Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Viscount Trenchard

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Grand Committee

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a director of two investment companies, as stated in the register.

I too congratulate my noble friend Lord Bridges and his supporters on their most interesting proposal to set up an independent office for financial regulatory accountability. The Bill as drafted does not secure sufficient change in the way the regulators carry out their duties and the speed with which they will work to simplify and improve the rulebook. In particular, I welcome the provision in Amendment 162’s proposed new subsection (2): that the office “must prioritise” analysis of regulations that reduce competition, negatively affect competitiveness and add compliance costs. In other words, the office will be bound to identify regulations such as the myriad anti-competitive and cumbersome regulations adopted by the ESAs in recent years.

I support my noble friend’s amendment and believe it would augment but not replace the work of an FSRC, such as my noble friend Lady Noakes and I proposed in Amendment 86. As such, it would mitigate further the regulators’ lack of accountability to government following the transfer of significant rule-making powers. This is most likely to be a good thing, although alone it does not do enough to improve the deficit in accountability to Parliament.

I would like my noble friend Lord Bridges to tell the Committee whether he envisages the office working alongside a Joint Committee such as the FSRC and whether he would consider amending his Amendment 165 to replace the Treasury Committee of another place with a suitable Joint Committee. I agree entirely with what the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Vaux, said about the need for a new Joint Committee.

Along with my noble friends Lord Sandhurst and Lord Roborough, I have put my name to Amendments 169 to 174, so eloquently proposed by my noble friend Lord Lilley. In common with my noble friend, I am not a lawyer; I am a banker. I was proud to work in the City of London when I joined Kleinwort Benson as a management trainee in 1973 because, by and large, the City was an honest place and its leading firms were well regarded. We knew the importance of the old maxim, “My word is my bond.” The banks did not maintain vast compliance and legal departments. During my banking career, I have seen the relative size of these departments increase massively as a proportion of total staff. This itself has had a negative effect on the culture of our leading firms, reducing the emphasis on innovation and business development and increasing the number and influence of those employed in compliance and legal, and of the interlocutors with the regulators.

We believed that Brexit would enable us to return to our simpler, less cumbersome, common law-based regulatory system. These proposals will enable this and encourage agility and precision in the drafting of rules. The regulators operated in this way after the Financial Services and Markets Act 1986, and this is how the FSA was empowered to act under FSMA 2000. But by then, the EU acquis on financial services was beginning its period of rapid expansion, so most of the rules since then have actually been made at statutory level by the EU. FSMA 2000 already accepts that judicial review is an inadequate safeguard against unduly harsh decisions by the regulators, and it gives the final say on enforcement decisions to the Upper Tribunal. These proposals would ensure that the regulators act predictably and consistently. They would ensure that they are no longer above the law—now even more important, as a result of their greater rule-making powers.

I believe that the opportunity costs of the current regulatory system are too high. Legitimate financial business, such as providing new products for consumers, is not being done because of regulatory uncertainty. These amendments would ensure that the wording of the rules is more thoughtfully drafted than it was under EU regulation and would reduce compliance costs. The rules would be based on common law methodology. The wording would be applied to facts on the basis of their natural and ordinary meaning. The renamed financial adjudication service would reach decisions not only on its own subjective opinion but on the basis of the growing body of case law deriving from decisions of the new first-tier tribunal.

Does my noble friend the Minister understand just how important it is that the Bill be made a lot more radical in changing the way our regulators operate? As drafted, nothing much will change. There was no point in Brexit if we continue to apply a bureaucratic, overly cautious and cumbersome regulatory system. These proposals would take us down the right road as a significant step to ensuring the City’s future and reversing the recent decline of some of our most important institutions, such as the London Stock Exchange.

[Lord Turnbull (CB)]

My Lords, I have not spoken before in this Committee, but as one of the surviving members of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, I want to address an instance where an amendment directly challenges one of the proposals that was incorporated following the commission’s report. Earlier in proceedings—on day three, I think—the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, addressed Amendment 46, which introduced the concepts of predictability and consistency. He asked, “Who could possibly object?”, and went so far as to describe them as “motherhood and apple pie”. On examination, these principles, particularly predictability, can be seen to be simply duplicating the existing provisions of administrative law, but also as introducing provisions that could limit the scope of the regulator to address new and previously unforeseen problems.

A similar problem arises with Amendment 174 in this group. How could one possibly object to acting

“reasonably and in good faith”

as a defence against sanction under the senior manager conduct regime, the SMCR—the principal sanction being disqualification from practising? By way of a bit of background, the PCBS spent a great deal of time on structural issues—bank break-up, ring-fencing, capital adequacy, liquidity adequacy and so on—but it also attached a great deal of importance to conduct issues, hence the creation of what was then called the senior person conduct regime and is now the senior manager conduct regime.

Is there evidence that this regime has proved oppressive and needs to be relaxed? Quite the contrary, in my view. There have been very few cases, although it has only been fully in force since 2018. Following the 2008-10 financial crisis, Mr Peter Cummings of HBOS is the only senior person to have been seriously sanctioned. One can debate whether that verdict was fair or unfair, but it is undeniable that it is unfair that he should be the only person sanctioned of the big players in those events. I do not think the case for further easing has been made out; more effective application is needed.

The introduction of a defence of acting

“reasonably and in good faith”

would, in my view, be a serious weakening of the regime. Very few people who made serious errors—which were costly to their customers, their own companies or the economy at large—set out intentionally to do harm. The thinking behind this amendment is that it is unfair to sanction people who claim that they did not intend to do harm, even if their actions were genuinely harmful. The protection of consumers is not achieved if those who mis-sell financial products or take what prove to be excessive risks are immune from regulatory action if they can show that they did not intend to do so.

Once again, these amendments look superficially desirable, but they would weaken the SMCR and could cause a lot of damage. The normal pattern in Committee is that an amendment is proposed and others stand up to support it. I want to do the opposite: I urge the Minister to stand firm in rejecting Amendment 174. In any case, I wonder whether the right way to change the underlying philosophy of regulation and the balance between the regulator, the common law and the courts should be to set out a comprehensive proposal, rather than through the accumulation of a disparate set of amendments in this Bill.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Viscount Trenchard

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Turnbull]

My Lords, an important finding of the commission was that the existing approved persons regime was flawed. After a debacle wiping billions of pounds off the value of shareholdings, requiring the state to inject billions of pounds into the industry and take huge financial exposures, and after several serious lapses of conduct, according to my researches one person has been fined and another person has negotiated an agreement not to practise.

Our conclusion was that the APR operates mostly as an initial gateway to taking up a post, rather than serving as a system through which regulators can ensure the continuing exercise of responsibility at the most senior levels within banks. A major cause of this flaw was that responsibilities were ill defined and were not joined up, so that those at the top could claim they “didn’t know” or, “It wasn’t me”.

We proposed a two-tier system: a senior persons regime, now called a senior managers regime, covering a meaningful chain of accountabilities, which we wanted to apply to all banks and holding companies operating in the UK; and, below that, a licensing regime, where no prior approval from the regulator would be required to employ anyone but banks would have to take responsibility for ensuring that those they did employ were properly qualified and trained and that they observed a code of conduct. This would apply to those who could seriously damage the bank or the bank’s reputation or harm a customer’s reputation.

The commission welcomes many of the Government’s proposals: defining the functions of senior management; requiring senior managers to have a statement of responsibilities; extending the limitation period for regulators to take enforcement action from three years to six; recording information on a person’s regulatory history so that a new employer can find out important details about whom they are recruiting; and the reversal of the burden of proof on whether a person is fit and proper.

However, serious issues are left unresolved. Amendment 55 provides a definition of a bank to which the regime applies. I found it impossible to discover what the definition means. Does it meet the commission’s objective of covering all banks and holding companies operating in the UK? Would the Minister clarify what he means by “bank”? Could it be a ring-fenced bank, a non-ring-fenced entity conducting investment activities within a group, a whole group or a freestanding investment bank? In our view, the new senior managers regime should apply to all such entities. It would make a mockery of the scheme if, as I suspect may be the case, it applied only to banks taking deposits from the general public—that is, ring-fenced banks. It would be completely unacceptable if the regime did not apply, for example, to the senior managers overseeing the LIBOR traders, to those overseeing rogue traders such as the “London Whale”, to those overseeing the marketing of highly dubious packages of sliced and diced mortgages or to those engaged in the mis-selling of interest rate swaps. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give us an answer today or address this between now and Report.

There is no mention of the licensing regime, which the commission recommended. The Government said that they would ensure that regulators had the ability to take regulatory action against persons who were not senior persons—senior managers—or who were not subject to prior regulatory approval. There is no mention of the licensing regime in the government amendment. They have come up with something rather different in Amendment 53 on the rules of conduct. It states:

“If it appears … necessary or expedient for … advancing one or more of its operational objectives, the FCA may make rules about the conduct of the following persons”,

and those persons could be any employee of the bank.

I question whether that is the right answer. It is “may” rather than “must”, but I should have thought it essential that the FCA made rules. Is it right that it should apply to all employees from purely backroom or administrative staff? In some ways, the government scheme goes wider but it is possibly too permissive.

The final omission to highlight is that we propose that as well as an initial statement of responsibilities for each manager, there should be a handover note when people change jobs. We think that that is crucial because without it the chain of accountability breaks down, and when someone changes jobs we are back to, “I didn’t know”, or, “It wasn’t me”.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

I intervene to ask the Minister to comment on some concerns that I have about this new “approved persons” or senior managers’ regime. First, I am worried that it will place British banks at a considerable disadvantage when they try to recruit the most talented managers available, not just from the United Kingdom but from around the world. Everybody agrees that bank management failed, so it is clear that the supervision of senior mangers needs to be enhanced and improved. For example, someone may be offered a job to work in Hong Kong, where he would probably pay less tax anyway, and he is unlikely to run the risk of being individually liable or culpable in that jurisdiction. I am not sure which other jurisdictions intend to introduce some kind of senior managers’ regime such as this.

My second concern is that it seems to me that it is up to the manager to prove that he was not negligent in the exercise of his responsibilities. It is wrong that a senior manager should be deemed to be guilty unless he can prove his innocence. My third concern is that to increase the individual responsibilities of senior managers will have the unintended consequence of diminishing the responsibility of the board of directors as a whole, or the executive committee, risk committee, or whichever committee it may be. I have sat on an executive committee of a bank and often the business being discussed was not my responsibility, but I felt that I should understand what was going on and what the discussion was about because I was collectively responsible as a member of that committee. What worries me is that if it is very clear that the individual manager is going to be responsible, that effectively diminishes the responsibilities of the other members of the committee. It also diminishes the ability of the chief executive to change the responsibilities of his senior team based on his judgment, because it would be too complicated as each department or division would effectively be under the supervision of people outside the chief executive’s control. Can the Minister comment on these points as well?

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Viscount Trenchard

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard]

My Lords, I had considerable sympathy with the amendment of the right reverend Prelate, which I found rather clearer and easier to understand than I did the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Barnett. I am not convinced that appointing an additional two deputy governors is necessary because I believe these three sub-divisions of the Bank could be rationalised. However, appointing deputy governors will tend to make the governance of the Bank of England more rather than less level in that if you have a governor and one deputy, only one person comes close to challenging the governor’s authority. As proposed in the Bill, there will be three deputy governors, which will mean that the perception of the balance of power will be more level than before.

It is completely unnecessary for the governor to chair the Financial Stability Committee, because the governor chairs the court and the Financial Stability Committee is a sub-committee of the court. It is not right that the chairman of the court—that is, the governor—should also chair one of its own committees. That is highly illogical.

[Lord Turnbull]

I do not think that the governor chairs the court any longer.

[Viscount Trenchard]

I apologise to the noble Lord and I stand corrected. Perhaps the governor should chair the court. However, where possible, the deputy governors rather than the governor should chair the sub-committees.

[Lord Turnbull]

My Lords, I am not in favour of the amendments. First, there is the post of the deputy governor for prudential regulation. This is the old head of the FSA, in so far as it deals with macroprudential regulation, who is given the status of deputy governor in order to bring him into the councils of the bank. No extra posts or salaries are being created here. One might have been created by the creation of the FSA, but that is not here.

Secondly, as to the checks and balances on the governor, I do not think that a committee as important as either the NPC or the FPC being chaired by his deputy is a good way of exerting supervision of the governor. You cannot work for someone and supervise them at the same time.

At the moment, the governor chairs these committees and brings their thinking together; and, as we discussed earlier, there are other mechanisms around the court or the oversight committee—whatever it is called—that check the over-mighty power of the governor. Using one of his deputies to do this does not make sense.