House of Lords: Lord Speaker’s Committee Report

Lord True Excerpts

Tuesday 19th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, as I am speaking last on this side, and in opposition to the proposals, I am rather reminded of the 1997 general election, when we used to sit in No. 10 watching “Zulu”—the fight against all odds at Rorke’s Drift. It has felt a bit like that today. But I have to speak as I see it. These plans remind me rather of the ancient astronomer Ptolemy’s celestial spheres: masterly ingenuity applied to solve a problem that does not exist. The earth was not the centre of the universe, as Ptolemy thought, and this House is not ineffective because it has many Members. It works as a cheap, part-time, respected House of expertise precisely because it has a large pool to draw on of people who do not come here every day.

I agree with those who said that a 15-year limit would cost this House the wisdom of experience. The public, given the chance, regularly send people of more than 15 years’ experience to their Parliament. Why no longer here? If a 15-year limit was in place, we would have had no Lord Speaker to call for this report and no noble Lord, Lord Burns, to write it—they would both have gone. I agree with my noble friend Lord Robathan that to remove new Members only after 15 years is not sustainable. If this House mistakenly calls for a 15-year limit, how could it reasonably expect a future Government, looking to get their new people in, not to apply that principle to all?

The report leaves it to party groups to decide how those unwilling to go would be persuaded to go. As a bit of a serial dissenter, I am uneasy about that. What kind of backstairs inducement or pressure would be applied by party Whips to make the unwilling surrender their places? We do not have many governorships left.

Crucially, the report changes the way Parliament is made up. Your Lordships would decide who stays and, to some degree, who comes. I strongly uphold exclusive cognisance of procedure, but not exclusive cognisance of the composition of Parliament. My noble friend is right: the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is that this House is made up by statute. People are appointed here under statute, either by a statutory commission or a Prime Minister who is responsible to the elected House. Composition must be a matter for both Houses. If membership is to be capped, it must surely be by primary legislation with the consent of both Chambers, not by a privy oath over there in a closed private club.

From 1770 to 1958, only Salisbury, Lloyd George, Baldwin and Attlee ever recommended over 12 Peers a year across a term of more than a year. Lloyd George rose to 15.7. Twelve new Members a year would cut our numbers by death alone. With retirement, 15 would also do so, with no need for Ptolemy’s celestial spheres. Restraint is possible; history proves it.

I rather think we are fighting the last war. The report reacts to massive creations by Tony Blair and David Cameron. There is no reason why theirs should be the future standard. The House declined in size under Gordon Brown. So far it has done so under Mrs May, but she must be able to create some new Peers, whatever the attraction to the Benches opposite of blocking that now.

It may be said that we cannot just rely on ministerial restraint, but that is the basis of the report. Unless all future Prime Ministers, not just my right honourable friend, accept restraint, then the whole report falls, as paragraph 53 declares in bold. If we have restraint, then we do not need the complexities of the report and the inevitable internal strains it will cause. Numbers will fall. If we do not have restraint, then the report is pointless and it will not achieve its purpose.

Before concluding, I must respond to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who tempted me to 1719. I oppose the principle of a fixed cap on an appointed House. Robert Walpole defeated that Peerage Bill partly by telling MPs that a smaller fixed House would mean fewer peerages for them. I am sure that was the conclusive argument. It was also partly on the basis—true then, and in 1832 and 1911—that a cap would leave the elected House unable to overbear the unelected one swiftly in a constitutional crisis. As Walpole then said,

“in all disputes between lords and commons, when the upper house is immutable, the lower must sooner or later, be obliged to recede”.

The Commons wisely rejected the cap which the Lords then proposed. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and others that no wise Prime Minister would give up that latent power with an appointed House.

In conclusion, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Burns, on his ingenuity, as others have done, but this House would be a less uneasy, better functioning place without Peers feeling that they have to come here every day or make unnecessary speeches just to jump through the hoops of the complexities of Ptolemy’s spheres.