The Ukraine Effect (European Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 21st November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, unlike the noble Baroness, I was not a member of the committee, so I begin by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, and the other members of the committee on the report they have produced. It has been 10 years since I chaired a committee—the EU External Affairs Sub-committee of the old European Union Committee—that produced a report on Ukraine, and I know what is involved in this matter. I congratulate the members of the committee on the outcome.

I must also say that, as an outsider, I found the committee’s report rather encouraging. It shows the extent to which, when faced with a common threat, the UK, the EU and its member states are able to work together in formulating policy and determining objectives. Of course, the implementation has perhaps not been quite as good as the willingness to co-operate. The spirit is willing but the flesh has been weak so far as sanctions are concerned, although I was struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, and the report had to say about the greater success in military co-operation.

However, there are clear limits to what is possible. The noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, mentioned the third-party rules arising out of our non-membership of the European Defence Fund. This is not only serious in itself; as I will point out in a moment, it provides a warning of problems to come. Of course, there is a long history of British reluctance to get involved in European initiatives within NATO, and of European reluctance to see outsiders participating in European projects. But, as the report says, what we have at the moment amounts to protectionism. The committee says:

“Protectionism is not the way to build an efficient defence”


alliance, and nor is it the best way to keep the newly elected President Trump involved in European affairs. What he wants is European countries to operate more effectively, as well as to spend more. It is essential that this obstacle to which the committee refers be overcome.

I also fear that, whether or not that is overcome, similar attitudes could be carried through from defence procurement to the reconstruction of Ukraine, notwithstanding United Kingdom participation in the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform and our prominent role in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. As the report says, the reconstruction of Ukraine will be a colossal task, and it will also be closely linked to Ukraine’s candidacy for membership of the European Union. This means that it will also be closely linked to that most controversial of all issues within the European Union: its budget, for which, many decades ago, I was at one time the responsible commissioner. The danger is that it will be so difficult for the EU member states to reach agreement on programmes and expenditure among themselves that, when they finally do, it will be even more difficult for agreement to be reached with other donor countries. Against that background, the UK Government must ensure not only that the costs of reconstruction are fairly and proportionately divided, but that UK companies receive an appropriate share of the contracts involved.

Finally, I want to say a word about paragraph 222 of the report, which refers to bringing Ukraine into western institutions. Yes, we and the EU do want to bring Ukraine into western institutions, and Ukraine itself wants to be brought into western institutions, but I would suggest that this should not be an exclusive relationship. Looking to the long term—perhaps, but not necessarily, after Putin has gone—Ukraine should also rebuild its economic and personal links at all levels with Russia. To the extent that the Russian people—I emphasise, the Russian people—see Ukraine as the vanguard of western encroachment into their own historic sphere of influence, it will remain a potential casus belli. To the extent that Ukraine has links with Russia as well as with the West, it could provide a bridge to help bring about improvement in relations between Russia and the West. That might sound at present rather idealistic, but it is very important that Ukraine should be facing east as well as west if it is to have a secure position in the West. When one looks at the historic links of the Ukraine economy with that of Russia, it will also be beneficial in the long run if Ukraine is able to rebuild its relationships with Russia, as well as to become embedded in western institutions.

EU: Trade in Goods (European Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 2nd February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Lamont, I was shocked to learn that our noble friend Lady Chalker is to leave us. I had not realised that that was going to happen, and I am extremely glad that I should be here on the occasion of her valedictory speech. I remember her well as a radical and disruptive influence in the Young Conservatives back in the late 1960s and 70s. Since then, she has had a most distinguished career; she has combined idealism with energy and vision with practicality. This House, and particularly the Conservative Benches, will be sadly diminished by her departure.

For me, too, this is something of a valedictory speech because, to my great regret, I have been rotated off the European Affairs Committee; indeed, I think I ceased to be a member two days ago. I wish to say how much I have enjoyed serving on the committee; how very much I have appreciated the wisdom, fairness and deliberations of our chair, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull; and how much I have enjoyed the company of the other committee members. Although we have not all agreed on everything at all times, it has been a model of noble Lords of different parties working constructively together. I hope that my successors on the committee will find it as enjoyable as I have and will continue to produce reports of the quality that the noble Earl has made possible. I also wish to say how very well served we have been by the committee staff. They have had a considerable amount of work to cope with and have done so in a very efficient fashion.

Very often, the time that elapses between the publication of a report and its debate in this House is a disadvantage but, on this occasion, it is an advantage. As other noble Lords have said, when the report was published, it was still unclear what the effects of both Brexit and Covid were and it was difficult to disentangle them. However, now, after the effluxion of time, we can see how perceptive the committee was in disentangling those factors and identifying the problems that have been created by the terms under which we left the EU.

The Government’s response is a very singular document. It is basically a list of their efforts to overcome obstacles to Britain’s trade with its principal trading partner that the Government themselves are responsible for creating. It is a very unusual situation. In saying that, I am not trying to reopen the Brexit debate; as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, that issue is settled. What I am doing is drawing attention to the consequences of the terms on which Mr Johnson and my noble friend Lord Frost negotiated our departure from the EU. It did not have to be this way. The country took the decision to leave the EU, which I personally regretted very much, but the manner in which we did so has created a range of problems that could well have been avoided had we adopted different negotiating tactics and objectives.

As we know, all countries have been hit by the effects of Covid and the consequences of the war in Ukraine. In explaining the problems facing the British economy, Ministers harp to a great degree on these matters but, in those respects, the United Kingdom is in the same position as everybody else. The reason why we are facing additional problems is, as I have just said, the terms under which Mr Johnson negotiated our departure.

Their manifestations are clear for all to see: the fact that the UK is the only major economy still at pre-pandemic levels; the hit to our exports, to which other noble Lords have referred; the fact that business investment has been growing by so much less than the G7 average; the shortage of workers, which all European countries are suffering from but our problems have been made worse than they need have been; and the IMF forecasts that suggest that we will be alone among the major economies in going into recession.

As my noble friend Lord Lamont pointed out, forecasts are not always right and the UK has defied pessimistic forecasts in the past. However, this accumulation of factors is significant. I agree with those who say that Brexit is not the only factor behind them but the terms on which it was negotiated are a very important factor. All these problems were foreshadowed in the committee’s detailed questioning of witnesses and the responses that they received. From the evidence we collected, it was clear that the totality of the individual issues that we identified would cause major problems to the economy.

My party devotes a great deal of time to debating growth and how best to achieve it. Growth is a difficult thing to achieve but one way in which we could certainly contribute to growth would be, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has pointed out, making Brexit work. As this report and the government response shows, one of the best things we can do is set about resetting the relationship between this country and the European Union. It is not a question of returning to the EU. That is not something we should be thinking about at all at the present time. We should be thinking about how this country can deal with the EU on a constructive, equal and mutually beneficial basis. I very much hope that an agreement on the Northern Ireland protocol might prove to be the first step on that road.

Qatar: FIFA World Cup

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend will know all too well as a former Minister in DCMS, this is a matter for that department. At the same time, the main engagement on this issue has been through the Football Association directly with FIFA, which is the normal way. But, to go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Birt, it is important as we look forward that the issue is not just about celebrating tournaments. We should look at the countries that are chosen and taken forward to celebrate international events, but that is the time for profiling human rights in their own backyard. It provides an opportunity to have constructive engagement. In future decisions, which are for other people, we should make our views clearly known.

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that the only real heroes of Qatar are the Iranian footballers, the only people who have actually made a protest for which they are going to have to pay a price?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, as we celebrated England’s victory, I think we were all were touched by the poignancy and solidarity shown by the Iranian football team, people who were in solidarity particularly with the brave women of Iran. It was an incredibly courageous step, and we stand very much with everyone who is standing in unity with the Iranian people.

Philippines: Typhoon Odette

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 5th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

Because I do not think that answer exists, and it is hard to assess. However, our support for humanitarian crises remains a priority, and that will be reflected in our upcoming development review.

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, sadly, natural disasters of one sort or another occur in different parts of the world with very great frequency. No doubt as a result of climate change the frequency will increase. Her Majesty’s Government will naturally want to help whenever they can but they cannot possibly help on every occasion. Can my noble friend tell me whether his department has an objective set of criteria by which it judges the suitability of help, both in terms of the form of the disaster and of the country concerned?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, that is perhaps the most difficult issue for the department to grapple with. Shortly we will produce our international development review, which seeks to address exactly that question among a great many others. However, my noble friend is right that we have to ensure that when we deploy support it is to areas where we can have the biggest possible impact.

Climate Change: COP 26

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 18th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by congratulating the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Exeter on his notable maiden speech. His eloquence is worthy of the beauty of his cathedral, and his timekeeping is an example to us all.

I will say just a few words about China, India and coal. It is right that coal should be at the heart of the problem, and it was the statement on coal that was a disappointment at the end of the conference, but I think we need to see this matter in context. For a moment, I will turn the clock back 50 years. At that time, in the 1970s, one of the world’s great challenges was how to avoid widespread famine. I remind noble Lords of the famous Club of Rome 1972 report, The Limits to Growth, the most eloquent and influential exponent of that prospect and one that enjoyed great support among the scientific community. It turned out to be wrong. Not only has the predicted famine not occurred, but the position of the world’s poorest has been transformed for the better. World Bank figures show what has been achieved: in 1981, 42.7% of the world’s population was living in absolute poverty; now, the figure is 9.3% of a very much larger population.

The two countries that have done most to bring about this change are China and India. One of the most important instruments in enabling them to do so has been coal-fired electricity. Resolving one problem has contributed massively to creating another. The lives of millions of the world’s poorest people now depend on the fuel that is polluting the planet. While I recognise that phasing down coal, rather than phasing it out, represents a disappointing end to COP 26, I feel it represents an important step forward by China and India. If great human suffering is to be avoided, they need time to turn their economies away from coal.

The fact that they need time, however, does not mean that nothing should be done. The move must be made and they, like everyone else, must be subject to appropriate internationally verifiable targets and deadlines. At the same time, richer countries must make every effort to assist poorer countries to lessen their dependence on coal, and in that respect, the harnessing of private enterprise to governmental efforts, to which a number of noble Lords have referred, is a very important development.

Finally, the developed industrial countries that pressed for the phasing out of coal must move forward as quickly as possible to fulfil that aim. Achieving it and assisting the developing countries in reducing their dependence on coal, and indeed the efforts of China and India, will demand the most massive expenditure and huge changes in the way of life of people in this country, the developed world and the developing world. It is very important that Governments everywhere, but particularly our Government, be more frank than they have been about what those changes imply and what the costs will be. It is essential to do that if public opinion is to provide the necessary support for the required changes.

UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order (International Relations Committee Report)

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, like others I should like to begin by congratulating my noble friend Lord Howell not just on this report but on the whole period of his chairmanship of the International Relations Committee. He has rendered an enormous service to the House, and the continuation of the committee after he steps down will maintain that work well into the future.

The report itself is of course a timely contribution to the foreign policy debate. It comes at a time when the whole direction and basis of British foreign policy needs to be rethought as a result of Brexit, and it also comes at a time when assumptions on international relations across the world are being called into question, not just by President Trump but also by the rise of China and some of the policies that China is pursuing.

The report deals comprehensively with the issues to which these changes give rise, but it provides questions rather than answers to those issues. In so doing, I fear it exposes with alarming clarity the muddle that the United Kingdom has got itself into. That emerges in the summary to the report, with its exhortation to resist United States challenges to the multilateral system and to make defence of the rules-based international order central to our bilateral relations. I agree very strongly with that, and so do many other noble Lords. But how can one reconcile that exhortation with our departure from the most important and highly developed international organisation of which we are at present a member?

Whether or not it is good or damaging for Britain in the long run to leave the European Union is of course a matter of intense domestic debate. But there is one thing on which one has to be absolutely clear. Our decision to leave the European Union is very damaging to the European Union. It means that the European Union is losing its second-largest or third-largest member and it calls into question a number of the policies on which it is based. Some harsh words have been uttered about President Trump, but he has done nothing as damaging to the international rules-based order, or to international organisations, as that. It is something that it behoves us to remember.

Not only that, but on the basis of this report our Foreign Secretary does not seem to have grasped the full consequences of what we are doing. He is quoted as saying that the United Kingdom should be a link between the United States and Europe. I certainly agree with that; it has been our traditional role and something that we have sought to do for a very long time. But you cannot be a link between the United States and Europe if you are weakening your relationships with your principal European partners and if you are weakening the international organisation to which they attach more importance than any other. I am of course delighted to read in the report that the Foreign Secretary wants the strongest possible partnership on foreign and security policy with like-minded European partners. That is absolutely right; we certainly do. But that is not quite the same as being a member of the European Union.

Many of us in the House will remember Ray Seitz, an outstanding ambassador to this country, and will have read his book, Over Here, in which he describes the basis of British influence in Washington. He explains that it is based partly on the defence and intelligence relationship that is discussed in the report and partly on our experience in different parts of the world. He emphasises the extent to which it is because we are a member of the European Union and have been able to influence the way in which the Union developed.

That, I am afraid, is not the only example of an inconsistency between what the report sensibly recommends and the direction of British foreign policy —or at any rate British policy—at present. Among the international organisations that the report mentions is one that it particularly wishes us to uphold: the WTO. That, too, is quite right; the WTO is a very important organisation and we certainly wish to support it, particularly in the light of our departure from the EU. But it is of course also the international organisation to which President Trump has perhaps done more damage than any other by, in effect, neutralising its appellate procedure. To call in aid WTO rules as an alternative to EU rules at precisely the point that the United States is undermining the WTO, as the ERG MPs and some Ministers who favour a no-deal Brexit recommend, beggars belief. I am afraid that it is another example of how the wise words of the report are at variance with what the British Government are doing.

Another is the inconsistency, to which the report rightly draws attention, between the need for the United Kingdom to strengthen its considerable soft-power assets and the Government’s policy on students from abroad. Including them in the immigration target both damages our universities’ ability to compete in the international market and conveys an attitude of hostility to the students and to the countries from which they come. In particular, it has damaged relations with Commonwealth countries, and above all with India. The report rightly attaches importance to the Commonwealth, and the future of the Commonwealth will depend to a great extent on the attitude taken by its largest member.

So I praise the report, and I wish only that the behaviour, policies and direction of the British Government were more in line with its recommendations.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, this is a cracking debate, as I am sure all noble Lords will agree. However, more of your Lordships are managing to disregard the advisory speaking time than are observing it—so I am in your Lordships’ hands.

Brexit: Sanctions Policy (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 3rd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, it gives me very great pleasure to speak in this debate on a report produced by the sub-committee of which I was chairman before my noble friend Lady Verma. I congratulate her and the members of the committee, and indeed the clerks, on the quality of the report that has been produced.

This debate is also taking place at a topical moment in the light of what is happening in Korea—events to which my noble friends Lord Horam and Lord Risby have already referred. What exactly has brought the North Koreans to the table? One cannot be sure, of course, but certainly United States strategic pressure on the one hand and Chinese economic pressure on the other have played a significant role. According to Reuters, in January China exported virtually no oil products to North Korea and imported no iron ore, coal or lead. This is an encouraging example of how effective sanctions can be. Of course, China is not the only contributor, but it was by far the most important one in bringing pressure to bear.

By virtue of its dependence on China, North Korea is, of course, an unusually simple case. I very much agree with the following in the Government’s reply to the report:

“sanctions regimes are more effective when they are implemented by a broad range of countries”,

in support of a strategic policy than when they are conducted by a single country or small group of countries.

At this point, it becomes clear how much damage is done to the European Union as a result of Brexit. I am reminded of an inter-parliamentary gathering I attended when I was chairman of the sub-committee. A member of some other Parliament—I cannot remember which—asked the representative of Mrs Mogherini whether it would not much easier to reach decisions if Britain were to leave the European Union. The representative replied, “Yes, it probably would be much easier to reach decisions—and they would be worth much less”. She pointed out how weakened the European Union would be without Britain’s global reach and without the other assets referred to in this debate, of which the City of London in this context is an important one.

As the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, and others have pointed out, Britain, too, will be weakened. The Government’s reply suggests that the United Kingdom’s influence on international sanctions policy derives only partly from our current EU membership and points to our membership of the Security Council, but, as my noble friend Lady Verma and other noble Lords have pointed out, that is somewhat disingenuous: we all know how difficult it is to organise effective policies of this kind through the United Nations because of the Russian and Chinese vetoes. It is in the EU that we have played our most effective role, and it is within the EU that we will be most missed.

The report and the reply therefore dwell, as other noble Lords have done, on the need as far as possible to continue close co-operation with our EU friends, which is in their interest—indeed, more so—as well as ours. However, it will not be easy. Clausewitz is reputed to have said that war is simply a continuation of political influence with the addition of other means. If that is true of war, it is certainly true of sanctions. Sanctions emerge from discussions on common foreign and security policy, from which a common purpose or a coalition of the willing begins to take shape. If our influence and the value of our contribution are to be maintained, we have to be part of the initial discussions and not simply come in when the broad lines of a policy have been set. I make this point because, to be effective, not only do sanctions need to be implemented by a broad range of countries but their burden needs to be shared as fairly as possible among the participants. If the burden of the sanctions is not fairly shared, it is unlikely that they will be fully implemented. If we are not a part of the initial deliberations, EU policies will inevitably begin to take shape without taking our views sufficiently into account. That does not mean that a joint policy cannot be formulated, but it does mean that time will be wasted in achieving that joint policy.

Regardless of our particular issues in the European Union, though certainly including them, financial measures are likely to play an increasingly important part in sanctions regimes in the future. That is, of course, because they can be targeted not only on states but on individuals, and because, in the nature of the modern economy, so much international trade is financed through operations in New York and, to a lesser extent, London. Therefore, the role of the financial sector in implementing sanctions will be increasingly important, which is why Brexit is so damaging to the European Union in this respect. If sanctions are going to rely increasingly on the financial sector, this will raise very considerable problems for the United Kingdom. It is going to be very difficult for us to ensure that, in imposing sanctions, we are not imposing restrictions on the way our markets work or putting ourselves at a disadvantage in coming to agreement on joint policies with other people. I do not have an answer to that; I just raise the point that I think financial measures will be more important, and this adds to the difficulties in formulating effective regimes in the circumstances that will apply after Brexit has taken effect.

Iran: Future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 16th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

On the President, that is a matter for the United States. I assure the noble Lord that, first and foremost—I reiterate—we stand by the deal. Over the weekend my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary spoke to various counterparts, including Foreign Minister Zarif in Iran, and to senior representatives of the Trump Administration in the US, to reiterate our support for the continuation of the deal. The noble Lord also raised an important point about the implications. This deal is important for our security, and for the security of the wider region and the whole world. We call upon all parties to ensure its continuation.

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, I too welcome this Statement and the fact that the British Government are working closely with our European partners in the deal, notably France and Germany. Does my noble friend not agree that this is a very good illustration of our voice and influence in the world being enhanced when we work in conjunction with our European partners and that this shows the great importance of maintaining, as far as possible, the existing structures of political and foreign policy co-operation after we leave the European Union?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My noble friend raises an important point. We have been consistent in our approach to this deal and to international agreements. The way in which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister acted on Friday and the co-operation that we continue to demonstrate with our European partners adds to the strength of having a unified approach to issues on which we agree. That certainly reflects the situation with this agreement.

Populism and Nationalism

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, for giving us this opportunity to examine our own consciences and careers. I say that because the rise of populism and nationalism is the result of the failure of conventional politics—and all of us are of course involved in conventional politics. To the extent that populism and nationalism have become powerful in this country, it is in some measure a result of our own failures.

The words of this Motion are directed to the wrong target. It is not populism and nationalism that pose the main threat to the liberal international order. They are the symptoms rather than the disease. The way in which that order is working is provoking the resentment and hostility within many countries that poses the real danger. In his column in the Sunday Times last Sunday, Dominic Lawson wrote that,

“misery is a measurement of the difference between expectations and reality”,

which is a very good aphorism. Since the 2008 financial crisis, that misery index has risen to dangerous heights because the political parties and conventional politics in so many western countries have failed.

Some of the reasons for this are common to a number of countries, including this one. The handling of that financial crisis and what has happened since is obviously one. The banks were bailed out, which was absolutely necessary to prevent an economic breakdown, but no bankers have gone to jail or been held personally responsible. Meanwhile, other sectors of the economy have experienced closures and the attendant job losses, and many people have had their lives thrown into chaos. This has done much to discredit conventional politics and business leaders, and thus to fuel the rise of nationalism and populism.

Another reason common to many countries has been the handling of the combined effects of globalisation and technological advance. While some sections of society have benefited beyond the dreams of avarice, others have lost out badly—none more so than relatively unskilled men and their families. I believe that their problems have not received the priority they deserve in political debate and political programmes. It is no wonder, therefore, that they turned in large numbers to Donald Trump in the United States and are turning in large numbers to UKIP in this country.

Other factors are particular to some countries and regions. For instance, the way the eurozone has functioned has had the opposite effect from the one intended. Far from bringing the people of the eurozone closer together, its workings have driven them further apart and led to a rise in nationalism in a number of countries in northern and southern Europe.

While these developments have been working through the system, conventional political parties, of which many of us in this House are members, have paid little heed to the anger boiling up around us. The most obvious example in this country is the length of time it took us to focus on the concerns surrounding immigration. We failed to explain how the country benefits from immigration and why it needs it, and to tackle the social tensions and deep-seated social fears that it created. It was a double failure: a failure to explain and a failure to act.

I shall give another example of how in this House and in another place our priorities have sometimes diverged from those of the electorate and given rise to anger. While so many government programmes that touch on the lives of ordinary people have been cut or subjected to strict spending limits, the aid programme, to which the noble Lord referred, has been privileged to a unique and unprecedented degree. It is guaranteed a share of GDP, and those who run it are legally obliged to spend up to the limit. This is absolutely the reverse of the way every other programme works. I am not against aid—I am in favour of it—but it is no wonder that privileging the aid budget in a way that no other budget is privileged causes anger and resentment among people who are not prejudiced, not lacking in compassion and not unreasonable, when they compare that with what is happening in the NHS and social welfare.

My conclusion is not that there has been an underlying shift in the standards and values of electorates across the western world. It is rather that Governments and Parliaments have in too many cases, including in this country, failed to take sufficient account of legitimate public concerns. This has left the way open for populists and nationalists, and we must all ask ourselves how much we as individuals are to blame.

EU Foreign and Security Strategy (EUC Report)

Lord Tugendhat Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Tugendhat]

That this House takes note of the Report from the European Union Committee Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy (8th Report, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 97).

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with thanks, in particular to my colleagues for their commitment and constructiveness, and to our excellent committee clerk Eva George, Roshani Palamakumbura, Will Jones and our specialist adviser Dr Kai Oppermann. We were extremely well served by all of them. On behalf of the committee I express my gratitude to them. I am also grateful to the Government and to the EU high representative and vice-president of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, for their responses to our report, both of which we have had an opportunity to consider. Finally, I welcome the fact that so many of my colleagues are in the Chamber today and that a number will speak, as will a number of noble Lords who were not on the committee, which demonstrates the interest that the report has generated.

Inevitably, our work took place under the shadow of the referendum, and the referendum looms over our proceedings today. However, I stress that our inquiry was not taken for any reason connected with the referendum but because the high representative had stated some time ago that she was preparing a new EU strategy on foreign and security policy, to be published in late June. Our aim was to feed into and to influence that process. This exercise—the one we have been involved in but also the other work the EU Select Committee does—sets an example to parliaments throughout the European Union on how national parliaments can influence EU policy if they set out to study it and to make an input in due time. Our report today will have an impact, or will be seen to do so, on what Mrs Mogherini proposes at the end of June. Indeed, I am encouraged to learn from her response to our report that in a number of respects her thinking is very much in line with ours and, as I will make clear during the course of my speech, she has given other indications of the extent to which she and we have been thinking on similar lines.

At the beginning of our report we emphasised that foreign policy is the responsibility of the member states and that it should remain so. I was pleased to see that in a speech Mrs Mogherini gave in April at the European Union Institute for Security Studies she made exactly the same point. We want the European Union to provide the member states with an overarching framework within which they can act collectively and more effectively than in the past. This does not necessarily mean that all of them will work together all the time. Experience has shown that ad hoc groups acting on behalf of the Union as a whole can be the most effective means of achieving rapid and decisive action. One of a number of examples of that is of course the E3+3 on Iran. However, if one has an ad hoc group, the challenge is to ensure that the European Union has the means to ensure that the policies and actions of that group become and remain accepted by all the member states. To achieve this, we believe that the high representative should always be involved. In their response to our report the Government argue that that should not necessarily be a prerequisite. We think that the Government are mistaken because, although foreign policy is a member state responsibility, it is often executed by European Union institutions and by means of European Union instruments. The sanctions on Iran and Russia are obvious examples but one could also take examples from the fields of development and trade. So in our view it will be less difficult to achieve and maintain unity, and therefore to maintain effectiveness in the implementation of policies, if the high representative is always present on these ad hoc groups.

That brings me to the issue of Britain’s participation. Obviously, if we were to decide to leave the European Union, it would create a major upheaval in our relationships with our partners in NATO and in a number of other institutions, and it is hard to believe that foreign policy would be unaffected by that. Indeed, the fact that a number of previous NATO Secretaries-General and a number of former United States Secretaries of State have made their views known about how much they would regret Britain leaving the EU is perhaps an indication of that. However, even if the upheaval were less than I fear it might be and it were handled with the maximum good will on all sides, which naturally I hope it would be, Britain’s departure from the European Union would put us at one remove from the execution process. No doubt we would still be able to align our actions with those of the European Union but this would be less effective and more time-consuming than being part of the EU process in the first place. Therefore, we conclude that British withdrawal from the European Union would both limit the United Kingdom’s influence in foreign affairs and reduce that of the European Union.

Here, I should like to mention an exchange that I witnessed at an EU parliamentary conference in The Hague in April. Representatives of all the member state parliaments, as well as of the European Parliament, were there. One delegate—I do not know from which country she came—asked one of Mrs Mogherini’s top officials whether it would not be easier to reach agreement on foreign policy matters if Britain left the EU. The official replied, “Yes, it probably would be easier but the agreement would be worth an awful lot less than if Britain remained in the EU”. She emphasised that Britain is one of the most global member states of the EU and that the exercise of producing an EU foreign and strategic policy would be worth a good deal less if we were not part of it. I thought that that was a very apt reply and that it very much reflected the reality of the situation.

We also conclude that the most direct challenges to the security and stability of the European Union, to its member states and to the citizens of those member states originate in our neighbourhood, and that that is where the European Union’s efforts should be concentrated. I note that in a recent speech Mrs Mogherini made a similar point. In our report we call in particular for relations with Turkey to be put on to a new and sustainable footing. We believe that its application for membership having been left on the back burner for goodness knows how many years has led to disarray in the relationship between Turkey and the EU, and that it is now very important that that relationship should be rebuilt on the basis of first principles.

We do not envisage Turkey becoming a member of the EU; rather, we were thinking in terms of a close association. In the light of some of the things that are being said in the referendum campaign, it is important to emphasise that any decision for Turkey to enter the EU would require unanimity by all member states, that all member states would have a veto, and that a number of member states have made it clear in the past that they would exercise such a veto. None the less, we feel that a stable and clearly understood relationship between the EU and Turkey should be an important objective.

We have something to say too on relations with our other neighbours. So far as the Eastern Partnership countries are concerned we argue that, in the absence of a realistic timetable for entry into the Union, the European Union needs to define its objectives and interests and to communicate those as clearly as possible to the countries concerned. Most people will agree that when one looks at the political and economic state of those countries and the nature of their relationships with Russia, it is difficult to imagine them joining the EU for a very long time. However, at the same time, it is important that we have a clearly defined relationship with them, that our objectives and interests are stated, and that we avoid raising unrealistic expectations in those countries about what we are prepared to do and willing to deliver.

We believe that it is important for the European Union to continue to stand up to Russia’s breaches of international law, but at the same time make it clear that our quarrel is not with the Russian people but with the Russian leadership and that we remain open to dialogue and co-operation in areas of common interest. In this context, we also talk of the need to strengthen EU and NATO deterrents in the Baltic states and the Black Sea.

It is against this background that we call for better co-operation between the European Union and NATO. We want a closer cultural convergence between the two organisations. We address this recommendation to member states of both organisations—they are, to a great extent, the same—as much as to the organisations themselves, as individual member states’ foreign policy and defence postures can often diverge somewhat between what they say and do in an EU context and what they say and do in a NATO context.

Finally, I return to the Middle East. All of us are aware of the huge challenge of the migrant crisis, which has become more serious and more difficult since we completed our report. The migrant crisis was not part of our report’s purview, but the crisis itself emphasises our recommendation that the EU should focus its attention on the linked issues in the Middle East of economic reform and good governance, and on the political, judicial and security sectors of those countries, and seek to assist in whatever way it can in their development.

That is a brief summary of what the committee has proposed. I am grateful to the Government and the high representative for their responses. I look forward to what my colleagues and others have to say. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tugendhat]

My Lords, I want to thank everybody who contributed to this very thoughtful debate and say how grateful I am for some of the remarks made about the committee and my chairmanship of it. When I listened to a number of the contributions, I realised what a long agenda of possible subjects the committee has in front of it. I am sure that my successor was listening equally attentively, and I will follow with interest the path she takes in response to much of what was said today.

I thank the Minister for her thoughtful and encouraging reply. I take this opportunity, through her, to thank the officials in the Foreign Office, who were uniformly helpful, not only on this report but on the various other reports with which I was involved. I express my appreciation to them.

Many points were made that I would like to take up, but the hour is late and it would be doing the House a disservice were I to do so. I will confine myself to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, who talked about his wish that the EU would set an example to other parts of the world on how sovereign states can work together in a post-modern world. That is what the EU used to do. It was an exemplar, an example that people tried to follow. As a result of the mismanagement of the eurozone crisis and a number of internal issues—of which, I am sorry to say, the British problem has been an important one—the European Union has lost that position. I nurse the hope, as I think many other noble Lords do, that if we vote decisively to remain within the European Union, it will be seen as a vote of confidence in the institution and will give renewed confidence to the EU and to the rest of the world in the ability of the EU to fulfil its objectives.

Motion agreed.