Civil Service: Politicisation

Lord Turnbull Excerpts

Thursday 28th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Turnbull (CB)]

My Lords, I share the premise of this debate that all is not well within the triangle of relationships between Ministers, civil servants and special advisers, but the term “politicisation” may be a misdiagnosis. The problem is not so much that civil servants are being appointed on the basis of their political views; these processes are still conducted under the aegis of the Civil Service Commissioners. The issue is a different one, but equally troubling. It is that, over time, more of the work of civil servants, particularly policy advice, is being done by special advisers. So the correct diagnosis is that the Civil Service is being marginalised and not being used to best advantage.

The central principles of the Civil Service have for many years been a career service, selected and promoted on merit, serving impartially whichever party is in power. This had several advantages, including continuity of experience and development of a strong ethos. A downside, however, of a grow-your-own-timber approach is an excessively inbred service. There have been a number of reforms to address this problem. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Labour Administrations pioneered the role of special advisers, but the numbers were initially low. By 1997, there were still only 40, of which about six were in the Prime Minister’s office. The latest figures showed that that there were around 115, of which more than 40 were in the Prime Minister’s office—possibly quantity over quality. Over the years, there have been many highly effective special advisers.

In the Civil Service, my predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, initiated a reform programme, one of whose components was a working group called Bringing In and Bringing On, which recommended that many more vacancies in the senior Civil Service should be filled by competitions and more of those should be open to people outside the Civil Service. Under this initiative, many talented people have been brought in and have made a significant impact—we have the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, here as an example. The top of the Civil Service is no longer a closed freemasonry.

Taken together, these changes have greatly widened the insights available to Ministers. But is the right balance being struck? I doubt it. The pushing out of civil servants is seen most clearly in the new arrangements at the top of the Prime Minister’s office, where there is a chief of staff, then two deputy chiefs of staff and a director of communications, all filled by special advisers. We still do not know the position of the principal private secretary. The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers makes clear that their role is to provide an additional source of advice for Ministers, so that political considerations can be brought to bear on official advice. However, the code also states that, while spads can offer their own advice, they should not “suppress or supplant” the advice of civil servants. Thus, it was clear that these two streams are to be complementary to each other and not in competition.

Some of the problems derive from the concept of chief of staff. In my view, this is like chewing gum and Halloween: an unwelcome import from the United States. The title of chief of staff, in the UK context, is a nonsense. The special adviser code makes it clear that the chief of staff cannot manage Civil Service staff. When Jonathan Powell was appointed with that title, the rules were changed to allow him to do so, but he found that it was not necessary for him to fulfil his role and the power was allowed to lapse.

How then should departments be organised? There should be a special adviser cadre with its own leader, and an official cadre led by of the head of the Civil Service or the Permanent Secretary. Neither should attempt to outrank the other. They should collaborate to make the best use of the different skills and experience that each side can bring.