Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Lord Newby

Wednesday 27th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Turnbull]

I shall speak also to Amendment 183. This is about whether there should be a statutory basis for the existing remuneration code. One can analyse this at three levels. First, does the current code permit the kind of actions that the parliamentary commission recommended, such as longer deferrals where the nature of the risk justifies it, and more extensive clawback? Secondly, will those powers be used more rigorously than they have been in the past, particularly for banks? Thirdly, is giving statutory backing through the Bill necessary in order to ensure the correct answer to the second question?

Since tabling this amendment, we received a letter from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, on Monday, which in my view gives a satisfactory answer to the first question. All that the parliamentary commission sought, with the possible exception of forfeiture of some pension rights, can be imposed under existing powers. With regard to the second question—will those powers be used more rigorously?—the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, says that the regulators,

“have stated that they will revise the … Code following consultation in 2014. The Government will work with regulators to ensure that …the Code [takes] full account of the views of the PCBS and the debates”,

on this Bill. Therefore, it is a matter of judgment for the House. Does it want to accept those assurances or does it feel that further amendments are needed to embed this presumption more fully? I think that the correct way forward is for there to be some further discussion about precisely what the review and the outcome might be. I look forward to hearing what the noble Lord has to say.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I am extremely pleased that my letter has at least partially satisfied the noble Lord. He has left me with a remaining question, which is: are we happy to continue to engage with him and his colleagues as we work towards, and consider, the review? I can give him the absolute assurance that we will be very happy to do so. On that basis, I hope that he will feel content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Turnbull]

On the basis of that assurance, I am indeed content to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Turnbull]

This amendment concerns the concept of special measures. We were again told, as we often have been, that all the powers necessary are there and that, indeed, they are being used. That may well be the case. However, the Minister did not respond to my suggestion that, if this is part of the armoury of the regulators, it would be helpful if they set that out so that there was wider understanding of the special measures regime. I do not think that the regime has an identity in the way that it has in the US, where they talk about memorandums of understanding. Subject to that, I would be happy to put this matter into the box labelled “For further discussions”. I beg to move.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I think that this is now having the appearance of a Christmas box, in that the noble Lord is asking the Government to agree to things and we are tending to agree to agree to things.

Given all the powers that the regulators already have, we have been slightly sceptical about whether they need to have, as it were, an Ofsted power of special measures. We do not think that they need more powers but, in order to address the noble Lord’s concern that failings in professional standards and cultures should not be overlooked, we shall be happy to discuss this with him further and to involve the PRA in discussions about how we move towards a firm policy in this area.

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[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I understand the point being made by the noble Lord. I am not sure at this point, without further discussion, whether we need an amendment at Third Reading. We think that the way forward might be a PRA policy statement, but we can have urgent discussions with the noble Lord on that.

[Lord Turnbull]

It is indeed a PRA policy statement that I am after. I am trying to establish a regime in which the regulator sees things that are going wrong and gets into dialogue with the company about remedial measures to head off the long-drawn-out agony of enforcement. If it is already doing it, it would be helpful to codify it but I am very happy to work with the Minister on that basis. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Lord Newby

Wednesday 23rd October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Turnbull]

Amendment 97 would create a regime of special measures. In the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, from paragraph 966 onwards, we argued that regulators should have a power to give notice to a bank where they believe that the bank’s systems, professional standards and culture do not provide sufficient safeguards. First, they could require an independent investigation, and then require a remedial programme of corrective action. This would be seen as a precursor to enforcement. It is basically a way of trying to avoid getting into the morass of enforcement. A similar regime is operated in the US by the office of the controller of the currency. It is called the safety and soundness plan.

Although the amendment refers to the PRA or the FCA, I believe that it would work best if the special measures plan was jointly owned. The twin peaks system of regulation has its advantages but there was always a danger that with each regulator focusing on its specific areas of concern, between them they would fail to capture the bigger picture. There could be a more generic problem of standards and culture and this would be an opportunity to work collectively and engage with the bank.

It may well be that yet again the response is that regulators have these powers already. Indeed, if they believe that the way that a bank is being run is a risk factor, they can impose a capital add-on. However, the argument against all these cases where we have these powers already comes back to if that is case, how did we get into this problem in the first place? What we are trying to establish is whether things will be different in the future. It would help us judge that better if the PRA/FCA could produce a working document on how they envisage using powers of this kind—a special measures regime—where they are looking for generalised improvements in the culture and the way that a bank is being managed. I beg to move.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, we agree with the spirit behind the special measures proposal, as the noble Lord expected, but we do not believe it is necessary to give the regulators new powers in this area. They already have the powers to do everything the PCBS has asked. We have therefore been working with them on how they could respond to the recommendation using their existing powers.

The regulators published their responses earlier this month. These responses explain that both the FCA and PRA can, and in fact do, use the powers that they already have to do many of the things that the PCBS recommended and that are included in the amendment. The regulators have a significant range of powers to identify and tackle serious failings, either to rectify existing problems or prevent further consumer loss or reputational damage to markets. In fact, the regulators are able to replicate all the steps outlined in the amendment using their existing powers.

For example, the regulators already have the ability to give notice to a firm through an appropriate mechanism, be it a letter or an e-mail, as a matter of course if they have any concerns or think there may be a problem. The regulators will look to engage with the firm to address the concerns they raise. Whenever it is appropriate, the regulators may request information from the firm under Section 165 of FiSMA. If, following an investigation, the regulators believe further action is needed, the PRA and FCA can use their powers under Sections 55M and 55L of FiSMA to impose requirements on firms to undertake or cease a particular action. These powers can certainly be used to require a bank to adopt additional safeguards or to strengthen its existing safeguards.

Similarly, the regulators can appoint an independent person to undertake investigations using their power under Section 166 of FiSMA to commission a skilled persons report, or under Section 167 to conduct an investigation into the business of an authorised person. Both the PRA and FCA are committed to doing so in instances that they believe add substantially to their understanding of an issue. However, we do not think it is appropriate that the use of an independent person should be a requirement in all cases. There are some instances where the necessary information will be available from other supervisory sources making any such requirement unnecessarily costly and counterproductive.

Finally, there are already duties in regulations made by the regulators that require firms to deal with their regulator in an open and co-operative way. It may be that the noble Lord has not had a chance to look at the responses from the regulators and that, having done so, he will be satisfied, or, equally, that he would like further clarification. I suggest to him and any other noble Lords who have a particular interest in this matter that, if they have any further concerns having looked at those documents, we would willingly arrange a meeting with the Treasury to discuss any further elaboration that the noble Lord feels would help clarify how the system is going to work. Given that the powers exist, we really believe that the special measures powers envisaged in the amendment are unnecessary, and I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Lord Newby

Wednesday 23rd October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Turnbull]

My response to that is that it is completely unsatisfactory. We shall need to come back to it. I hope that there can be some discussion, maybe with officials in the Bill team. I am not satisfied that applying these various provisions simply to deposit takers covers all the areas of conduct that really need to be covered.

One other issue came to light in the course of this evening’s discussions about the remuneration regime. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, read out a list of people who are covered. Those are the people who are covered by the current remuneration regime. What was being proposed in my amendment was in effect a senior tier particularly for banking. Once you do that, you have to find a definition of a bank. I thought that we were a bit nearer to getting an answer until I heard from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. It is something we need to sort out, otherwise we shall find a serious area of misconduct in an investment banking area only to be told that when we legislated we forgot to cover these kinds of people. That would be completely unacceptable.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I thought that I read out virtually verbatim last week what the noble Lord has read out from the Bank of England. We are going to confirm that in a letter. However the most important point is the one that the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, raised about the scope of the senior managers regime and the criminal offence that goes with it. I can confirm now what I attempted to say last time, that my Treasury colleagues are considering the scope of the new regime and of the new criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank in the light of the previous debate. I can assure the House that they take your Lordships’ views extremely seriously.

[Lord Turnbull]

I infer that I should pay more attention to the letter of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, of 22 October than I should pay to the Bank of England’s response, because I think the former is a more constructive response than that of the Bank of England. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 104E.

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[Lord Turnbull]

Because of the piecemeal way in which the Bill has been constructed, we now have a piecemeal presentation of the secondary legislation procedure as it applies to each bit—and I have completely lost track of it. The first thing that needs to be done is to set out, for the whole Bill—the bits that were there originally and the bits that have been added—what the secondary legislation provisions are. Then we can make a judgment on whether they are appropriate: whether the right things have been assigned to the negative procedure and the right things assigned to the positive procedure. However, it is virtually impossible to do this on the basis of this piecemeal presentation.

Amendment 114 raises enormous issues. The Minister is shaking his head and may try to reassure us, but there are important provisions here that need to go to various committees which we have set up in this House to examine such things.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, three issues have been raised. The first is whether we have responded to the Delegated Powers Committee. I explained at some length last week what the Government’s response was. Subsequently, I wrote to the chair of the committee, reiterating what I had said. I am sorry if noble Lords have not seen the letter; I will make sure that it gets to them. I will repeat what I said and what the letter said.

The Government’s view, bearing in mind that the committee said it was for the House to decide and did not make a recommendation on the procedure to be followed, is that, given the technical nature of these statutory instruments, the best way forward, in the light of the Government’s response to the consultation process that they have just completed, is to invite noble Lords who are interested in the secondary legislation to the Treasury to have an informal discussion on the issues, and to see what they feel might be done, and whether any amendments are required. The Treasury does not have a fixed view on the detailed provision of that secondary legislation, and would welcome the further views of Members of your Lordships’ House.

Secondly, I find literally incredible the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that the Government took no account of the recommendations of the PCBS.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Lord Newby

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, we now turn to the government amendments which implement another important part of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards on senior persons and banking standards rules. This group also contains a number of amendments to the amendments the Government have tabled. I begin by explaining how the government amendments will deliver the goal of improving standards of conduct in banking.

The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards concluded that the current system for approving those in senior positions in banks—the approved persons regime—had failed. It saw it as overly complex and unable to ensure that individual responsibilities were adequately defined or that clear expectations were set for those holding key roles. The commission’s central recommendation in this area is for the creation of a senior persons regime applying to senior bankers. The regime for senior managers in banks will have the following features. It will reverse the burden of proof so that senior bankers will have to show that they did what was reasonable when a bank fails to comply with regulatory requirements in their area of responsibility, or face regulatory action for misconduct. It will have mandatory statements of responsibility, so that whenever someone is a candidate to be a senior manager in a bank, the bank will have to set out clearly what aspects of the bank’s business they will be responsible for. There will be powers for the regulators to make conduct rules for senior managers in banks instead of the old system of statements of principles supported by codes of practice. There will be a requirement that the register kept by the FCA must state who is a senior manager in a bank and give details of regulatory action taken against them.

The new regime for senior managers will also retain the tools which the regulators have under the existing approved persons regime. The regulators will also retain their tough powers under FSMA to impose unlimited fines on, or publish notices of censure about, senior managers in banks. It may sometimes still be appropriate for the regulators to approve people to perform functions that are not senior management functions but which still involve important responsibilities. The Government have therefore chosen to retain the power for the regulator to pre-approve individuals to perform functions outside the senior managers regime. It is for the regulators to determine what functions, if any, should be subject to pre-approval outside the senior managers regime. I am confident that noble Lords will agree that retaining this power is a sensible safeguard at a time when concerns about individual standards in financial services remain acute.

In addition to the regime for bank senior managers, the commission also recommended the introduction of a standards regime that would apply to a wider class of individuals who work in banks. The Government have therefore provided the regulators with a new power to make conduct rules for anyone who is employed by a bank, even if they are not a senior manager or other approved person. This is an extension of regulatory power in relation to individuals, and gives the regulators the power to impose a single set of banking standards rules for all who work in banks. Employees of banks could face disciplinary action if they breach these standards rules or if they are knowingly concerned in regulatory breaches by the bank. The regulators will not be compelled to make conduct rules. They will be able, quite properly, to exercise their supervisory judgment to determine who in a bank should be subject to rules, and what standards to impose.

Finally, the commission also recommended including provision for time-limited and conditional approvals of senior bankers, and longer time limits for the regulators to take disciplinary action against individuals. The Government also accepted these recommendations. Accordingly, the Bill will allow the regulator to grant approval to perform senior management functions in banks subject to conditions, as well as to take steps to vary an approval it has already given, for example by imposing new conditions.

Perhaps I may respond to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Brennan, Lord McFall and Lord Watson. Amendments 46A, 46B and 47A seek to ensure that responsibility for preventing money laundering and other financial crime is also a senior management function. The Government agree with concerns that underpin these amendments. UK banks should uphold the highest standards in preventing criminal activity, and not facilitate it. Where there is evidence that banks have not lived up to those standards, the people at the top should be held to account. I reassure noble Lords that the new regime for senior managers will deliver precisely that accountability in relation to financial crime. Therefore, while we can all support the result that the noble Lords want to achieve, I can assure them that these amendments are unnecessary and there are no loopholes when it comes to such matters.

I shall try to explain why. The definition of “senior” is quite comprehensive. It encompasses all aspects of the bank’s operations and would therefore include responsibility for aspects of a bank’s operations that are concerned with the prevention of financial crime, where those aspects could involve serious consequences for the bank, for business or other interests in the United Kingdom. The amendments could in fact have the unintended effect of requiring junior staff with specific duties in relation to financial crime to be treated as senior managers. That would run in the opposite direction to what the parliamentary commission intended, which was to focus on senior persons in charge of all aspects of the bank’s activities.

Amendment 53A has two limbs. The first seeks to ensure the operational objectives that the FCA must consider when making rules of conduct for approved persons or bank employees. I can assure your Lordships that this part of that amendment is unnecessary. The reference to the operational objectives in new Section 64A(1) attracts all aspects of these objectives as defined in Sections 1B, 1C, 1D and 1E of FiSMA, without any additional words.

The second limb of Amendment 53A, and Amendment 53B, would require both regulators to use their new powers to make rules of conduct specifically about the conduct of individuals responsible for preventing money laundering or other financial crime. I am not sure what these changes would add. The Fraud Act 2006, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 already bite on bank senior managers. Adding regulatory rules mandating compliance with statutory requirements would add little. Further, the regulators already have a power to make conduct rules applying to persons in banks who have responsibility for compliance with money laundering regulations and other laws creating financial crimes. We certainly expect the regulators to use this power to make rules about aspects of conduct that include ensuring that firms comply with their obligations relating to money laundering and preventing financial crime. However, to single these areas out in primary legislation adds little bite to the existing regime and is, we believe, unnecessary. I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will agree not to press those amendments.

I also assure the noble Lords, Lord Brennan, Lord McFall and Lord Watson, that Amendment 54A is unnecessary. The reference to an application for approval in a context which refers to a person approved under Section 59 of FiSMA already always means an application under Section 60. There is no other section under which such an application can be made. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lords will agree not to press their amendment.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 100, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell and Lord Tunnicliffe. This amendment is the same as an amendment brought forward on Report in another place. The government amendments, which implement the commission’s key recommendations, go much further than the noble Lords’ amendment, which would really just rename the existing approved persons regime as a “licensed persons regime”, and that is all. It would not deliver the real improvements sought by the parliamentary commission. I hope therefore that the noble Lords will agree not to press this amendment. I beg to move Amendment 45.

[Lord Turnbull]

My Lords, an important finding of the commission was that the existing approved persons regime was flawed. After a debacle wiping billions of pounds off the value of shareholdings, requiring the state to inject billions of pounds into the industry and take huge financial exposures, and after several serious lapses of conduct, according to my researches one person has been fined and another person has negotiated an agreement not to practise.

Our conclusion was that the APR operates mostly as an initial gateway to taking up a post, rather than serving as a system through which regulators can ensure the continuing exercise of responsibility at the most senior levels within banks. A major cause of this flaw was that responsibilities were ill defined and were not joined up, so that those at the top could claim they “didn’t know” or, “It wasn’t me”.

We proposed a two-tier system: a senior persons regime, now called a senior managers regime, covering a meaningful chain of accountabilities, which we wanted to apply to all banks and holding companies operating in the UK; and, below that, a licensing regime, where no prior approval from the regulator would be required to employ anyone but banks would have to take responsibility for ensuring that those they did employ were properly qualified and trained and that they observed a code of conduct. This would apply to those who could seriously damage the bank or the bank’s reputation or harm a customer’s reputation.

The commission welcomes many of the Government’s proposals: defining the functions of senior management; requiring senior managers to have a statement of responsibilities; extending the limitation period for regulators to take enforcement action from three years to six; recording information on a person’s regulatory history so that a new employer can find out important details about whom they are recruiting; and the reversal of the burden of proof on whether a person is fit and proper.

However, serious issues are left unresolved. Amendment 55 provides a definition of a bank to which the regime applies. I found it impossible to discover what the definition means. Does it meet the commission’s objective of covering all banks and holding companies operating in the UK? Would the Minister clarify what he means by “bank”? Could it be a ring-fenced bank, a non-ring-fenced entity conducting investment activities within a group, a whole group or a freestanding investment bank? In our view, the new senior managers regime should apply to all such entities. It would make a mockery of the scheme if, as I suspect may be the case, it applied only to banks taking deposits from the general public—that is, ring-fenced banks. It would be completely unacceptable if the regime did not apply, for example, to the senior managers overseeing the LIBOR traders, to those overseeing rogue traders such as the “London Whale”, to those overseeing the marketing of highly dubious packages of sliced and diced mortgages or to those engaged in the mis-selling of interest rate swaps. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give us an answer today or address this between now and Report.

There is no mention of the licensing regime, which the commission recommended. The Government said that they would ensure that regulators had the ability to take regulatory action against persons who were not senior persons—senior managers—or who were not subject to prior regulatory approval. There is no mention of the licensing regime in the government amendment. They have come up with something rather different in Amendment 53 on the rules of conduct. It states:

“If it appears … necessary or expedient for … advancing one or more of its operational objectives, the FCA may make rules about the conduct of the following persons”,

and those persons could be any employee of the bank.

I question whether that is the right answer. It is “may” rather than “must”, but I should have thought it essential that the FCA made rules. Is it right that it should apply to all employees from purely backroom or administrative staff? In some ways, the government scheme goes wider but it is possibly too permissive.

The final omission to highlight is that we propose that as well as an initial statement of responsibilities for each manager, there should be a handover note when people change jobs. We think that that is crucial because without it the chain of accountability breaks down, and when someone changes jobs we are back to, “I didn’t know”, or, “It wasn’t me”.

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[Lord Newby]

My Lords, perhaps I may start by dealing with the three points on which the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, sought clarification. The first was on the definition of “bank” for the purposes of these amendments. The regime will apply to all UK institutions that have permission to take deposits. That covers ring-fenced banks, other banks, building societies, credit unions and some wholesale deposit takers, but it does not cover things which in popular parlance are called banks but which do not take deposits.

[Lord Turnbull]

If a bank divides itself under the new regime into a ring-fenced bank which takes deposits and puts its investment activities—derivatives, underwriting and proprietary trading—into a non-ring-fenced bank which does not take deposits, does it mean that that mass of activity will not be covered by the regime? Much of the malefaction took place in that area.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I repeat: it is limited to banks that take deposits, because the view is that they are of a different order of significance in the system. I think that we have a difference of view.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Lord Newby

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I will answer that question. The principal role of the Financial Policy Committee and its principal area of responsibility is to maintain the stability of the financial system. That is very different from any of the other committees established by the Bank. As for people on the FPC who have any understanding of financial crises, at the moment, Dr Donald Kohn, for example, clearly falls into the category of people with that ability. The former governor believed that he had extensive knowledge of financial history, and therefore there was and is no lack of it on the relevant committees, even without the provision on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Turnbull]

I listened to the responses to my intervention and divide them into two categories. One is points made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on specifying expertise and skill. I can see some force in those points. If we are going to have the opportunity, I will try to improve on it. My main area of disagreement is that I just do not agree with the idea that the oversight committee—the repository of who is responsible for reviewing what the Bank has done—should be hived off to a committee of non-executive directors. It should be built into the DNA of the whole organisation. However, I can see I am not going to be able to persuade noble Lords of that, so—

Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Turnbull and Lord Newby

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, the provision in paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 1is sensible. It states:

“Staff are to be employed on such terms as to remuneration and other matters as the Office may, with the approval of the Minister for the Civil Service, determine”.

Surely that is the sensible way of doing it, with the chairman deciding which staff he wants. It would be slightly surprising if none of them came from a Civil Service econometrics background, which would bring strength to the office. Just because they have come out of Whitehall does not mean that they are somehow tied hand and foot to Treasury thinking. No doubt, people will come in from academia and elsewhere. It is for the chairman himself to decide who the best people are to do the job.

[Lord Turnbull]

I support the noble Lord, Lord Newby. As I understand it, the number of staff would be around 20. Some may be seconded from the Treasury, some may be brought in from academia, and some may come from somewhere else. It is basically for the chairman of the OBR to assemble the best team that he wants, and we should not fetter that discretion, because there is a safeguard in Clause 5(2), which states:

“The Office must perform that duty objectively, transparently and impartially”.

In other words, anyone who is on loan from another government department is subject to that duty, which should ensure that the right degree of independence is maintained. If you say that someone with a Civil Service career must resign from the Civil Service in order to go and work for the OBR, you will raise all sorts of issues relating to pensions, seniority, this, that and the other. You will make it difficult to assemble the best-quality team, and that should be paramount.