Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report for 2010-11

Debate between Lord Triesman and Lord Gilbert

Monday 12th December 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I start by joining everyone else in thanking the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, who not only introduced a very important report but did so in a way that I thought was very valuable in clarifying the critical issues in that report. Like him, I welcome the appointment of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, to whom I must apologise. I got locked in as the Vote was being declared in the Chamber and consequently missed what I hope was no more than a few seconds of his informative and important speech.

In thanking the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, I want to say that I was strongly impressed by what he had to say about the reform of the committee and about the proposals that are likely to appear in the Green Paper—an issue to which my noble friend Lord Foulkes also referred. I am quite sure that my noble friend Lord Foulkes is right about political balance, but I accept the argument that the future disposition of the committee and the way in which it works is a matter that still falls to be discussed on another occasion.

I agree with the noble Marquess about the role of redactions—they are plainly necessary, so we might as well be candid in saying that—and I agree strongly that the character of the changing risks that we face may well suggest the need for the recreation of a single account in order to be able to act with the appropriate flexibility.

I agree strongly with the notion of oversight of operational matters and of material of public concern that is in the national interest, and I can completely see that that could be formalised on a statutory footing by the Government. On behalf of the Opposition, I indicate my strong support for those propositions.

The noble Marquess must be right in what he says about the committee’s resources. The committee must have the capacity to generate information and to be able to analyse information on its own account.

Both the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, made the point that there is a strong case for the provision, under parliamentary rubric, of a presumption that foreign intelligence should remain closed in court procedures unless there is another reason. Unless we are going to abandon that whole approach, we must surely take that step, which is the only rational step that achieves that outcome.

My noble friend Lord Foulkes, in describing the importance of this overall area, said that he would welcome broader discussions on the Floor of the Chamber. There must be good sense in that.

The noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, drew attention to cyberattacks. I will come back to that more substantially in a moment because he made some very important points. However, I was intrigued by his argument, for which there may well be compelling evidence, that as changes take place in Europe more generally—and certainly within the EU—there will need to be careful consideration of whether new kinds of threats are emerging as a result. It will be interesting, to say the least, to see how fast these issues emerge on the agenda of the principal think-tanks over this next period.

The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, made the point, which I think has just been echoed by the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, about the international character of the work of the intelligence agencies. I share that view completely. In the contemporary circumstances, it is almost impossible to imagine working other than with those who have shared interests. There is too big a hill to climb under any other circumstances.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and others, including the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, we strongly support the creation of a parliamentary committee as the natural successor to the committee’s work over a long period.

The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, provided an exceptional forensic description of the new architecture, and I appreciated that a good deal. In the course of his speech, he made the point about the JIC potentially fading away. Perhaps I can address that point in a little more detail. First, Sir Malcolm Rifkind’s committee has produced an illuminating report that is of great use to all of us. He does not specifically mention the work of the staff of the intelligence agencies, but when you look at the overall substance of the report, you can identify the value of that unsung part of our work permeating throughout it. I share that appreciation and want to record the fact.

The report is couched, like so many that we produce and see, in typically diplomatic language. None the less, it is very sharp on all the main issues. However, I fear that the Government’s response is much less sharp, rather less focused and can be frustrating to read. I say this out of an interest and pride in, and a concern for, our national interest in this. There is no party politics in this point as far as I am concerned. I fear that it is of no use to deal simply with the main observations and proposals by thanking the committee for all its work and saying that you agree with all of it when the following text gives no detail of what that agreement might mean. I do not say this to be disobliging but the Government cannot argue that important parts of their response can be put in those terms without any apparent need to say what they intend to do about some of those key issues. I would have welcomed much more detail within the restrictions of dealing with secret intelligence.

May I just identify a few of the things that fall under that rubric and where I should like to see a more detailed, and perhaps more penetrating, response from the Government? The first is the issue that the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, and the noble Lords, Lord Alderdice and Lord Butler, have all mentioned: the provision of a suitable cadre of internet specialists. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, rightly mentioned that 18 bodies seemed to be involved in this and that there is at least a risk of a lack of co-ordination among so many of them. I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, that the attributes of many of the specialists are curious in the general spectrum of government service. I well remember, on one occasion as a Minister, talking to a young guy who collided with me on his skateboard in the office. Neither of us was seriously injured; I am bringing no claims against anybody for injury at work. However, it was certainly unusual. I completely subscribe to the view of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that many of these interesting and obsessive characters do it out of sheer love of diving into the nitty-gritty of all these processes.

The Government’s view of the possible need for a suitable cadre of internet specialists appears in their response to proposal E. It is essentially that we will somehow find a significant number of people who will emerge and train those we need. I will be candid: I do not expect to see it and I do not believe it. Interestingly, in recommendation K, shortly after the Government have made the point that they will produce these people by exposing them to the available suitable trainers, they also say that they will improve value for money from their work. I am keen to know how we will do these things and how many people we think we can recruit to these roles. Will the departments compete, as the Government’s response suggests, or, as under recommendation K, will they not compete because this is a time for non-competitive recruitment? Both proposals appear within two or three recommendations of each other. How on earth will we do these things? I do not ask this to be objectionable. If we all agree that it is that important, I am just eager to know how on earth we will do it. What do we think we need to do to reach any kind of milestone in that area?

I turn to recommendation F, about GCHQ’s accommodation strategy, which is described in the report as having been “haphazard in the past” and inflexible for the future, with no long-term sensible strategy. The Government’s response to that is that the haphazard character of the strategy will broadly be overcome. It is not clear how, because all the means of overcoming it seem to be dependent on others, including SIA. I am not sure that that is a strategy at all. How precisely will the Government overcome the criticism that the report levels and what is their plan for doing so?

I turn to the Government’s response to recommendation I, on the need to respond effectively to increased threats in Northern Ireland—incidentally, I do not for a second think that the Government do not take these threats seriously; quite the contrary, I do not know of any Government who in recent times have not taken the issue completely seriously. The committee states that,

“further sustained effort will be required”.

The Government agree, but how is that to be achieved? What consolidation of effort do the Government have in mind? Will there be additional resources or is it suggested that existing resources will be redirected? What, broadly—and without providing any sensitive information to those who would take unfair or wrong advantage—is the plan for doing that? What is even the shadow of the plan that we might have a look at?

I want to focus above all on the committee’s concern, which the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, has also dissected for us with great clarity, to avoid duplication, overlap and the consequent lack of focus, those matters which are covered broadly in section 5, but which come up time and again in the report as a whole. They are dealt with in recommendation N, on prioritisation and allocation of effort; in recommendation O, on the creation of the national security adviser post; in recommendation P, on overlaps in remit and duplication; in recommendation S, on the effective co-ordination of it all; and in recommendation T, on the strategic tasking directive not being satisfactory.

The noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Hennessy, have both discussed that this evening. The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, said that we need to address a new reality, which I am sure is quite right. However, the Government’s response is essentially an assertion that there will be prioritisation, that the roles will not overlap, that the national security adviser post will co-ordinate the work of the JIC, and that the requirements and priorities in process and the strategic direction of the National Security Council will all somehow be addressed without confusion in the midst of this quite complicated architecture. All those things are at least implied by the Government’s response to recommendation O.

In response to recommendation P, there is a list of the primary responsibilities of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. It is said that they are not the responsibilities of the National Security Secretariat, in respect of which no equivalent list is produced by the Government. I think that a number of people, including those on the committee, have described the listings as being details at a high level. It is because they are at a high level that I cannot tell whether the overlaps have been overcome. I simply cannot follow it; I have tried really hard. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I have somehow missed it, but I think that those questions about duplication, overlap and the lack of focus that might result have simply not been dealt with intelligibly in the Government’s response, and they are vital concerns for our national security. I am therefore inclined to the belief, expressed by the committee, that there is more to be done. Can the Minister perhaps list for us today the specific responsibilities of the secretariat so that I can see how they differ from those of other bodies? That would allow us to judge a little more about the overlap question.

My final observation, very briefly if I may, is on the question of the limitation of vital resources to undertake the work successfully. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, also raised this question. In recommendation V, the point is made that cuts to the ISC and the BBC Monitoring service are regarded as dangerous to defence intelligence capability. Defence intelligence relies heavily on these sources to support operations—these are the points that the committee makes. They serve the intelligence community as a whole, in addition, and without good information it is obviously hard to work on the basis that you genuinely have sound enough intelligence to do the job effectively.

The Government's response is not to give a clear undertaking or commitment about those resources—one might perhaps expect that response to what might be a problem for the safety of the people of the United Kingdom—but to say that they will work with the BBC to examine requirements. I want to know how and when that assessment is to take place. Will the levels of investment be sustained in the interim, while everybody is working out what might be the future dispositions? What leads the Government to believe that the defence intelligence and wider intelligence communities have not made a proper assessment so far of what they need, in order to work effectively at present? There may be an adequate response, but what I worry about is that in some areas—for example, on page 13 of the Government's response—it appears that those decisions have already been made in a negative sense. The future cuts will be, it says,

“fully in line with those of the wider Cabinet Office”,

while the task remaining is to,

“identify ways of minimising the impact”.

Whatever happens, it looks as though those cuts have been embedded.

It may be that the answer to a number of these questions will be that there is an operational risk in answering them. If that is said today, I shall accept it because I know from first-hand ministerial experience that I have no desire to see anything said that would be of any use to an enemy of the United Kingdom. However, the background detail in Sir Malcolm’s committee's excellent report suggests that those questions could be answered. That is the reason I urge the Government to do so. I look forward to the Minister’s answers. I feel that he will surely do better than the Government's response to the report and that that would be of huge benefit in making sure that the value of Sir Malcolm Rifkind's work, and the work of his committee, is realised to its fullest extent.

[Lord Gilbert]

My Lords, may I enter a rather eccentric note of dissent? I was listening with great care to my noble friend's speech. I thought it extremely well informed, and I was not surprised at that. My point of dissent is that I do not approve of this committee being translated into a parliamentary committee. I see great virtue in it being the only committee of parliamentarians that reports directly to the Prime Minister. In my experience, when I was on the committee and Sir John Major was the Prime Minister we used to have meetings with him at No. 10 to discuss our reports in detail. I know of no other committee that has that sort of access and I think that the Prime Minister and the committee benefited from it. The other benefit which you have from it being a non-parliamentary committee but a committee of parliamentarians is that you hugely diminish the role of the Whips in who goes on that committee. Both those things are matters of supreme advantage, which we would sacrifice by transforming this into a parliamentary Select Committee—a development which I personally deplore.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, that intervention invites a very brief response. I have no aversion whatever to the committee being available to and able to speak to the Prime Minister. Broadly speaking, I believe that Select Committees in Parliament have had that capability for a long time. In my view, the biggest advantage is that these areas which have been regarded as incredibly obscure and difficult, and usually as a means of veiling from the public and parliamentarians some things which are in their vital interests, and in the vital interests of the country, will at least be dealt with on the same basis that much other sensitive material is.