Procurement Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord True and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Monday 4th July 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord’s remarks. We will take them away. I have said that I will withdraw the amendment.

My noble friend Lord Lansley was accurate in divining the Government’s intention with this. The intent is to distinguish between the fully regulated—I will not use the word “covered”—and the less regulated.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but I am glad that I was not misdirecting myself.

On the noble and learned Lord’s point, I understood what it meant only when I looked at what “public contract”, as defined by Clause 2, means. Once one looks at Clause 2, it becomes very straightforward to check it. I looked at Clause 1 and realised that it is not a national covered procurement policy statement but a national procurement policy statement. None of the amendments change that bit, which told me that what we are dealing with here is the Government proposing that there should be a mechanism for talking about procurement in its broadest sense, while intending to regulate procurement in a slightly narrower sense by regulating everything above the value threshold. This did not seem intrinsically confusing to me once I understood what it is we are trying to do here.

[Lord True (Con)]

I do not think that, in public remarks that will be recorded for all eternity in Hansard, Ministers should ever agree to the idea that anyone might be confused by the crystalline words that come before the Committee, but I must say that I did not, at first blush, understand these proposals when they were put forward and laid. I understand the objective, and think that both the noble and learned Lord and my noble friend have understood and divined it. We believe that it meets the requirement but, in the light of what your Lordships have said, I am sure that we can reflect on that. I will withdraw this amendment so that we can come back to it.

My advice from legal advisers is that this amendment adequately achieves the objective we sought. As to the elegance of it, I am not going to go into a disquisition of other circumstances in which “covered”—

Public Procurement (International Trade Agreements) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Debate between Lord True and Lord Lansley

Wednesday 15th June 2022 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords, the instrument brought forward today will give legal effect in domestic regulations to the United Kingdom’s procurement obligations under the free trade agreement between the UK and EEA EFTA states of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EFTA agreement sought to reflect many of the provisions of the EU-EFTA agreement by which the UK was bound when an EU member state. This is part of the Government’s wider approach to provide continuity, as far as possible, in existing trade and investment relationships with third countries that had an agreement with the EU before we left.

The UK-EFTA agreement was signed on 8 July 2021 and completed its scrutiny period prescribed under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in October 2021. This instrument is concerned with implementing the procurement obligations contained in that agreement. The procurement provisions will ensure that UK businesses will continue to be able to access procurement opportunities in these three countries. This coverage is reciprocated by the UK giving businesses from those EFTA states no less favourable treatment when conducting its procurements covered by the agreement.

The UK has an open procurement market underpinned by principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment. However, without this instrument, there is a risk that, in respect of procurements covered by the agreement, relevant EFTA businesses will not be entitled to the legal remedies that the UK has committed to in the agreement. This instrument therefore ensures that we fulfil our obligations.

In terms of the coverage in the agreement, the UK is an independent party to the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement—or GPA, as it is known—along with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and other major world economies. The GPA aims to mutually open global public procurement markets and is worth some £1.3 trillion in guaranteed access to global procurement opportunities for UK firms.

The UK-EFTA agreement incorporates the relevant GPA provisions, and goes further. The procurement coverage is similar to the UK’s coverage under the EU’s agreement with the EEA EFTA states, with some exceptions including in respect of health services.

This instrument is being made using powers set out in Section 2 of the Trade Act 2021. It will add the UK-EFTA agreement to the existing schedules of international trade agreements contained in the various UK and Scottish procurement regulations to ensure that no less favourable treatment is accorded to businesses of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, where the procurement is covered by the terms of the agreement. It will also make explicit in those procurement regulations that contracting authorities can make inquiries as to whether subsidies form part of an abnormally low tender, as provided for in the agreement.

Importantly, these amendments do not add any burdens to the UK’s procurement process, nor do they reduce any of the UK’s procurement standards.

The provisions will be implemented across the United Kingdom. We have consulted officials from the devolved Administrations throughout the process. We have also formally notified each Administration, via ministerial letters, of our intention to lay this instrument. The Scottish and Welsh Governments have formally agreed to our approach and the Northern Ireland Executive Minister responsible for procurement has confirmed that he did not have any objections. I therefore thank each Administration for their engagement and collaboration.

Any amendments to the procurement coverage in the UK-EFTA agreement, or other international trade agreements, will require further legislation to give them legal effect. Any future trade agreements which the UK signs or has signed—for example, with Australia and New Zealand—will be implemented by separate legislation.

I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting these draft regulations. I commend them to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am very glad to have the opportunity to say a few words about these regulations and I thank my noble friend for introducing them so clearly. As somebody who laboured long and hard on the Trade Act 2021, it is always a pleasure to see the powers being used. There may not be many such further events but it is interesting to see it being used in this case.

I must confess that the reason I looked at these regulations was that, as my noble friend will recall, at Second Reading of the Procurement Bill I raised the interaction between that legislation and the Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill, which had, of course, been introduced at the same time in the other place. I looked at this instrument and thought, “How does this relate to the Procurement Bill?” Like the Australia and New Zealand Bill, as far as I can see, the Procurement Bill will supersede these regulations when it becomes law. Schedule 9 to the Procurement Bill incorporates the UK-EFTA agreement into the list of treaty state suppliers. So far, so fairly straightforward: we need these regulations to give effect to the agreement in the intervening period.

However, there is an issue about what these regulations do, because they also amend public contract, concession contract and utilities contract regulations to include the further provision relating to abnormally low tenders. It is a question of whether the price or costs take into account the grant of subsidies. First, I ask: does the preceding EU-EFTA economic area agreement have the same language? It seemed surprising if it did, on the face of it, because existing regulations, which are part of the structure of EU regulation, already take account of whether—to cite Regulation 69 of the Public Contracts Regulations, for example—the abnormally low tender price is because of the possibility of the tenderer obtaining state aid.

I should have thought that, in the EU context, the question of state aid and grant of subsidy were regarded as effectively the same thing. I suspect, therefore, that EFTA countries are saying that the words “state aid” do not necessarily have the same meaning in United Kingdom in future as “state aid” did in the EU in the past. I may be wrong about that, but I should be interested to know whether that is the case.

Anyway, this additional provision in the regulations changes, for example, Regulation 69 of the Public Contracts Regulations, which relates to abnormally low tenders. I thought, “Let’s see how this is incorporated into the Procurement Bill”, but I cannot find it. So, my other question is: how will that Bill incorporate the provisions of, for example, Regulation 69 relating to abnormally low tenders into the structure of our regulation in future? I am happy to be guided by my noble friend on that, not least because it will no doubt give us an opportunity to learn a bit more about how the Procurement Bill itself will work in future. Subject to those questions, I am glad to take the opportunity to welcome the regulations and support my noble friend.

Lobbying of Ministers

Debate between Lord True and Lord Lansley

Tuesday 1st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, a number of important documents and proposals have been presented to the Government; the noble Lord mentions one of them. We have the Boardman recommendations and the post-legislative scrutiny, which I have just mentioned. All those mesh together and the Government will respond, as I said in the previous answer.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I was responsible in the other place for the passage of the Bill on transparency of lobbying, et cetera, because Nick Clegg, then the Deputy Prime Minister, did not want to be responsible for it, although it was a coalition Bill. Does my noble friend recall that the record of ministerial meetings published quarterly is not confined to consultant lobbyists and includes meetings that Ministers have with external organisations? That is the central mechanism by which the transparency is achieved in reality. Does my noble friend agree that, as long as Ministers are honest and open about their meetings, we can see who they are being lobbied by?

[Lord True (Con)]

My noble friend makes a very fair point and I pay tribute to him for taking up the work that he tells us Mr Clegg did not wish to take up. The transparency of publishing the details of Ministers’ meetings on a quarterly basis is important, and this is among the issues the Government are considering.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Lord True and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am coming on to that, as I just said to the House I would. You can look at those circumstances in different ways, I would submit. Perhaps I will deal with that and then go on to the other point.

The Government had effectively lost the confidence of the Commons on the central purpose of its being, which was to deliver the referendum result on a key European policy. As the noble Lord opposite says, they tried to call an election three times, and three times the Commons refused to grant one. Why did the other place refuse to grant one? I cannot remember which noble Lord it was who said in the debate that it was because the leader of the Opposition sat on his hands and decided to prevent an election taking place. The noble Lord said he would not have done, but he did—three times.

The votes for dissolution were 298 on 4 September, 293 on 9 September, and 299 on 28 October. On every occasion they fell short of a majority. The Labour Party cast its vote to secure what it manifestly wished to do, which was to prevent the Prime Minister going to the country. Three times Mr Corbyn was presented—like Caesar on the Lupercal—with the crown of the election that he could have had the following day, on 4 September, 9 September and 28 October, and he declined.

The noble Lord suggests that of course if they had known there would be an election, the Opposition would never have sought to vote against it. By sitting on their hands, the Opposition defied the people and did not have an election.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My noble friend must address the point. The point is that if the requirement were not what the Fixed-term Parliaments Act required but a simple majority on a Motion in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister back in October 2019 would have secured a simple majority and got his election.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, there is a conditional in that: a “would”. I believe that people must be presumed to intend the consequences of their own actions, and the consequence of Mr Corbyn’s actions was to thwart a general election three times. The figures I have given to the House are there in the book.

I want to move on because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in the gravamen of the argument—although I think the matters I have covered are a flaw in it—used the argument, which I think was taken up by my noble friend Lady Noakes, that the votes of millions of people should not be overturned by Dissolution. A number of noble Lords have addressed this. By implication, the noble and learned Lord argues, per contra, that the chance to vote for millions of people should be denied by a vote of the House of Commons. It seems to me an extraordinary concept that a House of Commons that does not wish to go should, in his words, prevent or overturn the votes of millions. I respectfully disagree. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, who chaired your Lordships’ Constitution Committee with distinction, put some political practicality into the equation, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. This is very serious. I simply do not accept the argument that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, put forward.

A simple majority vote, for the reasons I have given, would not necessarily prevent deadlock in certain conditions—my noble friend Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury spoke to this—such as when the Government of the day held only a small majority, no majority at all or depended on a small party with a particular regional or country-specific interest. The procedure that is proposed would, in my submission, fail the test of clarity and the absence of loopholes, as the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, put to us. The Joint Committee itself noted on the matter of a vote in the Commons before Parliament was dissolved, that, “The majority”—there were conflicting views, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, put to us—

“considers it a change which would only have a practical effect in a gridlocked Parliament, which could mean denying an election to a Government which was unable to function effectively, and which might therefore be counter to the public interest.”

I agree with the submission of the majority that this would be

“counter to the public interest.”

In short, far from making things simple, the very thing that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said he wished to achieve, it could still lead to stasis.

The most detrimental aspect of a vote in the other place, and potentially allowing that to be used to frustrate an election, is that general elections are sometimes called when the existing Parliament has proven to be unviable. The statutory requirement for a vote in the other place would only compound that problem, and in such a case, as we have discussed or I have submitted, with part of his own party potentially voting against a Prime Minister—circumstances that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, suggested could happen—even a simple majority would be too high.

Past Governments, and potentially future Governments, have often worked within turbulent political and economic contexts, trying to deliver ambitious and significant agendas and sometimes with small majorities. It is in these circumstances, above all, that the flexibility of the system which the two major parties in this country pledged to revive and which we are seeking to revive through this Bill matters most. In these scenarios, a Prime Minister should be able to be decisive and request a Dissolution to try to resolve a parliamentary stalemate or test their mandate to govern.

My noble friend Lord Lansley asked by what authority a Prime Minister might act. I think my noble friend and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern answered that. The Prime Minister, acting as the Sovereign’s principal adviser, is able to request a Dissolution by virtue of an ability to command the confidence of the other place. In the case of a minority Government or a confused House of Commons, the agreement to a Dissolution might be difficult to secure—as it proved three times in 2019. I submit that not many new MPs—some noble Lords have been slightly disrespectful of what might be the motives of people in another place—would rush to face the electorate in a matter of months if given the chance to have a say.

It is by no means certain, as noble Lords have suggested, that past minority Governments would have secured opposition support for an election had this system operated. I agree with the powerful interventions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and my noble friend Lady Noakes on this point. Some noble Lords seem to forget the experience of 2017-19. A vote in the House of Commons might have meant other minority Governments and similar ones having to limp on like that one, unable to deliver their priorities. The revival of the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament is, in our submission, the most effective way for a Government to be permitted to put important questions to the people, resolve stasis and secure the mandate to govern effectively. It is a system of constitutional practice that has worked; I urge noble Lords not to seek to add complexity where previously, before 2011, there was none.

I must address briefly the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. It would go further in the development of a statutory process by making express provision that, when Parliament stands prorogued, a Dissolution cannot be sought. The amendment seeks to set a condition that a Parliament must be “recalled”—or rather summoned—for the purpose of the passage of a Dissolution approval Motion.

Prior to the Dissolution of Parliament, a short Prorogation may be necessary to allow the swift conclusion of business; of course, it should be as short as possible. This has happened on several occasions, most recently in 1992, 1997, 2005 and 2010. In 2010, Parliament was prorogued from Thursday 8 April until Monday 12 April, whereupon Dissolution was proclaimed. Among other things, this enabled the general election to take place on a Thursday, as has been usual practice. Although the concepts of Prorogation and Dissolution may be superficially similar in that they are both prerogative acts, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, they are distinct. Prorogation is the formal ending of a Session; Dissolution provides an opportunity for the electorate to give their verdict.

I have heard the arguments in favour of a Commons vote on this matter in the circumstance of a Prorogation also but, respectfully, the Government believe that this is undesirable and risks repeating some of the worst aspects of the 2011 Act. In our submission, providing for the requirement that a prorogued Parliament must be summoned serves only to build in additional delay and undermine the ability of the Prime Minister to act decisively. The risk that the noble Lord alluded to in seeking to strengthen the role of the Commons raises that fundamental question: who should be the ultimate judge on the Government’s decision to call an election? As many noble Lords have said, the answer is clear: the electorate. As the Joint Committee said, they are

“the ultimate authority in a democratic system”.

Like my noble friend Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury, I simply do not understand the idea of a rogue or outrageous Dissolution because it is the fundamental act of humility by the Executive to place their future in the hands of the electorate, who should be the final arbiter of whether a Prime Minister has called an election legitimately. I acquit the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, of this but I have found it strange to hear noble Lords say that they want to repeal the FTPA but return to some of the worst aspects of it. I think that there is a further complication in what the noble Lord suggested.

I am sure that the House wishes to move on. We will have further opportunities in the debate on the next group to discuss sovereignty and controls on Parliament, but I ought to say in preamble that noble Lords have suggested that a Commons vote increases parliamentary accountability and acts as a check on the Executive. It is not our view that the prerogative system diminishes parliamentary sovereignty and the Executive’s accountability to Parliament. Rather, by reviving the prerogative powers, we are restoring the link between confidence and Dissolution. If a Prime Minister loses the confidence of the elected House, they can either resign, seek a Dissolution or seek to recover the confidence of the House. The other place has the nuclear option of a Motion of no confidence and a plethora of means of holding the Executive to account. It does not require further prescriptive statutory measures to do so effectively.

Notwithstanding the gentle chiding of the noble Lord, Lord Newby—I am grateful to him for taking the time, or wasting it as he seemed to argue, to read the letter that I sent to noble Lords—I ask your Lordships to consider carefully the potential, unknown, long-term consequences of this amendment, which flow out of some of the problems that we have discussed in this debate. A vote in the Commons would disrupt the equilibrium in finely balanced, historical constitutional arrangements and could have an impact on the role of the sovereign. In reviving the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament, the Government have clearly acknowledged that this power is exercised by the sovereign on the request of the Prime Minister, as we discussed in the first group.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014

Debate between Lord True and Lord Lansley

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, we have long had a paid-advocacy rule in your Lordships’ House, and it is a good rule.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend will recall that I took charge in the Commons of the passage of the transparency of lobbying et cetera Act. In my view it was wrong then and is wrong now to include in-house lobbyists, because many thousands of people working in companies will have to register simply to speak on behalf of their own company.

My noble friends Lord Grade and Lord Norton of Louth have it right. There has never been a sufficient level of openness about who Ministers receive lobbying from, or indeed receive any communication from. That should be published. It was not sufficient then and it is not sufficient now.

[Lord True (Con)]

My noble friend puts his finger on a key issue that I alluded to in my reply to the noble Baroness opposite, in terms of the scale of the undertaking that would be required. I agree—government publishes data on meetings between Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and external interests. Regulation must balance the need for transparency on third-party lobbyists while not preventing engagement by the voluntary and private sector. These issues require and will receive very careful consideration. I can assure all noble Lords that the matter of integrity in public life is something that this Government take profoundly seriously.

UK-EU Future Relationship Negotiations and Transition Period

Debate between Lord True and Lord Lansley

Tuesday 8th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

As the noble Lord says, our outstanding academic sector and the adequacy of data are of course extraordinarily important. As he knows, negotiations are continuing, and we must await the outcome.

[Lord Lansley (Con) [V]]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the majority of people have not entered into negotiations with the objective of reducing our standards—on the environment, on labour rights or in other areas? That should be of some assurance to our European colleagues. Will he also confirm that, as an independent country, we cannot agree to take rules from the EU in future? We should negotiate our standards and they should accept that.

[Lord True (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend’s final remarks. The UK’s reputation for quality, safety and performance is what drives the demand for UK goods. The Government have no intention of harming this reputation.