European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Triesman and Lord Waddington

Monday 9th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Waddington]

Does not the noble Lord appreciate that there is a very strong feeling in the country that, very often, the Government have not said no and have allowed the transference of power when there was no interest whatever to the people of the country? The most obvious example was the previous Government giving up half the rebate. What conceivable benefit did the people of this country get from that surrender, when it was given on the promise of a reform of the CAP which never took place?

[Lord Triesman]

I appreciate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, makes, but that was not a surrender of any power or competence. It might be regarded as the wrong judgment to have made about national assets, but it was nothing to do with a power or a competence. It may be felt that past Governments have acceded too willingly to arrangements that they did not like—that point was made very early in the debate this evening—but in almost every one of these areas it is perfectly possible, should this Government wish, simply to say no. They can achieve, without large rafts of legislation, the same result with a word of no more than two letters.

Amendment 40 and subsequent amendments would delete various decisions which would require both an Act and a referendum before a Minister could vote in favour of them. As a result of them, there would be no decisions which required both mechanisms. Our Amendment 40 would delete a number of the paragraphs from Clause 6(5) along with those that others have identified.

We completely agree with the proposition that a referendum would be required in the case of the euro, but we have also previously mentioned other major constitutional reforms as a second possible decision area requiring a referendum. I shall not speak to the amendments in the next group, Amendments 39A and 39B, other than to mention that in them we identify the way in which those issues might be selected as issues for a referendum. It is not a hollow premise; we are testing out ways in which, apart from the euro, other major constitutional changes might also be considered.

We agree entirely with the case for holding a referendum over the euro and we also believe that there are significant constitutional issues—although we know as a result of an earlier debate that they will not include accession of other countries—which might attract a referendum. Indeed, your Lordships’ committee was also clear that this could be appropriate in a number of circumstances. I immediately recognise that somebody will say, “Well, how is it we determine what should count as significant? What will that word mean when the decision is taken?” Looking at the Bill, the mechanism which is currently envisaged seems to me to be wholly inadequate. It has fault lines built into it to the extent that I believe that it will not work. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and I have not agreed about this; I fear, with the greatest of respect to him, that we will not agree about it this evening. Even as alumni of the same college, we will not find that we achieve agreement this evening, because the decisions which would so limit the role of Parliament extend so widely through this clause that it is very easy to see, in the contemporary political circumstances, how they would give rise to a continuous pattern of dissent which I do not think would make the British people feel any more comfortable that their view was being taken seriously or even sought, as has been suggested.

I make this point because it was clear in the intervention, for example, of the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, who is not in his place. It was made equally clear by the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, and other noble Lords on our previous day in Committee. Their objections to the development of the European Union have been so profound and so marked that almost any opportunity would give rise to triggering the whole sequence that is contained in the Bill—judicial review at the very least.

In this Bill we have the potential to make sure that widespread and protracted campaigning will take place on every issue, not because a practical issue is always involved but because that is the way in which it is possible to organise resistance to the change. It may be that the change merits resistance. I am not arguing that that will never be the case, but it is simply an armoury of tactical approaches that become available for anybody who wants to slow down or block any kind of change at all. If I were of the same mind as some of those noble Lords, I would say “fair enough”. Give me those tactical options and I would probably choose to use them, and of course they will be used in that way.

The practical route seems to be where a degree of independence is possible in determining what is a significant issue so that those issues can be put through the whole process, including a referendum. In Amendments 39A and 39B, we canvassed those possibilities—either a Joint Committee of both Houses or an independent review commission. We would then begin to reach some kind of reality about what it is sensible to do or not to do outside the remit of Parliament itself.

I have listened intently to all that has been said about the role of Parliament as contrasted with the role that might be taken in the conduct of referendums and I find myself in agreement essentially with the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, about the diminution of the role of Parliament. I will come back to the point about reconnection with the electorate because it is important. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said in his opening speech, we will see changes taking place or being suggested in small amounts and pretty much continuously as adjustments of this variable architecture become possible. I acknowledge that that is what many people have objected to.

Parliament, apparently, would gain the confidence of the electorate if it ceased to do the job that it had been elected to do. How that will achieve greater confidence in Parliament completely bemuses me. I have to acknowledge that. There may be many criticisms of Parliament and parliamentarians, but the one criticism that I doubt we will hear anywhere is that people believe that we should give up doing the job that we are expected to do and franchise it to somebody else.

[Lord Waddington]

Does not the noble Lord agree that Members of Parliament are elected to exercise the powers that they have inherited, not to give away those powers in perpetuity?

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I broadly do agree, but that does not alter the general proposition that MPs are expected to take a dynamic and full political role in determining the outcomes of debates in these areas. Whether the determination goes in the direction of giving away no more powers or giving away more powers, that is the job of a sovereign Parliament and people working in a sovereign Parliament.