(13 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps we could reconsider government Amendment 152.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, for tabling these amendments. I should reassure him that councils in neighbouring wards can get together to hold a referendum covering a community. I cannot help the way that warding is done. Generally speaking, we have to have building blocks in local government and the ward system is the one that is used, but under the provisions of the Bill it would be possible to hold a referendum that just addressed the interests of Keighley or Burnley, which he illustrated.
Perhaps I can address the implications of the amendments and say why I will resist them. Amendments 120B, 120C, 126ZZA, 128QA, 128R, 128VA and 128W would remove the provisions that would allow councillors to call for local referendums and councils to pass a resolution to hold a referendum. These amendments would have the effect that if an authority were keen to hold a referendum on a local matter, it would not be able to use the powers to hold a formal referendum conferred by the Bill and would only be able to use the rather informal powers contained in Section 116 of the Local Government Act 2003. We accept that local authorities have the power to hold advisory polls under Section 116, but those polls are limited to the council’s services or its expenditure on such services and are therefore not as far-reaching as the provisions in the Bill.
We want to enable councils to hold referendums on any issue of local importance. We believe that as leaders in their areas, it is right for them to be able to do so. It is open to a council under the provisions to hold a referendum on any matter. However, any decision must be taken within the parameters of administrative law. It would need to be a rational decision with reasoned grounds for it. In answer to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, these provisions apply also to mayoral councils. Clearly it would not be rational to hold a referendum on a matter about which no practical decision would be possible by those who were able to take the decision. For example, a decision on whether the country should invest in a programme—the illustration that I have here is rather far-fetched, to send a person to Mars; I am not sure who the drafters of this text had in mind—would not be a rational subject for a referendum by a local authority. Further, the local authority would need to consider very carefully the holding of a referendum on a matter over which it, its partner authorities or the people of the locality had little or no influence. It is not rational for the authority to incur the cost of a referendum which can serve no possible purpose.
I do not see any great advantage in denying authorities access to the referendum framework that we are setting up under this Bill if they want to use it. Nothing in the provisions that my noble friend seeks to omit imposes any obligations on authorities, so I urge him to withdraw the amendment and to support the localism that they promote.
Some of these amendments, Amendments 129K and 129L, refer to the mayor as a member, and I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing them forward. They would remove elected mayors from the definition of “member”, meaning that they could not use the power in Clause 45 to call for a referendum in the area of the council that they have been elected to lead. In fact, this may not be such a great hardship for elected mayors, since they could initiate a referendum by seeking a resolution of the authority under Clause 50. I accept the point made through Amendment 129L—to remove the Mayor for London from the provisions set out in Clause 58(2)—and we will want to consider these points carefully with a view to returning to them at a later stage. I thank my noble friend for submitting those amendments.
With the explanations which I have given in support of the Bill’s provisions, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. Unless I missed it, I do not think that he addressed the particular concerns referred to by both noble Lords, which is what happens with split wards. What would happen to a three-member ward where two are from one party and the third is from another? In my own borough, one-third of the wards are in that position, so it is a significant point. A long time ago I was an opposition councillor, and I would suspect that in the run-up to the council elections, which in London is only a one-in-four-year opportunity, it would be almost irresistible for two opposition councillors seeking to oust their third, unwelcome friend from another party, to seek to trigger a referendum, if only to force the majority party to turn it down shortly before the election. I am sure that that is not what the Government have in mind. I speak with the confidence that none of the opposition councillors in my borough will ever read Hansard and know that I am saying this, but I suspect that this is a tactic that may well enter the minds of some. It is not what the Government intend. I therefore wonder whether we ought not to think a bit more about tightening the provisions to prevent what I must not call frivolous campaigning, but very opportunistic opposition campaigning, by whichever party, because I am sure that, in opposition, we would all do it. Perhaps we should consider that point.
My Lords, that is exactly my point. I thought that the Minister had just given the reason which the local authority would give in those circumstances for not accepting it. If I remember rightly, the question asked by my noble friend Lord Greaves was, “What are these exceptional circumstances?”. The example that has just been given is not one of them because the local authority would give the reason which the Minister has just given us.
Perhaps in continuing to respond to this set of amendments the answer might become clearer. The noble Lord went on to suggest that with the words “designated in the petition” and in seeking to get a particular person named as the petition organiser, it would be reasonable to expect that a petition will usually make clear who an organiser is and that in most cases the organiser will welcome being the contact point for the petition. However, it is possible that a petition could fail to specify the organiser and we expect authorities to act reasonably in seeking to identify who might take on that responsibility. Little is added to this clause by imposing a requirement on anyone to provide a notification. Where the petition is clear, the person identified will be the organiser; where it is unclear, the discretion in Clause 48(6)(b) enables an authority to decide who appears to be carrying out the role of organiser. My reaction in considering this amendment is rather overshadowed by my political campaigning background. I have explained the difference between electoral processes and the petition process, but I see what my noble friend is driving at. If there is ambiguity in this matter, I am prepared to look at this again.
I am not convinced that Amendments 129CAA and 129D are necessary. It is reasonable to expect that if a council or partner authority decides to give effect to a referendum they will tell people about how they have listened and acted on their views or that local people will notice it anyway. However, the provision in Clause 55 is important in that it ensures that where partner bodies decide not to give effect to a referendum result, local people are made aware of the reasons why. I hope that that explains that. Sometimes giving the reason for the rejection can give the game away; for example, it could identify that an individual had a criminal conviction. This is another reason why it might be essential to have discretion in the Bill. However, given the contributions made by noble Lords, we will look at this and see if the wordings do reflect exactly what it is the Committee would wish to see in the Bill.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I suspect that as he was speaking he was remembering many of the things that I am only too well aware of in the reality of petitioning. On the question of the exceptional circumstances, if they were reasons of a confidential nature I imagine that the local authority would use the words that they use now when they are going into confidential session as the reason for not pursuing the Bill. These are not major points that will hold up the Bill but we should look at them to see whether there can be better wording. If there really are exceptional circumstances that the local authority is unable to state—and I am bound to say that I cannot think what that might be, because if something is of a confidential nature then that would be the reason—then we should say what they would be. I cannot think that there are any that cannot be covered by the appropriate form of words.
Amendment 128H, which is in the name of my noble friend Lord Greaves and refers to “designated in the petition”, once again reminds me of the happy hours we spent on the local democracy Bill and all that that legislation prescribed on petitions. I recall that my noble friend brought in some petitions to his council, which did not look like petitions to Parliament in any sense. We all know that they are not usually neat and tidy, with the petition organiser’s name at the top. Again, this is not a major point. My noble friend has suggested an alternative wording which I think would meet it very well. However, the term “designated in the petition” does not meet it. Most of the petitions to my council that I have seen—and I suspect that the Minister has had similar experience—do not designate anyone in the petition itself. It just does not work that way. Therefore, a rather simpler, looser way would serve the point much better and save people getting into an unnecessary tangle.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the coalition has considered the whole issue of standards boards and standards committees. We must recognise that there are different arguments in this case between the Benches opposite and ourselves. Amendment 96A seeks to remove the amendments that the Government are proposing to the Local Government Act 2000, which are needed to remove the requirement for local authorities in England to have standards committees. Of course, this applies only to England.
Rejecting the coalition’s changes to the standards board regime will remove local choice and retain a key aspect of a costly conduct regime which, as my noble friend Lord Shipley has said, has led to vexatious and politically motivated complaints against councillors. However, my noble friend would admit that if we are going to instil a full sense of responsibility in local government, we need to vest in those local authorities the responsibility for the standards of their members. Local authorities may well wish to adopt a voluntary code of conduct for members and co-opted members and determine for themselves what should be in that code; or they may choose to ensure high standards in another way, for example, through a statement of clear principles against which members can be judged by the electorate. The key element is that the choice about how to promote good conduct should be for local authorities to make, rather than for Government to impose on them the requirement for a code of a conduct or standards committees if they do not wish to go down that route.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will disagree with this because he disagrees with the purpose of this amendment but I have to state the position of the coalition, which is quite clear, that this is a matter for local authorities themselves.
My Lords, I hesitate to intervene at this stage. This is almost the first time in a very long local government career that I actually think that central government should be imposing something. I share the views that have been expressed that it must be a statutory requirement that each local authority must—not may—have a code of conduct. There is a separate issue concerning how that code of conduct is drawn up but I think that it would be nonsense for each local authority to have a different one. There should be a uniform code. I believe that the Association of Council Secretaries and Solicitors—we used to call them legal officers—is drawing up a code of conduct that could be adopted. That is good and right, and I do not suggest for a moment that central government should draw up the code and impose it; I am saying, and I believe quite strongly, that Parliament—central government, if you like—should say that a code of conduct is mandatory, not voluntary. Good local authorities—the vast majority—will adopt a code of conduct, but the ones that most need, and should have, a code are probably those least likely to have one. That is why it should be a mandatory requirement.
The code does not have to be drawn up by central government; it could be drawn up by the association that I mentioned or by the Local Government Association. However, I believe that it needs to be a uniform code so that we do not have different standards wherever they happen to suit particular local interests, usually because it is those local interests that are most in question.
My other question relates to the standards committee. Again, I feel that in the general, although not universal, rejoicing at the departure of the Standards Board for England we are in danger of throwing out a baby with the bath water. We are in danger of moving to a situation that is worse than the one we had before the Standards Board was put in place. Therefore, I believe that it should be mandatory for each local authority to have a standards committee. I say that as one who will constantly argue against prescription, but this is one area where it is particularly important. My noble friend Lord Shipley has proposed a way in which standards committees might be constituted. There are lots of discussions to be had around that, and they could well be had within local government and not necessarily involve central government. However, again, the mandatory requirement to have a standards committee is fundamental.
Those are two issues where, unusually for me, I argue that there should be at least a minimum requirement of a mandatory code of conduct and a standards committee, the composition and nature of which could be subject to further consultation and discussion. Those two requirements should be in the Bill.
My Lords, I can perhaps offer a slightly more friendly response to my noble friend Lord Tope’s more recent speech than I did to his previous suggestions. The proposal in Amendment 96B and the consequential Amendment 98G—that the new standards function set out in Chapter 5 of Part 1 of the Bill should be a joint duty of the Mayor of London and the London Assembly, as it now is—is one that we are open to considering and seems to have common sense behind it. I can see the benefit of ensuring that the mayor and the Assembly are given equal roles and responsibility for promoting and maintaining high standards.
On Amendments 98A, 98B, 98C and 98D, we see that there is a specific issue here for the GLA in terms of the delegation of decision-making by the Assembly to employees of the authority and we are happy to consider it further. I am not convinced that the same issues apply to other local authorities that have the benefit of Section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972, so perhaps it is not necessary for the amendments to be drafted in quite such wide terms. I am therefore happy to undertake to further consider all these amendments with my fellow Ministers and we can return to our discussion on Report.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for what I hope was a favourable reply. I am certain that the GLA and my noble friend Lady Doocey, who is still a member of the London Assembly, will wish to join me in saying that we seek a common-sense and rational solution to a particular issue that applies to one particular authority, the Greater London Authority. On that constructive note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I am sorry to have to say that as a loyal member of the coalition, but it is my view.
Amendment 98J would simply leave out “and other”. The other amendment in my name in this grouping is identical. My purpose is not so much to press the amendment as to find out what the Government have in mind with “and other”. What does it refer to?
My Lords, we do not see the case for these amendments, which would limit the registering and declaring of interests to financial interests. That would take us back to the days before the Widdicombe committee in 1988, when there was widespread concern about the treatment of non-pecuniary interests, which led to the strengthening of the requirements relating to pecuniary interests. There are clearly situations where non-financial interests are relevant to decision-making by councillors, and it is right that the public are aware of such interests so that they can see that decisions are being made fairly and transparently. I hope that my noble friend will see the merit of the argument and withdraw his amendment.
I thank noble Lords. I am sort of having a second bite of the cherry within the group, because I can talk specifically about the proposals of my noble friend. I hope that I can really reassure him. He talked about appeal structures and the like and the need to maintain them—and of course human rights legislation provides for this. But in actual fact the sanctions that the Secretary of State intends to provide for in regulations under Clause 18(2) will be relatively low-level sanctions based on powers of discipline that councils already possess. It is not our intention to confer any new disciplinary powers of the sort that would give rise to a need or expectation for a bureaucratic appeal process.
I cannot support Amendment 98M, which would insert a new clause relating to parish standards, although I understand the interest in it. The legislation as currently drafted gives parishes the power to have a code or a standards committee if they would like. Parish councils are free to make arrangements to work jointly with other authorities. My noble friend is mistaken if he believes that advice is not available to parish councils. The last Government published the Quality Parish and Town Council Scheme; it was published by the department in 2003, and it gives information about model charters whereby principal and local councils in England can work in partnership. That document can be viewed on the DCLG website. We intend here also that the regulations to be issued by the Secretary of State under Clause 18(1) will specify that the registration of parish members' interests will be carried out by the monitoring officer of the district within which the relevant parish falls.
There was some talk about the criminal sanctions for failing to register, and I note noble Lords’ concerns on that. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked, too, that he might be a party to discussions that we might have before Report on those issues. I assure noble Lords that we would be happy to discuss that aspect of Clause 19 relating to breaching regulations under Clause 18. With that, I ask my noble friend Lord Tope to withdraw the amendment.