Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

The intentions in China are possibly as human as intentions here. If people produce a substance in China, it is bound to be possible to say why they are doing it. I agree that the more remote they are, the more difficult it is to bring to bear our criminal system but the system has to work when the drug is brought into operation in this country. The people who bring it in will have a purpose. They will no doubt have some kind of relationship with those who produce it, in China or elsewhere. I do not think that they are normally bringing it in as a charity but for some commercial purpose.

As far as I can see, the type of approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has suggested may be capable of being rephrased to bear on the purpose for which the drug is produced. If that were possible, it would be a much more feasible and workable solution than is contained in Amendment 2 at the moment. I am very sceptical about anything I could say about a definition of this kind that is supported by no less a person than the noble Lord, Lord Rees of Ludlow. However, this has legal implications as well, which is why I have been encouraged to say what I have thought about it up to now.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, hit on the essence of the Bill at the beginning of his contribution. It takes a different approach from the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, because of the speed with which these new products are coming into our society. We all at least agree that their impact is one of tremendous and peculiar harm. The Labour Front Bench supports the Bill and the essential concept behind it. We had a manifesto commitment to address legal highs and we approve of the device used, which is a wide definition with exceptions. That is the difference between the two sides in this debate. We therefore, as a generality, oppose the narrowing of definitions, as that would go to the essence of how the Bill is designed to work.

Amendment 1 would narrow the definition to “synthetic”, which would potentially exclude a large group of naturally occurring substances. Amendments 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 all seem to be about the same concept, with the same words used over and over again, as in Amendment 2, to limit the definition to,

“any drug which is, or appears to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs to be, misused and of which the misuse is having, or appears to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs”—

here we get to the key words—

“to be capable of having, harmful effects sufficient to constitute a social problem”.

Those ideas would drive right through the concept of the Bill and reverse its essence, meaning the psychoactive substance would first have to be proved harmful. The Bill is poised the other way round: if the substance is psychoactive, it is presumed to cause harm and is illegal under the Bill unless exempted.

The wording and framing of those amendments seems also to leave out the concept of self-harm, which the Bill seeks to address. It certainly takes out the more complex issues of harm such as dosage, volume, et cetera. We therefore cannot support those amendments.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving way. How does he deal with the objection raised by Professor Iversen and his colleagues on the ACMD in their letter of 2 July? The professor warns that:

“The psychoactivity of a substance cannot be unequivocally proven”.

He goes on to say how difficult it would be to demonstrate in court that a particular substance was indeed psychoactive. He also says:

“It is almost impossible to list all possible desirable exemptions under the Bill”.

Are those two objections not very serious ones to the legislation? What is my noble friend’s response to Professor Iversen?

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that intervention and hope to respond to it, at least in part, as I progress through the points I am making.

Amendment 7 would delete the definition in the Bill and would hence create the opposite effect from the one that we wish to pursue. For those reasons, in general we oppose these amendments. But—and it is an important but—we have become increasingly concerned with the operation of the Bill. What will happen? The concern that was building up and which came out on the first day in Committee was about how it will work operationally. It is of particular concern because the Bill refers specifically to the “balance of probabilities” and then, in other places, ends up with criminal sanctions. That is starting to feel very wrong. We challenged the Minister on this and he promised to write to me to provide reassurances about the operational aspects and the whole issue of proving whether something was psychoactive. I intend to refer to the letter that I got from the Minister. I thank him for the letter and I thank him and the team for making sure that it was copied to anybody who has spoken in the event—so anybody who has spoken in the debate so far should have a copy of the letter.

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Amendments 2 and 5 to 8 seek to define a psychoactive substance—

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, I am, albeit temporarily, on the same side as the Minister, and I am now confused. I think he said—some minutes ago, I grant you—that the Government had not ruled out the use of the word “synthetic”, but then he went on to rule it out. Can he be clear: are the Government thinking about adopting the word “synthetic”, and if so, in what timescale? If I misheard him, he now has the opportunity to be absolutely clear.

[Lord Bates]

I ask the noble Lord please not to go to the other side just yet but to stay with me a little longer. I was referring to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and was talking about the use of the term “novel” in this context. That was the ACMD point, as opposed to the point about the use of “synthetic”, which I shall come to later and have already touched upon. Now the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, looks puzzled; perhaps I have lost him in gaining the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. Perhaps I may continue with what I was saying and then I will come to the specific point raised by the noble Lord.

I accept that while our target in this Bill is substances that are harmful when misused, or which have the potential to cause harm, the Bill seeks to define the effect of these substances rather than to make any explicit reference to their harms. Of course, the advisory council has a considerable and impressive track record in making these harm assessments. It is a scientific body of experts which for the last 40 years has been advising successive Governments. These amendments would require assessments of individual substances, or even groups of substances, for the purpose of bringing them within the scope of the Bill and its offences.

Our fundamental issue with that is that it would perpetuate the inadequacies and frustrations of our current approach under the 1971 Act. As the expert panel found, a substance-by-substance approach would not meet our core objective to get fully ahead of the market and scientific developments. It would allow the suppliers to adapt their range of substances on sale in response to new controls. That is exactly what has happened in the past and is behind the purpose of this legislation. Indeed, by driving innovation in the market, the current approach adds to the harms caused by these substances, as each new generation of psychoactive substances is more potent than the last. We need a change in gear—that is what the blanket ban will deliver.

Finally, Amendment 9 adopts a different approach again to how we define a psychoactive substance for the purposes of the Bill. Clause 3 enables the Home Secretary to make regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure, which add to or vary the list of exempted substances in Schedule 1. As we have previously debated, the regulation-making power in Clause 3 has been designed to future-proof the list of exempted substances and ensure that, for example, medicinal products are not inadvertently caught by the blanket ban provided for in the Bill. Schedule 1 contains broad categories of established substances and products that we want to exclude from this regime, mostly because they are already regulated by other legislation.

I turn to the specific point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. He pointed to the advisory council’s concerns about proving psychoactivity as a point of law. I wrote to the noble Lord on this very issue, and he quoted my letter, in which I said:

“The Government is committed to supporting the law enforcement community in the exercise of their powers under the Bill. We will work with the national policing lead and College of Policing on the development of policing guidance”.

It is important to recognise that different powers in the Bill apply to different standards of proof. For example, the powers of seizure in Clause 42 operate to a “reasonable belief” test. An officer’s reasonable belief that a substance is psychoactive could be based on a number of factors, including the substance’s packaging, its markings or even whether the individual from whom it was seized appeared intoxicated and the officer could infer that the substance found might be responsible. The same “reasonable belief” test applies to the issuing of a prohibition notice or a premises notice. Applications for prohibition orders and premises orders are determined on the basis of the balance of probabilities.

In the case of a prosecution for an offence under Clauses 4 to 8—I think that this comes to the point that the noble Lord invited us to look at—we have the criminal test of “beyond reasonable doubt”. Clause 25, which is referred to in my letter, deals with the offence of failing to comply with a prohibition order or premises order. That clearly involves the civil test of the balance of probabilities. However, failure to comply with the order can involve a criminal sanction. Therefore, quite rightly the noble Lord came back and asked whether it was possible that we could end up with someone being caught between the two tests—the civil and the criminal—and facing a criminal sanction on the balance of probabilities test. As I understand it, that is at the heart of his concern. I can certainly give him the assurance that before any criminal sanction could be made under Clause 25, there would need to be proof to the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” that the substance involved was indeed psychoactive.

I hope that that clarification will help the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, with his concerns. I also hope that the point that I made right at the beginning to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, that we are continuing in a genuine dialogue with the Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs, will allow her to—

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Listening to the Minister, one might almost interpret him as saying that this is a balanced issue on which he needs more time to think and on which he wants to involve noble Lords. However, the only time when noble Lords will get another chance to debate this will be at Third Reading. Is the Minister saying that he may be able to take this away and shed more light on his conclusions at Third Reading?

[Lord Bates]

Look at the pace of events over the past week and the exchanges of correspondence that there have been. This is moving because we are genuinely exploring what the definition should be. Of course we will keep it under review for Third Reading and, should the Bill go to the other place, it is likely that, as a result of deliberations in your Lordships’ House, government amendments will be tabled in other areas dealing with other clauses. Therefore, through the normal process, we will get an opportunity to consider those Commons amendments should they be made. There will be opportunities for this discussion to continue with the ACMD in the proper way. However, I come back to the basic principle on which the noble Lord and I agree absolutely: we cannot have any more loopholes popping up so that people can exploit the gaps in the legislation. That is the whole point. We might as well not have the Bill if it will simply open up a number of new areas—be it botanicals or some other derivative—that can be used for the purposes that the Bill is intended to clamp down on.

[Lord Bates]

That would seem an elegant solution.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Is the Minister saying—I think he is about to get an answer from the Box—that he may well further consider this issue before Third Reading and that we should debate further at that point? That is very important to the noble Baroness in deciding whether to press her amendment.

[Lord Bates]

In responding on the Bill, I gave a number of examples of particular botanical substances that would fail the test of “synthetic”. Therefore, it is very much as my noble and learned friend has said. Those substances do not meet the harm threshold of the 1971 Act, but some natural substances are controlled under it. This is part of the confusion and discussion that is still to be resolved, but we believe that what we have at the moment is clear in terms of the intent of the Bill and that to insert “synthetic” at this stage would unnecessarily limit the scope of the Bill and potentially open up new loopholes, which would need to be closed down legislatively on another occasion.