European Union (Referendum) Bill

Debate between Lord Triesman and Lord Cormack

Friday 31st January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not passing up the opportunity, I just could not believe that no one else was standing up.

The amendments present some serious options for the House to consider. There is a need for serious parliamentary analysis of the outcome of whatever referendum there may be. Let me set out the argument in these terms. It may be that, after a referendum, it is wholly clear what the people of the United Kingdom wanted—but, even in those circumstances, some things would not be wholly clear because work would still fall to be done.

I am not saying that because I would disrespect a serious majority among a large number of people voting, but just in terms of trying to work out what would need to be done and how we might set about it. The precise terms of the disengagement would need to be thought through and negotiated. Later amendments address this question, but there would need to be a consideration of what the continuing relationship would be as, many people would submit, we would not simply cut ourselves off and that would be the end of the matter; there would be a continuing relationship of some kind, and that would need to be thought through. The terms of the continuing relationship would, I submit, need to cover trade agreements and competition rules—we would not want suddenly to find that the businesses and industries of the United Kingdom were at a massive disadvantage in relation to other nations in competition terms. We would need to look with considerable attention at labour market arrangements—I know that they are among the most highly contentious things, but none the less, it is unavoidable that we would need to analyse them properly.

I will not bore the House with the whole list, but as another example, we would need to look at environmental co-operation and at all the arrangements, which have preoccupied me during parts of my career, for the relationship between higher education institutions, the movement of scholars, what we regard as comparable qualifications and so on. In all those cases, and in many other issues, we would need to consider timing. Their timing might not be identical. There would need to be a serious analysis. Parliament will have a major role in that analysis at every phase.

I made the point a few moments ago that in the case of a big majority and a very good turnout, we might be able to say that we were at least wholly clear. In those circumstances, there is what I described last Friday as an expression of the settled will. Even that has its complexities, which are also addressed in amendments. The settled will of people in Scotland or people in Wales about the EU is a significant issue, because we have already devolved a considerable amount of political authority, and I think that the people to whom that political authority has moved will want to feel that they have an objective view of what is happening and what their interests might be. So even that expression of settled will has ramifications.

However, the result may not be of that kind. Personally, I do not believe that it will be. I would like to believe that the people of the United Kingdom would wish to remain in the European Union, but let us suppose for a moment that they decided by a very marginal result, on a very small turnout, that there was a wish to leave. I completely accept that that would be a result of sorts, but just think of the set of negotiations which we would need to conduct. Those negotiations would be considerably complicated by being conducted in circumstances where there was a marginal result on a low turnout. All the counterparties in the negotiation would understand that it was a weak decision which, in that sense, would reflect that at that moment we had become a weak nation. I cannot believe that counterparties in the modern world would not take advantage of those circumstances. Those are real politics in what could be a real set of circumstances.

I have heard it said in the House that we resolve issues at general elections on simple majorities. However, this is not like a general election, where people are being voted for in a single constituency. It is not one-650th of the variance at stake; it is much more profound than that. Neither will it be changed five years further on by another election or, in an even shorter period, by a by-election. It is essentially an indelible decision and, for all those reasons, it does not have the potential to be corrected—certainly not in the short or the middle term.

I do not believe that the appeal to other kinds of votes which we have had on other matters is really a direct comparison either. The weight of this decision is quite different from that about whether someone wants to have a mayor in Tyneside, for example. That is no comment on Tyneside or its relative importance; it could be a mayor anywhere else. It is simply a different decision, and when people have said, “Well, what about all those decisions?”, I cannot believe that they would transform our constitution in so fundamental a way on the basis of those kinds of decisions setting the precedents. The length of time for which the decision would hold, as I said, would be of profound significance.

I would argue that the issues at stake are quite different. This set of decisions will be fundamental to our economy, now and in the future. The decisions will be fundamental to our relations in economic terms with North America, China, the BRIC states and the MINT states, whatever difficulties some of those states may be facing, probably temporarily. When we start thinking about the character of the economic relations that we would want with them, we will have a totally different game plan in any negotiation with them, depending on whether we are doing it within Europe or trying to do it without the rest of Europe. It is fundamental to our economy, and to political and international relations.

I ask the House to reflect on what has happened in the past weeks over Iran, the possible consequences—they are not certain by any means; it is still highly problematic—for Syria and Iraq, and the broader settlement of the Middle East conflict. The role of my noble friend Lady Ashton has been commented on, quite rightly, in this House and at some length. I believe that everybody in your Lordships’ House understands that the power and authority which she exhibited in that role was because she was speaking for a bloc of real international importance, and that she could not have achieved that result, whatever her talents, in any other way. That is a Britain operating properly in an international context to produce profound international results which may be a route—as I earnestly pray that they will be—towards a peace which has been so elusive.

Our impact, even with a permanent seat on the Security Council, is not of the same order. We are relatively small and no longer quite a power in the old sense. I believe that if we took the wrong decision, it would not be long before the argument about whether we should retain that permanent seat rose to the top of the agenda again. If I was in one of the countries that might be affected, I can tell your Lordships that it would be high on my agenda because I would know that I was speaking from strength to people who would speak only from weakness.

The reason I put all these points to the House is that my view is that the decision has to be very clear, and it is inevitable that Parliament will have to review and decide in terms of the realities on the ground. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, made the point last Friday about how people would have to deal with the realities. We already know that the decision taken in a referendum would be advisory. That has certainly given weight to the decision but it still means that there is much to do, and it will have to be done by both Houses.

[Lord Cormack]

The noble Lord has made a number of constructive and sensible speeches from the Dispatch Box. Is he speaking on behalf of the Official Opposition? If that is the case, why on earth were these points not put with such cogent lucidity in another place by those who speak for his party on these issues?

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I am speaking for myself in this House. This is a Private Member’s Bill and all I can do is to urge the House on the basis of my experience of foreign affairs. As I think I said last week to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, the decisions taken at the other end will always be decisions with which I shall not even try to interfere, knowing the way that that would be responded to. I will try to tie this up quickly. I understand why the noble Lord makes his point but I think that everyone will know that, whether sitting on government Benches or on these Benches, I have essentially argued in this way the whole of the time that I have been in your Lordships’ House. I am making these points because I think that they are the right points to make.

If the result is a narrow one on a low turnout, the terms of disengagement will appear to Parliament to be potentially quite dangerous—or very dangerous—for the United Kingdom both in economics and politics, as I have said. In those circumstances, to decide to go ahead regardless—to recognise that it is an oncoming car crash and to do nothing about that—is hardly what the people of the United Kingdom will expect of their Parliament. Few will regard it in the decades that follow as having been a heroic moment. The bell-wether moments in geopolitics are probably not all that many but I suspect that, rather like the comment that this might be the most profound decision in 60 years, if we get it wrong in terms of geopolitics it may well rank with Suez and one or two other things which have been real disasters for us internationally.

Parliament is the best judge of this. It is sensible to say that the weight of the vote will show itself either to be compelling or not, and will show whether there is a settled will. Taking the right steps to be negotiated and assessed will be a matter for Parliament. It is not in any sense disrespectful to the people of the United Kingdom for their Parliament to give coherent thought to the real circumstances—what in some circles are called the ground truths.

The only objection to this is not to do with democracy or following democratic practice. The objection is that it would get in the way of a rush to exit the EU. That is why the Bill is in the form that it is and it is reckless—a word that was used earlier in the debate. It may be that Mr Cameron does not intend this to be the outcome, but it may also be that he can no longer manage the wish of much of his party to leave the EU.

Some may have reached that decision because they have a paralysed fear of UKIP and no desire to take on UKIP and its arguments. That would be a pity. However, I suspect that many simply want to leave the EU and that is all there is to it. They are entitled to that view but this House and the other place—Parliament as a whole—are entitled to ensure that we get the whole of this right, so that we know that the will of the people of the United Kingdom is a serious expression, not a marginal one leaving us with little to say in anything that follows.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cormack]

I express the hope that it is not as a result of our friendly exchange this morning that the noble Lord is now speaking from the Back Benches.

[Lord Triesman]

I promise that I shall be even closer to the noble Lord later.