lords, this is the Bill’s first outing in this House since last week’s referendum, so I think we are entitled to take stock of the coalition’s position in the light of the electorate’s aversion to radical reform. Clearly, as the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Grocott, strongly said before we opened the Report stage today, the referendum casts fresh doubt on the wisdom of persisting with major constitutional measures that lack popular support. Ministers have changed tack on the timetable for this Bill before, and I suspect there would be few tears shed on the Conservative Benches if they took another look at it even at this late stage. However, we have to proceed and we have to deal with what is before us this afternoon.

I imply no criticism when I observe that the new politics that the coalition claimed to represent in its early days has lost a bit of its sheen. Ministers would be wise to take account of reasoned objections in this House to some of the Bill’s more doubtful features. It is in the light of this that I support and commend the amendment moved so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The amendments in this group do not challenge the Government’s intention to hold the next election in May 2015 or 2014, whatever may finally be decided. Nor do they challenge the Government’s proposal to introduce legally binding procedures to make an early election unlikely. However, as currently written, this legislation goes much further than the lifetime of this Parliament in a way that I believe is unwise and unjustified. This legislation seeks to bind future Parliaments to the same legal restraints intended primarily for the lifetime of this coalition Government and this Parliament. These restraints are destined to last “henceforth” according to Mr Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister.

I understand perfectly the coalition’s wish to serve for a fixed period of years, to tackle the current economic situation and to see that its programme is enacted. However, I reject the same imposition being placed on the freedom of action of future Parliaments, and this will be the situation without these amendments. Without them, the constitution is being blighted permanently and unnecessarily. The amendments allow future Parliaments to accept or reject the Bill’s provisions after every election as they see fit and to do so by means of a resolution of both Houses. Mr Clegg disagrees with me on this: we disagree on a number of things, but certainly on this. Last year, he described the Bill as,

“a constitutional innovation of significant proportions”.

He argued that it would be “bizarre” to confine it to one Parliament. These amendments do not propose that it should be left to one Parliament only. Importantly, they propose that future Parliaments should decide for themselves.

We know that countries with written constitutions have the kind of entrenched laws that the Deputy Prime Minister appears to want—but Britain is not one of those. The Government would do well to remember that. As far as I can recall, at the last election the country did not exactly clamour for fixed five-year Parliaments. If I interpret the public mood correctly—as did the noble Lords, Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack, with whom I entirely agree—people in this country want honest politics. They want good government and greater scrutiny of what Governments are doing in their name. They do not want an assortment of ill considered proposals to turn Parliament upside down to suit a political elite.

Your Lordships will not be surprised to know that I do not regard this legislation with great affection at all. In fact, I believe it is quite unnecessary. This House is charged with the responsibility and the role of examining legislation and scrutinising it. As a Member of this House, I reckon I have to make the best of what I think is a very bad job. The amendments before us today would preserve the freedom of future Parliaments to face their own challenges in their own way and in the circumstances of the time. I strongly support them and hope that many of your Lordships will do likewise.

[Lord Tyler]

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and his distinguished collaborators have, as ever, tabled very interesting, very seductive, amendments. I examined them with great care because I respect their expertise. Reluctantly, I believe the amendments are flawed. The purpose of the Bill is to do one very simple thing: to remove from the Prime Minister—the leader of a political party—and, by extension, from the governing party, the right to time elections for their own political convenience. I give credit to the present Prime Minister: he has been the first Prime Minister to accept the logic of that position.

Hitherto, Prime Ministers—leaders of political parties—have been able to look at the polls and see if they look good in order to be able to say yes to an early general election or no to postponing it. The Government’s objective is to remove that question of when elections should be held from routine partisan political advantage and its consideration. After all, that is already the case in local government; it is the case in the devolved Assemblies and Parliaments throughout the United Kingdom. This Parliament has insisted that that should be the case, and clearly that is right.

This Parliament has recognised in primary legislation time and again that elections are the mechanism by which political parties are held to account. It surely cannot be right, then, that any one party or collection of parties should be able to contrive to time the election for a moment which is propitious for their own advantage. That is the clear principle and objective of this Bill.

I invite your Lordships to look very carefully at Amendment 25 in this group. This would undermine the central objective of the Bill by setting up a routine for Governments to instruct their newly elected majorities in the Commons after 2015 as to whether they particularly fancied a fixed-term Parliament or not—for their own party advantage, not in the interests of good governance. There would be an immediate return to the worst feature of prime ministerial prerogative. If the Bill were amended, it would be not a fixed term but a semi-fixed term, subject to the machinations and inclinations of the Prime Minister and party leader of the day, the exact opposite of what the Bill seeks to achieve and what the other place has already voted to do. This Bill is already more flexible than some of us would like. I would favour a superglue fix in the fixed-term Parliament, without extensive opportunities for early Dissolutions, but I accept that a sensible middle way has been achieved.