Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Laird, for giving us the opportunity to have this discussion. The debate illustrates the difficulties faced by the United Kingdom in balancing, on the one hand, a complex set of concerns which do not always sit comfortably together and, on the other, a very small capability as a single sovereign nation to influence the trajectory of the region. The issues concern us, but it may be more realistic to recognise that it is our work through the European Union and NATO that is likely to have the greatest impact on the country and the region.

I am obviously aware, as noble Lords have been throughout the debate, of the struggles for independence that have taken place in Azerbaijan and the region more generally. I emphasise that history because it appears to me that it is shared to a greater or lesser extent by the whole region. Independence has been fought for in many ways and with diverse allies, each with their own motivations. At the moment, at the heart of all these struggles, one can see the assertion of national identity, but it is based on some very different premises—some national, some subnational, some regional, some ethnic, some religious—in their identity. It is perhaps unsurprising that deep fault lines have appeared and will continue to appear, making it difficult to find simple solutions.

For those reasons, the previous United Kingdom Government and, I believe, the current one, have been consistently concerned about the dangers inherent in conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed territories, the question of the ethnic Armenians in the enclave and the alliances which have been formed around them. What does the Minister believe are the still current and useful bases of the Madrid principles and the work being done by the Minsk group? Do the Government believe that we can achieve a withdrawal of remaining Armenian forces from the country? How do they see the demilitarisation programme? How do they see the deployment of international peacekeepers? What are the prospects for reconstruction and the return of displaced Azerbaijanis? What programme do the Government have? If that programme is a European one, I make no criticism of that whatever; it may be the right way to go.

As I suggested, this is by no means the only fragile regional problem. The breakaway republics in Georgia, which have been supported by Russia, plainly in response to Georgia’s potential closeness to NATO, have created ongoing tension. David Miliband in another place was right in my view to describe Russia’s actions as aggression. The United Kingdom has been right to call for respect for Georgia and for its territorial integrity under international law. I should like to know that the Government still adhere to that position. Georgia is entitled to know that it retains our broad support. I do not for a moment underestimate the difficulties that would occur in discussing any future developments moving closer to NATO that would occur with Russia but, none the less, I am keen to know what the character of those discussions might be.

Several noble Lords made the point that visits to the region in general, including to Azerbaijan, by prominent politicians give signals. The first signal is one in the interests of the future of the country but it is also an opportunity—Hillary Clinton took that opportunity on 6 June 2012—to give signals about our expectations for a more normal and generous attitude to human rights, as well as to trade opportunities. Of course, there are signals being given all the time by Europe and by the United States; it may very well be that we can add to those. All speakers in this debate will appreciate the importance of energy supplies but, while we cannot ignore that, we need to place it in a context. The impact of having alternative sources of energy supplies to those provided by Russia unquestionably increases the prospects for energy security throughout Europe. I entirely see the arguments for developing the links and the commercial possibilities that BP and others have produced—not just in the extraction of oil and gas but in the construction of the pipelines. All of these are important economic developments.

In the last few moments that I have, I suggest that these interests should not for ever silence us to the issue of the poor human rights records in Azerbaijan. When one looks at how the wealth that has been generated has underpinned the power of just one political entity in Azerbaijan, it should concern us a great deal. The country is rated as not free by international indices; it has a number of political prisoners; its TV channels are controlled by the Government; its journalists are routinely threatened and, of 178 nations ranked in the 2011-12 press freedom index from Reporters Without Borders, the country ranks 162nd. The political opposition has all but been eliminated.

I therefore ask whether the Government have a view on whether the economic measures we have taken through the European Union and the discussions about the potential for NATO membership are, in themselves, having any kind of impact on a recognition of the need for human rights and democracy in that country. Like others, I do not say that out of a spirit of hostility but rather to make this point. If we believe that our influence has been significant, and significant through international bodies including the EU and NATO, how are we making sure that that influence is beginning to change what I believe is a human rights record which needs urgent attention?