Drones: Code of Conduct

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Judd, for tabling this debate. I wish that more noble Lords had taken part to discuss this important issue. I also thank the Library for its extremely useful briefing note. I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Judd, has said, but at the beginning I must state categorically that we on these Benches believe that unmanned aerial vehicles are a good thing, particularly in the military environment, and that by a “good thing” we mean that we believe that their value-added exceeds their risks. We agree with the noble Lord that appropriate controls over their use are essential.

In essence, the noble Lord’s question is this: do we need a code of conduct, along with regulations for the manufacture of and the operation of drones, and should these be international? I shall touch as quickly as I can on three areas, the first of which is safety. The operation of drones in UK airspace raises three areas of concern: collision; what we might call “terrain strike”, where drones fly into buildings and so on; and the possibility of technical catastrophe. Noble Lords will know that their computers are of a generation that is more adolescent than mature: that is, they are brilliant but they fail frequently. All these possibilities generate risk in the air environment, and any code of conduct or process of operation in UK airspace must cover all these risks. The risks are a particularly difficult regulatory challenge because drones do not have an established position in UK airspace at the moment, and therefore safety could be assured by simply denying them access. That makes it even more important that we understand the value that drones provide, the risks that they present, and that there are appropriate procedures to mitigate those risks.

What is the value of UAVs? The answer can be divided into two parts, the first of which is what I would call observation, and the other is the military delivery of lethal force. Observation can be secured by manned platforms: helicopters and fixed-wing aeroplanes. What is special about the drone in this observational area and what are the new challenges? I contend that the potential for drones to be both cheap and small introduces a new series of challenges for society as a whole. Because drones are potentially cheap and small, they have the potential to be both numerous and covert. The military use of drones for observation and reconnaissance is unexceptionable. Armies, navies and air forces throughout history have used all reasonable methods to secure information about their enemies, and I believe that drones are but part of that suite of capability. I do not believe that the military use of drones in the observation and reconnaissance role is particularly contentious.

However, in the non-military role, the potential for problems emerges, and we should address it. The non-military role divides into two: the state and the private sector. In the state sector, there is the potential for observational roles for the security services, the police and some other services. As the briefing note points out, we have some legal protections in the police and perhaps some in the security services, but by no means are they comprehensive, so one of the areas that has to be addressed is that of the whole suite of law covering operations that the state must obey in the use of this new technology.

In the private use of drones, one can certainly see the potential for them developing the inspection of hazardous environments and so on, but the area of most concern to me is that of intrusion. The fact that it is probably technologically feasible within a relatively small number of years to have an affordable drone the size of an apple that has a high-resolution camera in it means that there is a whole new potential for intrusion in the private environment. We know that our present laws are ineffective on intrusion by the press, and we are at the moment agonising over that with respect to Leveson. Surely, this new area must be included in those concerns to make sure that the whole issue of privacy is considered when developing the codes of conduct for these things.

The final and most contentious area is the use of drones for the delivery of lethal force. They are very effective in this role in uncontested airspace. They are able to deliver force with great precision and are therefore better than many other weapons that have defended us in the past: they are not indiscriminate like cluster bombs, mines or even modern artillery. They have the ability to loiter and be persistent, which allows for high precision, smaller munitions and the potential for less collateral damage. They also eliminate operator exposure.

The regime for their use essentially uses the manned platform regime, which involves military advisers in all aspects, including targeting and compliance with international law; there is a human decision-maker. As far as we know, society is not contemplating autonomous use. All those things are there. However, it is this very precision that causes us to think about the drone and that brings home to us that it is about damaging the enemy and killing them. Very usefully, the pack refers us back to Robert E Lee’s statement:

“It is well that war is so terrible—otherwise we would grow too fond of it”.

If war has no risk to the aggressor, how do we ensure that we do not become too fond of it? We must retain the horror of war itself. As the note points out, it is the remote warrior that is at the centre of this whole dilemma. The retention of the remote warrior as the stepping stone, the filter, and the way in which the state’s use of lethal force is used is absolutely crucial. We certainly, as I have said, see no movement towards autonomous use.

We need codes for the use of drones and the use of lethal force, which need to be bigger and probably more effective than those we have now. They should be developed through a transparent process, even in respect of military use, so that society knows how lethal force is being delivered and that appropriate, politically accountable systems ensure that this frightening delivery of lethal force by our remote warrior is properly controlled. We agree that there is a need to look at new controls and that, where possible, these should be developed internationally. We believe that they should pass the test of the public having confidence that the operation of drones in UK airspace will be safe, that their use in non-military applications will preserve our privacy and that their military use will ensure the protection of national security and the value system of our society.