Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Paddick

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, this amendment in the name of my noble friend seeks to insert a new clause after Clause 20 to prohibit the display of bladed products in shops. The honourable Member for Lewisham Deptford, Vicky Foxcroft, the chair of the Youth Violence Commission, has done some excellent work on this matter. Members from all sides in the other place, along with academics, practitioners, youth service workers, the police and experts connected with youth violence have been very involved in the work of the commission. I commend the commission’s report, which was recently published—it should be read by all noble Lords. One of its important recommendations is the prohibition of knife displays in shops. During consideration in the other place, USDAW—the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers—was asked whether it believed that putting knives behind displays would be helpful. Doug Russell, representing USDAW, said:

“It would be. Obviously, now big retailers are increasingly going down the route of making it more difficult for customers to get their hand on the product until they have been age-checked”,—[Official Report, Commons, Offensive Weapons Bill Committee, 19/7/18; col. 98.]


and they have assured themselves that a transaction is safe. I want people’s ages to be checked properly when they seek to purchase knives.

We must also protect against the theft of knives. There are several restrictions in law relating to other products, most obviously the extremely restrictive provisions for the sale of tobacco, which prohibit the display of tobacco products in relevant shops and businesses in England. The Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002 refers specifically to under-18s, so the principle already exists in law to protect under-18s from harm by prohibiting the open display of goods. I see no reason why this should not be extended to bladed products. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, if I understand this amendment correctly, I do not feel I can support it. Clearly bladed products should be displayed in a way that ensures they are safe and cannot easily be stolen, but I cannot agree with the suggestion that they need to be hidden in case they lead people into being tempted to use them for criminal purposes, if that is what the noble Lord is saying. The noble Lord mentioned cigarettes. They are now hidden from view and advertising them has been banned because they are always and in every circumstance bad for your health and addictive, but the same cannot be said for knives. We do not conceal alcohol or glue as they have legitimate uses, and we do not believe it is necessary to conceal knives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

This takes me back to those heady days when we had a Labour Government and I was a lowly Whip. That sounds like a very Treasury counterargument. One day when I was handling a particular clause, I was told that it was impossible to frame the legislation to meet the need. I said, from my lowly position in the massive meeting, “You’d better try because otherwise you will get the words that are in the amendment because it will pass at the next stage”. At that, there was a great writing of things and, lo and behold, the Government managed to find an amendment which was satisfactory. I strongly recommend that the Government make an intense effort to frame an amendment of their own which meets the across-the-board support for the spirit of this amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, it should be said that concerns are being expressed at the impression being given by the Government of there being no room for negotiation on this issue. I hope that they will at least approach that meeting with an open mind rather than giving the impression, as might be inferred from what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box, that there is no room for manoeuvre.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Paddick

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to the other amendments in the group in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. These amendments seek to change the offences in the Bill from those where there is a reasonable excuse defence only when charged to ones where, if someone has a reasonable excuse, they do not commit an offence. They seek consistency in approach between legislation where no offence is committed if someone has an offensive weapon in a public place because they have a reasonable excuse and legislation where, in exactly the same circumstances, a person does commit an offence and has to rely on a defence only once they have been charged. The amendments also seek consistency between offences where the burden lies on the prosecution to disprove a reasonable excuse defence and offences where the burden lies on the accused to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they have a reasonable excuse.

We return to an issue that I raised in discussion of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill and which is applicable here; namely, creating offences where a completely innocent person commits an offence and has to rely on a defence once charged, rather than someone with a reasonable excuse for his actions not being guilty of an offence in the first place. In the context of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the Government acknowledged this problem in relation to the designated areas offence. In that Bill, the Government accepted that, rather than a person entering a designated area and having a defence once charged if they had good reason to be there, if they entered or remained in a designated area involuntarily or for a range of other reasons stipulated in the Bill, they did not commit an offence. The Government accepted that there could be legitimate reasons for visiting or remaining in a designated area and that it was more sensible to say that no offence was committed if they had good reason, rather than that they committed an offence but had a defence once charged.

In one part of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the person does not commit an offence if they had good reason yet, in another part, a person has a defence once charged—a different approach in different parts of the same Bill. It is still a Bill, I think, and has not yet received Royal Assent—I am getting nods from the back, so that is good.

In Clause 1 of this Bill, a person commits an offence if they sell a corrosive product to a person who is under the age of 18. They have a defence, if charged, by proving that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence, rather than it saying, “They do not commit an offence if they act reasonably”. In Clause 3, a person commits an offence if he delivers the corrosive product or arranges its delivery to residential premises. They too have a defence, if charged, if they prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence, rather than it saying that if they act reasonably, they do not commit an offence. There is also an issue with Clause 4, but it slipped through the net and therefore there is no amendment in this group to address it.

In Clause 6, however, a person commits an offence if they have a corrosive substance with them in a public place. It is a defensive charge if they prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place, rather than the provision being that if they had good reason or lawful authority, they do not commit an offence. It will perhaps be clearer if I concentrate on the latter of these three offences.

If a 19-year-old young man has a corrosive substance with them in a public place with the intention of using it to attack someone else, they commit an offence under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 of having an offensive weapon with them in a public place with the intention of causing injury to someone. It is an intended offensive weapon. However, if they have been sent out by their mother to buy drain cleaner in a squeezable bottle to unblock the kitchen sink—I speak with some experience having recently cleared one of my drains; drain cleaner does come in squeezable bottles—they do not commit an offence under the 1953 Act. They have a corrosive liquid with them in a public place, in a squeezable bottle that could be used to cause injury to someone, but have a reasonable excuse for possessing it. Were the police to stop and search the youngster, a quick phone call to the mother could establish the reasonable excuse.

Under the Bill, the 19 year-old running the errand for his mother commits a criminal offence because, under Clause 6(1):

“A person commits an offence if they have a corrosive substance with them in a public place”.


Under Clause 6(2), it is a defence for the youngster charged with an offence under subsection (1) to,

“prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place”,

but a police officer would be justified in arresting the youngster, because he is clearly committing a criminal offence.

When discussing the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, we also debated the principle of necessity in relation to arrests. One of the circumstances included in the reasons why an arrest might be necessary under Section 110 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 is to allow,

“the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or of the conduct of the person in question”.

It would be quite easy for a police officer to reason that the quickest and easiest way to determine whether the young man has a blocked drain is to arrest him and take him to his home address, to see whether the kitchen sink is blocked.

I am sure that the Minister will say that of course the police will act reasonably, but the police do not always act reasonably. Believe me, from 30 years’ experience in the police service, including four years as a bobby on the beat, I can say that sometimes police officers look for any reason to arrest someone. For those who might argue that my experience is not current, I point out that if you own a drone, live within a short distance of Gatwick Airport and have suspicious neighbours, apparently you can end up being arrested even when you can easily prove that you were miles away at work at the time the offence was committed.

There is another anomaly. In the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, in offences that remain of the “defence when charged” type, the burden is on the prosecution to disprove the reasonable excuse defence put forward by the accused, and to do so beyond reasonable doubt. Section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000 states:

“If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.


Indeed, in Clause 3(10) of this Bill we find a similar provision, except that it applies only in Scotland. South of the border, not only is it only a defence once charged—as in subsection (8)—but the person charged has to,

“prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”,

presumably beyond reasonable doubt. Noble Lords will recall that Section 118 of the Terrorism Act saved the Government from the accusation of reversing the burden of proof but, in these offences, the burden of proof is on the accused, presumably to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, that they have a reasonable excuse. Why is the burden of proof reversed in this Bill, except in Scotland, but not in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, which passed through this House only recently?

Sending a message to the police that an offence is not committed if someone has lawful authority or reasonable excuse is preferable to saying that an offence is committed and that there is a defence once charged. Sending a message that you have nothing to fear by buying corrosive substances for illegitimate purposes and carrying the substance home through the streets or to a place of work is preferable to saying: “You are committing an offence and have to prove to a jury beyond reasonable doubt that you did so innocently”. The principle adopted in Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, which deals with offensive weapons, is that you are innocent if you have a reasonable excuse. That legislation has not been repealed, nor have the Government sought to amend it. That is the principle adopted by the Government in recent weeks in relation to an offence under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, and it is the principle that the Government should adopt in this Bill. I beg to move—

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

Not being familiar with police procedures, to me the essence of the argument seems to be about when the defence is deployed. Can the noble Lord explain what that means in practical terms?

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, when the police are told that the offence is not committed if somebody has a reasonable excuse, the clear message sent to them is that they need to investigate the matter there and then to establish whether that reasonable excuse exists. If a Bill, as in this case, says that somebody who carries a corrosive substance in a public place commits an offence, it sends a message to the police that investigation of any reasonable excuse that the person may have can wait until later because, according to the legislation, the defence is available only once the person has been charged.