Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, first, I draw attention to paragraph 41 of the memorandum concerning the delegated powers, which says:

“We do not anticipate using the power to create, extend or increase the penalty for, a criminal offence very often, however it may be needed, in very limited circumstances, in order to implement effective enforcement provisions for some potential future PIL agreements.”


I stress: some potential future PIL agreements.

I want to speak mainly to Amendment 19, although I support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said in relation to Amendments 20 and 21 and his criticisms of the super-affirmative procedure. The Committee may recall that in its first sitting, I made comments about the necessity for democratic legitimacy and scrutiny when it comes to the making of legislation in this form. I do not consider that the form of approach of an affirmative resolution on its own is enough. I certainly do not think that the super-affirmative procedure adds very much to that. As for scrutiny, the noble and learned Lord has already referred to the fact that the Lord Chancellor’s committee was not given an opportunity to consider the Bill.

Criminal offences are set against the background that everybody is presumed to know what the law is. To put it another way, familiarly, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Any criminal offence created requires clarity, certainty and proportionality. I illustrate this by referring to what is very much in the public eye at the moment, the Health Protection (Coronavirus Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020. No draft was laid or approved by Parliament by reason of urgency, and one understands entirely that reason, but the instrument has been amended twice since it was passed in March and the latest version came into force on Monday. It had 12 regulations and two schedules in its original form and Regulation 6(1) provides that everyone must stay overnight at

“the place where they are living”.

There are certain exceptions, including, at Regulation 6(2)(d),

“to provide care or assistance, including relevant personal care within the meaning of paragraph 7(3B) of Schedule 4 to the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, to a vulnerable person”.

At that point I gave up further research, but I do not think that particular exception can possibly refer to ordinary childcare. Yet there has been controversy. The Prime Minister and four of the Cabinet have taken one view or interpretation of these regulations and almost everybody else has taken a completely different view on whether what happened was legal or not. An unlimited fine is payable on summary conviction, which can be avoided by complying with a fixed penalty notice. Noble Lords will appreciate that that is typical of the sort of offence that can be created by secondary legislation that nobody understands—I say “nobody understands”; many people understand the drift of it, but the particular detail can be the subject of controversy.

Coming back to the Bill, it is obviously undesirable that there should be a lack of clarity in drafting criminal offences when it is possible for those criminal offences to result in a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. An unlimited fine is quite a burden, but imprisonment through regulations that refer to other Acts of Parliament—subsection this and sub-subsection that—is entirely undesirable and never gets, whether by the ordinary affirmative procedure or the super-affirmative procedure, adequate scrutiny and understanding by the authorities that have to put it into effect and, most relevantly, by the people who are affected by it and who have to obey the law.

Public international law covers, as we discussed, a wide variety of issues. It is not at all satisfactory for the wide power that I referred to—for some potential future PIL agreements to create criminal offences—to be put in the hands of Ministers. For that reason, this is an aspect of the Bill, never mind the whole of Schedule 2, that I find offensive.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, the Act referred to in the Bill is dated 1982, which shows that we are concerned with the time when I was Lord Advocate and before devolution. I remember it lucidly. It fell to the Lord Advocate to deal, inter alia, with the Scottish position and what the detail involved. I strongly oppose the group of amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. My understanding of the principle that rules in this area is that when the United Kingdom undertakes an international obligation, that does not become part of the law of the United Kingdom until it becomes part of the domestic law of the United Kingdom and, since devolution, that may apply differently in devolved jurisdictions. A suggestion has been made that the principle goes further and requires that the result can be achieved only by primary legislation doing so directly, without the intervention of subordinate legislation. I do not agree with that. I can see no logical requirement to restrict the power of Parliament in that way.

My noble and learned friend the Minister has already given examples. Since we joined the EU, this has been achieved by a statutory instrument naming the treaty involved, without any further detail. The year 1982 yields another striking example. Section 60 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 confers power by Order in Council to make provision for carrying out the Chicago convention. If the principle were as claimed, surely the Act could not confer this power. I regard the provisions of the Bill as entirely adequate. Once we undertake an international obligation, it seems right to implement it in our law as soon as possible. The ordinary affirmative procedure seems entirely adequate, particularly since the other place now has power in relation to international obligations.

The noble Lord preceding me, an expert in many of these matters, particularly in the criminal law, requires that the criminal law should not be specified except very clearly and very occasionally in statutory instruments. In my respectful submission to your Lordships, this is a space in which the international agreement must have in it the criminal offence in question, because it is only a reflection of what is in the international obligation that will become part of the law under Clause 2. This seems to me to adequately secure the definition of the offence in question. I will add only that I would like to see the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee consulted as much as possible: it is a very well informed, very good source of solid advice. I also add that if the Government’s ambitions are fulfilled for many international agreements in the future, it would be a great pity to saddle the procedure to implement them into our law with unnecessary delays.

Privileges and Conduct

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Thursday 15th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, will the noble and learned Lord explain which rules permitted the commissioner to make submissions on the appeal, refuting the grounds of appeal, at the end of which she suggested that the appeal should be dismissed?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

She was the investigator and complaints were made about the nature of the investigation. She submitted to the Committee for Privileges a document containing that information. That was submitted to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for his consideration—the committee was not going to take one side or the other. He then submitted a supplementary comment on that also. The last person we heard speak on this was the noble Lord, Lord Lester. The commissioner was not asked to speak after that. We were firmly of the opinion that the commissioner’s report had to be taken on the basis of what she said, and the committee had the duty of deciding, on the balance of probabilities, whether that was a reasonable decision in the circumstances or to reject it. We also had the knowledge that, if we rejected the commissioner’s report, we were in fact saying that the complainant’s account of the matter was a complete lie. The evidence she submitted on paper was detailed and circumstantial, and the commissioner went over it with her.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I said it was obliged to obey the rules laid down by this House for the conduct of these proceedings. It was 11 years ago, but the rules have been subject to review by the sub-committee ever since. They are still the rules, and they were the rules when the lady came along. We must give that fact a fair hearing on the side of the lady. She came to this place complaining on the basis of the procedure laid down in our rules, and these rules were completely obeyed. No one has submitted that the commissioner did not know what she was doing or had not obeyed the rules: she obeyed the rules as she had them. The idea that she could have employed someone to cross-examine the complainant does not have any support in the rules whatever. She had no authority under the rules to ask someone to cross-examine the complainant.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps I may ask the noble and learned Lord if there is anything in the rules about her becoming respondent to the appeal. There is nothing in the rules.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

We accepted what she has put in. It was just an elaboration of what she had said already. As I say, we gave the noble Lord, Lord Lester, a full opportunity to comment on what she had said, and he did so. That was the last part of the proceedings.

In my view, we were as fair as we could possibly be. I take this responsibility very heavily and no one in the Privileges Committee considered this matter lightly. We considered that the matter had been given a fair hearing according to the rules—to both sides—and the commissioner decided the matter.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The first thing I did was to instruct a solicitor to go and see him.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

One possible approach would be to consider what is meant by legal professional privilege. It is a privilege of the account that the client gives to the solicitor of the facts on which the client wishes to be advised, and the advice that the solicitor gives in return to that application. A statement of where, for example, the client is at that particular time is not part of either of those. Therefore, that is not, strictly speaking, covered by legal professional privilege at all. This is a way of looking at this matter that is slightly differently from trying to make conditions on legal professional privilege.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Before he finishes, may I ask the noble Lord about claims against the Armed Forces? For example, Iraqi claims have been brought forward that rely, to some extent, on the Human Rights Act. What is the impact of his amendment on that?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

This applies only to the injury or death of those serving in the military on behalf of the British Crown. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, pointed out to me just before we came in, operations nowadays may not be on behalf of only the British Crown. They may be carried out, for example, in combination with the Americans, the French or some other nation. That is a further complication which did not arise in the case of Smith. The same principles could possibly apply in that situation. However, it does not deal at all with actions against, for example, Iraqis or any other people among whom our Armed Forces might be serving. The jurisdiction applies, in this particular case, to the injury or death of those serving. There would be implications of other kinds, not dealt with in Smith, so far as people who are not members of the Armed Forces are affected by actions of the Armed Forces.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I may be the only person present in the Chamber who was here when Lord Sewel issued these words. Maybe the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Drumadoon, and the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, were there at the same time. As I recall, we were debating these matters late into the night, and at 1 am or 2 am, when we came to Scottish and Welsh matters, there was a blockage. The words that Lord Sewel spoke were a very welcome resolution of a particular problem that had arisen. I recall afterwards that when it was referred to as the Sewel convention we used to rib Lord Sewel that he had unwittingly added his name to something that seemed to have become a great constitutional principle.

I intervene in this debate to refer to the problems in Wales as illustrative of the problems that your Lordships face. We have had three trips to the Supreme Court between the Welsh Assembly and the Wales Office in a very short period of time because we have not had the ability to pass primary legislation until quite recently. Legislative competence is always at our fingertips in Wales. We talk about it all the time. Indeed, the Welsh Labour Government talk about it all the time in holding up the consideration of the current draft Wales Bill. This issue seems to require either a mechanism that resolves the problems or something that is absolutely solid and certain in this particular piece of legislation.

Those who served as my colleagues during the coalition Government in the Wales Office tell me that legislative competence was a weekly discussion and deals were done between the Wales Office and Cardiff in order to solve where the parameters were. Of course we do not have reserve powers devolution in Wales; it is rather different from Scotland. We have been rather envious that Scotland has not so far had to go to the Supreme Court to sort things out in this way. It seems to me, in following my noble friends, that the way it is expressed in the Bill is such that Scottish lawyers will become very wealthy in their trips to the Supreme Court to sort things out. At the moment I am trying to work on a mechanism in Wales that will resolve these difficulties if that cannot be done between Governments in a simple way, not the way that has been arrived at so far. So, go carefully: canny down the brae, as they say, when it comes to consideration of this particular part.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, some time ago I indicated to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, that I support his approach to this clause. It is vitally important to consider the question of whether it is intended that the clause, whatever its terms, should be subject to decision by a court of law. The situation so far as Wales is concerned—and I think it would be true for the Scottish Parliament—is that in some cases its powers are subject to judicial scrutiny. The Parliament of the United Kingdom is not of that kind. It has never had its principal functions subject to judicial scrutiny. If a term is put into this Bill, which will then become an Act, that determines when the United Kingdom Parliament can act, that will be a complete innovation. It does not matter what the terms are, however precise and well drafted, I cannot see how that could be excluded unless provision is made in the Bill which states that the decision on this point is to be a matter for the United Kingdom Parliament. This I regard as an extremely serious point which the Government have to decide.

It is not a question of agreeing with the Scottish nationalists. The amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seems to be in accordance with what they would like to see; that is, the furthest stretch of the convention, which is called the Sewel convention for various reasons, amounting to what is really a complete ban. That is what I think the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, does, but that does not cut out by itself the idea that a court of law could determine whether the United Kingdom Parliament had acted lawfully in making an Act which could affect Scotland. That is why I strongly support Amendment 12 tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey. That concept must be put into this clause at some point in order that the matter be not justiciable.

Tax Credits (Income Thresholds and Determination of Rates) (Amendment) Regulations 2015

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Monday 26th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I am sorry, the right reverend Prelate. That was a bit of a promotion because we are in the presence of the two Primates. The Motions mark a refusal to accept a decision of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege as the final authority for it. That is what they amount to. It has to be noted, as I have said, that this is the privilege of the elected Chamber, not of the Government.

The amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate—I shall try to get it right this time—is entirely in accordance with the arrangements of this House and with the financial privileges of the House of Commons. Therefore from the point of view of the powers of this House, it is by far the safest of the Motions that have been put forward. In light of what the Leader of the House said in opening, I believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is very open to considering the detail—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord not agree that the conventions to which he has referred, going back to the 17th century, were so uncertain that in 1908 the Conservative Party defeated Lloyd George’s People’s Budget in which he sought to give money to the poor people of this country? Does he also not agree that the 1911 Act set out a mechanism whereby the Speaker would certify that a money Bill was a money Bill, and that would remove from us our powers of consideration? Is he not going back to an argument that failed more than 100 years ago?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Not at all. I am stating the present practice, according to Erskine May, in relation to matters of financial privilege. As I said, it is not a matter of the conventions of this House, but of the rights of the other place in this matter. My clear submission to your Lordships is that these amendments challenge the final authority of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege. It is true that the Liberal Democrats—I suppose they were the Liberal Party then, but the succession is probably allowable—found it necessary to take further action to ensure that the practice that had been built up in the 17th century applied in the 20th century and beyond. They put mechanisms in place to prevent financial privileges being in any way transgressed again.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Tuesday 26th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Absolutely, that is the procedure with excluded material. Of course, excluding the material can sometimes be extremely damaging to the interests of the other party to the litigation. The noble Baroness referred to Matrix Churchill. That was exactly the sort of case that Matrix Churchill would have been if the judge had excluded it because the material that was sought to be excluded as sensitive material was, on further examination, of great use to the claimant, as we all know. The idea that a public interest immunity certificate is so superior to this procedure strikes me as being without great foundation.

I assume that the only material in question is material that has been subject to all the processes that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has suggested for removing its sensitivity, because if you can do that the party is not required to produce sensitive material because it has been neutralised and the difficulty has been removed. Therefore, when you have that in mind, it is very hard to see how you can find out whether there is any other way in which the case can be dealt with. One of the problems about that is that at the beginning of a case things may look different from how they look as the case proceeds.

One of the great benefits of the amendments that the other place has put in here is that this matter can be reviewed at any stage of the procedure. Therefore, it seems to me that this system, in a very small minority of cases, will be the best way of securing the fair and effective administration of justice in that case. It is not a question of excluding material, which is an appropriate test for the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald; it is nothing to do with that. It is to see that the material that is being used is used in a way that does not damage the security of this nation. The Government have as one of their primary responsibilities securing the national security, as evidenced by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said about control orders, which control people’s liberties, in which this sort of procedure was introduced. I believe that this procedure is the best way in which to secure national security.

I endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said in his letter. Our judges are as familiar with the desirability of open justice as any Peer who has spoken. They know the value of open justice; they were brought up to it. There is no question of a judge going for a closed material procedure if he thought it could be done in open court. I believe that giving this discretion to the judiciary in very limited circumstances with two very important conditions is the right way to deal with it. It is not the Executive who are deciding, but the judge. Judges have taken an oath to,

“do right to all manner of people … without fear or favour, affection or ill will”.

That oath will apply in the decision that the judge has to make, and it seems to me that the best possible test has been evolved by the House of Commons in its consideration of our Bill, and the test is the fair and effective administration of justice in that case.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, much of what I intended to say has already been said, but I shall give an illustration from the classic case of Duncan v Cammell Laird, which involved the sinking of a submarine in Liverpool Bay while undergoing trials on its maiden voyage in 1939. Ninety-nine men were lost. Their widows, mostly from Merseyside, sued the shipbuilders. The Admiralty, in the middle of the Second World War, declined to allow the production of the designs of the submarine on grounds of national security. Contemporary evidence, which has been seen since, suggests that its true motive was to restrict the power of citizens to sue government departments, particularly when they were financed by trade unions. In fact, the claimants lost.

Today, other means, which have been referred to in the course of this debate, might have been used to assist those claimants in the projection of their cases, but suppose this legalisation had been in force and that the Government had applied for a secret hearing. Can your Lordships imagine the uproar in Liverpool if the Admiralty had been able to produce not merely the designs but its expert evidence and argument, and to explain those designs to the judge in secret, without challenge and without anything being heard on the other side? Patently, it would have been a miscarriage of justice.

Open justice, very simply, means first that a claimant should know the case made against him. That principle derives from what was said more than two and a half millennia ago by Aeschylus in the “Oresteia”.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

How does my noble friend know what the judge would have decided, assuming that he had had a chance to look at the designs?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am not saying what decision he would have made—how could I possibly know? I am saying that the public would have been outraged at the idea that the Admiralty could go to see the judge up the back stairs, in a secret court, and produce the designs and the arguments to support their case.